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THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL: FOUNDERS, MOTIVES, CHARACTERISTICS

The term “Lublin Philosophical School” describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by a group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity (achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism. In a broad sense, the Lublin Philosophical School is the philosophical milieu of the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland (CUL).

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The Name of the School and Its Founders

The didactic and scientific works initiated at the beginning of the 1950s in the Department of Christian Philosophy at CUL by Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, and Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, were described by Kalinowski (who since 1957 has lived in France) on the occasion of a discussion of CUL's philosophical legacy in the periodical *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, as the "école philosophique lublinoise."¹

In this way, the name "Lublin Philosophical School" began to function as a description of the program for teaching and the style for cultivating philosophy started in the latter half of the 1950s in CUL. In this program, philosophy was presented as an autonomous discipline possessing its own object, method, and purpose. The way philosophy was cultivated and understood would determine whether a philosopher's affiliation to the Lublin Philosophical School was actual or merely nominal.

Besides this name, others appeared interchangeable with it: "Lublin School of Classical Philosophy," "Lublin School of Christian Philosophy," "Lublin School," "Polish School of Classical Philosophy."

The Lublin Philosophical School (hereafter: the School) arose in the institutional framework of CUL's Department of Christian Philosophy (in 1991, in accordance with the requirement of the Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia Christiana*, called the Department of Philosophy), which was established by a decree of the Academic Senate of CUL on June 17, 1946, and began its official activity on November 10, 1946. The first years of the department's operation were concentrated on its organization.

Among the School's founders we should mention Swieżawski, Kalinowski, and Krąpiec. The main weight of the development of the School's philosophical program is connected with the works of Krąpiec, and he also left a basic distinctive mark on the School's philosophical character.

The Causes of the Rise of the School

Among the chief reasons for the rise of the School, we should mention the following: (1) the introduction of Marxism by administrative

¹ "W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego. Z dyskusji o dorobku Wydziału Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej z okazji 60-lecia Uczelni [In the circle of the philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin. From a discussion on the legacy of the Department of Christian Philosophy on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the school]," *Życie i Myśl* 28:11 (1978): 30.

means in all state universities, higher schools, and postgraduate studies—this ideologization of the teaching of philosophy threatened to shatter the foundations of humanistic culture by breaking the truth about man and the world, by enslaving free philosophical thought by ideology; (2) the need to develop an updated conception of classical realistic philosophy (which was deformed by Suarezian neoscholasticism and the essentialism of Christian Wolff and Joseph Kleutgen), the proposal of an alternative conception of maximalistic philosophy, and the response to other propositions appearing at the time, such as the Roman Ingarden's Kraków Phenomenological School and the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logical Analysis.

The Pressure of Marxist Philosophy

At the beginning of the 1950s, the Communist authorities in Poland intensified their action in teaching Marxist philosophy at all levels of schools—higher and secondary ones—with the intention of bringing a materialistic ideology in place of the Christian world-view. Adam Schaff gave expression to this “education policy” in 1950:

the condition for the complete ideological victory of the Marxist-Leninist world-view in Poland is, among other things, to overcome the ideological influences of philosophical currents that are alien to our class. It is a question here primarily of Thomistic philosophy, that is, the philosophy with a clear fideistic profile that is officially the philosophy of Catholic schools. Neopositivistic philosophy possesses important influence. Finally, a certain variety of E. Husserl's philosophy has some influence. Struggle with these alien ideological influences in philosophy is not easy. It is so simply because of the fact that Marxist scientific cadres are only now growing, and the adherents of Marxist philosophy are only beginning to occupy university chairs. Marxist theory, however, has influence by various roads. The wide network of Communist party schooling and mass action for spreading Marxist ideology are powerful weapons in the struggle with alien ideological currents. The greatest influence is exerted by the written word. Translations of the classic works of Marxism and of scientific Marxist literature are being published in fantastic numbers in comparison with prewar Poland. It is enough to say that more than 200,000 copies of Marx's and Engel's *Dziela wybrane* [Collected works] have been printed, 275,000 copies of Lenin's *Materializm i empiriokrytycyzm* [Materialism and empiriocriticism], over 300,000 copies of Stalin's *O materializmie dialektycznym i his-*

