Focusing on their approaches to Nicolas Malebranche, this article compares the contributions of Étienne Gilson and his student and colleague, Henri Gouhier, to the debate around the notion of Christian philosophy during the mid-1920s into the 1930s. Gilson agreed with Brunschvicg’s characterization of Nicolas Malebranche as an important representative of Christian philosophy, and both Gilson and Gouhier had a profound understanding of Malebranche’s thought. Following St. Thomas that philosophy should strive to be a ‘perfect use of reason’, Gilson posited Christianity’s influence as remaining exterior to philosophy itself. More sympathetic to Malebranche’s Augustinian approach, Gouhier allowed for religious experience to operate at the interior of philosophy. These different approaches stemmed from fundamental differences as to how the historical method should be employed in philosophy and what it reveals.

The role of Christian Revelation in philosophy continues to be vigorously debated and discussed by philosophers and theologians today. This article focuses on the contributions of Étienne Gilson and his student and colleague, Henri Gouhier, to this debate; it compares and contrasts their early thinking on issues central to the notion of Christian philosophy. For purposes of this article, ‘early’ will refer to the formulations of Christian philosophy developed by Gilson and Gouhier during the mid-1920s into the 1930s. Because of differences about how the historical method should be used in philosophy and what it reveals in philosophy these two great historians and philosophers adopted very different approaches to Christian philosophy.

For a number of reasons this article will devote more attention to Nicolas Malebranche than much of the literature on Christian philosophy. First, Gilson agreed with Léon Brunschvicg’s characterization of Nicolas Malebranche as an important representative of a Christian philosophy. Secondly, both Gilson and Gouhier had a profound understanding of the thought of Malebranche and studied Malebranche’s Christian philosophy. When Gouhier first wrote on Christian philosophy he had already published his two doctoral theses on Malebranche. Gilson directed Gouhier’s doctoral work. Finally, the approaches of Gilson and Gouhier
on Malebranche readily illustrate very different approaches to Christian philosophy that stem from their fundamental differences about how the historical method should be employed in philosophy and what it reveals in philosophy.

I. GILSON: CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Gilson’s first used the expression ‘Christian philosophy’ in his third edition of Le Thomisme which was printed in 1927 with a preface dated 1925. His use of the term soon came under attack and triggered two major expositions of this notion. The first occurred in 1931 and took the form of a debate between Gilson and Émile Bréhier. The second took the form of Gilson’s Gifford Lectures, a series of twenty lectures on The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy presented in 1931 and 1932 at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland.

The lectures concentrated on the notions of being and creation, and the unsuitability of Greek and Arabian philosophical essentialism to express the nature of being in an existential world of God and creatures. Gilson thought that Aquinas, especially, reconciled Greek thought and Christianity in a philosophical manner foreshadowed by several medieval thinkers. Aquinas executed this more completely primarily because of his metaphysics of being as embedded in the bosom of theology. According to Gilson, St. Thomas’s metaphysics of creation and epistemological realism make ultimate philosophical sense because they maintain the existence and autonomy of a natural order. Such an order allows for natural capacities in creatures that are more philosophically respectable than divine assistance, which escapes reason’s grasp.

Gilson argued that: (1) we cannot explain the historical existence of some philosophies purely rational in their principles and methods without the existence of Christianity and (2) these philosophies are Christian as philosophies. Specifically, Gilson contended that, historically, the theology of the medievals had revealed itself as the seedbed of authentically philosophical notions subsequently incorporated into religiously neutral systems of modern Western philosophers.

From the outset, Gilson admitted that we cannot decide the issue of Christian philosophy solely on historical grounds. We must ‘go beyond the level of empiricism’. The issue is philosophical and even theological as much as it is historical. The diverse historical perspectives in which Christian philosophy does or does not emerge depend upon, and are generated by, differing conceptions of philosophy. Secondly, the scholastic excellence in philosophy resulting in progress, especially in metaphysics, was due to the fact that the scholastics philosophized as Christians, under the influence of the light of faith.
Gilson maintained, ‘There is no such thing as a Christian reason, but there may very well be a Christian exercise of reason’. He also said, ‘A true philosophy, taken absolutely and in itself, owes all its truth to its rationality and to nothing other than its rationality’. Gilson called this concrete historical situation ‘Christian philosophy’, describing it as ‘every philosophy which, although keeping the two orders of reason and faith formally distinct, nevertheless considers the Christian revelation as an indispensable aid to reason’.

As a work of human reason, philosophy is purely rational. Nothing of faith or revelation can be a constitutive element in its texture, which would be a contradiction, but faith can enter into the work of its construction. Christian philosophy, through the higher light of faith, enables the philosopher’s reason to see the truths it contains. Christian philosophy is ‘that body of rational truths, discovered, explored, or simply safeguarded thanks to the help that reason receives from revelation’.

Considering the notion of Christian philosophy in its proper sense meant, for Gilson, keeping it on the plane of concrete reality, especially history. If there have been philosophies, or systems of rational truths, whose existence would be historically inexplicable without taking into account the existence of Christianity, then these philosophies should bear the name Christian philosophies. They are philosophies because they are rational, and they are Christian because the rationality they have produced would not have been conceived without Christianity. For the relationship between the two elemental concepts to be intrinsic, it is not sufficient that a philosophy be compatible with Christianity; it is rather necessary that Christianity played a role in the very construction of this philosophy.

