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THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

Guest Editor of the Issue: Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B.

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ANDRZEJ MARYNIARCZYK, S.D.B.

THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION

An encyclopedia is a work that serves the continuing education (Gk. ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία) of individuals and whole societies. In the tradition of western culture, encyclopedias were and are the most universal way of providing information and education. Encyclopedias produced by specific academic institutions are also a testimony to the knowledge they acquired and a sign of the level of culture that a national or international society has achieved. Compiling then an encyclopedia on a specific domain of knowledge and making it available to society is not a matter of the ambition of a group of scientists, but primarily an expression of concern for the level of education and scientific culture in a society.

Among different kinds of encyclopedias, philosophical encyclopedias play an indispensable role in the formation of culture. Philosophy, which permeates such essential domains of culture as cognition, behavior, and production, is the logos (reason) for the culture of every nation or society that makes it possible for their members to discover a higher—rather than merely expedient—end of life and action.

The philosophers of the Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, who are members of the Polish Thomas Aquinas Association, a section of the Societá Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, and who tirelessly work to develop a deeper understanding of our philosophical cognition

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of the world and man, decided to answer the human need for philosophy by writing and publishing *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and so to stand on guard for the cultural heritage of mankind. The Societá Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino (*nota bene*, Card. Karol Wojtyła, presently St. Pope John Paul II, was one of its founding members) is one of the best known worldwide philosophical societies whose chief purpose is to spread and develop philosophical culture.

The initiative for writing and publishing the multi-volume *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, came from Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P. (one of the most prominent Polish philosophers), and his fellow scholars, who together formed an academic circle that—in the second half of the XX century, i.e., the most difficult time for philosophy and humanities in Poland—developed, defended and fostered independent philosophical cognition, and in so doing became guardians of a culture fit for the human person. Therefore, the people who initiated the work on *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* were aware of the great labor and difficulty it entails, but also of their responsibility for the cultural and social standards in the contemporary world. They treated this task as a duty to truth and a service to the culture of thought.

The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy is primarily focused on fundamental philosophical problems. They are presented in a way that takes into account existentially important metaphysical issues, and considers their solutions in the context of the entire history of philosophy. This approach allows the readers to form an opinion on which solutions are correct and which are not. The problems are presented in objective language and in the form of a lecture: it is a distinguishing mark of this encyclopedia. Such a presentation is to show the understanding of the problems by indicating the real factors (not merely theories) the negation of which entails the negation of the fact that is given for explanation. For this reason, the authors, while discussing a problem, do not restrict themselves to relating various

views and positions, but they also propose rational and well-grounded solutions.

Besides entries directly focused on philosophical problems, *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* also contains review entries which survey and summarize various philosophical systems that laid the foundation of modern and contemporary culture, and determined specific ways of understanding the world and man. The review entries are not only aimed at describing phenomena of thought that led to the formulation of particular philosophical systems or methods, but also at helping the reader understand various phenomena and processes of thought that occur in contemporary culture (science, ethics, art, and religion).

Moreover, philosophical positions and views are also discussed in biographical entries on famous thinkers who had an important influence on the history of philosophy, and marked out different ways of understanding the world of persons and things. These biographies are a source of information about particular thinkers, and offer the reader an opportunity to get acquainted with the context in which a particular philosophical idea or interpretation arose.

The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy gives special consideration to the heritage of classical philosophy, as it is the basis of the identity of Western culture. But it also carefully considers the achievements of Indian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, Muslim, Jewish, Incan, and African philosophies, whereby it provides a broad and universal perspective for understanding philosophy in general.

The authors of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* represent academic institutions not only from Poland, but also from Spain, Italy, France, the United States of America, Russia, Ukraine, Bielorus, Estonia, Slovakia, and others. Such a wide cooperation has been made possible because of the involvement and contribution of the Societa Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino whose members represent philo-

sophical schools and institutions from around the world. The Scholarly Committee and the Editorial Team of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* has been established by members of this Society.

The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy was first published in Polish in 2000–2009. At present, it is being revised and prepared for publication in English. This initiative is guided by three fundamental goals: *first*, to include a significant group of philosophers (about 700 authors of *The Encyclopedia*) from central Europe in a worldwide philosophical discourse, which thus far has seemed inaccessible to them; *secondly*, to provide and disseminate the understanding—developed in different cultural and social traditions—of the world, man, human action, and that of philosophy itself; and *thirdly*, to give the English-speaking world an opportunity to learn about achievements of a wide range of philosophers from Central Europe, including in a special way those from Poland.

The English version of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy* is projected to appear in 10 volumes, each containing around 500 entries. We hope that it may contribute to the strengthening of the foundations of philosophical and scientific culture all over the world.

In this special issue of *Studia Gilsoniana*, the reader can find a selection of problem, review and biographical entries (in the form of academic articles) which will soon appear in the English edition of *The Encyclopedia*. The selection includes the entries for the following topics: “Abortion,” “Atheism,” “Beauty,” “Civilization,” “Man,” “Étienne Gilson,” and “Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec.”

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WOJCIECH CHUDY

MIECZYSŁAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec was a philosopher, theologian, humanist, co-founder of the Lublin Philosophical School, rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, initiator and chairman of the scientific committee of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*; born May 25, 1921, in Berezowica Mała, the Tarnopol voivodeship in Podolia (at present in Ukraine), died May 8, 2008, in Lublin (Poland).

Krąpiec graduated from the Wincenty Pol Classical Gymnasium School in Tarnopol in 1939. In that same year, he entered the Dominican Order in Kraków. During the German occupation of Poland, he studied in the Dominican Institute of Philosophy and Theology in Kraków. He was ordained to the priesthood in 1945. In 1946-1954, he worked as a lecturer in the Dominican Institute of Philosophy and Theology in Kraków. He wrote his doctoral dissertation in philosophy, entitled *De naturali amore Dei Super Omnia in Creaturis*, under the direction of Fr. Jacek Woroniecki, O.P.; it was accepted by the Angelicum in Rome in 1946. He wrote his doctoral dissertation in theology, entitled

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De Amore Hypostatico in Sanctissima Trinitate Secundum St. Thomam Aquinatem, under the direction of Fr. Antoni Słomkowski; and he defended it at the Catholic University of Lublin in 1948. He began his habilitation research, entitled *The Existential Foundations of the Transcendental Analogy of Being*,[1] in the philosophy section of the Theology Department of the University of Warsaw in 1951, but, after the department was liquidated by the communist authorities, he finished it in the Department of Christian Philosophy of the Catholic University of Lublin in 1956. He became docent in 1956, associate professor in 1962, and full professor in 1968. He has been connected with the Catholic University of Lublin since 1951. He was dean of the Department of Christian Philosophy in 1958-1961, and 1969-1970. In 1970-1983, he was elected five times as rector. He contributed to the scientific development, renewal, and national and international promotion of the Catholic University of Lublin, which at the time was the only non-state university in the communist bloc.

Krąpiec was one of the main founders of the Lublin Philosophical School, also called the Lublin School of Classical Philosophy. As early as the 1950s, the School brought together such eminent thinkers as Stefan Swieżawski, Jerzy Kalinowski, Fr. Stanisław Kamiński, Fr. Marian Kurdziałek, and Fr. Karol Wojtyła. The School shaped its identity by taking the legacy of the great tradition of classical philosophy—Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. The School looked to the realistic current of neoscholasticism of the nineteenth and twentieth century, chiefly Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain. It went beyond the historical and scholastic framework, and engaged in dialogue with the most important movements in contemporary philosophy, such as neopositivism, neo-Kantianism, phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and existentialism. It became an important antidote to the Marxist philosophy

[1] Originally in Polish: *Egzystencjalne podstawy transcendentalnej analogii bytu*.

and ideology that was obligatory then in the states of the Soviet bloc. It provided a comprehensive and original philosophical synthesis which encompassed the fundamental domains of philosophy, and which was set apart by its wisdom-oriented and realistic approach. Its understanding of reality was focused on existence—the fundamental reason for the realism of being and cognition. Its understanding of man, in his structure and action, was based on a vision of man as a person.

Krąpiec did research in the fundamental domains of philosophy; this resulted in monographs in general metaphysics, the methodology of metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of culture (science, ethics, religion, and art), the philosophy of language, the metaphysics of cognition, the philosophy of the nation, and that of Christian culture. Krąpiec's literary legacy includes 30 books and over 400 articles, studies, and dissertations. 300 master's theses and 60 doctoral dissertations have been successfully completed under his direction; many of Krąpiec's students became full professors.

Krąpiec was a member of many learned societies, including the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, Academia Scientiarum et Artium Europaea, Societé Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale, Görres Gesellschaft, Societas Humboldtiana Polonorum, Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino, Polish Academy of Sciences, Polish Academy of Learning, Polish Philosophical Society, Learned Society of the Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin Learned Society. In 1996, he co-founded and became the first president of the Polish Society of Thomas Aquinas (a section of the Società Internazionale Tommaso d'Aquino). He was awarded the degree of doctor *honoris causa* by the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto, Canada (1989), the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium (1990), and the Ternopil Experimental Institute of Pedagogical Education in Ukraine (1993). He was decorated and honored many times, receiving,

inter alia, the Order of Academic Palms from the French Government, the Grand Officer Order of Leopold II (Belgium), the Order of Polonia Restituta with the Star (Poland), the Premio Internazionale Salsomaggiore Parma (Italy), the Medal for Merit to the Catholic University of Lublin, and the Order "Polonia Mater Nostra Est" awarded by the Public Foundation for the Memory of the Polish Nation.

Krąpiec's major works include: *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [*Realism of Human Cognition*] (1959), *Teoria analogii bytu* [*Theory of the Analogy of Being*] (1959), *Dlaczego zło? Rozważania filozoficzne* [*Why Evil? Philosophical Considerations*] (1962; in French: *Pourquoi le mal? Reflexions philosophiques*, trans. G. Roussel, 1967), *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics*] (co-authored with Stanisław Kamiński, 1962), *Struktura bytu. Charakterystyczne elementy systemu Arystotelesa i Tomasza z Akwinu* [*Structure of Being. Typical Elements of the System of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas*] (1963), *Metafizyka. Zarys podstawowych zagadnień* (1966; in English: *Metaphysics. An Outline of the Theory of Being*, trans. T. Sandok, 1991), *Ja-człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* (1974; in English: *I-Man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. M. Lescoe et al., 1983), *Człowiek i prawo naturalne* (1975; in English: *Person and Natural Law*, trans. M. Szymańska, 1993), *Byt i istota* [*Being and Essence*] (1981), *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet* [*Man, Culture, University*], ed. A. Wawrzyniak (1982), *Język i świat realny* [*Language and the Real World*] (1985), *Człowiek w kulturze* [*Man in Culture*] (1990), *O rozumienie filozofii* [*On the Understanding of Philosophy*] (1991), *Wprowadzenie do filozofii polityki* [*Introduction to the Philosophy of Politics*] (1992), *O ludzką politykę* [*On a Human Politics*] (1993), *Poznawać czy myśleć. Problemy epistemologii tomistycznej* [*To Know or to Think. Problems of Thomistic Epistemology*] (1994), *Psychologia racjonalna* [*Rational Psychology*] (1996), *Ludzka wolność i jej granice* [*Human Freedom and its Limits*]

(1997), *Filozofia—co wyjaśnia?* [*Philosophy—What Does It Explain?*] (1998), *Filozofia w teologii* [*Philosophy in Theology*] (1998), *Rozważania o narodzie* [*Considerations on the Nation*] (1998), *Arystotelesowska koncepcja substancji* [*The Aristotelian Conception of Substance*] (2000; its part I published in 1966 as: *Arystotelesa koncepcja substancji* [*Aristotle's Conception of Substance*]), *O rozumienie świata* [*On the Understanding of the World*] (2002), *Sens kultury chrześcijańskiej* [*The Meaning of Christian Culture*] (2004).

Krąpiec sets maximal tasks for philosophy. In his conception, philosophy is wisdom-oriented knowledge. It has as its object the world of real beings (persons and things). Its method (called "decontradictification") consists in identifying the ultimate causes—the negation of which would be the negation of a being that is being explained. Its primary domain is metaphysics; metaphysics is understood as a general theory of being, where being is understood primarily as a concrete existing thing. According to Krąpiec, without an appeal to existence as the fundamental reason for being, metaphysics cannot be cultivated, and philosophy becomes at most mythology or ideology. Therefore, metaphysics is the first among the philosophical disciplines.

Metaphilosophy

Krąpiec's conception of philosophical cognition is rooted in the classical understanding of science that was developed in the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. Common-sense pre-scientific cognition (everyday cognition) is the basis for scientific knowledge, and in the explanation of reality the accent is placed on the objective reason for cognitive apprehensions. The question "why?" underlies philosophical cognition; that question concerns the existence of all reality. That conception of knowledge is in opposition to the conceptions that have been dominant in the philosophy and methodology of philosophy of the twentieth cen-

tury where, on the one hand, following the thought of Immanuel Kant, various *a priori* elements of scientific cognition were highlighted, or, on the other hand, looking to the views of Auguste Comte, scientific knowledge was instrumentalized and subordinated to utilitarian ends. Krapiec's conception of philosophical knowledge is built upon cognitive realism. This kind of philosophy is in a position to provide cognition that is both universal (due to its analogical character) and concrete. The methodological principles of such a scientific attitude include the principle of historicity (including the postulate to draw on solutions already known in history—both in a positive and a negative sense), the principle of objective explanation, and the principle of cognitive neutrality, especially at the starting point of scientific cognition (in the case of philosophy, the fact of the existence of being is such a neutral starting point).