torycznym [*On dialectic and historical materialism*], and 1,300,000 copies of *Krótki kurs historii WKP(b)* [*Brief course on the history of the All-Union Communist Party*]. The struggle against bourgeois ideology in People's Poland is one of the aspects of the struggle taking place in this country and throughout the whole world of the camp of democracy and socialism against the camp of the imperialism that threatens humanity with the unleashing of a new world war. In light of the recent great historical victories of socialism, in light of the uninterrupted progress in socialist construction in the USSR and in lands of people's democracy, the perspectives of this struggle are outlined with complete clarity—there can be only one result: socialism's victory throughout the whole world. This will be the ultimate triumph of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism.²

The ideological and anti-national action organized by the government of the time inclined those who were lecturing on philosophy at CUL (Swieżawski, Kalinowski, Krąpiec) to defend “the philosophical reason” and sovereignty of Polish culture by planned scientific and didactic work in philosophy. The need to show the full truth about man in philosophy turned out also to be an important point. For the proper organization of social, political, religious, and cultural life depends upon this truth.

Appealing to objectively existing reality and the cognition and explanation of this reality was to be the antidote to the ideologized, Marxist philosophy administratively imposed on Polish scientific centers, and also to the limitations connected with the scientific positivism and anti-metaphysical attitude dominant in recent philosophy.

Among the professors of philosophy at CUL was born the postulate to rebuild realistic classical philosophy which would strive to have ultimate cognition of reality in its essential, necessary, and universal (transcendental) structures. It was to guarantee the apprehension of these aspects of reality which the natural-mathematical sciences could not reach on account of their methods.

A group of people prepared by an in-depth reading of classical ancient and medieval texts, sensitive to the things that threatened the full truth about the world and about man, saw that the abandonment

² Adam Schaff, *Narodziny i rozwój filozofii marksistowskiej* [*Birth and development of Marxist philosophy*] (Warszawa 1950), 403.

of classical philosophy would cause an enormous injury to man and culture. Hence their appeal to classical philosophy.

It was not a question of a return to the past, proper to historians, but of resolving contemporary problems by the continuation of a methodologically defined type of philosophy and by taking advantage of the experience of the best thinkers of the past and present in order to understand and explain reality as properly and as profoundly as possible.³

Beginning in the 1950s, CUL was the only school in Poland cultivating independent philosophical thought and providing a university education free of Marxist ideology. This became particularly evident when as a consequence of pressures from the Communist party on the authorities of the institutions of higher education and from the younger generation of the propagators of Marxist ideology who were attempting to prepare positions for themselves in university chairs, the most eminent professors of philosophy were removed from the state universities, including Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Roman Ingarden, Tadeusz Czeżowski, and Izydora Dąmbska. We should note here the provocative action against Tatarkiewicz performed by students who attended his seminar at the University of Warsaw and who were members of the Communist party [Polish United Workers' Party]—Bronisław Baczko, Henryk Jarosz, Arnold Słucki, Henryk Holland, and Leszek Kołakowski. This action was one element in a program aimed at taking the chairs over from professors who did not want to give way to Communist ideology.⁴

These professors found opportunities to give talks and guest lectures at CUL, and they could also continue to direct dissertations of their doctoral students (e.g., Maria Gołaszewska completed her doctorate with Ingarden at CUL).

At that time there were no textbooks or philosophical monographs serving the cognition and explanation of the world in a rationally justified and verifiable way. The works available bore the mark of Wolffian essentialism, making philosophy an object of sterile inquiries divorced from re-

³ Zofia J. Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku—Polska Szkoła Filozofii Klasycznej [On fidelity to reality and the full truth about man—the Polish School of Classical Philosophy]," *Summarium* 8 (1980): 110.