Gilson posed the question of Christian philosophy on historical grounds because it was through the study of the history of medieval philosophy that he discovered this notion, rather than through a theoretical consideration of its possibility. He sought in the notion of Christian philosophy a traduction conceptuelle (conceptual translation) of what he believed to be a historically observable object: ‘philosophy in its Christian state . . . all that history can do is to say whether the object is real; it is for philosophy to say how it is possible’.

Gilson emphasized that ‘Christian philosophy’ does not designate a formal nature. It rather designates concrete historical realities – a description, not a definition. The strictly rational exercise of intelligence occurs always within an existential or historical state. On this point Gilson deferred to Jacques Maritain’s remarks and regarded them as bringing precision to the most difficult aspect of the question: the concrete existence of Christian philosophy.

In the concrete working out of particular philosophical positions, the philosopher brings experiences, opinions, views of the world, and so on, to the study of philosophy. A philosopher’s faith is surely part of his or her
understanding of the world. That such faith should direct and inform the philosopher’s thinking about philosophy is natural. Although Christian philosophers have a right to interest themselves in all philosophical problems, in fact, they are interested uniquely, or above all, in those that affect the conduct of their religious life.

While Christian philosophers like St. Thomas had an interest that extended to all of philosophy, Gilson recognized that they did their creative work only in a relatively limited area. And he thought, ‘nothing could be more natural’. Since Christian revelation teaches us only truths necessary for salvation, Gilson maintained that ‘its influence could extend only to those parts of philosophy that concern the existence and nature of God, and the origin, nature, and destiny of the soul’.

Through faith’s elimination of unnecessary curiosity, Gilson became convinced that revelation’s influence on philosophy facilitated the work of its constitution. By choosing human nature in relation to God as its central theme, Christian philosophy acquires ‘a fixed center of reference’ that assists Christian philosophers to ‘bring order and unity’ into their thought. For this reason, Christian philosophy always displays a strong tendency to systematization: ‘it has less to systematize than any other and it has the necessary center for the system as well’.

According to Gilson, Christian revelation contains many naturally knowable truths and facts essentially mysterious in themselves in which human reason apprehends the only possible answer to its difficulties. For this reason, Gilson thought ‘the Judeo-Christian revelation is a fertile religious source of philosophical development’. The paradigm for Christian philosophy is ‘a demonstration of a saving truth revealed by God and accessible to the light of natural reason. God’s existence is the most basic of such truths. It constitutes the ‘field par excellence for Christian philosophy, for here it may show itself as at once fully philosophic and fully Christian’.

II. GILSON: MALEBRANCHE’S CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

While the Gilson-Bréhier debate and the Gifford Lectures focused on medieval philosophies as authentic and distinct from ancient and modern Western philosophies, they also allowed Gilson a cursory glance at modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Malebranche, who build their philosophies to some degree on faith. Gilson maintained that the history of modern philosophy from Descartes on would not have been what it is had there been no Christian philosophers. Despite Descartes’s dogma of the independence of reason from theology and revelation, ‘his whole physics is bound up with a certain metaphysic; this metaphysic hangs altogether from the idea of God’ – the notion of an omnipotent God ‘who, in a way, creates himself and therefore, a fortiori, creates the
external truths, including those of mathematics, creates the universe \textit{ex nihilo}, and conserves it by an act of continuous creation’. Descartes’s God, an infinite, perfect omnipotent being, creator of heaven and earth, is really the God of Christianity.\textsuperscript{11}

During the debate, Gilson concurred in Brunschvicg’s designation of Malebranche as ‘le représentant typique et essentiel, d’une philosophie chrétienne’. Gilson added that he was ‘tout à fait persuadé que Malebranche est un philosophe chrétien et un chaînon dans l’histoire de la philosophie chrétienne’.\textsuperscript{12}

Malebranche clearly affirmed that he bases key elements of his thought on the Christian notion of God. For example, his analysis of our general, abstract, and confused idea of being concludes that it is the sign of the presence of Being itself to our thought. Thus, Malebranche prolongs one path followed by the Christian tradition: ‘if we think of God, He must necessarily exist’. God is the necessary cause of the idea we have of Him. Gilson had no ‘excessive admiration’ for ontological proofs of God’s existence, but stressed that at the basis of Malebranche’s position lies the Christian view that the proper name of God is Being.\textsuperscript{13} This name denotes God’s very essence.

Likewise, central aspects of Malebranche’s thought, such as occasionalism and the vision in God, depend on the Christian notion of an omnipotent deity. Since nothing that exists is independent of God, Malebranche correctly cites the claim to independence as the most dangerous of all those besetting the creature and the one most firmly to be resisted. Gilson, however, doubted whether Malebranche always recognized this claim where it existed, and was sure he often saw it where it was not.

Malebranche could understand that a pagan system like Aristotle’s should attribute subsistence, independence, and efficacy to finite bodies. And ‘if it goes on to attribute our knowledge of bodies to their existence and action on the soul, we need not feel any surprise. But a Christian, surely, should be more happily inspired!’ As a Christian, St. Thomas knew that to cause is to create, and that creative action is proper to God. Thus, according to Malebranche, Aquinas should have denied the existence of natures or substantial forms, ascribed all efficacy to God alone, and therefore situated in God the origin of our actions and of our knowledge as well. ‘In short, it is as essential elements in any philosophy truly Christian and based on the idea of omnipotence that Malebranche maintains the truth of occasionalism and the vision in God’.

Malebranche reproached scholasticism not ‘for confusing philosophy and religion, but rather for being insufficiently Christian’. St. Thomas’s offense consisted in following Aristotle and Averroes, his ‘wretched commentator’, instead of St. Augustine, the perfect representative of the Christian tradition. This, Gilson claimed, ‘is no accidental or external criticism of the system, but a blow aimed at its heart. Had scholasticism
been more Augustinian it would have been more religious, and, consequently, truer'.