Philosophy is rational cognition that seeks an ultimate rational justification for everything that exists. It starts from common-sense cognition, which is the primary or primitive intuition of the real world. It ends with the explanation of the investigated fact by indicating a necessary and objective factor that allows the philosopher to ultimately explain that fact. Philosophy, thus understood, is metaphysics (the cognition of really existing reality). Metaphysical cognition is also that to which the purpose of philosophy—the rational, necessary, and ultimate explanation of known reality—is subordinated. In Krąpiec's conception, the purpose of metaphysical cognition is focused on showing the ultimate causes of the existence of reality (unlike idealism, agnosticism, or radical empiricism). Krąpiec appeals to the immediate experience of being, the basis of which is the primary or first cognitive act, i.e., the human intellect's contact with existing reality. The character of this act is defined by Krapiec's theory of immediate experience; according to this theory, the spontaneous and pre-reflective act of cognition, in which no intermediaries of an emotional or semiotic (*quo* or *quod*) type

participate, is a condition (both an ontic and epistemic condition) for the cognitive relation between subject and object. In Krąpiec's terminology, this act is called the existential judgment.

The existential judgment, in which we affirm the existence of anything whatsoever immediately and directly, constitutes the genetically and structurally primary and first cognitive act in the system of metaphysics; it is the "man's most primary cognitive experience."[2] It is filled with the content of what exists, and with the affirmation of the existence of that content. The next phase of metaphysical cognition, including reflection, subjective consciousness and reference, and the critique of cognition, is built upon the act of the existential judgment.

Krąpiec lists two types of immediate existential judgments: the judgment which affirms the existence of a being that is external to the cognizing subject ("something is—it exists"), and the existential judgment which is reflective with respect to the cognizing subject ("I am—I exist"). The judgment of the first type constitutes the metaphysical and epistemic point of support for the realism and objectivity of philosophy.

Metaphysics: The General Theory of Being

In Krąpiec's conception, metaphysics is the fundamental philosophical discipline from which all the other disciplines of philosophy are derived or upon which they are dependent (as they are essentially particular parts of metaphysics). Metaphysics has as its task to explain in an ultimate way both individual beings (concrete things) and beings in general by indicating the inherent and necessary factor due to which they are beings. Krąpiec's existential conception of being, by highlighting the factor of existence and the fundamental composition of being from essence and existence, allows us to explain in ultimate terms met-

[2] Stanisław Kamiński and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Z teorii i metodologii metafizyki* [*On the Theory and Methodology of Metaphysics*] (Lublin: TN KUL, 1962), 194.

aphysical facts, such as the contingency of beings (the non-necessity of their existence), the pluralism of beings, their interdependence, and the problem of the source of existence. In this conception, the act of existence (*esse*) is the most profound and most perfect act of being; without the act of existence, any content (*essentia*) would remain only a pure possibility. Being apprehended in the aspect of existence ensures the realism and objectivity of cognition and of the language that man uses.

The composition of being from existence and essence as fundamental elements is made more clear by the discernment of universal properties, called the transcendentals, of cognition and language. The transcendentals (described by abbreviated names, such as: being, thing, unity, something, truth, good, and beauty), which are the results of reading the necessary and, at the same time, universal properties of beings, are fundamental cognitive structures, in the framework of which the process of cognizing both concrete things and all existing reality, takes place. The fundamental character of the transcendentals is expressed in the fact that they also encompass the so-called "first principles" of being and thought (the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of the excluded middle, the principle of the reason of being, and the principle of finality), the articulation of which shows the unity of the fundamental laws of being and those of logic. On account of the analogical way of being of things, all metaphysical cognition also has an analogical character. Moreover, the order of metaphysical cognition (the construction of the theory of being, the primary and secondary character of theses, the hierarchy of determinations of compositions of being, of aspects of apprehensions, etc.) is determined by the ordering of internal and external relations of being. In connection with this, metaphysics in the formal aspect has the character of a system, the coherence of which is determined by the coherence of being and of all reality.

In Krąpiec's system, an especially important role is played by metaphysical separation. It is the method for singling out the object of metaphysics (being as existing). By separation we establish the difference between existence and essence, and we affirm the necessary character of this difference in the dimension of every contingent being. The definition of being as something existing makes possible the further analysis of being in metaphysical cognition. Beside the discernment of the transcendentals by separation, the discernment of the fundamental structures and compositions of being takes place in metaphysical cognition. These include the following: substance and accidents—the composision which allow us to explain the identity-based way of the being of things, and which also is the basis for the formation of the concept of person and that of relation; form and matter—the composition that explains the mutability of material beings; and act and potency—the composition that allows us to explain the dynamism of existing things.

The problems of the Absolute constitute the crowning point of metaphysics. In cognizing the Absolute, a special role is played by the reference to the analogy of being which consists in the similarity of all beings in the aspect of essence and existence. The affirmation of the analogical character of beings allows us to establish the hierarchy of beings, and makes it possible to answer questions concerning the ultimate source of existence, and the Being that is the reason for all reality. The answers are contained in the theory of the Absolute which results from the metaphysical analysis of contingent beings; that metaphysical analysis requires us to indicate the ultimate reason for their being. The establishment of the properties of the absolute Being and of the ways in which contingent beings participate in the perfection of the Absolute (the theory of participation) brings the theory of being to completion in the systemic aspect.

In Krąpiec's entire metaphysics, what comes to the fore, and determines its specificity, is the general existential aspect of the explana-

tion of being. There, existence (*esse*) is regarded as doubly important: in terms of being—for existence commensurate with essence is the ultimate and necessary reason, irreducible to other reasons, for the factual reality of everything that exists; in terms of cognition—for the capacity of being to be cognized is conditioned by the reality of being, and existential judgments constitute a constant element of metaphysical cognition.

Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics

The starting point of the philosophy of man is found in the data that come from the apprehension that accompanies the existential judgment: "I exist." The scope of the fundamental data includes especially man's subjectivity and efficacy. At the same time, the results of general metaphysics serve the philosophical analysis of that data. Philosophical anthropology in its fundamental dimension is the metaphysics of man; the end of the metaphysics of man is to present the structure of human being, and to show and explain the foundations of man's transcendence. Considered in metaphysical terms, man appears as a material-spiritual being whose reason for unity is the act of existence; considered as a substantial being (a subject), possessing a personal nature that is expressed in free and conscious action (science, morality, religion, creativity), man is open to truth, the good, and beauty, and in particular to God.

The cognition of the existence of one's own "I" has its foundation in an existential judgment concerning the external world; the affirmation of the existence of "I" is epistemically based on the primary and first affirmation of the world's existence. In the existential judgment of the type "I exist," man discovers the specific existential value of his own "I," which constitutes the center of all "his" (he would say "my") acts, operations, and passive experiences. The existence of the

"I" is apprehended by reflection, for "in every instance of the intellectual cognition of our operations, especially intellectual operations, we have *in actu exercito* the affirmation of our own existence."[3] At the same time, it is in the existential judgment concerning his "I" that man determines his own identity and the reality of the world and of himself. In his book *Ja-człowiek* [*I-Man*],[4] Krąpiec presents a description of man's fundamental psycho-physical structure: "I—mine." By the variety of acts of which man is the efficient cause ("mine") or with which he has solidarity, the "I" is manifested in its real existence; as it is at the same time immanent and transcendent in that which is "mine," the "I," just through what is "mine," expresses itself and determines its own identity and development.

The metaphysical interpretation of the structure "I—mine" leads to the definition of the human being—the human being is a person, which Krąpiec defines as a "self of a rational nature."[5] The main element that is typical of man's personal being is his transcendence, both in relation to the world of nature and to society. The person is a being who exceeds the determinations of the world of nature because the person is endowed with the faculties of intellectual cognition and free will, and the ability to love disinterestedly. In turn, the person transcends society by virtue of being the subject of law, and on account of the completeness (the substantial character) of his being, and the dignity that he possesses; his dignity indicates that man is an end and not a means.

General metaphysics and philosophical anthropology is the basis upon which Krąpiec constructs his conception of ethics, i.e., his philo-

[3] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Realizm ludzkiego poznania* [*Realism of Human Cognition*] (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1959), 589.

[4] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja-człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* [*I-Man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*] (Lublin: TN KUL, 1974).

[5] *Ibid.*, 362.

sophy of human conduct. Metaphysical investigations allow us to discover the purpose of man's life, which is the actualization of the good of the person. Human nature is endowed with specific inclinations that direct man to the achievement of the end of life. Those inclinations are perfected by virtues, which are acquired by education and culture. On the basis of those inclinations, man freely makes moral decisions. A decision that leads to action that realizes a good perfects the human being in harmony with his human nature. Hence, in Krąpiec's conception, the decision is the proper object of ethics; the decision is the "reason for the being of rational and conscious human action."[6] Morality is present wherever man consciously and freely makes a decision regarding the realization of a concrete act; the good of the person (read in harmony with the truth of being) is the norm of morality.

The Philosophy of Politics and of Culture

According to Krąpiec, man as a sovereign being and the author of culture stands at the center of the conception of society and culture. Sovereignty, which belongs to the human person by reason of the person's ability to make conscious and free decisions, determines man's priority over all group forms and structures, such as society or the state. Society is "the group of organized inter-human relations;"[7] those relations are by nature ordered to man's comprehensive personal development; this development constitutes the common good to which all other social goods are subordinated. The common good also constitutes the criterion for the evaluation of political and social systems. In Krąpiec's conception, the group of real relations of each human person to the

[6] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Decyzja—bytem moralnym [Decision—A Moral Being]," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 65.

[7] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *O ludzką politykę* [*On a Human Politics*] (Katowice: Wydawnictwo *Tolek*, 1995), 93.

common good, understood as the actualization of their personal potentialities, is the foundation for the existence of society.

Society, as a "naturally necessary" being, is bound by the principles of natural law. The realization of the common good depends on how the rules for the functioning of the community are based on principles resulting from a reading of man's nature. Many social structures that exist are ordered to the supreme natural end, but the natural forms of society, i.e., the family, the nation, and the state, have special value and permanence; for they possess the closest relation to the realization of the common good of individual persons.

The whole of actions and their results, that constitute and at the same time express social life, compose culture. Man, as he realizes the common good and is turned toward the truth, the good, the beautiful, and the holy, is the author of culture. The subject of culture, i.e., man who directs himself in his action by the truth and the good, is the guarantor of culture in terms of culture's being authentically humanist. In connection with its intentional mode of being, culture constitutes a system of signs that are of human origin and are given to man to read. Hence, language is an essential and constitutive element of culture; the fundamental connection of language with reality ensures the permanence of culture and defends culture from being separated from culture's real ends, i.e., man's good.

The life of the individual in society is determined on the basis of natural law by the domain of human rights. Those rights are the natural entitlements of each and every human person. Entitlements (*ius*), such as the right to life, the right to truth, and the right to freedom of conscience, possess their grounding in man's rational nature, in particular in the human being's relation to the common good, unlike positive law (*lex*), which is binding by virtue of the legislator's will. Human rights in the sense of *ius* are the reason for positive law; the criterion for the legality of *lex* is whether or not positive law agrees with the principle of

the common good (Krąpiec underscores that the UN Declaration of Human Rights is a document that ultimately appeals to rational human nature).

In the domain of the philosophy of politics, Krąpiec advocates the priority of the common good and morality, and opposes the modern tendencies which (following Niccolò Machiavelli) shifted politics from the sphere of morality to the sphere of art, and reduced it to an order of contract and efficiency. In Krąpiec's conception, politics is the prudent realization of the common good; politics as such, since it is subordinated to the end that is man's personal good, constitutes the domain of "the morality of human social action."[8] The state, which Krąpiec defines as "the natural, necessary, and ordered association of families and small communities to achieve the human good,"[9] is brought into being for the sake of the good of sovereign individuals. Any absolutization of the state (e.g., the totalitarian mode of governance) is a deformation of of social order and an axiological usurpation, even if it is done in the name of the common good, because only the individual person possesses the ability to realize the common good that, as the essential end, stands before the organism of the state. While persons are sovereign beings, the nature of social life consists in relinquishing parts of their sovereignty by individual persons. The structure of the state includes such essential elements as: law (the system of law) and state power (its role and the ways it is exercised). Therefore, the evaluation of a particular concrete state depends on the degree of realization of the common good by social and economic institutions under conditions of a specific legal and constitutional system.[10]

[8] *Ibid.*, 15.
[9] *Ibid.*, 85.

Krąpiec's metaphysical views are the foundation for the rational justification of his views in the domain of the philosophy of history.[10] A structural and essential analysis of particular types of civilization (in which he looks to Feliks Koneczny's historical findings) leads him to the conclusion that only Latin civilization creates real conditions to ensure and realize the natural rights of the human person. This is determined by fundamental features of Latin civilization, such as (1) the affirmation of the truth which is accepted as the end (norm) of cognition, (2) seeing the end of action in the honest good as such, (3) treating health as a condition for man's development, and (4) respecting private property as the foundation of economic life. Only in this type of civilization is the human person protected from and secured against usurpation or domination by the structures of the state. In the selection of Latin-Roman culture at the dawn of Poland's existence as a state, and in the role that the Catholic Church played over the entire history of Poland, Krąpiec sees the essential elements of the identity of the Polish nation.