⁴ Bronisław Dembowski, *Spór o metafizykę i inne studia z historii filozofii polskiej [Controversy over metaphysics and others studies in the history of Polish philosophy]* (Wrocław 1997), 307.

ality, or the mark of an apparent rationalism that tried to build philosophical systems after the model of deductive systems. Meanwhile, the seeming realism of materialistic philosophy (which was basically one of the forms of idealism, since it was based on an abstract idea of matter that was accepted *a priori*) had to be opposed with a common-sense and rationally justified vision of reality as really existing. It was a challenging task for the people who created the program of the School to develop and present the basic domains of philosophy in textbook form in the middle of a sea of Marxist literature.

The Polish School of Realistic Philosophy

The beginning of the School was also a response to the positivism (neopositivism) that was dominant in the latter half of the twentieth century in European philosophy, which was propagating a program of minimalistic and non-autonomous philosophy, and it was also a response to the currents of the philosophy of consciousness and the philosophy of language.

Attempts to combine realistic philosophy with phenomenology, esp. that of Ingarden, which declared itself to be realism, did not guarantee cognitive success on account of the different objects of inquiry (intentional beings existing in the cognizing subject instead of real things). Attempts to combine realistic philosophy with analytic philosophy also appeared problematic on account of their different object of inquiry, the methods they used, and their cognitive purposes. The same may be said about attempts to make realistic philosophy “scientific” by the formalization of its language, as those made by Jan Salamucha, Jan F. Drewnowski, and Józef M. Bocheński.

Proposals for the cultivation of philosophy from Ingarden’s Kraków Phenomenological School or the Lvov-Warsaw School of Logical Analysis (an analytic school) presented in opposition to the pressure of Marxism were characterized by a cognitive minimalism that was already in its starting point closed to existentially important human problems. For this reason they could not be a counterweight to Marxism. Furthermore, they were permeated by the positivistic mentality as manifested in reducing the description and explanation of the world to a narrowly understood scientific explanation based on a mathematical-natural model. They were philosophies that make the data of consciousness or language into the object of inquiry, leaving out of the area of inquiry what is most important, namely human being and the world that surrounds us.

The program of the School was directed to working out a new version of classical realistic philosophy that could be something capable of resisting Marxism, which proclaimed itself to be realism. In this program,

two postulates specific to the philosophy cultivated in the Lublin School have their source: (1) an in-depth consideration of historical experience by a return to the sources, to the original thought of important philosophers, in particular Thomas Aquinas, to avoid the deformations made by his commentators and later representatives; (2) methodological reflection which accompanied considerations on meritorious questions and took into account the generally accepted achievements of the logical theory of science.⁵

The School tried to bring its inquiries to bear on all the propositions advanced by contemporary philosophical currents. While understanding that human thought was subject to historical development, that man is a historical being, the School tried to pay close attention to the entire history of philosophy, esp. the periods in which new currents of philosophical thought appeared. At the same time, aware of the great number of philosophical currents and different ways of cultivating philosophy, the School emphasized methodological matters in philosophy. What turned out was a fact that philosophy, despite being one of the oldest domains of knowledge, still did not have a satisfactorily developed methodology of its own.⁶

The philosophy cultivated in the School, the central discipline of which was metaphysics, was accompanied by a broadly conceived methodological reflection in general metaphysics and the various particular metaphysics, and in the history of philosophy. Krąpiec's and Stanisław Kamiński's work *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the theory and methodology of metaphysics*], and Swieżawski's work *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [*The question of the history of philosophy*]⁷ set the direction for inquiry and created the framework for the program of the School that was taking shape. The Chair of Metaphysics (General and Particular), the History of Philosophy, and Methodology of the Sciences took part in the works of the School.

⁵ Zdybicka, "O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku," 110.

⁶ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej [On the Lublin philosophical school]," in his, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet* [*Man, culture, university*] (Lublin 1998), 249.

⁷ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the theory and methodology of metaphysics*] (Lublin 1962); Stefan Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii* [*The question of the history of philosophy*] (Warszawa 1966).