As Gilson indicated, the Thomistic creature can do no more without God’s aid than the Augustinian creature can. In both doctrines God produces all things and creatures produce what they produce. The difference is that St. Thomas’s God shows Himself more generous than St. Augustine’s. Unlike St. Augustine’s secondary causes, which merely awaken or incite latent virtualities that God deposited in matter when He created it, St. Thomas’s doctrine contains no lack of efficiency in nature that marks a void filled by the divine efficiency. St. Thomas’s God gives creatures existence and true causality as a participation in divine causality: ‘The work of the Almighty can by no means be an inert world, for then the work would not give testimony to the workman’.

The doctrines of St. Augustine and St. Thomas are ‘two different expressions of the same sense of the glory of God’. Malebranche adopted the Augustinian approach of inclining spontaneously, when there are two equally plausible solutions to one and the same problem, towards that which conceded less to nature and more to God. However, Malebranche took this to an extreme so that every instance of causality, including human knowledge itself, guaranteed maximum dependence on God.

Malebranche’s thought may be characterized as ‘first and foremost an exaltation of the power and glory of God’. But Gilson preferred St. Augustine’s, and especially St. Thomas’s, position on this matter. God does not create so that witnesses may exist to render Him His due glory. God creates so that beings may exist (1) who shall rejoice in His Glory as He rejoices in it Himself and (2) who, participating in His being, participate simultaneously in His beatitude. God seeks His glory for us, not for Himself; not to gain it, for He possesses it already, nor increase it, for already it is perfect, but to communicate it to us. According to Gilson, Malebranche in ‘perverting the principles of Augustinian-ism would have it that the glory of God is chanted by a world without nature and without efficacy, a radical impotency attesting to the omnipotence of its Author’. Gilson provided a harsh critique of Malebranche’s Christian philosophy:

A philosophy may invoke a revelation and be false, but if false it is not on account of the revelation, but because it is bad philosophy; the errors of Malebranche, deeply and genuinely Christian as he was, would be a sufficiently good example.

III. MALEBRANCHE WITHIN GILSON’S PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

During the same period that Gilson discovered his notion of Christian philosophy, he also developed his notion of a philosophical history of
philosophy. He presented the junction of history and philosophy in a paper he delivered in 1926 in Boston at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, ‘Le rôle de la philosophie dans l’histoire de la civilisation’.17

In probing the relations between philosophy and civilization, Gilson presented three main points: (1) philosophy is shaped by, and has an external source in, history and society; (2) through the efforts of individuals like Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, and Bergson, philosophy has helped to create that history and society; and (3) philosophy, beyond its relation to history, penetrates to timeless truths and spiritual riches that are the accumulating treasures of humanity, which at least describe, if not define, civilization. Gilson maintained that philosophy is the love of wisdom, and no wisdom can exist without truth. But truth does not depend on a society or on the creative genius of philosophers:

[Les systèmes de philosophie apparaissent comme conditionnés uniquement par les relations nécessaires que nouent entre elles les idées. Négligeant comme accidentels tous les éléments historiques, sociaux ou individuels qui entrent dans la composition des systèmes, l’histoire de la philosophie ainsi étendue ne retient que leur valeur propre de vérité: elle est essentiellement philosophie.18]

For Gilson, no authentic civilization can exist without a philosophy that acts as a mediator between the historical and the eternal. Philosophers undertake the development of a synthesis, an intellectual unity, from conflicting views and spiritual values in society without which no true order or peace can exist. They find themselves in the presence of ideas, of necessary essences, whose content escapes their free choice. ‘When all is said and done, the philosopher’s doctrine is nothing but the universe thought in function of an essence: ‘Toute philosophie est une expérience métaphysique poussé à fond sur le contenu d’une idée’.19

Philosophy’s history is only the history of this incessantly renewed experiment. Philosophy depends upon, and creates, history. Philosophy is the expression of a spirituality and current science, and a participation in a world of timeless essences. When we treat philosophies as experiments of reason, access to that world of philosophy, the history of philosophy, becomes the history of philosophy. Many of these points anticipate Gilson’s William James Lectures presented at Harvard in 1936 and published the following year as The Unity of Philosophical Experience.

In these lectures Gilson interpreted Malebranche’s philosophy as properly within the declining phase of Descartes’s ‘recklessly conducted experiment to see what becomes of human knowledge when molded into conformity with mathematical evidence’. Descartes’s mathematical approach to reality took the form of his method of clear and distinct ideas. This method allowed a philosopher to assent only to clearly and distinctly perceived objects of thought. By substituting the evidence of
method for the evidence of existence, Descartes transformed philosophy into the management of concepts, a programme doomed to failure because knowledge minus reality will never lead to knowledge plus reality.

Starting within his mind, Descartes arrived at the certainty of his own existence and separated thought from extension, for each has its own clear and distinct idea. An immediate consequence is the real distinction between mind and body. Yet Descartes remained convinced from experience, especially the experience of sensations, that the mind and the body form a substantial unity – a fact difficult to reconcile with the consequences of the method of clear and distinct ideas.

Gilson agreed with Leibniz’s observation that ‘at that point Monsieur Descartes withdrew from the game’. Yet neither Leibniz, Spinoza, nor Malebranche saw that Descartes’s failure was due to the fact that his mathematicism caused him to deal with concrete substances in the same way that geometers deal with abstract definitions. All three of these great metaphysicians retained mind, matter, and God. Descartes played the first two and failed, so all three then tried to explain everything by God. Malebranche’s occasionalism was his attempt to answer the question of how mind and body can interact.