Students and Continuators

For more than half a century of his academic work, Krąpiec has influenced philosophical culture and formed several generations of philosophers. The large group of his students form a major part of those who developed or still develop realistic philosophy in academic centers in Poland. His students who became university professors include the following: Marian Card. Jaworski, Antoni B. Stępień, Władysław Stróżewski, Bp. Bohdan Bejze, Zofia J. Zdybicka, Tadeusz Kwiatkowski, Edmund Morawiec, Andrzej Woźnicki, Andrzej Wawrzyniak, Romuald J. Weksler-Waszkinel, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, Piotr Jaroszyński, Hen-

[10] *Ibid.*, 90 and 137.

ryk Kiereś, Krzysztof Wroczyński, Włodzimierz Dłubacz, Wojciech Chudy, Jan Sochoń, Bp. Ignacy Dec, Hugh Mcdonald, and Bogusław Paź.

Conclusion

Because of the aspect of the existence of being, which is dominant in Krąpiec's investigations, his philosophy constitutes a cohesive system that explains all reality. The unity of cognition, man, and the world is in Krąpiec's metaphysics demarcated by the unity of being. His metaphysical work introduced many original solutions; e.g., he pointed to the absolutely primary and immediate existential judgment, he singled out the method of metaphysical separation, emphasized the significance of the integral language of metaphysics, singled out transcendentalizing cognition, formulated the theory of the analogy of being and cognition, based individual and social ethics on the foundation of the natural law, formulated the conception of man as a sovereign person, upon which he built the fundamental domains of culture (science, ethics, art, and religion).

For more than half a century of philosophical work that was consistent with and faithful to realism, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec created a coherent system that, by a metaphysical explanation, encompassed the whole of reality that is accessible to human cognition. Both with respect to its comprehensive scope and its meritorious importance, Krąpiec's philosophy is the greatest achievement in classical philosophy in Poland and in the world in the twentieth century. The vision of the world that it reveals shows man's unity and harmony with the reality that surrounds him, and at the same time opens man to a connection with the transcendent Absolute.

MIECZYSŁAW ALBERT KRĄPIEC IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY*

SUMMARY

This article introduces the life and work of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (1921-2008)—a Polish philosopher, theologian, humanist, co-founder of the Lublin Philosophical School, rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, initiator and chairman of the scientific committee of *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Krąpiec created a coherent philosophical system that, by a metaphysical explanation, encompassed the whole of reality that is accessible to human cognition. According to the author, Krąpiec's philosophy is the greatest achievement in classical philosophy in Poland and in the world in the twentieth century, both with respect to its comprehensive scope and its meritorious importance; for the vision of the world that it reveals shows not only the human person's unity and harmony with the reality that surrounds him, but also his openness to a connection with the transcendent Absolute.

KEYWORDS

Krąpiec, Lublin Philosophical School, Catholic University of Lublin, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, philosophy, metaphysics, realism, Thomism, existential judgment, metaphysical separation, metaphysical language, transcendentalizing cognition, theory of analogy, sovereign person.

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ABORTION IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Abortion (Latin: *abortio*, *abortus*—miscarriage, including induced miscarriage, from: *aboriri*, *abortire*—to perish, to vanish) is the deliberate and immediate killing of a human being before birth (abortion must be distinguished from spontaneous miscarriage or a situation where the child is allowed to die without this being intended, where the death is the result of causes not dependent upon acting persons—*abortus indirectus*).

This issue is especially important in the 21st century because of the availability of technologies that make it easier to perform abortions and because of the spread of a mentality approving abortion.

The philosophical aspects of abortion concern in particular the moral evaluation of the act. The moral evaluation of abortion depends, on one hand, upon how the ontic status of the conceived human being is defined, and on the other hand, upon what kind of criteria one assumes for the moral evaluation.

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The Ontic Status of the Conceived Human Being

In ancient times and in the Middle Ages, there were various positions on the beginning of human life. According to Tertullian, Plato thought that a human being does not acquire a soul until the moment of birth: with the child's first breath, the soul is infused from outside of the mother's womb.[1] Tertullian writes that Plato also held another conception: "I hardly know [which of Plato's two views I should believe], for he here shows us that the soul proceeds from human seed (and warns us to be on our guard about it), not, (as he had said before) from the first breath of the new-born child."[2] Plato commanded that the unborn should be surrounded by special protection.[3] Tertullian thought that the Stoics, along with Aenesidemus, shared this opinion. Aristotle's position that the fetus becomes human forty days after conception in the case of a male, and ninety days after conception in the case of a female, had a particularly strong influence until the end of the Middle Ages.[4] It is thought that Aristotle did not treat these times as the moments when the fetus would acquire a soul (when the intellectual soul would appear). The Stagirite was not certain whether this problem can be solved and he did not say when the human soul enters the body. Philo followed the Book of Exodus (21:22) and said that the fetus is a human being if it is formed, while Tertullian stated that the embryo has a soul from the moment of conception, since the "substance of both body and soul . . . are conceived, and formed, and perfectly simultaneously."[5] According to Tertullian, if someone thought that the body was

[1] Tertullian, *De anima*, 25, 2–4.

[2] *Ibid*. Translated by Peter Holmes. From *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 3, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885). Available at: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0310.htm.

[3] *Leges*, VII, 789 A–790 A.

[4] *Generatione animalium*, 2, 3.

[5] Tertullian, *De anima*, 25, 2; 37, 2.

conceived earlier than the soul, he would be compelled to distinguish the times of their respective inseminations; furthermore, "if different periods are to be assigned to the inseminations then arising out of this difference in time, we shall also have different substances."[6] Tertullian regarded the fetus as a potential human person: "That is a man which is going to be one; you have the fruit already in its seed."[7] St. Jerome, on the other hand, wrote that embryos are gradually formed in the womb.[8] Jerome and Augustine both admitted that they did not know when the rational soul is given by God. Augustine truly accepted the Septuagint's distinction between the *fetus formatus* and the *fetus informatus*, but this did not make the formation of the fetus the same as its acquisition of a spirit. He allowed that it is possible that unformed fetuses are endowed with a rational soul, but he did not settle the question of whether animation occurred at the moment of conception, when the fetus takes a human shape, or at the moment it makes its first movements.

Thomas Aquinas knew Aristotle's view on later animation and occasionally cited him on account of his scientific authority when he stated that God infuses a rational soul into the body only when the body is prepared.[9] According to this theory, the embryo would undergo substantial changes: first it would possess a substantial form which was a vegetative soul, then the sensitive soul would take its place, and finally the rational soul would replace the sensitive soul. Thomas's position, however, may be interpreted as follows:

> the sequential *generationes et corruptiones* . . . occur in an infinitesimal interval of time or completely outside of time, or to put it more strictly—in a temporal moment *in instanti*. In such a case, the theory of sequential substantial changes in the embryo could

[6] *Ibid.*, 25, 2; 37, 7.

[7] *Apologeticum*, IX 8.

[8] *Letters*, 121, 4.

[9] *S.Th.*, I, q. 100, art. 1, ad 2.

> be brought into full agreement with the theory that the soul endowed with a mind was created by God at the moment of conception, and so at the moment of the first formation of the human embryo.[10]

However, if we consider the scientific findings of our day, we cannot hold the view that any substantial changes occur over the course of the life of the human being during the fetal stage.

Modern philosophical argumentation on the beginning the life of the human being as a person appeals to data from the natural sciences that show that when the sperm cell joins with the ovum the first living cell is produced; this cell possesses the human genetic code that henceforth without interruption directs the entire psycho-physical development of the human being. The identity of the system of man's operation from conception indicates that there is one and the same source for these operations, and this we call the human soul. The position that the human soul first appears at the moment when the body is properly organized must be rejected, since

> we see the identity of the system of operation according to the inherited code. The soul is simple in itself and is not capable of successive exchanges; either it is whole or it is not. If it is one and the same source of operation, then it is one and the same soul in this operation as the intellectual soul which prepares for itself . . . its own organism distinct from that of its mother and father, the human body which at the right moment allows intellectual cognitive activities and together with them the whole ensemble of man's spiritual activities.[11]

The soul as the being's act of existence cannot be posterior to the being itself.

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[10] Św. Tomasz z Akwinu [St. Thomas Aquinas], *Traktat o człowieku* [*Treatise on Man*], ed. Stefan Swieżawski (Poznań: Pallotinum, 1956), 734.

[11] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Psychologia racjonalna* [*Rational Psychology*] (Lublin: RW KUL 1996), 302.

It is also shown that theories that human existence does not begin until some moment after conception do not respect the elementary principles of being and thought. Since a human's life is a continuum and at the same time a uniform and identical process (as is indicated by the natural sciences), and man is the point at which this process aims, then any attempts to locate the beginning of man's existence at some other time than at the moment of conception are contrary to the principle of sufficient reason, as well as the principle of non-contradiction and identity. Furthermore, all the theories that state that the beginning of human life is later than at the moment of conception (e.g., based on such criteria as the moment of birth, the ability to exist on one's own, the possession of consciousness, the development of nerve tissue, the ability to move, etc.) arbitrarily take some stage of human development as the determining factor in the existence of the human being. This leads to absurd consequences when one is forced not to recognize as human beings those who certainly are human beings.

Some of the findings of embryology (the fact that until the time of implantation, two or more organisms can arise from one embryo, or that two zygotes can unite into one individual) have influenced some thinkers to accept the theory of successive animation (e.g., Karl Rahner, Wilfried Ruff, Tadeusz Ślipko). Some thinkers regard this theory as more probable than the theory of simultaneous animation. Some argue that the phenomenon of monozygotic twins does not provide sufficient grounds for rejecting the theory of simultaneous animation (at the moment of conception). Because of the particular epistemological and methodological character of such statements (such statements belong to the experimental sciences and thus they can have only a hypothetical character), their ethical conclusions remain the same as when one presupposes simultaneous animation.

The Moral Evaluation of Abortion

In ancient Greece and Rome abortion was generally accepted, while the Jews and Christians clearly and constantly condemned it.

Plato allows abortion and infanticide for eugenic reasons and to control the number of people in the ideal state: "[P]referably not even to bring to light anything whatever thus conceived, but if they are unable to prevent a birth to dispose of it on the understanding that we cannot rear such an offspring."[12] In the *Leges*, Plato presents colonization, but not abortion and infanticide, as a sufficient means for avoiding overpopulation: "[I]n case . . . [of] a superabundance of citizens . . . there still remains . . . the sending forth, in friendly wise from a friendly nation, of colonies consisting of such people as are deemed suitable."[13] Aristotle also justified abortion:

> As to exposing or rearing the children born, let there be a law that no deformed child shall be reared . . . there must be a limit fixed to the procreation of offspring, and if any people have a child as a result of intercourse in contravention of these regulations, abortion must be practised on it before it has developed sensation and life; for the line between lawful and unlawful abortion will be marked by the fact of having sensation and being alive.[14]

Seneca noted that abortion was universal and regarded the custom of killing and drowning lame and deformed newborn fetuses and

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[12] *Republic*, 461 C, in Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 5 & 6, trans. Paul Shorey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1969). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

[13] *Laws*, 740 D–E, in Plato, *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Vols. 10 & 11, trans. R. G. Bury (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1967 & 1968). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

[14] *Politics*, 1335 b, in Aristotle, *Aristotle in 23 Volumes*, Vol. 21, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1944). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

children as fitting. He thought it was the proper decision since "we separate the sick from the healthy," yet he had a negative opinion of abortion. He recalled that despite the prevailing customs his own mother did not destroy her "expected child within your womb after the fashion of many other women."[15]

Philo regarded the killing of one's own children as murder in the highest degree, for it is the murder of one's own offspring. Clement of Alexandria states that Christians should not

> kill, by various means of a perverse art, the human offspring, born according to the designs of divine providence; for these women who, in order to hide their immorality, use abortive drugs which expel the matter completely dead, abort at the same time their human feelings.[16]

Athenagoras also condemned abortion.[17] Tertullian said that, "To hinder a birth is merely a speedier man-killing; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is born, or destroy one that is coming to the birth."[18] Jerome and Augustine both admitted that they did not know the moment when the fetus became animated, but they condemned abortion—irrespective of the age of the fetus—as the homicide of one's own child. Augustine condemned the slaying of children before they are born.[19] Basil of Cappadocia described abortion as murder irrespective of any distinction between the "formed" and the "unformed" fetus.[20]

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[15] Seneca, *De consolatione ad Helviam*, XVI, in Seneca, *Consolations from a Stoic*, trans. Aubrey Stewart (Enhanced Media, 2017).

[16] *Paedagogus*, 2, 10, 96, trans. Simon P. Wood. (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1954).

[17] *Legatio pro christianis*, 35, PG 6, 950.

[18] *Apology*, IX, 8, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 3 (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957), 25.

[19] *De nuptiis et concupiscentiis*, I, 18 [XV].

[20] *Letters* 188, PG 32, 672.