The history of philosophy as cultivated at CUL by Swieżawski, which looked to the thought of Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, “is the history of metaphysics. Thereby it alone functions also as a particular experience of metaphysics cultivated systematically in the chair dedicated to this discipline.”⁸ Logic and methodology were conceived as instruments to facilitate philosophical (metaphysical) cognition, and secondarily as autonomous disciplines (also in view of didactic needs).

In the methodological inquiries made by Kamiński in close collaboration with Krąpiec, the emphasis was on the development of research methods for philosophy, esp. for realistic (classical) metaphysics. They attempted to systematize the methods of rational and scientific cognition in general. The purpose was to show the context of scientific cognition, into which area not only the mathematical and natural sciences enter (a restriction forced by scientism), but also such sciences as philosophy, humanities, and theology.

In the School’s philosophical program, philosophy was put on the foundation of experience broadly conceived, including not only sensory and intellectual perception, but also the intellectual intuition (intellectualism) of the theoretical, that is, the inclination to know truth (*propter ipsum scire*). Moreover, the School indicated the consequences and practical ends that follow from truth which is not constructed, and justified and explained their appraisals and norms by referring to the ultimate essences of things.⁹

Because there were no monographic works on the basic divisions of philosophy, Krąpiec as he lectured on metaphysics faced the challenge of filling this gap. He began a systematic development of the main domains of realistic philosophy, the beginnings of which appeared in Aristotle, but which were given depth by Thomas Aquinas, and in the twentieth century in some domains were presented by Gilson. Gilson’s works were to be made available to Polish professors and students as quickly as possible. It was decided that philosophical teaching should look for support in the newly developed metaphysics, since it determines methodical teaching also in the other branches of philosophy that grow from the metaphysical trunk. Besides the metaphysical foundation of cognition, it also was to consider the in-depth historical-methodological reflection provided by the history of philosophy, the theory of knowledge, logic, and methodology.

⁸ Swieżawski, *Zagadnienie historii filozofii*, 250.

⁹ Zdybicka, “O wierność rzeczywistości i pełną prawdę o człowieku,” 111.

From metaphysics as the basic philosophical discipline new domains of philosophical inquiry began to emerge and find autonomy: the theory of knowledge, philosophy of religion, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of law, philosophy of culture, philosophy of art, the theory and methodology of metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, and particular ethics (e.g., ethics of work, ethics of scientific research).

The School was to be this

particular place where the links with the entire rich tradition were not broken, where there was no bowing to the pressure of cognitive minimalism, scientism, and also the pressure of the philosophy of the subject, which broke away from objectivism, not to speak of the pressure of ideology, which was especially strong in our country. Withstanding the latter pressure required intellectual and moral strength. The philosophers of this current of philosophy were aware of all the pressures and perhaps for this reason, for the most part, more than anywhere else, they were able to effectively defend the theory of man from curtailed visions that reduced man to the role of an instrument.¹⁰

Specific Character of Philosophy in the School

The things that characterize the School are: (1) a return to classical philosophers, that is, to their texts as sources, in the conviction that these philosophers have the most to say in philosophy, and (2) a methodological reflection taking shape against the background of ways in which philosophy has been cultivated up to the present time, including the ways of defining philosophy, of philosophical explanation and argumentation, and of constructing a philosophical system (without violating therein the postulate that philosophical thought should be open)—all of which is for the purpose of being freed from the verbalism that grew in the classical tradition. It was not so much a matter of some concrete and unimpeachable legacy (although the School actually tries to work for such a legacy), as a matter of continuing a certain tradition, a style of philosophical thought, which the School calls “classical,” “existential,” or “the philosophy of being.”¹¹

From the beginning in the School’s program, realistic metaphysics was indicated as the central philosophical discipline that plays a fundamen-

¹⁰ Id., 115.

¹¹ “W kręgu filozofii Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego,” 24–25.

tal role in the cultivation of philosophy and in philosophical education. Also the several particular metaphysics were distinguished; they took in the particular domains of philosophical inquiries. These inquiries were to be completed by a study of the history of philosophy (ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary) and were to be given depth by a reflected methodological, logical, and epistemological awareness.