Gilson discussed the ‘necessary’ and ‘fearful consequences’ of occasionalism, some of which Malebranche had not been able to foresee. Malebranche accepted that, since we know everything through or in God, our knowledge is directly related only to the ideas of things in God, not actually to existing things. We know that things are and what they are, but we really know them owing to God, and not to material substances themselves. In short, we do not know material substances themselves. Hence, physics is knowledge of the intelligible idea of matter that is in God, and not knowledge of the external world. Furthermore, we do not know our own bodies any more than we know other bodies. The body which the soul sees is not the body it animates. It is the intelligible nature of that body that the soul sees in God.

This final consequence stems from Descartes’s failure to prove the existence of the material world. Descartes argued that, since God is not a deceiver, we can follow our natural inclination to believe that bodies can act on our minds. Malebranche argued that being true to Descartes’s principles meant that we cannot prove the existence of the world. Malebranche denied that we should accept an inclination as rational evidence. Our minds cannot directly perceive bodies. And they cannot demonstrate the existence of bodies from a consideration of God’s nature, because God has created them by a free decision of His will, not by any intrinsic necessity of nature. Hence, our only recourse is divine revelation; this tells us that God created the heaven and earth. We know that God exists, and we believe that He is the Christian God. Consequently, we should also believe what He says in Holy Scripture and hold, as an article of faith, that the external world exists.
Only a short step remained to the last stage in the evolution of Descartes’s distinction of mind and body. Berkeley, who agreed that God gave us all our ideas, including ideas of material things, went on to ask why one should maintain that anything independent of our ideas actually exists. Revelation tells us that God created the heaven and earth; it does not tell us that God created an unknowable substance called matter that hides behind our ideas and feelings. Berkeley concluded that ideas and spirit make up the whole of reality.

Gilson located the trouble behind Malebranche in Descartes – specifically, in his geometrical metaphysics. ‘Everyone is free to decide whether he shall begin to philosophize as a pure mind; if he should elect to do so, the difficulty will not be how to get into the mind, but how to get out of it’.

Gilson’s philosophical history of philosophy allowed him to situate the failures of Malebranche’s philosophy in Descartes’s mistake of substituting the principles of mathematics for those of metaphysics. Seduced by mathematics, Descartes permitted it to absorb philosophy and thereby destroy it. Instead of addressing being itself, the proper object of metaphysics, Descartes destroyed this object of metaphysics by investing the mathematical order of reality, a particular determination of being, with the universality of being itself. He gave in to the most tempting of all the false first principles ‘that thought, not being, is involved in all of my representations’. Confounding thought with being, Descartes opted for idealism from the outset and included the whole in one of its parts. But a metaphysics of existence ‘cannot be a system wherewith to get rid of philosophy’. Authentic metaphysics remains, according to Gilson, ‘an always open inquiry, whose conclusions are both always the same and always new, because it is conducted under the guidance of immutable principles, which will never exhaust experience, or be themselves exhausted by it’. We think in a world that changes according to the light of principles that do not change, because reality’s structure does not change.

Since his method in *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* is purely dialectical, Gilson acknowledged that its conclusions are only probable. The fact that some conclusions necessarily follow from a principle does not prove that the conclusions are necessary in themselves or that the principle from which they flow is true or false. History only guarantees that the conclusions have necessarily emerged from the principle. It is then up to philosophers to determine the truth. If they cannot accept the conclusions because the principles are not in accord with reality, philosophers must give up the principle. For the same reason, if they cannot accept the principle, they must consistently deny the conclusions. The dialectic of history can thus help philosophers arrive at the truth; it cannot, however, give it to them.
Henri Gouhier’s academic work led to his becoming intimately familiar with the notion of Christian philosophy and the debate surrounding it. In 1919, he entered the École Normale Supérieure in Paris. As an undergraduate under the direction of the famous historian of philosophy Emile Bréhier, Gouhier completed a mémoire (term paper) on ‘La foi et la raison chez Descartes’ for the Diplôme d'études supérieures. Afterwards, Gouhier pursued graduate study under Gilson at the Sorbonne and École pratique des hautes études. In 1924, Gouhier published his doctoral thesis for the École pratique, La pensée religieuse de Descartes, a brilliant intellectual biography of Descartes in terms of his metaphysical, scientific, and apologetical preoccupations. Two years later, Gouhier completed the requirements for the Doctorat d'état and published two important theses on Malebranche: La philosophie de Malebranche et son expérience religieuse and La vocation de Malebranche. The thesis on Descartes was awarded a prize by the Académie française; the works on Malebranche remain classics in the field.

Gouhier maintained that differences among historians of philosophy hardly concern method. The true differences stem from the idea each historian of philosophy has of that history. For Gouhier, because there is no concept or essence of ‘philosophy’ that fits all philosophers or that transcends various philosophers, the ‘history of philosophy’ consists of the history of philosophies. Unlike Gilson, Gouhier denies that philosophy can in any way transcend history. For Gouhier, philosophy, as such, has no historical existence; only philosophers exist, and each defines philosophy within his own philosophy. As regards philosophical problems, Gouhier posited that ‘une philosophie n’ôte qu’aux yeux de ses adversaires’. Thus, for Gouhier, every definition of philosophy, qua philosophy, is relative to a particular philosophy. In his review of Gilson’s Unity of Philosophical Experience, Gouhier made the point that one’s ‘propre vision du monde est sans cesse sous-jacente pour l’excellente raison que chacun de nous ne peut prononcer un mot sans la supposer. Ceci n’est nullement une objection mais une précision destinée à expliquer pourvoir ces pages d’une saisante rigueur historique soulèveront des objections: il y a toujours des lecteurs qui ne verront pas le monde comme l’auteur’. Gouhier viewed Gilson’s probing study of The Unity of Philosophic Experience as leading to another on the diversity of philosophical experience: ‘elle porterait sur les métaphysiques comme visions du monde et ne conduirait probablement au-delà d’une phénoménologie’.