Peter Lombard argues that the animation of the fetus takes place only when it has been formed, and to cause an abortion when the fetus has been animated is homicide.[21] The text cannot be taken as a moral approval of the abortion of an "unformed" fetus. In his commentary on the *Sentences*,[22] St. Thomas Aquinas describes the use of abortifacients as a "sin against nature." In the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas comments upon the Book of Exodus (21:22) and describes the causing of a miscarriage by hitting a pregnant woman as "accidental homicide" (*homicidium casuale*).[23] Both Thomas and Albert the Great regarded sexual relations in the later period of pregnancy as a serious moral evil (a grave sin) because of the possibility that it could cause a miscarriage. Thomas also rejected the idea that abortion can be allowed for the good of the child.[24] In his opinion, for the eternal good of the child it is not allowed to cut open his mother in order to remove him from the womb and baptize him; it is also not permitted to kill a child before birth to save him from some earthly misfortune (e.g., because of mental retardation). Thomas resorts to the principle that the end does not justify the means, or in other words, that one may not do evil that good may come of it. Aquinas also provided some principles that are indispensable in the moral evaluation of so-called therapeutic abortion, that is, the killing of the child in order to save the life of the mother, and in distinguishing this act from *abortus indirectus*. In his opinion, homicide in self-defense is proper if the death of the other person is the unintended result of an action that was aimed at saving one's own life.[25]

The first expression of approval for abortion in European philosophy may be found in the Marquis de Sade's book, *La philosophie dans*

[21] *Sentences*, 4, 31.

[22] *In IV Sententiarum*, 4, 31, 18.

[23] *S.Th.*, II–II, q. 64, art. 8, resp.

[24] *In IV Sententiarum*, 1, 1, 3, ad 4.

[25] *S.Th.*, II–II, q. 64, art. 7.

le boudoir;[26] he justifies abortion performed for the sake of controlling the population. This is also in harmony with the apotheosis of lust and coercion in his writings.

Various forms of subjectivist approach to the norm of morality (i.e., of making activity aligned not with objective reality, but rather with some factors which are ultimately subjective) may allow for a positive evaluation of abortion, if it is espoused by a "calculus of pleasure" (ethical hedonism), the decision of a subject (autonomous deontonomism), or the decision of a morally authoritative instance outside a subject (heteronomous deontonomism). It is essential to a moral judgment that it should be based upon the perception of the truth about objective reality in which the acting subject finds himself—especially the truth about who the subject of an action and the person addressed in that action are in their ontic and axiological structures. If abortion is the taking of the life of an innocent and defenseless human person, then this act is always and everywhere morally wrong. Life is man's fundamental good and it gives meaning to all the other goods of man. To take a human person's life means to disrespect the ontic and axiological status of this person. Such an act is always and everywhere wrong because no real conflict is possible between life and any other higher good.[27]

It is wrong to present abortion as a situation of defense against an unjust aggressor in which it is permitted to apply proportional measures to save oneself from some act of aggression. A child before birth cannot be qualified as an aggressor because he cannot perform rational and free actions.

No possible doubts about the humanity of the fetus can change this moral qualification of abortion, because when someone undertakes an action which may be the killing of a human being, that person in fact

[26] Londres 1795.

[27] The respect both for life and any such higher good is a condition for affirming the value of the person.

is consenting to the possible killing. Aquinas recalls the incident described in the Book of Genesis (4:23) and writes that "he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide."[28] For these reasons, the moral evaluation of abortion in the Middle Ages (unlike the legal evaluation, which required that the punishment—adapted to the views on biology prevalent at the time—should be meted out for the good of the accused) was independent of the accepted view concerning the time of animation.

The justification of abortion in terms of the expectation that thereby some good will be achieved (e.g., that the mother's life will be saved, or that she will be spared sufferings resulting from rape or difficult material conditions) implies the impermissible treatment of the person of the child as nothing more than a means to the end of some other person. Meanwhile the human person by reason of his ontic and axiological dignity—based on his rationality and freedom which allow him to define and to choose his own ends by himself, and which does not depend upon the circumstances of his conception or living conditions, and by which the person is a *bonum honestum*, a good in himself—definitely cannot be treated as a means to an end.

The killing of the child before birth in order to save the life of the mother in cases where these goods are in conflict is also not morally justified. This situation must, however, be distinguished from *abortus indirectus*, that is, from cases where the obligation to save the life of a woman in immediate danger justifies a medical intervention which indirectly—unintendedly but unavoidably—results in the death of the child (e.g., the surgical removal of part of the fallopian tube in a case of extra-uterine pregnancy which poses an immediate threat to the lives of

[28] *S.Th.*, II–II, q. 64, art. 8, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947). Available at: https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/.

both mother and child). Cases where the death of an unborn child is merely allowed must be distinguished from cases where the child is directly put to death in order to save the mother's life. In the latter case the child is treated merely as a means to the end of another person, which is as morally unjustified as it would be to treat the mother merely as a means for the good of the child. Since persons can never be treated merely as means to an end, they must not be treated as such when a mother's life is in danger.

It is also morally impermissible to kill an unborn child who is mentally retarded (such killing is defended in vitalistic conceptions of man supported by, e.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, Peter Singer). The value of the person and the value of the person's life do not depend upon the person's state of health (no matter what his illness is or how serious it is, the sick person does not cease to be a human person equal in dignity to other persons). For this reason, the human person's state of health does not have any essential influence upon the moral evaluation of the act of putting him to death.

ABORTION* IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

The author discusses the problem of abortion. He defines abortion as a deliberate and immediate killing of a human being before birth; he distinguishes it from spontaneous miscarriage or a situation where the child is allowed to die without this being intended, where the death is the result of causes not dependent upon acting persons—*abortus indirectus*. In order to morally evaluate the act of abortion, the author considers both the ontic status of the conceived human being and the criteria usually used for the evaluation.

KEYWORDS

abortion, human being, person, unborn, child, death, infanticide, homicide, fetus, Christian philosophy, Christian ethics, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

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BEAUTY IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Beauty (Greek: καλός, Latin: *pulchritudo*, *pulchrum*) is an analogically understood property of reality, of human products (including art), and of the human mode of conduct, and expressed in the tradition of Western culture under the form of harmony, perfection, or splendor, which as beheld and for beholding arouses complacency or pleasure.

At present, beauty is most often associated with art, with sensory knowledge, and with emotions. The reflections of the ancient Greeks on beauty did not put works of art in the first place, but instead put reality (the cosmos) and morality (καλοκάγαθία) there. The first theories of beauty were not univocal but were intended to consider the analogical dimension of beauty, and even the transcendental dimension of beauty.

Classical Theories of Beauty

The first theory of beauty was developed by the Pythagoreans. They regarded number as the main principle of being. Number was mani-

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fested under the form of harmony that permeated the world on the macroscopic and microscopic level. Music was the chief manifestation of harmony. The Pythagorean Theon of Smyrna wrote:

> [M]usic is the warp thread of agreement between things in nature and the universe of the best administration. Harmony as a rule takes the form of harmony in the universe, legitimacy in the state, and a prudent way of life in the home. This is because harmony joins and unites. They say that action and the application of knowledge [musical knowledge] are manifested in four human domains: in the soul, in the body, in the home, and in the state. This is because those four things require harmonization and unification.[1]

Beauty as music and harmony refers to the universe, to nature, to the state, to domestic life, and to man in his bodily and spiritual aspect.

The second theory holds that beauty is form. It was formulated by Plato who thought that an immaterial world to which ideas belonged existed above the material world. Among the ideas there is the idea of beauty whereby, by participation (the theory of participation), material beings are also beautiful—"[T]hat I asked about beauty itself, that which gives the property of being beautiful to everything, to which it is added—to stone and wood, and man, and god, and every action and every branch of learning?"[2] Man should strive after beauty as thus understood as the purpose of his life—"[A] man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty."[3]

A somewhat different conception of beauty is found in the *Timaeus*: there beauty is not determined by participation in the idea of

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[1] *Mathematica*, I, cit. after Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Historia estetyki* [*History of Aesthetics*], vol. 1 (Wrocław 1960), 105.

[2] *Greater Hippias*, 292 D, in Plato, *Dialogues*, vol. 1, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 579.

[3] *Symposium*, 211 D, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 9, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collections.

beauty, but by the degree to which things produced by the Demiurge are in agreement with their immaterial primordial models—"But when the artificer of any object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using a model of this kind, that object, executed in this way, must of necessity be beautiful."[4]

Plotinus criticized the theory of harmony. He remarked that since harmony is unity in plurality, then beauty could not be something simple, e.g., light or color. Meanwhile, it is that which is simple (a model, idea, or form) that is beautiful, and what is composite is beautiful by participation in an idea.

> Almost everyone declares that the symmetry of parts towards each other and towards a whole, with, besides, a certain charm of colour, constitutes the beauty recognized by the eye, that in visible things, as indeed in all else, universally, the beautiful thing is essentially symmetrical, patterned. But think what this means. Only a compound can be beautiful, never anything devoid of parts; and only a whole; the several parts will have beauty, not in themselves, but only as working together to give a comely total. Yet beauty in an aggregate demands beauty in details; it cannot be constructed out of ugliness; its law must run throughout. All the loveliness of colour and even the light of the sun, being devoid of parts and so not beautiful by symmetry, must be ruled out of the realm of beauty.[5]

Plotinus was inclined to accept light-form as the source of beauty, both in a material sense and in a spiritual sense. His conception found continuators in the Middle Ages. Pseudo-Dionysius gave it a more metaphysical form and remarked that supra-entitative beauty is the source of beauty.

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[4] *Timaeus*, 28 A–B, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 9, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/collections.

[5] *The Enneads*, I, 6, 1, trans. Stephen MacKenna (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 46.

> But, the superessential Beautiful is called Beauty, on account of the beauty communicated from Itself to all beautiful things, in a manner appropriate to each, and as Cause of the good harmony and brightness of all things which flashes like light to all the beautifying distributions of its fontal ray . . .[6]

Robbert Grosseteste and Witelo, under the influence of new discoveries in optics, thought that light was also the cause of beauty, and that light was what allowed us to see beauty—"Lux est maxime pulchrificativa et pulchritudinis manifestiva."[7] Ulrich of Strasburg said that there were two kinds of light, physical light and immaterial light, which respectively are the reason for material beauty and spiritual beauty—"[S]icut lux corporalis est formaliter et causaliter pulchritudo omnium visibilium, sic lux intellectualis est formalis causa pulchritudinis omnis formae substantialis etiam materialis formae."[8]

In the Aristotelian schools, beauty was associated with form. Form was understood either as an internal principle of being or only as an accidental form that organizes matter or human action. Albert the Great held such a position—"Pulchrum [dicit] splendorem formae substantialis vel actualis supra partes materiae proportionatas. . . . Ratio pulchri in universali consistit in resplendentia formae super partes materiae proportionatas, vel super diversas vires vel actiones."[9]

Thomas Aquinas also thought that form was the reason for beauty—"[B]eauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause."[10] He

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[6] *De divinis nominibus*, IV, 7, in *The Collected Works of Dionysius the Areopagite*, trans. John Parker (Woodstock, Ontario: Solace Games, 2015), 20.

[7] Robert Grosseteste, *Commentarii in De divinis nominibus*, IV. Cf. also, Witelo, *Optica*, IV, 148.

[8] *Liber de summo bono*, II, 3, 5.

[9] *Opusculum de pulchro et bono*, V, 420–421.

[10] *S.Th.*, I, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1: "[P]ulchrum proprie pertinet ad rationem causae formalis." Retrieved from: St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947). Available at: https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/.

combined previous elements of reflections on beauty and presented a definition of beauty (called the objective definition) in which he emphasized three elements: perfection, proportion, and brilliance—"For beauty includes three conditions, *integrity* or *perfection*, since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due *proportion* or *harmony*; and lastly, *brightness* or *clarity*, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color."[11]

While the two theories of beauty above had objective value, the third, which had appeared among the Stoics, considered the role of the subject without falling into subjectivism. Basil the Great was the author of the theory. Basil thought that beauty was the proper relation (or proportion) between an object that is beheld and the subject who sees it; that relation makes the joy of beholding appear in the subject—"Would not the symmetry in light be less shown in its parts than in the pleasure and delight at the sight of it? Such is also the beauty of gold, which it owes not to the happy mingling of its parts, but only to its beautiful color which has a charm attractive to the eyes."[12] Thomas Aquinas presented this idea saying: "beautiful things are those which please when seen" and of which "the *beautiful* is something pleasant to apprehend."[13]

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[11] *S.Th.*, I, q. 39, art. 8, resp.: "Nam ad pulchritudinem tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, integritas sive perfectio, quae enim diminuta sunt, hoc ipso turpia sunt. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et iterum claritas: unde quae habent colorem nitidum, pulchra esse dicuntur."

[12] *Homilia in Hexaëmeron*, II, 7, trans. Blomfield Jackson, in *From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Second Series, vol. 8, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1895). Available at:

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/32012.htm.

[13] *S.Th.*, I, q. 5, art. 4, ad 1: "[P]ulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent;" and *ibid.*, I–II, q. 27, art. 1, ad 3: "[P]ulchrum autem dicatur id cuius ipsa apprehensio placet."

Beauty in the Metaphysical Conception

Metaphysics as it was classically understood investigates being as being and the properties of being that are called the transcendentals. The transcendentals, aside from being, are as follows: thing, one, separateness, truth, and good. The status of beauty has been a matter of discussion. Some authors think that beauty cannot be considered one of the transcendentals because it does not refer to every being, since some things are ugly (Marc de Munnynck, Marie-Dominique Philippe), or not all are harmonious (Maurice de Wulf), or because beauty does not refer to every element of being but only to form (Philippe), or because it is only a species of the good (Joseph Kleutgen, Joseph Gredt), or a synthesis of the recognized transcendentals, especially truth and the good (Antoni B. Stępień). Most authors, however, hold that beauty is a separate transcendental property of being, although it is a synthesis of truth and the good (Alejandro Lobato, Matteo Liberatore, Antonin D. Sertillange, Étienne Gilson, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec), or of being, truth, and the good (Gerald B. Phelan), or even a synthesis of all the transcendentals (Jacques Maritain). Beauty is most often mentioned at the end, but it has been mentioned at the beginning when someone considers not philosophical reflection on the transcendentals but considers the character of man's personal life, which is integrally activated both in the cognitive sphere and in the emotional-volitional sphere (Krąpiec).