The starting point in constructing the School (the new school of realistic philosophy) was an accent upon the existential understanding of being as the object of philosophy. The existential conception of being was the aspect of the new version of philosophy that indicated the basic differences in the Aristotelian, scholastic, and neoscholastic versions of classical philosophy. Among the things that contributed to a rediscovery of the existential concept of being were a return to the texts of Thomas Aquinas, and a special sensitivity to the problem of existence (and what poses a threat to it) on the part of the School's founders, who carried in themselves the tragic experiences of the Second World War. They saw that it is the act of existence that constitutes the most important and most perfect factor of being, a factor that needs to be affirmed and becomes the first and fundamental object of philosophical explanation. This fact sets the purpose for cultivating philosophy, which is the cognition and explanation of the really existing world of persons and things. The purpose of philosophy will thus be to indicate the necessary and ultimate factors that explain the existence of the world, and the existence of man in particular. The indication of being understood existentially as the formal object of philosophy became the point that integrated the different sections of philosophy in the explanation of reality.

Regarding the methodological reflection that should accompany realistic philosophy, Kamiński stated:

In the years 1952 to 1957 when we were developing the Department's full structure, our attention was especially turned on methodologies of sciences, and in general on the level of the meta-theoretical reflection on studies . . . Since in Poland in the period between the wars and right after the Second World War the analytic-critical attitude was dominant, therefore among us there was a special harmonization of classical philosophy, which was maximalistic

with regard to content, with the analytic-critical style of approaching to the philosophical problems.¹²

Kamiński paid attention to the specific character of metaphysical cognition that was revealed especially in the analogical character of the language of metaphysics, in procedures of explanation, demonstration, and rational justification, which often occur simultaneously. He underlined that methodological tools cannot be brought across from the natural or mathematical-logical sciences to metaphysics, but autonomous tools should be developed. The result was the development (in cooperation with Krąpiec) of a methodology of metaphysics that was unique in Polish and world science¹³ and the accent on the specific character of metaphysical demonstration and analogical-transcendentalizing language. Krąpiec insisted on going into depth and working out the conception of judgment-based (existential) cognition, which was the main form of realistic cognition.

In the School's program, the autonomy of philosophy was carefully maintained, both in relation to particular sciences, theology, and the then popular philosophical currents of phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and existentialism. This did not mean a separation of the School's philosophy from these currents and sciences. In cultivating philosophy, the School indicated the necessity of knowing the results of the mathematical-natural sciences, the theological sciences, and contemporary philosophical trends as elements of erudition and inspiration. The School entered into discussions with actual philosophical trends in order to refine the explaining methods of realistic philosophy, and also to take up new aspects of inquiry inspired by currents of contemporary philosophy (e.g., phenomenology, existentialism, and the philosophy of language).

Anthropological and ethical questions were devoted much attention to in the School's program too. The School undertook works in this domain, when Karol Wojtyła, having recently received his habilitation degree, joined in the School's team. The questions of classical ethics were enriched by the works of Wojtyła who strove to join ethical questions more closely with anthropology and metaphysics. Although in his description of moral acts he drew on elements of the phenomenological method, in his habilitation work on M. Scheler's ethics he showed that the ethics of values could not be transferred or applied to Christian ethics.

¹² Id., 30.

¹³ It was presented in Krąpiec's and Kamiński's book titled *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki*.

The history of philosophy as developed by Swieżawski was basically strengthened by Marian Kurdziałek and was joined to metaphysical inquiries by a concentration of efforts on showing not so much the history of thoughts (ideas) as the history of problems and how they were resolved. For this reason Krapiec worked out a so-called net of problems that the historian of philosophy should consider when investigating the views of particular philosophers or philosophical currents. The School undertook monographic studies on the philosophy of the Middle ages, with particular reference to the contribution of Polish philosophical thought. Institutes for studies on this problem were established at CUL and Polish Academy of Sciences.