Gouhier participated in some of the great discussions, such as those at Juvisy, that occurred in France on the notion of Christian philosophy. His contribution took the form of trying to find ‘a more concrete vision of philosophy’. Like Bréhier, Gouhier considered the notion of Christian
philosophy inconceivable. He also agreed with Bréhier’s contention that on the rational level we cannot find a Christian influence on philosophy similar to Cartesian, Spinozistic, or Kantian influences. For Gouhier, this did not mean that Christianity’s arrival had no effect on philosophy, or that Christian philosophy did not exist; it meant that the historian might be forced to look beyond philosophy to find a proper and adequate meaning for this term.

Part of Gouhier’s solution is to recognize that the world is not the same for all of us. This is due to (1) scientific progress, which continually changes our image of nature, and (2) the inspirations of religious genius that launch and re-launch us in pursuit of our being, the deepest supernatural interiority that we know and desire. In Malebranche, the inspiration of religious genius joined the scientific spirit: provided that the intellect followed Saint John and Saint Paul as commented on by St. Augustine, and arrived at God as the only efficacious cause and sole light, Cartesianism represented the true physics and proclaimed the same truth as the Gospels. The *spiritual* penetrated the *intellectual*, and Malebranche’s new system of ‘nature and grace’ entered history.23

V. PHILOSOPHIES OF TRUTH AND PHILOSOPHIES OF REALITY

Gouhier thought we can understand the possibility of a Christian philosophy in two ways. This can refer to the aptitude of Christianity to enter into a philosophy and even create a specific philosophy (and not only a theology). Or, it can mean the aptitude of philosophy to accommodate a Christian inspiration. Gouhier considered this second approach more promising and more interesting because it focuses on the nature of philosophical activity. This activity does not accommodate Christian inspiration by focusing on dogma (and its theological explanation); it does so by taking into account Christian history as interiorized within the spiritual experience of individual human beings and within the testimony of the mystics.

Fundamental to Gouhier’s position is his distinction between ‘les philosophies de la vérité’ and ‘les philosophies de la réalité’. According to Gouhier, philosophies of truth, like science, seek to explain. Their point of departure is the real, and they seek its principles outside the immediately given, because if these principles were visible to the naked eye, we would not be able to search for them. To explain is to attain by reason a reality not immediately attained, even though it is the condition of what we immediately attain.

Philosophies of reality suppose that principles could be visible to the naked eye. Clearly, the difficulty is to have a naked eye. We do not have it beginning with the real because, in our daily state, we are too far from it and need to ‘approach’ it. The immediate givens are precisely that which
is not immediately given. Philosophy is an effort to establish contact, thereby allowing reality to arrive at its truth in the philosopher’s language, a language whose ambition seeks only to see and make seen that reality in itself. This type of philosophy mediates the immediate in such a way that it does not cease to relate to an inexhaustible reality. St. Thomas’s proofs for the existence of God, contrasted with the ontological arguments for God’s existence, serve as examples of these two philosophical attitudes. In the former, God is ‘cause’, whereas in the latter God is ‘source’. Strictly speaking, the ontological argument is not a proof. Ultimately, it provokes a type of intuition or ‘sentiment de présence’ of the divine – ‘en une certaine manière, Dieu en moi, pensée de ma pensée, vie de ma vie, lumière de ma lumière – “quelqu’un qui soit en moi plus moi-même que moi”’. The same paradox and intellectual desire drives both philosophical attitudes: the paradox of trying better to see, understand, and articulate the real, and the intellectual desire to place one’s restricted universe back into the total existent on which it depends. The two differ in that philosophies of truth are a series of arguments that, taking an existing given as a starting point, proceed to prove the existence of their complementaries. Philosophies of reality are works of exploration that do not prove any existence. Instead, they uncover an existent hitherto hidden. The first attitude is directed toward the abstract, the second toward the concrete.

Gouhier also indicated that no philosophy falls completely within one or the other category. The two attitudes stem from a common ambition; what distinguishes them is the orientation of this common ambition. Philosophies may prefer one orientation or the other, but the presence of one does not exclude the other. Despite a preference for one or the other, no philosophy can dodge the problem of uniting truth and reality. In one manner or another, all philosophy attempts to tell the truth about reality or to speak truly about reality.

VI. CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY AS A PHILOSOPHY OF REALITY

Gouhier maintained that a Christian philosophy is possible in a philosophy of reality, but not in a philosophy of truth. The crucial question for Gouhier was not whether and how Christianity lends itself to philosophy. It was which philosophy, without denying its principles, can be a Christian philosophy? Gouhier preferred philosophies of reality because they are especially apt to be Christianized by the presence of a reality that is the Christian history of human beings and their relations with God.