Beauty as a transcendental property of being is one of the relational transcendentals that show the relation of being to the subject—in a constitutive sense to the Absolute, and secondarily to man. Although formally beauty is a synthesis of truth and the good, from the metaphysical point of view, it expresses an integral relation of being to the person, and not only to the intellect (the truth), or only to the will (the good).

Beauty in Aesthetics

In ancient and medieval theories of beauty, the transcendental and the categorical conceptions of beauty were not presented as being opposed, all the more since aesthetics as a separate science did not appear until the mid-eighteenth century. Aesthetic theories of beauty are burdened by the same philosophical assumptions from which aesthetics arose. Those assumptions concern the theory of being, nature, and man. Aesthetics arose in the Cartesian-Leibnizian current because of Alexander Baumgarten (1750), a student of Christian Wolff. Beauty was connected with art and defined as the perfection of sensory knowledge. The beauty of reality (i.e., the beauty of being and the beauty of nature) was abandoned, as did moral beauty, which was so typical of the Greeks. The expression "fine arts" was introduced by Charles Batteux (1748). In aesthetics, beauty was initially regarded as the chief concept, but by the end of the nineteenth century, beauty lost its position to aesthetic categories (Karl Groos, Victor Basch) and then to (1) aesthetic values, such as sublimity, appropriateness, or charm and grace, which were already known to ancient writers, or (2) new categories, such as the small, the immature, and even the ugly and the atrocious (Roman Ingarden).

Because of the shaky status and conception of beauty in aesthetics, there were even proposals (especially in analytic philosophy) to remove beauty from aesthetics (Jerome Stolnitz, Herbert Read, and John Passmore). A further step was anti-aesthetics and anti-kallism where negative aesthetic values including ugliness took the superior position.[14] The crisis of beauty in aesthetics is affected by the context of the crisis in philosophy and Western culture. Aesthetics is not an autonomous domain of philosophy because it is cultivated within certain

[14] Henryk Kiereś, *Człowiek i sztuka* [*Man and Art*] (Lublin: PTTA, 2006), 41–58.

movements of philosophy whose aims, object, and methods can either open or close aesthetics to reality and the legacy of culture. Anti-kallism falls into the context of late ancient oriental movements, such as Manicheanism and Gnosticism, that penetrated into Western culture and promoted the negation of both matter and the cosmos under the form of evil and ugliness.

The Separation of Beauty from Reality

The process of the separation of beauty from reality appeared in the context of the conception of being, nature, and human knowledge. If a philosophical position says that being is unknowable, by the same token no properties, and all the more beauty, can be predicated of being. Modern and contemporary theories of beauty were strongly influenced by Cartesian agnosticism in which ideas, and not reality transcendent to ideas, were regarded as the direct object of human consciousness. Descartes was influenced by Francisco Suárez and identified ideas with "subjective concepts" (*conceptus subiectivus*); the subjective concept no longer performed a transparent cognitive function (as a *medium quo*). As a result, man's entire personal (cognitive, volitional, and emotional) life was locked within human awareness. The real world ceased to be the object of philosophy, and beauty could appear only as one of the immanent correlates of our acts; as a result, the subjectivization of the understanding of beauty had to follow.

The conception of being either opens or closes the way to beauty. If being is understood in an analogical and transcendental way, beauty can be a property of being. On the other hand, if the concept of being arises by way of abstraction, then being is either something completely undetermined in itself, a pure possibility, and non-contradiction (John Duns Scotus), or it is identified with nothingness and as such is regard-

ed as internally contradictory (Georg W. F. Hegel). In the second approach, there is no room for the beauty of being.

The connection of beauty with nature depends on the conception of nature. If nature is a purely systemic concept entirely dependent on the structure of a philosophical system and independent of reality, then the position of beauty will depend on the system. For Schelling, the beauty of art is higher than the beauty of nature because the Absolute is the paradigm for understanding reality; the evolution of the Absolute first goes through the phase of nature, then through the phase of art, which is a higher phase than the previous one because in the phase of art finitude is united with infinity that is still absent in nature. In this conception, the beauty of nature is accidental and the beauty of art is essential. Hegel precluded the beauty of nature and thought that only art can be beautiful. This was because nature in the process of the dialectical development of the Absolute is the negation of the Spirit, and beauty is born from the spirit and reborn for the sake of the spirit. In both cases, both beauty and nature are interpreted exclusively in the categories of the philosophical system.

Nature can be treated as a correlate of the particular sciences, such as physics, chemistry, or biology. Then the treatment of nature in realistic and common-sense categories is regarded as an expression of naivety and subjectivism. The beauty of nature is only an effect of our subjective impressions under which lies a "cold" and "indifferent" world of the components of matter invisible to the naked eye.

Nature can also be regarded as a necessary, but in itself worthless, basis for aesthetic objects that appear due to art. In fact, what is beautiful is an aesthetic object that results from activities of an artist whose work is appropriately interpreted by the recipient (Ingarden).

The aesthetic conceptions of beauty refer to acts of knowledge, to emotional states, or to the aesthetic object constituted on the basis of a work of art. According to the founder of aesthetics—Baumgarten,

beauty is a perfection of sensory knowledge,[15] which in the system built on the principles of G. W. Leibniz meant a vague representation of perfection. Baumgarten was followed by Georg F. Meier, Moses Mendelssohn, Johann A. Eberhard, and Johann G. Sulzer who emphasized representation more than knowledge. The British philosophers, aside from knowledge (mainly sensory knowledge), expounded on the role of emotions. Joseph Addison held that beauty evokes in us a secret joy and appeals directly to the imagination. In turn, Francis Hutcheson connected beauty with pleasure, that is, with that which comes from knowledge of complex ideas. David Hume returned to the classical theory of harmony; following in the tracks of Plotinus, Edmund Burke criticized that theory. Henry Home limited beauty to the sense of sight, even eliminating hearing.

The Kantian theory of beauty rose above the line of thought of Baumgarten and of British aesthetics and was an integral part of transcendental philosophy. Beauty is delight that flows from the free play of the imagination with the intellect, and also from form, but not from the matter of the object; that delight is indifferent to existence (disinterested joy)—that is purposefulness without a purpose or end (unreflected knowledge). Kant's conception, especially his category of play, was referred to by Herbert Spencer, Grant Allen, Karl Groos, and Jean-Marie Guyau.

Under the influence of Hegel, the conception of beauty as expression was developed, especially as the expression of the artist who expresses himself in art. According to abstract idealism, beauty is mainly a property of ideas, and only in addition is it a property of matter (Karl C. F. Krause, Karl W. F. Solger, Christian H. Weisse, Hermann Lotze), but according to concrete idealism, a connection with matter is necessary (Friedrich E. D. Schleiermacher, Martin Deutinger, Friedrich

[15] *Aesthetica* (Hildesheim 1986), I, 14: "[P]erfectio cognitionis sensitivae, qua talis."

T. Vischer, Eduard von Hartmann). Beauty is described as a perfectly expressed ideal (Louis A. Reid), as an expression of aesthetic feelings (Samuel Alexander), or as an expression of the artist's internal life (Henry Osborne). Beauty is a signifying form expressed by the senses (Susanne Langer, Ernst Cassirer).

Benedetto Croce's theory was also inspired by Hegelianism. Croce held that beauty was the most primary form of intuition or expression that flows through human life; it is a synthesis of feelings and knowledge, especially the imagination; it is indifferent to reality and is part of the aesthetic synthesis that precedes logical synthesis and practical synthesis. In such a source-related and primary experience, the French phenomenologist, Mikel Dufrenne, also looked for beauty.[16]

A typical feature of the theories of beauty proposed in aesthetics is that beauty is separated from reality and from man's higher personal acts; beauty is treated mainly as a correlate or property of sensory-emotional acts that have a pre-intellectual and pre-reflective character.[17]

The Problem of Ugliness

Ugliness must be considered both in the context of the conception of beauty, since it is its negation, and in the conception of being. At the level of objective definition, ugliness can be the negation of harmony as disharmony, the negation of light as darkness, the negation of perfection as imperfection. From the metaphysical point of view (the analogical conception of being), ugliness is a lack that ultimately presupposes the positively understood basis (subject) in which it appears. There is neither positively nor absolutely understood ugliness. Being as such is beautiful in the transcendental sense, because as such it presup-

[16] *Esthétique et philosophie*, vol. 1 (Paris: Klincksieck, 1967), 139–160.
[17] Cf. Piotr Jaroszyński, *Beauty and Being* (Toronto: PIMS, 2011), 57–155.

poses a commensurate subordination to the Absolute's love and knowledge.

In the univocal conception of being, ugliness cannot be treated as a privation of being, but as something in itself that is called ugliness because it does not possess a feature essential to beauty (the good).

In neo-Platonism, diffusion is a feature of the good (emanationism), while evil is a property of matter; matter is the final stage of emanation and thereby it no longer imparts itself and must be ugly (Plotinus).

At the level of the relationist definition, ugliness means either cognitive vagueness or the evocation of negative emotions (disgust, revulsion). Being as such exists only due to actual ordering to the Absolute's love and knowledge, and thereby in a metaphysical sense, being cannot be ugly.

In the case of a being's relation to human love and knowledge, we can speak only of its potential subordination, which means its openness both in the aspect of intelligibility and loveability, which do not need to be realized in actuality.

The problem of ugliness in the aesthetic sense concerns above all ugliness as the topic of works of art where the artist's intention is to show something that is disharmonious, deformed, dark, and which arouses negative emotions. In that case, the measure of perfection must include the relation of the work of art to the artistic conception that is the exemplary idea and the measure of perfection, and not in relation to the world that is represented. The second aspect concerns the manner of representation, which can be perfect with respect to the author's talent. Then a phenomenon appears of which Thomas Aquinas spoke: we call an image beautiful when it perfectly represents a thing, although the thing is ugly in itself. Perfect representation includes artistic skill, which makes pleasing to us that which in relation to reality may have shortcomings and may arouse negative emotions, but a feeling of satis-

faction rules over those emotions because the work of art revolves directly in the realm of the world that is represented (art as an intentional being).

The philosophical analysis of beauty, that considers beauty as a property of being, allows us to investigate and separate beauty as a cultural and historical phenomenon. It explains why there is no room for transcendental beauty in some kinds of metaphysics (ontology), why the crisis of beauty arises in ethics (by the breaking of contact with reality), and what vision of being is presupposed in cultural currents that promote anti-kallism.

Just as beauty from the objective side highlights the harmony and order of reality, so from the side of the human subject, especially personal life, which encompasses what we call culture, and what contains within it human knowledge (including science), moral conduct, productivity, and religion, beauty is the keystone that in the dynamic of our development brings order and opens us to ultimate fulfillment, which in the supernatural perspective takes the form of the *visio beatifica* (the vision of God, which causes happiness), which engages all man's spiritual faculties in their entirety in the highest degree. On this account, beauty is a crucial category for culture in general because it integrates various lines of our personal life, and it cannot in any case be reduced merely to aesthetics (art) or lost from the field of vision of human life as integrally and transcendentally understood.

BEAUTY* IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

The author considers the problem of beauty. He identifies beauty as an analogically understood property of reality, of human products (including art), and of the human

mode of conduct, and as that which, in the tradition of Western culture, is expressed under the form of harmony, perfection, or splendor, which as beheld and for beholding arouses complacency or pleasure. The article discusses the following topics: classical theories of beauty, beauty in the metaphysical conception, beauty in aesthetics, the separation of beauty from reality, and the problem of ugliness.

KEYWORDS

beauty, reality, morality, art, human being, Western culture, harmony, perfection, splendor, complacency, pleasure, metaphysics, aesthetics, ugliness, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

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MAN IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Man (Gk. ἄνθρωπος, Lat. *homo*) is a concretely living being of a corporeal and spiritual nature.

The general human culture is full of multiple questions on man and various answers to them, for the reflection of man about himself seems to be as old as human history. It is expressed and confirmed, for example, by the inscription on the architrave of the temple of Apollo at Delphi: Γνῶθι σαυτόν ("Know thyself"). In this context, I am going first to review the most general and culturally important statements on the subject of man, and then present the developed and rationally justified conception of man as a personal being who, by his action, transcends nature, society, and himself. This conception, unique in world literature, finds its expression in St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*, which presents a justifying context for man's origin and life, ontic structure, individual and social actions as rationally conditioned, and the eschatic fulfillment of his natural desire for happiness by the intervention of the Incarnate God—Jesus Christ. In his *Summa*, Aqui-

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nas not only considers and rationally justifies all the basic aspects of the nature of man who transcends the world by his conscious and free action, but also takes into consideration various anthropological theories developed in ancient Greece and Rome.

Pre-Systemic Statements

In the ancient Indian philosophico-religious thought that is available to us today, man (puruṣa, manuṣya) was included in one of five sub-groups of domesticated animals: cows, horses, goats, and monkeys, and differed from them in his ability to perform sacrifices; furthermore, only man (and that was to testify to man's supreme dignity) could free himself from the circle of palingenesis by definite modes of life. That liberation, however, did not affect man as a whole, but only his internal element which determined "being oneself" (the self, selfness). Moreover, the ultimate liberation was not achievable by all people, but only those from the highest social castes.