Particular questions

The main factors that determine how philosophy is cultivated in the School are as follows: (1) an understanding of being as that which exists, as the object of metaphysical cognition; (2) the acceptance of a radicalized conception of cognition in which acts of existential judgments constitute the most primary cognitive acts (prior to acts of conceptualization); (3) a return to natural and integrated language in philosophy (in which the syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects occur inseparably); (4) a method composed of the description of facts, historicism, diaporesis in explaining problems, the question $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\iota}$ [diá ti] and indication of the objective factor that renders the explained fact free of contradiction; (5) cognitive tools, including logic conceived as the theory for making cognition efficient (as distinct from making thinking efficient); (6) a theory of rational justification—indicating the ultimate and objectively verifiable reason for the investigated aspect of being.

A new understanding of being. The character of metaphysics depends completely upon the conception of being, which is its object. The first and basic question of metaphysics is the question concerning being, and the understanding and elaboration of the conception of being are its most important assignments. To understand what is new in this conception, we must resort to history. The conception of being conceived as that which exists was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas. He also delineated a method for arriving at being so conceived, described by the term “separation,” a path completely different from the “abstraction” of which—invoking Aristotle—later scholasticism spoke so much. Scholasticism, after all, had in large measure lost the legacy of Aquinas, simplifying and schematizing it, and it had grown distant from the living problems that grow on the soil of

realistic metaphysics which concentrates on the questions that follow from perceiving and analyzing individual and concrete existence.¹⁴

Realistic philosophy is directed to the cognition of really existing persons and things. This is the traditional and classical object of philosophical cognition, as opposed to various forms of subjectivism that reduce philosophy to an analysis of cognitive signs, concepts, language, or the data of consciousness.

The conception of metaphysical cognition. In realistic philosophy, cognition is based on common-sense cognition and is a development of it. Common-sense cognition connects us with the really existing world. Thus a theory of metaphysical cognition had to be developed so that, on the one hand, it would guarantee the reality and concreteness of the object of metaphysics, and on the other hand, it would guarantee its generality, based, however, not on abstraction, but on analogy. Only in this perspective could the School approach the task of reconstructing metaphysics as a whole, of working on many particular questions such as the theory of the analogy of being, the theory of transcendentals, the internal and external reasons of being (more precisely, the factors that render being free of contradiction), etc. The matter of cognition itself is also seen in a new light. Cognition is also a being, a being of a particular kind, and so cognition also lies within the scope of metaphysical inquiries. As it turns out, in this approach many epistemological questions lose their *raison d'être*. Some of them are simply pseudo-problems, while others recede into the background. The reconstruction of metaphysics entails the reconstruction of the theory of cognition, which is most closely connected with it, and which should basically be a particular instance or special domain of metaphysics.¹⁵

In working out the conception of realistic cognition, there was noted a fact that there are acts of direct cognition in which we are not aware of the opposition of subject and object. They are precisely the most original or pristine acts in which we experience existence itself. They find expression in the existential judgments to which metaphysics appeals. In a metaphysical judgment we have the directly given fact of the existence of something that we still have not cognized well. The very fact of existence “grabs us by the throat” so that at that moment we cannot speak of any doubt or cognitive distance. The doubling into subject and object is also excluded here;

¹⁴ Krapiec, “O filozoficznej szkole lubelskiej,” 251.

¹⁵ Id., 251–252.

this doubling can appear only in acts of reflection, while the existential judgment is the result of spontaneous pre-reflective cognition.¹⁶

The conception of language. The language that serves to communicate the results of cognition is an integrated language that is not one-sided and that does not overvalue any aspect of language (semantic, syntactic, pragmatic).