Gouhier thought that a philosophy of truth explains and demonstrates. It can only explain the explainable and demonstrate the
demonstrable. It excludes two types of ‘irrational’: (1) when concluding, it excludes what resists rationalization (for example, politics), and (2) when commencing, it excludes what by nature should resist rationalization (for example, religious data, such as the Incarnation, revelation, grace, and so on). The problem of the ‘religious irrational’ arises within the consciousness of the philosopher, provided that faith dwells there. It does not arise within the field of philosophy itself.

As Christians who are also philosophers, we confront the question of the relation between faith and reason. The question does not arise for a philosopher who lives and thinks by reason alone. According to Gouhier’s understanding of a philosophy of truth, the Christian truth cannot descend into philosophy without deforming its nature. Christianity represents a truth of another order. We cannot demonstrate it or render it evident.

Gouhier’s preference for philosophies of reality stemmed from the metaphysical significance he attributed to the drama of existence. The vision of the world from which he viewed philosophies was too attentive to the drama of existence for him not to favor philosophies of reality. Gouhier thought that the theater well displayed the human condition ‘en situation’, the object of philosophies of existence such as we find in Sartre and Marcel. Gouhier considered every great theatrical work to bear a philosophy within it.28

For Gouhier, philosophies of reality alone can capture all the metaphysical dimensions of the drama of human existence, because philosophers of reality do not start by placing the irrational outside philosophy’s bounds. Their main concern is to place themselves in reality’s presence. For them, no boundary exists for philosophy. If the philosopher is Christian, his or her Christian consciousness is a reality encountered when in the presence of the real.29

Gouhier thought that a Christian who is also a philosopher is one who, at the extreme, can be a philosopher without saying that he or she is a Christian. This would be the case with philosophers such as Aristotle, St. Thomas, Octave Hamelin, and Victor Delbos. But a philosopher who is also a Christian is held philosophically to profess publicly his or her Christianity (for example, St. Augustine, Pascal) not because of pride, piety, or religious zeal, but because philosophy, in throwing us against the real, finds Christ in that world and says so. In philosophies of the real, the problem of the religious irrational is posed within philosophy, not outside philosophy.

A philosophy of reality allows for religious reality and, therefore, Christianity to coexist without contradiction with natural realities within one and the same philosophy. Within philosophy, reasons are provided to justify why a reality is true; but these reasons do not render something real. Likewise, we cannot separate truth from the manner in which we know it. This manner is frequently what is most important in a
philosophy. But if reality exists, how we grasp it is of little concern. In general, the manner by which we grasp truth (sensation, tradition, testimony, sentiment) is not very philosophical.

Gouhier thought that, for philosophy to be Christian, there must be: (1) recognition of ‘the Christian fact’ as a given, and (2) integration of this fact into ‘an image of the world’. He hyphenated Christian philosophy: Christian-philosophy indicates ‘continuous impregnation of the substantive by the adjective’. The result is not a denaturation of philosophy, because, in the real order the irrational can be a center of rationality and even render the world more rational.

Gouhier endorsed a statement from Gilson’s *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy*: ‘The philosopher finds himself in a world where there is Christianity’. Thus, Gouhier agreed with Gilson’s charge that Bréhier ignored the rupture, the radical newness, established by Christianity. ‘Is there not a new man who follows Christ? Did not Christianity result in a radical transformation in what William James calls our “mental universe?”’ Religious genius introduces new facts into the universe that the philosopher observes. Christianity is not metaphysics, but it is laden with themes susceptible of metaphysical refinement.

Christianity’s influence is different from the influence that a great metaphysical system can exercise. A metaphysical system introduces a new vision of the universe; the religious genius introduces new facts into the universe, which the philosopher then takes into account. Christianity does not act directly on philosophy, but the philosopher may find himself in a world where Christianity exists. The aspirations of the religious soul and the rigorous intellectual method do not follow parallel paths. Cardinal Bérulle was no metaphysician, but his creative religious emotion influenced Malebranche’s metaphysics. Gouhier maintained that religious emotion, affectivity or sentiment is creative and results in an affective history of philosophy, or, rather, a history of affective philosophy.

VII. GILSON AND GOUHIER: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES

Gilson and Gouhier approached the issue of Christian philosophy as historians. For Gilson, Christian philosophy applies to any system of philosophy, or any authentic way of philosophizing, which is *de facto* richer and more fertile because it is pursued in the context of religious doctrines. Because Gilson approached Malebranche’s Christian philosophy from the perspective of his own philosophical history of philosophy and the unity of philosophical experience, he examined Malebranche’s thought critically. He identified limitations and unacceptable philosophical consequences resulting from (1) Malebranche’s deviation from St. Augustine’s thought and (2) his inability to deal successfully with problems inherent in Descartes’s metaphysical experiment. For Gilson,
Malebranche’s thought constitutes an excellent example of a philosophy that is thoroughly Christian while being philosophically inadequate.

Gouhier’s historical method allowed no divorce of Malebranche’s life from his thought. Gouhier’s method assumed from the start the internal coherence of that thought and posited a unity of Malebranche’s philosophy and religious experience. Remaining within Malebranche’s vision of the world, Gouhier’s interpretation of Malebranche was sympathetic and relatively non-critical; it declined to evaluate Malebranche’s thought from a viewpoint other than its own. Gouhier interpreted Malebranche as a classic example of a philosopher of reality elaborating our lived experience of the divine.

The historical approaches of Gilson and Gouhier to Christian philosophy focus on ‘l’homme tout entier’ and take great care to remain in contact with reality.31 Categorizing Malebranche, or any thinker, as a Christian philosopher necessitated considering philosophy as an historical actuality. Gilson and Gouhier agreed that only philosophers, and not philosophy, exist. They denied a radical separation of the Christian awareness and philosophy within Malebranche or in any Christian philosopher; they admitted and wished to preserve the autonomy of philosophy and Christianity while opposing any confusion between the two.