In ancient Greek philosophy, although man is similar to the gods, yet he differs from them in that he is mortal and dwells on the earth; as a being subject to the influence of time and change, he is also subject, in his earthly life, to evil and misfortune. Therefore, according to the ancients, those whom the gods love die young.[1] Philosophers, trying to gain knowledge of the universe and man's place in it, regarded man as a "microcosm." Man belongs to the world of animals, but he differs fundamentally from them in that not only does he receive information from the world, but also understands the information; nevertheless, man is deficient in his endowments (such as physical strength, natural fur, etc.) in comparison to certain other animals.

[1] In Homer's *Iliad* (VII, 131), there is the belief that the soul abandons man with his last breath, or loss of blood.

In Hesiod's stories, it was Zeus who burdened humans with a hard and toilsome life, but he also gave them the law as the highest good. One of the heroes, Prometheus, in a desire to alleviate human misery, stole fire from the gods and gave it to man; Prometheus taught man not only to use fire, but also, as Aeschylus completes Hesiod's myth, to cultivate various arts (especially the "art of moral life"), which were supposed to constitute man's "second nature."

In ancient Greek thought, then, man appears as more and more perfect; in fact, he is perfect to such a degree that, for Protagoras, man is "the measure of all things." Thus, what at first appeared as a distinct deficiency (in comparison with the endowments of animals) over the course of time came to be regarded as the cause of the coming into being—thanks to intellectual cognition and the use of language—of culture and art. Man is, then—as Diogenes of Apollonia, a disciple of Anaxagoras, observed—the only creature who "looks up to the heavens" (and not, like animals, down at earth), and therefore he can be compared to the gods who look down from "on high," understand cognized things, make use of language, and recognize the law.

Elements of the Orphic-Platonic Vision

In the Orphic philosophico-religious current, there is a view (which had an important influence on Pythagoreanism and Platonism) that the human soul has a divine origin: it emerges from a deity and returns to it at the moment of man's death; the soul is a divine and immortal element, different from the body in which it resides only for the time of earthly life. Plato compares the soul's abiding in the body to its abiding in a tomb (σῶμα—body, σῆμα—tomb), or in a prison from which it can be freed by a virtuous life.[2]

[2] See Plato, *Cratylus*, 400 B–G.

In agreement with the doctrine of the migration of souls he received from the Orphics and the Pythagoreans, Plato conceived of man as an eternally existing soul that—as a result of its offenses—became tied to a body. Those offenses had to be of various kinds, because souls could be tied to different bodies (e.g., to the body of a man, a woman, or even an animal). In such a situation, the man-soul tied to the body can only have one purpose, namely, to free himself from the body and return to his original spiritual state. The fall of the man-soul could have happened, since (according to those beliefs, and also on the basis of internal human experience) the human spirit (soul) is expressed in its action in various ways: desire, courage, and reason (symbolized by a many-headed insatiable hydra, a lion, and a man). This threefold action of the human spirit is manifested in the organization of the political state formed by three social classes: the craftsmen, the soldiers, and the rulers, among whom justice should reign, that is, each should receive what is due to him. Only those who know the purpose of man's life can rule the state; this purpose (i.e., to be freed from forced incarnation) can be accomplished through a rational and just life. Only philosophers know about the good which is effusive and all-encompassing. It is thus necessary to build such a state that, by the application of law, will make the just life possible (or impose it by force), and thereby will enable a return to the state of a pure spirit. The state ruled by philosophers and good laws requires the continuous education and improvement of man. The entire educational process—παιδεία—creates culture (i.e., the rational "cultivation" of man) according to the model of the very idea of "man"—the idea which, as general and necessary, is the sum of perfections that man should achieve during his connection to the body. Paideia is based on intellectual cognition; corporeality hinders the soul from having insight into pure truth, which the soul was in possession of before its incarnation; once tied to the body, the soul must force its way through to and discover anew the knowledge that it has possessed *al-*

ways. The attainment of knowledge consists in recalling (ἀνάμνησις) that which is the soul's life, namely, the truth. When the soul, as a consequence of its fall, becomes incarnated in matter, it passes through the "river of forgetfulness"—Λήθη, and therefore only by anamnesis can it return once more to the sphere of truth—ἀλήθεια. Hence, man's knowledge of the world as a whole is a knowledge by anamnesis. According to Plato, this is an additional argument for the immortality and eternity of the soul:

> [I]f the truth of all things that are is always in our soul, then the soul must be immortal; so that you should take heart and, whatever you do not happen to know at present—that is, what you do not remember—you must endeavor to search out and recollect.[3]

Anamnesis is present in all the modes of cognition: in doxal cognition, dianoetic cognition, and in the highest type of cognition—noesis. Without anamnesis, man would possess no knowledge; only the soul in its intellectual vision is capable of understanding that which it contemplates.

> For the colorless, formless, and intangible truly existing essence, with which all true knowledge is concerned, . . . is visible only to the mind, the pilot of the soul. Now the divine intelligence, since it is nurtured on mind and pure knowledge, and the intelligence of every soul which is capable of receiving that which befits it, rejoices in seeing reality for a space of time and by gazing upon truth is nourished and made happy until the revolution brings it again to the same place.[4]

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[3] Plato, *Meno*, 86 A–B, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 3, trans. W. R. M. Lamb (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1967). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

[4] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247 C–D, in *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, vol. 9, trans. Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1925). Available at: http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/.

The vision of the world and man in Plato's writings is conditioned by a twofold presupposition: the primacy of cognition over being, and the acceptance of certain (in particular Orphic) mythological visions of man. The primacy of cognition over being is expressed in the fact that cognition does not flow from a cognitive interiorization of the world of senses and individuals, but it is an operation of the spirit which sees the "objects" of its cognition. Depending on the character of cognition, various types of objects of cognition appear. In noetic cognition, the objects of cognition are ideas; in dianoetic cognition, these are mathematical constructs; in doxal cognition, changing and individual objects can be cognized. The universe is arranged as a consequence of, and a dependent on, cognition: the world of ideas, the world of mathematical constructs, and the world of changing individual beings. In all this, it is not clear how the world of ideas is related to the world of mathematical constructs or to the world of changing individuals; the latter merely participates in the world of ideas and that of mathematical constructs. The primacy of cognition over the objects of cognition, however, is beyond doubt, and the objects of cognition themselves (ideas, numbers, and the world of shadows, that is, that of individual beings) are in large measure a consequence of cosmogonic myths and purely intellectual speculations. The dialogue *Timaeus* provides a good illustration of this, for there appears the demiurge who is the maker of the world of changing individuals resulting from the synthesis of matter and spirit.

Since the soul is a spirit-intellect, possessing the truth within itself, it can never be deprived of this truth completely. Therefore, the type of knowledge by anamnesis (which only apparently makes human cognition independent of the world of changing material individuals), which was adopted from Plato by many philosophers in later times, became a recognition sign of the reception of Platonism, especially in terms of emphasizing the active role of reason in the process of intellec-

tual cognition. That was the case with ancient and medieval Christian philosophy, and then—with Descartes—it was passed on to modern European philosophy.

Aristotle's Conception of Man

In relation to the Platonic conception of man, Aristotle made a fundamental change. He rejected the mode of cognition by anamnesis in favor of genetic empiricism. Philosophers who succumbed to mythological interpretations were treated by Aristotle with contempt, which was already true in Book I of his *Metaphysics*, that is, when he still regarded himself as a Platonist; instead of accepting myths, he undertook studies of nature, which found their reflection in his treatise Περὶ ψυχῆς (*On the Soul*). There is no clear evidence that Aristotle first accepted the Platonic-Orphic conception of man, and only later, distancing himself from the thought of his master, came to his own conception.[5]

Naturalism

In the real world, Aristotle distinguished lifeless substances (τὰ ὄντα ἄψυχα), which in keeping with the views of his time were reduced to the four basis elements: earth, water, air, and fire, and a fifth one—ether, from living substances (τὰ ὄντα ἔμψυχα) that possess a soul (ψυχή) as a source of life within themselves. The soul, being a source of life, occurs in the following hierarchy: the vegetative soul (ψυχὴ θρεπτική), the sensitive soul (ψυχὴ αἰσθητική), and the rational soul (ψυχὴ νοητική). The soul, as the life-giving factor, is the object of special interest for Aristotle; he devoted a separate work to the soul—Περὶ ψυχῆς (*On the Soul*), in which he depicted it as existing at three differ-

[5] Cf. Paweł Siwek, "Wstęp [Introduction]," in Arystoteles, *O duszy* [*On the Soul*], trans. Paweł Siwek (Warszawa: PWN, 1988), 7–44.

ent levels (vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), and which are united in man. The myth describing the conversation between Midas and Silenus, according to which it is best for man to die young, since life on earth has the character of a punishment, was negated by Aristotle.[6] Man is the noblest among the animals living in this world, which is evidenced by his natural existence obtained in accordance with the normal course of nature (φύσει τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γέγονε). Thus man is not to be pitied, but is "like a god" in comparison to other creatures.[7]

Aristotle rejected the apriorism of cognition in relation to the real world of changing individual beings. Cognitive processes do not determine the object of human cognition—as took place in Plato's conception—but on the contrary, it is reality that triggers human cognition; man, through the application of various cognitive methods, can cognitively interiorize this reality. Human cognition begins at the moment when the reality of the real world affects the human senses—first the external, and then the internal senses (especially imagination and memory). Reading the data of sensory cognition, the intellect comes to know necessary contents and produces general concepts—both in the area of mathematical cognition and in metaphysical cognition, which express the essential states of things. The mode of being, then, differs from the mode of cognition—things existing in an individual manner can be cognized in a general and necessary manner in a cognitive system of science. The source of cognition is empirical (derived from sensory experience), but the mode of cognition is rational; intellectual cognitive understanding permeates all the degrees (respectively corresponding to external senses, internal senses, and reason) of human cognition. It is not cognition and its structure that determines the object of

[6] See Malcolm Davies, "Aristotle Fr. 44 Rose: Midas and Silenus," *Mnemosyne* 57, no. 6 (2004): 682–697.

[7] Cf. Aristotle, *Protrepticus*, ed. & trans. D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson (2017), 42. Available at: http://www.protrepticus.info/protr2017x20.pdf.

cognition, as was the case in Plato's philosophy; it is reality that triggers in man the cognitive processes which, taking various forms and methods, make it possible to understand this reality. Aristotle's position on the mode of human cognition, later called the theory of abstraction, had a fundamental influence on the shape of science and of philosophy. The philosophical trends, that contrary to Aristotle's realist stance accepted elements of Platonic apriorism, led to post-Scotist currents, such as Cartesian and Kantian subjectivism, or post-Kantian philosophical systems.

The basic difference between Plato's and Aristotle's positions on the character of human cognition consists in the fact that in Plato man is regarded as a spirit-mind living an "immanent" eternal life, whereas in Aristotle man is a product of nature. The process of cognition in man results, as in animals, from the action of natural factors on man's cognitive faculties; before that action there were no *a priori* cognitive processes in man, nor are there any; for man has not always existed, his existence (life) begins in time. Hence, all human operations, including cognitive operations, have their definite beginning, namely, the action of reality (nature) on man's sensory and intellectual faculties. Cognition becomes the reception and interiorization of the ontic contents of the existing world. The rationality of human cognition is nothing other than the interiorization of the intelligibility of the really existing world. It is not man who brings nature before the tribunal of reason (as Kant says in a Platonic vein), but it is the world, its actually existing content expressed in cognitive signs of senses and reason that constitute the realm of the rationality of human cognition. This is why the reading and understanding of the reality being researched, including the reality that is man himself, are so important for Aristotle.

The Soul as a Source of Motion

Aristotle, setting about an understanding explanation of animate beings (especially man), was aware of the difficulties involved in the task:

> Holding as we do that, while knowledge of any kind is a thing to be honoured and prized, one kind of it may, either by reason of its greater exactness or of a higher dignity and greater wonderfulness in its objects, be more honourable and precious than another, on both accounts we should naturally be led to place in the front rank the study of the soul. . . . Our aim is to grasp and understand, first its essential nature, and secondly its properties; of these some are taught to be affections proper to the soul itself, while others are considered to attach to the animal owing to the presence within it of soul.[8]

Aristotle referred to the views of his predecessors on the subject of the soul:

> For our study of soul it is necessary, while formulating the problems of which in our further advance we are to find the solutions, to call into council the views of those of our predecessors who have declared any opinion on this subject, in order that we may profit by whatever is sound in their suggestions and avoid their errors.[9]

Many philosophers before Aristotle (Thales, Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, and finally Plato) conceived of the soul as a principle of motion, but their understanding of motion was different from Aristotle's—for them, motion was a (self-) movement. Consequently, they conceived of the soul as that which by its nature is in motion, after the model of a body in motion. That resulted in the concep-

[8] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 402a, trans. J. A. Smith. Available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/soul.1.i.html.