The language of the theory of being differs in its character from the language of other types of knowledge, and moreover, it is difficult to make a full semiotic determination of it. Although with respect to the analytical aspect it is close to the language of the formal sciences, at the same time it is marked by an integral and almost extreme realism. It concerns the qualitative aspect of reality, but at the same time it gives ontological and cognitive primacy to the general-existential aspect. In terms of its genesis it is derived from ordinary language and is chiefly based on it, but at the same time it uses terminology that has more specialized semiotic functions. Finally, it uses names with the widest scope, and at the same time it ascribes to these names content which is not at all empty. To reconcile these oppositions and to resolve the difficulties connected with them, what was developed was a doctrine adequate to the language of theory of being, that is, a doctrine of analogy, participation, transcendentals, and necessary truths.¹⁷

In the program of the School, what is underlined is that language is not an autonomous construct guided by autonomous laws and rules that are independent of the structure and nature of the world of things to which this language refers us, but it is in its subject-predicate structure grounded in the structure of things (in their composition of substance and accidents, essence and existence). The rules of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics also are grounded in the structure of things, the expression of which are Aristotle's categories, which show the objective grounding of predicates.

It is also underscored that it is part of the specific character of the language of metaphysics that it is a language of the first degree, that is, a language "to things," which means that it is directed to the perception of

¹⁶ Id., 253.

¹⁷ Stanisław Kamiński, "Osobliwość metodologiczna teorii bytu [Special methodological character of the theory of being]," in his *Jak filozofować? [How to philosophize?]* (Lublin 1989), 81.

things, and not to the definition of concepts. Furthermore, it is an analogical-transcendentalizing language so that it can transmit knowledge concerning all reality.

The autonomous method of metaphysical cognition. This method consists in the analysis of real facts in the light of the scientific question: “why” (διὰ τί [diá tí]), and in indicating such factors that render those facts free of contradiction, that is, the factors the negation of which entails the rejection of the facts that are being explained. Metaphysical separation, which allows us to differentiate the object of metaphysics and to cognize it in the framework of a so-called process of refinement, is such a method. The essence of metaphysical separation is reaching the factors of being (of an investigated event, fact, process, or construct) through which it exists. Thus it is not a method that parcels the object into parts that when known are, as it were, independent of the whole, but it is a method that allows us for cognitive purposes to differentiate definite essential factors of composition in order to better understand the whole of an existing being (of a phenomenon, event, or construct). Separation conceived analogically is also a method of the various particular metaphysics, and so of realistic philosophy as a whole.

The development of cognitive instruments. Logic is conceived as a set of instruments for cognition with understanding (differing from the instruments of effective thinking). Problems with the adaptation of contemporary logic to metaphysics arise primarily because this adaptation usually consists in the reduction of metaphysical cognition to logical-mathematical cognition.

The instruments contemporary logic uses are incapable of grasping and making efficient metaphysical cognition, which is concrete and transcendental cognition expressed in analogical language. This type of cognition cannot be reduced to (or replaced by) combinatorial or operational cognition.

The theory of rational justifications. Deduction as it is understood today does not appear among the methods of the philosophy of being. Metaphysical cognition is not a formal thinking that uses inference. Syllogistic deduction in the Aristotelian sense also does not appear here. For this reason here there is no apodictic argumentation as understood also in the Aristotelian sense. The chief reason for this is that metaphysical concepts cannot be strictly defined *per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*. The concepts of the philosophy of being are supergeneric and of infinite scope. If by deduction we were to call thought based on necessary states of

things, then the deduction so conceived would take place in the philosophy of being. It would presuppose, however, (1) a conscious construction of the object of the philosophy of being (a conscious construction also in the form of the noetic first principles: identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and reason of being), (2) a basically negative kind of argumentation by indicating the evident absurdity of the opposite proposition, the disagreement of the opposite proposition with the fact, the reduction of the opposite proposition to contradiction, the impossibility of any other way of presenting the matter even by a real or fictitious opponent. All negative argumentation is made in the light of a constructed proper object of philosophy (not arbitrarily constructed), apart from which we cannot philosophize at all, just as scientific investigations cannot be made in a science in isolation from its proper object.¹⁸

In realistic metaphysics we perform analyses of states of things. Although in this analysis all the ways of reasoning known in the contemporary methodology of the sciences occur, we are always dealing with a special kind of cognition that does not completely fit into separate formal classifications.