Gilson, following St. Thomas’s position that philosophy should strive to be a ‘perfect use of reason’, posited Christianity’s influence as remaining exterior to philosophy itself. Christianity may be a constitutive element of a philosophy, but not in its texture, not in its reasoning processes.32 Also, Gilson’s view of Christian philosophy did not accent religious experience or sentiment; it identified religious dogma as coming to the aid of reason and allowing philosophy ‘to attain a fuller comprehension of its own deepest truths’.33

Gilson later expanded his treatment of Christian philosophy by going beyond the historical approach. He attempted to explain (1) how the complex notion of Christian philosophy is possible theoretically, (2) whether it can be autonomous or must exist as a service to theology, (3) what competing conceptions of philosophy and the philosophical character of ‘historical facts’ this notion depends on, and (4) how we should approach the definition or criterion of philosophical reason in the context of philosophical pluralism.34

Gouhier denied that philosophies of truth, such as St. Thomas’s philosophy, could be Christian philosophies.35 Only philosophies of reality can rightly be deemed Christian, because only they allow for religious experience to be interior to philosophy. For Gouhier philosophy is neither opposed nor related to Christian givens as one solid facing another, nor as one body of knowledge facing another body of knowledge; it is instead a disposition, a work open to and potentially incorporating Christianity. For him, philosophy can materially appropriate Christian givens.36
To my knowledge, Gilson never addressed Gouhier’s classification of St. Thomas’s philosophy as a philosophy of truth and, therefore, not capable of being a Christian philosophy. Gouhier’s characterization of Aquinas’s thought as a rationalism focused on the explainable or demonstrable and excluding the contingent and non-necessary fails, however, to do it justice. Far from arguing for the sufficiency of reason or philosophy, Aquinas acknowledged the weakness of human nature as a result of the Fall, and the benefits that accrue from the positive influence of faith on the philosophical activity. In fact, if Gilson is correct, Aquinas’ conception of God as Being took its origin from the action of something irrational, Christian Revelation, on the exercise of reason. Aquinas discovered the notion of God as being in the Bible and then attempted to understand it. Moreover, according to Gilson the relation between faith and reason in Aquinas’ philosophy is not extrinsic.37

Malebranche’s philosophy has pronounced phenomenological or descriptive, as well as mystical or intuitive aspects. But its reliance on clear ideas and a systemization based on them, along with its willingness to go further than Aquinas in considering religious dogmas that were mysteries as matters for philosophical speculation, led to interpretations of it as a rationalism more in accord with a ‘philosophy of truth’ than the philosophy of Aquinas. Some also have correctly raised the question of whether the relationship between philosophy and faith in Malebranche’s philosophy is harmonious. This relationship has been interpreted, not as a mutual aid but as a struggle between the two, with faith serving not as a light or stimulant but rather a restraint and hindrance to the full flowering of Malebranche’s system into a pantheistic naturalism.38

Gouhier never systematically used his distinction between a philosophy of truth and a philosophy of reality, nor did he ever develop a list of philosophers within one or the other category. He might not have done so, since he thought that interactions between the two types are possible and desirable for two reasons: (1) concern about reality within a philosophy of truth can prevent it from closing in on itself; (2) concern about truth within a philosophy of reality can prevent it from succumbing to a naive or dogmatic realism. Although some view Gouhier’s distinction as ‘subtle but fragile’,39 it has close similarities with Bergson’s and William James’s position that reality is mobile and, therefore, the truth cannot embrace it if it begins to reify and immobilize it. The key issue seems to be a possible accord between the movement of thought and the movement of reality itself.40

Gilson and Gouhier spent much of their long philosophical careers elaborating and refining their thinking on Christian philosophy and the relationship between history and philosophy. Gilson continued to emphasize the importance of metaphysics and tried to demonstrate how philosophical systems and doctrines develop through history, but in accordance with philosophical principles. Gouhier maintained as a
principle that ‘the history of philosophies excludes the philosophy of the history of philosophy’. He continued his *historical* history of philosophy by presenting a phenomenology of *individual* philosophical minds. Because Gouhier insisted he was an historian and never presented his own *philosophy* (since he could not state or define what philosophy was for him), interpreting his thought and work continues to be a challenge. But as a historian, Gouhier also came to admit an ‘actuality’ of great philosophies in the past that constituted what the French literary critic Charles du Bos referred to as ‘un ciel des fixes’.

Gilson and Gouhier also refined their interpretations of Malebranche. Gilson provided a more detailed historical treatment of Malebranche. And Gouhier’s position evolved on whether or not Malebranche’s philosophy is a system. In 1971, Gouhier conceded that Malebranche’s very structured philosophy lends itself to systemization. Still, Gouhier found in Malebranche:

> Une certaine continuité de la vie spirituelle à la métaphysique: il ne s’agit pas de réduction, mais d’expression, ou, mieux, de transposition. La vision des idées en Dieu, par exemple, relève d’une étude technique comme toute doctrine qui inclut dans son sens la démonstration de sa vérité: à son principe, il y a pourtant une union à Dieu par l’intelligence, éprouvée, méditée, vécue par l’âme en prière.