[9] *Ibid.*, 403b.

tion of the soul as being incessantly in the motion understood in local-spatial terms:

> [B]elieving that what is not itself moved cannot originate movement in another, they arrived at the view that soul belongs to the class of things in movement. This is what led Democritus to say that soul is a sort of fire or hot substance; his 'forms' or atoms are infinite in number; those which are spherical he calls fire and soul, and compares them to the motes in the air which we see in shafts of light coming through windows.[10]

Aristotle also mentioned the doctrine of the Pythagoreans on the subject of the soul:

> [A]ll seem to hold the view that movement is what is closest to the nature of soul, and that while all else is moved by soul, it alone moves itself. This belief arises from their never seeing anything originating movement which is not first itself moved.[11]

While presenting the opinions of his predecessors and contemporaries (i.e., Plato) on motion as originating from the soul, Aristotle conceived motion in an entirely different way. His conception of motion (Book XI of the *Metaphysics*) followed from the conception of being as composed of act and potency, and in the sphere of material beings—as composed of matter and form; he thus conceived motion as "the act of a being in potency." Moves, coming from the soul as a source of motion, are nothing other than the actualization of the potency of a particular being. This means that a concrete being—which is a particular (hylemorphic) kind of composite of a potential factor (a passive factor) called matter, and a factor that determines and constitutes the content of being, called act (form), which makes it possible for us to deal with "this here" (τόδε τι) being—is capable of moving itself through its own form which is the source of further action. The action of a being is this

[10] *Ibid.*, 403b–404a.
[11] *Ibid.*, 404a.

being's "second act," which is rationally justified in ontic terms by its "first act," which is its form.

Aristotle's reasoning does not follow the direction set by previous philosophical thought (including Plato's) that the soul as a source of motion "externally" puts the living body in motion. Although this source "externally" putting living bodies in "vital" motion can be conceived of in widely varied ways, all theories of that type are unacceptable, since they presuppose an erroneous concept of motion as external to the living body. Having presented these theories (including the Platonic theory, to which he devotes much attention), Aristotle ultimately rejects them as he shows that they involve contradictions. He proposes to think of motion not as something separate from a being that is in motion (from a "moved" being), but as an "act that is in potency as such." He sees an internal connection of motion with being: motion is the actualization of a being's potency. In the *Metaphysics*, he writes that there are as many kinds of motion as there are those of beings, for motion is the act of a being in potency. Such an understanding of motion, revolutionary in comparison with previous conceptions, indicates the dynamism of being. The reason for its movement, therefore, should be sought in being itself. In Aristotle's understanding, to be a being is fundamentally to be a substance, since it is substance that stands at the foundations of the understanding of reality. Dynamic substances, subject to motion, must be composed of at least two factors: one that is the reason for passivity which he called matter (ὕλη), and which performs the function of potency, and another that is the reason for movement, which he called form (μορφή), and which performs the function of act (ἐνέργεια). The composition of substance from potency (δύναμις) and act (which has two names: ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια) occurs in all natural substances. These substances, possessing in themselves act-form (ἐντελέχεια), are capable of performing movement (ἐνέργεια). The enérgeia is proportional to the form (entelécheia) that constitutes the be-

ing. Living substances, as observation confirms, express themselves through their nourishment, reproduction, growth, and sensory cognition. The soul as the factor that constitutes the living being—the factor that performs vital functions conceived precisely as life—is thus the form, that is, the first act (entelécheia) which manifests itself in various vital actions as a secondary act. For this reason Aristotle calls the soul the first act (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) of a body that possesses life in potency, insofar as life is understood as various vital operations. The soul, being a form (entelécheia), expresses itself in secondary (second) acts which also flow out of the organs of the body. These acts presuppose "potencies" proportional to them, that is, the faculties of the soul. Every soul is an entelécheia, that is, a form that organizes a parcel of matter to be a concrete being. As observation confirms, the living beings of nature generate various forms of motion (action), such as nutrition, sense cognition, and intellectual cognition. As forms of motion (action), each is certainly an act: a "second act"—an act that is secondary to the fundamental form of being that is entelécheia (the substantial form). Since these actions sometimes occur and some other times do not, it must be admitted that the secondary act is also potentialized. Keeping in mind the conception of act and potency—as well as the proportionality between them—it is possible to learn, from the analysis of an act, about what the source of this act is. The soul, conceived as "the first act of a physical organic body possessing life in potency," appears as composed of its faculties which are the direct source of the appropriate vital action. The soul, while organizing the body, simultaneously organizes the appropriate organs through which it acts.

The manifestations of life ("second acts"—ἐνέργεια), such as taking nourishment, exist "in potency," which means that a living being can use its faculties (although it does not use them constantly) for meeting the needs of the soul (the "first act"). The conception of potency and act (or matter and form in material beings) became for Aristotle the

basis for the definition of the soul as a source of life. What was especially important in his theory, as it made possible the discovery of the structure of the soul, was the affirmation of the fact that potency and act are transcendentally (that is, wherever there is a composition of potency and act) and necessarily ordered to one another. Act and potency ordered to one another pertain to the same ontic order: if act belongs to the order (category) of substance, then the potency ordered to it also belongs to the order of substance; vital acts—emanated from substance, characterized by the non-necessity of action, relating to the categories of time and space, and those of action and the reception of action—are accidents in their ontic structure; they are evidence that the soul has its own faculties of action which are subjected in the appropriate organs of action of the living being. The understanding of the soul as the "first act of a physical body that has life in potency" is thus rationally grounded.

The conception of potency and act—applied by Aristotle, and confirmed by the nature of the soul as acting through faculties—invalidates the Platonic conception of the soul as an independently existing spirit (a divine entity) that acts with its whole being, permeates different levels of reality, and is incarnated in different forms of living matter. If there is, however, no proportionality and no ordering between various structures of living matter and the spirit, no new substantial being of a definite nature and natural action can arise from matter. Without the necessary ordering of potency to act, the coming into existence of a being, that is characterized by coordinated action, is not possible. That is why it is impossible for the soul as an independently existing spirit, as a being that is "pure" by its nature, to be joined with any living matter which indeed has its own act of life, its own "entelechy." That line of reasoning made Aristotle conclude that the conception of the soul, as source of motion separate from matter and attached to already-living matter, would have destroyed the unity (which, according to Plato and—to some degree—Aristotle, is the foundation for being a

being) of the being that arose (following the assumption that henology is superior to ontology, which means that being a being results from "unification" fulfilling the requirement of non-contradiction, that is, being only "this" and not "this and non-this" at the same time).

Exclusion of Reincarnation

Aristotle's conceptions of the soul and of man flow from his understanding of natural beings. This is the understanding that requires, under threat of falling into contradiction, the acceptance of both the composition within being of various non-identical factors, and the ontic unity of natural beings. And it is free of contradiction only when in one being its component elements are to each other as potency to act, as matter to form. Between these factors, then, there is a necessary ordering that excludes joining other factors which might disturb substantial unity. The material-potential sphere always has appropriate disposition toward a proportional form-act. Therefore the soul, being a source of life, can only be an actual, essential component of a being, but not something perfect in itself and coming to a being from outside. The soul cannot join a living being from outside, because ontic forms are pre-contained in the potentiality of matter itself. This essentially precludes the mythical views of Plato that the soul as a source of life can be connected from outside as pre-existing "in itself." Plato's conception distorts the understanding of being as essentially one; were it true, there would be no natural beings that were substantially one, but only peculiar ontic collages whose operations would have various sources of action that are incompatible with each other, that is, uncoordinated and ineffective. Nature does not know such beings.

The Aristotelian conception of the soul—as the "first act of an organic physical body possessing life in potency"—is a rational explanation of the structure of the living being; it is at the same time a critical response to Plato's and the Platonists' mythical understanding of the

soul as an eternally existing spirit that is connected in time with certain natural bodies. Aristotle regarded Plato's position as being in contradiction with the facts and the rational understanding of natural beings as substantially (essentially) one; for natural beings show their unity in action flowing from one and the same source, form, conceived as the first act of a being, from which second acts can emerge. Such second acts (nutrition, sense cognition, etc.) really exist; in natural beings, there is a structure revealing the faculties (organs) proper to the vital activities of these beings (such as eyes, ears, organs of nutrition, sensation, etc.). The entire structure of being is thus connected to the soul as the factor that organizes the body in a purposeful manner, that is, for its own good. How, then, can the factor called the soul, understood as a source of movement, organize the body of a man or an animal from outside? And, if the soul does not organize the body from outside, then two souls should exist as two sources of action that are independent of one another and connected to one another only accidentally. Then, however, the human being (or the animal being) would be a collage of beings which generate uncoordinated (not subordinate to each other) actions resulting from different ontic sources and manifesting a lack of internal cohesion (a lack of unity) in the human being (or the animal being)—that would be similar to the ontic collage of a tree and a mistletoe (a parasitic plant growing on trees). Ontic activities that do not come from the same source may turn out to be injurious to each other. But the analysis of natural beings, that is, beings that arise as the result of generation in nature, indicates that they bear no traces of internal disharmony; for the structure of a natural being is an organic structure containing formed organs which are the direct sources of action and serve the good of the whole of a natural substantial being. All these attributes of a natural organic being lose their meaning in the Orphic-Platonic conception of the soul and the related conception of reincarnation (palingenesis).

Objectivity of Action

The soul as the first act of a natural organic body is manifested in its action which is understood by Aristotle as a "second act." The second act consists of various vital operations that mark the nature of the soul as an internal source of life. Various vital operations flow from their immediate sources, called the faculties of the soul; these faculties establish a special hylomorphic structure, that is, they are composed of the matter (ὕλη) of particular organs and their secondary forms (e.g., vision, hearing, and touch in the sensory order, or nutrition, respiration, and reproduction in the vegetative order). Aristotle devoted much attention to describing the action of these faculties as secondary (second) acts of a living substance. The particular faculties of the soul, ordered to action, are what in the definition of the soul is described as "having life in potency;" it is these faculties of the soul that are the immediate source of action. This action sometimes occurs and sometimes does not, since not all faculties act all the time; the action of the faculties of the soul is thus characterized (in the ontic respect) by contingency and accident: actions are not independent substantial beings, but they are "radiated" from the primary source (faculty) of action—the substance. The actions of the soul, as its "secondary acts," are subject to the general law of action—objective determination (all actions are of some character, they are determined; indeterminate actions do not exist), and thereby the question of the objective determination of the actions of the soul arises.

By his exposition on the objects of the actions of the faculties of the soul, Aristotle attempts to describe the objectivity of sensory actions, and then to explain what he understands by the concept of the "object of action." Aristotle divides objects of action into the so-called proper objects (the common objects) and the accidental objects; this division is intended to eliminate misunderstandings that could upset the

conception of the "proper object" as that which—as the scholastics would say—"enters into the definition" of action. The understanding of the object of actions, including the so-called proper object, results from the application of the theory of act and potency to the philosophical explanation of the ontic structure of the living being, especially man. Given the necessary ordering of potency to act (especially the act that appears in actions), "active potency" is described as a source of action, and thereby it is possible to arrive at an understanding of the ontic state of what is called a faculty of the soul. Since the soul exists as the first act, then by the acts of this soul, called secondary acts, one can directly determine the source of these acts, that is, the active potency, and so the faculty of the soul through which the living being—formed by the soul as this living being's "first act"—acts. Consequently, it turns out that the human soul in itself is not absolutely simple. While it is simple in its essence, the soul has its faculties as the direct sources of actions; these actions are observable in our cognition (if it did not possess faculties of action as different from its essence, the soul would be a pure act or, in point of fact, God). The accidental and contingent character of the soul's actions indicates that the soul in its being is not a pure act, but is composed of essence and its faculties which are active potencies. This is an important argument against the Platonic conception of the soul as a spirit (νοῦς) which thinks and acts with its whole being.

Having affirmed that the acts of the soul (including acts of intellectual cogition) are not always being performed in man, Aristotle had to take the position that acts of intellectual cognition do not constitute the essence of the soul; they are only accidents and, as accidents, require a special source for their action, that is, an active potency as a faculty of the soul by which the soul manifests its life in action. The soul cannot thus be (in its existence within the body) absolutely uncompounded, but it must be composed in a special way of essence and its faculties (*totum potestativum*) as the appropriate sources of action.

There are as many faculties of the soul as there are proper objects of action that characterize particular faculties; it is the proper objects of the soul's action that form the special character of particular actions (their irreducibility to actions of another type), and thereby indicate that separate and specific faculties of action (as active potency that constitutes the source of action) must exist in the soul. It is the proper objects of the action of a living being that determine this being's action, and specify it by influencing the cognition of the sources of direct action, and thereby affecting the understanding of the soul as the "first act" of the physical (natural) organic body that has life ("second act," action) in potency. Due to having life in potency, the body has in its structure faculties of action (as active potencies) which are the direct sources of action. The proper object of action is necessary for the action of a living being. To deny proper objects is tantamount to a denial of the existence of determined actions, for every action is directed to an object; proper objects determine action and make it possible to know action.

Determined action flows from the function of final causation. In its action, a living being must be motivated, for motive is what causes action to occur, rather than not occur. For the living being then, the motive of action is a kind of good by which the being takes real action, and thus perfects itself. By its action, the being "expresses itself" externally; without action, there would be no life. If the living being (especially man) is to perform an action that did not previously exist, then, for this action to occur, the being must be brought out of neutrality (i.e., passivity) in relation to action. Only the good understood as an end can be a motive for the occurrence of an action. The good shows an end for various actions of a living being (to see rather than not see, to hear rather than not hear, to take nutrition rather than not, to perform cognition rather than not, etc.). Actions are "called to existence" by concrete goods; goods motivate the coming into existence of an action, and determine the action to achieve them.