The School's Program

The School's program, developed in the meritorious aspect chiefly by Krąpiec, is made up of the following elements: (1) the objective way of cultivating philosophy, which is general metaphysics and the several particular metaphysics; (2) historicism, which protects philosophical thought from returning to ancient errors and shows the development of philosophical thought; (3) the awareness of methodological autonomy, which entails the need to develop autonomous methodological-logical instruments for general metaphysics and the several particular metaphysics; (4) the use of an integrated language (considering the semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic aspects), which determines the specific character of metaphysical cognition; (5) in the demonstration of metaphysical assertions, the use of the method of objective explanation (i.e., rendering free of contradiction, de-contradictification) of the investigated facts, events, or processes, by indicating real factors, the rejection of which would entail the negation of the explained fact; in this explanation we strive to show the foundations for delivering human cognition and thought from absurdity and apriorism by

¹⁸ Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Stanisław Kamiński, "Specyficzność poznania metafizycznego [Specific character of metaphysical cognition]," *Znak* 13 (1961): 627–628.

indicating the objective reasons (causes) of existence for the investigated facts; (6) providing philosophical instruments for the realistic interpretation of the world and man, and revealing the foundations of the rationality of human cognition and action.

The task of deepening, developing and specifying the program of the School was connected institutionally with the Section of Metaphysics, which was directed from the beginning by Krąpiec, and he was also the chief animator in entering new domains of philosophical inquiry. Other sections—the Section of the History of Philosophy, the Section of Ethics, the Section of Logic and the Theory of Cognition (occupying different chairs)—joined in these works.¹⁹

Translated from Polish by Hugh McDonald

**THE LUBLIN PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL:
FOUNDERS, MOTIVES, CHARACTERISTICS**

SUMMARY

The article is focused on the Lublin Philosophical School; it explains its name, presents its founders, reveals the causes of its rise, and introduce the specific character of the School's philosophy. It starts with stating the fact that in the proper sense, the term "Lublin Philosophical School" describes a way of cultivating realistic (classical) philosophy developed in the 1950s by the group of philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. The Lublin Philosophical School is characterized by cognitive realism (the object of cognition is really existing being), maximalism (taking up all existentially important questions), methodological autonomy (in relation to the natural-mathematical sciences and theology), transcendentalism in its assertions (its assertions refer to all reality), methodological-epistemological unity (the same method applied in objectively cultivated philosophical disciplines), coherence (which guarantees the objective unity of the object), and objectivity

¹⁹ Within the Section of Metaphysics, at the moment it was established (1956), two chairs were created separately: the Chair of General Metaphysics (directed by Krąpiec, and since 1997 by Andrzej Maryniarczyk), and the Chair of Particular Metaphysics (directed by Stanisław Adamczyk). Over time, from the Section of Metaphysics the following chairs of particular metaphysics emerged: Chair I of Particular Metaphysics (1969), renamed in 1970 as the Chair of the Theory of Cognition and joined to the Section of Logic and the Theory of Cognition, the Chair of the Philosophy of God and Religion (since 1973 directed by Zofia J. Zdybicka, and since 2002 by Piotr Moskal); the Chair of the Philosophy of Culture (since 1991 directed by Piotr Jaroszyński); the Chair of the Philosophy of Art (directed since 1996 by Henryk Kiereś), the Chair of the Philosophy of God (directed since 2005 by Włodzimierz Dłubacz).

(achieved by the verifiability of assertions on their own terms, which is achieved by relating them in each instance to objective evidence). The term is the name of the Polish school of realistic (classical) philosophy that arose as a response to the Marxism that was imposed administratively on Polish institutions of learning, and also as a response to other philosophical currents dominant at the time such as phenomenology, existentialism, and logical positivism.

KEYWORDS: Lublin Philosophical School, metaphysics, realism, philosophy, Krąpiec, Kalinowski, Swieżawski, Wojtyła.