A letter from Gilson to Gouhier on June 9, 1966 provided a rare glimpse into Gilson’s view of the fundamental difference between himself and Gouhier which affected how they conceived philosophy. This, in turn, had implications for how they conceived the notion of Christian philosophy. Gilson did not contest what he called Gouhier’s ‘radical historical contingentism’. He admitted continuing to teach it. The main problem Gilson had with Gouhier’s consideration of contingency in philosophy was precisely that the historical contingency in question concerned ‘philosophy’. Gilson maintained that, ‘because it concerns philosophy, a necessity is inscribed in that contingency’. Just like a physicist, a philosopher is free to choose ‘possible fields of inquiry’. But, once chosen, the field of inquiry governs the philosopher’s thought because of completely impersonal necessities of thought. Gilson attributed the great difference between his own and Gouhier’s way of writing history to Gouhier’s being interested mainly ‘in the philosophers’ while Gilson was ‘interested particularly in philosophy’. This difference lies at the heart of their different conceptions of Christian philosophy.

Notes

1 De Lubac characterized the issue of Christian philosophy as one ‘concerning an essential problem, a question which has imposed itself on centuries past, which will continue to impose itself on centuries to come, and which under various names designating by turns its many aspects


4 Étienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1934); first published as L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale (Paris: J. Vrin, 1932). This article does not take into account Gilson’s presentation of Christian philosophy as it occurs in his Christianisme et philosophie. Gilson’s arguments may be presented slightly differently in this work but the essentials are found in his The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy. See Gilson, Christianisme et philosophie, pp. 138–39, n. 2.

5 Gilson, ‘La notion de la philosophie chrétienne’, p. 43. All translations from the French are mine.

6 Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 12, 37, 40.


9 Gilson, ‘La notion de la philosophie chrétienne’, p. 72. For Maritain’s remarks, see pp. 59–72. See also Gilson, L’esprit de la philosophie médiévale, p. 439, n. 80.

10 Ibid., p. 226.

11 Ibid., p. 77, 82

12 Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 59, 61.

13 Ibid., pp. 15–16.


17 Ibid., p. 530.

18 Ibid., p. 534.

19 Ibid., p. 334.


21 All three works were published by J. Vrin, Paris.


23 Henri Gouhier’s ‘Digression sur la philosophie à propos de la philosophie chrétienne’ originally appeared in the Revue philosophique, 1927, and then in Recherches philosophiques, 3 (1933–1934), pp. 211–36. All references are to the final version as found in Gouhier’s La philosophie et son histoire; see pp. 7–10, pp. 13, 15–16. For Gouhier’s interventions at Juvissy, see La philosophie chrétienne (Journées d’études de la société thomiste, II) (Juvissy: Editions du Cerf, 1934).

24 La philosophie et son histoire, pp. 23–45, 26. This position enables us better to understand Gouhier’s intriguing comment about Gilson’s language in The Unity of Philosophical Experience: ‘One will not leave these pages without noting what satisfaction the intelligence experiences before such mastery; a captivating optimism, a desire to see clearly and justly in a sincere and determined manner result in a style that is, perhaps, also, and above all, philosophy’ (ibid., p. 134).

26 La philosophie et son histoire, pp. 27, 32.
27 Gouhier, La philosophie et son histoire, pp. 40–44.
29 Gouhier, La philosophie et son histoire, p. 36.
36 In advocating opening up supernatural mysteries to philosophical inquiry for the benefit of philosophy, Henri de Lubac, Edith Stein, Xavier Tiliette, and Alvin Plantinga seem to agree with Gouhier. Since philosophy is the love of wisdom, who would deny that this love is diminished when it operates in the light of faith? For de Lubac, this could result in a blurring of the distinction between philosophy and theology. See Matthew A. Bloomer, Judeo-Christian Revelation as a Source of Philosophical reflection according to Étienne Gilson (Rome: Pontifica universitas Sanctae Crucis, 2001), pp. 332–34.
37 La philosophie chrétienne (Journées d’études de la société thomiste, II), 70, pp. 139–42.
38 Malebranche’s philosophy has been interpreted as a ‘Christian rationalism in extremis. It is not so much as instance of Christian philosophy as the use of Christian belief to avoid the consequences of a philosophical tradition. Malebranche wants to defend both religion and scientific knowledge, but he finds that the defense cannot be made on the philosophical basis of rationalism without leading to the pantheistic naturalism of Spinoza. Hence he shifts to a fideist view which is saved from being identical with the older skepticism only because of its speculative theological content and its respect for the sciences. The three main teachings where this process can be observed are: occasionalism, or the sole causality of God; the intuitive vision of God; and the vision of other things in God’. See James Collins, God in Modern Philosophy (Chicago: Regnery, 1959), p. 86. Guéroult’s interpretation of Malebranche diametrically opposed to that of Gouhier, found in Malebranche a colossal, rational machine applied to and imposed on Christianity with man’s Fall being the only irrational infiltration. If Guéroult is correct and the metaphysical notion of order prevails in Malebranche’s system, it is difficult to understand how such a philosophy agrees with Christian experience. See Martial Guéroult, Malebranche, 3 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1955–59). According to Alquié, Malebranche refused to accept the integral consequences of rationalism. While there was a Christian Malebranchism there also existed a non-Christian and even an anti-Christian Malebranchism whose doctrine was used by his disciples against the apologetical intentions of Malebranche himself. The dangers inherent in the theories of Malebranche did not escape his contemporaries like Bossuet and Arnauld and resulted in some of his works being placed on the Index. See Ferdinand Alquié, Le Cartésianisme de Malebranche (Paris: Vrin, 1974). My thanks to the anonymous referee of this article for perceptive comments on Gouhier’s notion of the ‘philosophy of truth’.