The objectivity and teleology of action are intertwined into one. In every action, there are three causes which operate together, and without which there would be no real action: the final cause which is the motive of action, the exemplar cause which determines the action by giving it internal ordering, the efficient cause which is the immediate source of action. An actual action would not come into existence without its motive (i.e., the end which is a concrete good for a living being) and its rational ordering (i.e., the determination of action; for an action, having a defined motive and object, must be ordered precisely by its object which is at the same time its motive). All this results from the direct source of the determined and purposeful action of a living being. Aristotle holds that action is determined by a proper object; in human cognition (sensory and intellectual), it is the proper object that excludes error. The rationality of cognition is an expression of the rationality and teleology of nature itself. Although he did not explicitly determine the ultimate sources of the rationality of being, Aristotle—having taken the position that the rationality of human cognition flows from the interiorization of reality as it is given—implicitly admitted the real being itself to be a source of rationality. In its action, nature that is a rational structure expresses itself rationally, and thereby teleologically and objectively as well. The proper object of the action of a living being cognitively determines and defines the character of an action. An action as unnecessary in itself indicates its direct source which is the acting faculty; the acting faculty, since it is proportional in its ontic nature to an action, is an accidental structure, and so it presupposes a substantial structure—the soul which is conceived as the first act of an organic body possessing life (vital acts) in potency.

Man as ζῷον λογικόν (an animal capable of rational cognition) arouses particular interest in the philosophical understanding of the world. In his biological structure, the rationally cognizing man is an animal whose life manifests itself in acts of sensory cognition (includ-

ing both external and internal senses), and in affective drives (ὄρεξις) which—being of a psychophysical nature—are acts common to soul and body. The action of the reason, including spiritual (i.e, separate from matter) acts of rational cognition, ranks the acts of a psychophysical nature. It is because of the reason that the soul rears above other living beings—this view of Aristotle calls to mind the conception of the Platonic soul which (as a spirit-reason) is an abode of cognitive forms (ideas)—and so it is capable of knowing everything, because it contains nothing that is matter: *cognoscitivum aliquorum nihil eorum habet in sua natura*.[12]

Reason, according to Aristotle, is the factor that characterizes man. In his introduction to Aristotle's treatise *On the Soul*, Paweł Siwek wrote:

> Man owes to his reason the features which differentiate him from all other creatures, and which assure him an entirely exceptional place among them. These features include speech[a], the social, economic, and political system[b], science, the feeling of obligation, justice, and law[c], the ability of free choice[d], virtue and vice[e], etc. There is even no lack of people—adds Aristotle—who think that the gods are people who during their life rose to the heights of moral virtue[f]. «If therefore nature—as he concludes—makes nothing without purpose or in vain», then it must be supposed «that nature has made all [what we can see in the world] for the sake of men»[g].[13]

[12] Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, I, q. 75, a. 2: "Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else." Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Benziger Bros. edition, 1947). Available at: https://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/.

[13] Siwek, "Wstęp [Introduction]," 28–29 [[a] *Polit*., I, 2, 1253 a 10; VII, 13, 1332 b 4; [b] *Polit*., I, 2, 1253 a 2, 8; III, 6, 1278 b 19; *Eth. Nic*., I, 5, 1097 b 11; [c] *Polit*., III, 10, 1281 a 35 f.; 16, 1287 a 27–30; [d] *Hist. Anim*., I, 1, 488 b 24–25; [e] *Polit*., I, 2, 1253 a 16, 31 f.; [f] *Eth. Nic*., VII, 1, 1145 a 23–24; [g] *Polit*., I, 8, 1256 b 20–22; *Phys*., II, 2, 194 a 34–35].

Intellectual Cognition

When he cognizes intellectually, man is in a special situation; for he can cognize necessary, general, constitutive structures and relations as relations, and he can express all this in concepts produced in the cognitive process. Conceptual cognition, characterized by generality, necessity, and invariability, constitutes an important cognitive domain. This type of cognition received special attention by Plato. Aristotle, while residing for twenty years in Plato's Academy, got to know in detail the problem of intellectual cognition, so decisive for philosophy; he provided a sound explanation of this fact without appealing to innatism which he himself rejected. The process of intellectual cognition is analogous to sensory cognition; there exists an object of cognition (i.e., a concrete real being) that in a special way acts on the cognizing subject. The cognizing subject cannot contain within itself what the object is.

> In order for vision to see a given color, e.g., green, it cannot become green itself, or even in general it cannot possess any color, for otherwise its own color would obscure the proper color of an object seen; e.g., being green, it would see everything in green. For a similar reason the reason cannot possess any attribute belonging to the thing that can be cognized by it: «Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought—says Aristotle with emphasis—mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture»[a]. Because the reason or mind is not in its cognition restricted only to a certain *category* of being (unlike what takes place in the senses), but extends to all being both actual and potential, present, past, or future, real or merely possible, therefore it «can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus . . . [it] is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing»[b]. This capacity is

> real, and it must be based on some existing thing. This thing is the human soul . . .[14]

It is proper to the nature of the reason that it cannot contain anything that becomes the object of its cognition: *cognoscitivum aliquorum nihil eorum habet in sua natura*. Therefore the reason, capable of cognizing everything, cannot be material or possess any material organ, for this would make cognition impossible for it. The reason is only a potency—a capacity of cognition without any limitation, for it can cognize everything; and so it is immaterial.

> If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Mind must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible. Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; . . . it follows that it too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing. For this reason it cannot reasonably be regarded as blended with the body: if so, it would acquire some quality, e.g., warmth or cold, or even have an organ like the sensitive faculty: as it is, it has none. It was a good idea to call the soul 'the place of forms', though (1) this description holds only of the intellective soul, and (2) even this is the forms only potentially, not actually.[15]

Considering the process of cognition (which is analogous in the mental order and in the intellectual order) and the subject that cognizes

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[14] *Ibid.*, 32 [[a] *On the Soul*, III, 429 a 13–18; [b] *On the Soul*, III, 429 a 18–24].

[15] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 429 a.

intellectually (with the immaterial faculty of the reason), the question arises, how can the cognized material world (material beings) act upon the intellect that is immaterial, and in what way can this material world be cognized? After all, there is no proportion between the material stimulus, sent from a concrete material being, and the immaterial reason. A material stimulus (because of belonging to a different ontic order) cannot actualize the cognitive process of the intellect, for matter does not act, as an act, upon a spirit; the cognitive stimulus seems thus to be disconnected from the concrete cognized being, but, if it is true, then our contact with the world is broken. Aristotle was aware of these relations of dependence.

Is it then possible to find a solution to this problem which at the same time will allow to establish the receptivity of cognition to the material stimuli coming from the really existing world, and to preserve the proportion between the immaterial reason of the man who cognizes and the material world which is cognized? Aristotle claims that the system of sensory cognition is coordinated with the immaterial factor, called the active reason (νοῦς ποιητικός), which makes the process of cognition possible (free of contradiction). The process of rational cognition begins with the senses being released from the state of cognitive indifference by a physical stimulus (e.g., a color which in the eye becomes a physiological stimulus, and thereby releases the faculty of vision from cognitive indifference).

> [T]he initiative of the external object, according to Aristotle, consists in the action that it performs on the environment with the help of its powers—δυνάμεις. They are its different properties falling under the senses (αἰσθητά): color, sound, smell, etc. When, by accident, an organ endowed with the capacity to receive forms without matter (αἰσθητήριον) is found within their range, these properties elicit in it a special kind of change (ἀλλοίωσις) which actualizes the organ's capability, i.e., its potency, and allows the individual to experience a given form in-

> wardly. This experience is a single undivided act (vision, hearing, etc.), although it is a result of two different causes: the external object and the individual endowed with sensory life.[16]

The reason that cognizes intellectually identifies itself in a special way with the object of its cognition; the object must be "present" in an individual fashion in the reason, as an image or phantasm. A phantasm, however, is not necessary, unchanging, or general in its structure, whereas intellectual (rational) cognition is general, stable, and necessary. The representation of a thing as an "expressed image" in the imagination is an interiorization of an imagined thing; it is a special cognitive presence of the object of cognition in the cognizing subject. Still, it is an individual sensory phantasm; therefore, the content of the object of cognition given in a phantasm must be "necessitated" and "generalized" by giving it features of stability and invariability (which after all are confirmed by man's cognitive self-consciousness). Aristotle, while keeping in mind the general theory of action, came to the conclusion that if something which did not previously exist is subjectivized, then there must exist an active factor that causes such an effect— in this case: the state of intellectual cognition. Something must exist that generalizes and necessitates the object of cognition, presented as an individual phantasm—this something is called the active reason, and it is opposed to the potential reason in which cognition occurs. There then exist, as it were, two reasons: the active reason which makes cognition possible, and the potential reason which cognizes.

There must exist, according to Aristotle, a spiritual factor that is separate from matter, resistant to external influences, and unmixed with any other elements; this factor is the active reason which like a light can illuminate that in the phantasm which is characteristic of the concept: the general features of a phantasm, its necessary ontic features, and its

[16] Siwek, "Wstęp [Introduction]," 24.

unchanging features. Although individual, every phantasm is an image of a being, and therefore potentially contains all such features; all that is needed is a proper spiritual faculty that can penetrate the image and display the features proper to intellectual cognition—the features which appear explicitly in the concept as an act of intellectual cognition.

Aristotle confirms that the Platonic doctrine of noetic (conceptual) cognition, which is performed in separation from matter, is not mixed with anything unintelligible, and concerns what is general and stable. In order to acquire intellectual cognition characterized by such features, a force is necessary which in its own way will purify the "spiritual" object of cognition of matter by liberating it from and in the data of imagination. If one accepts concepts in the process of intellectual cognition, one must also accept an active factor, that is, the active reason. If one did not accept it, one would have to subscribe either to the Platonic innatism which entails anamnesis in cognition, or to sensualism which sees no difference between sense cognition and intellectual cognition; but both positions are unacceptable, since they are in disagreement with the facts of psychic life and the rational vision of the world. Aristotle's hypothesis of the active reason invalidates the claims of innativism and sensualism. The hypothesis of the active reason is necessary for explaining—in a decontradictifying way[17]—the fact of the receptivity of rational cognition to the material and spiritual world.

Desire

Another important element of the Aristotelean conception of man and his soul is the ability of desire, that is, the psychic striving for a known good. In his Περὶ ψυχῆς (*On the Soul*), Aristotle shows the pro-

[17] Decontradictification is a metaphysical method for identifying the ultimate causes the negation of which would be the negation of a being that is being explained.

cesses of desire or appetition in connection with motion which he conceives as a consequence of appetition.

> Let us next consider what it is in the soul which originates movement. Is it a single part of the soul separate either spatially or in definition? Or is it the soul as a whole? If it is a part, is that part different from those usually distinguished or already mentioned by us, or is it one of them?[18]

Considering the so-called parts that are the faculties of the soul in vegetative, animal, and rational orders, Aristotle indicates the existence of motion as a consequence of appetition which can be both sensory and intellectual:

> [A]nd lastly the appetitive, which would seem to be distinct both in definition and in power from all hitherto enumerated. It is absurd to break up the last-mentioned faculty . . . for wish is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational; and if the soul is tripartite appetite will be found in all three parts.[19]

Since Aristotle distinguishes in the soul three levels: vegetative, sensory, and rational, and each of these levels has its own "form," that is, a factor that determines a specific mode of being, it becomes clear that each form generates its own (natural or cognitive) inclination (appetite) for motion. At the vegetative level, there is a natural inclination (appetite) which is manifested by nutrition and reproduction. At other levels, the motion of an animal or a man, performed with the help of appropriate bodily organs, is a consequence of a perceived practical good that, in sensory or rational estimation, became a motive (goal) of actions connected with that motion. In the subject in motion, there are thus (1) two associated (natural and cognitive) aspects of action which engage different faculties of the soul, and (2) a cognitive faculty that

[18] Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III, 432 a.
[19] *Ibid.*, III, 432 b.

acts on the basis of either sensory and imaginative cognition or rational cognition. The motion of a subject can be perfected only by making an accurate judgment on a practical good which is a real good for the subject, that is, a good that corresponds to the nature of the subject; such a good then can become really an object of appetite, that is, it can become a real motive for motion in the desiring subject.

Having affirmed the sensory vision of the practical good (recognized as practical by the faculty of sensory estimation, called natural instinct, which infallibly guides the action of animals) and the intellectual vision of the good (which becomes the motive for rational action), one must also affirm the existence of separate appetitive faculties, namely, the faculty of sensory appetite and that of intellectual appetite which in man is the will.

Turning his attention to conflicts that occur in the realm of appetition, which arise as a result of the variety of man's psychic faculties (especially sensory appetites and rational cognition), Aristotle recalls that appetites appear in two ways: as concupiscible, when their object is a good appropriate for the nature of the cognizing subject, a good that attracts to itself the appetitive faculty, and as irascible or, as it was later called, combative. Irascible appetite is aimed at effectively removing some evil, that is, something that does not concretely correspond to the nature of sensory appetite; irascible appetite (anger) arises against a concrete evil; the removal of this evil makes it possible to achieve a good appropriate for the nature of the animal (or man's animal aspect). There are thus two sensory appetitive faculties: concupiscible appetite and irascible appetite. The acts of these appetites are conditioned by imagination and sensory estimative judgments concerning the concrete suitability of a good for the nature of a cognizing subject (or its unsuitability which produces acts of irascible appetite). In man, beside irascible and concupiscible sensory appetites, there is a rational appetite, called will, whose object is the good as good and as the recognized

purpose of action and of the stimulation of the motor forces of a subject.

Considering Aristotle's doctrine as a whole, it seems that he did not paint a complete picture of man. Certainly, he was right in rejecting the conceptions of his predecessors concerning the soul, but, when formulating his own conception of the human being, he was unable—for he did not know the conception of the creation of the soul by God—to bring it to a rational completion. He did, however, present an ingenious theory of act and potency in light of which he could interpret and understand the action and the structure of the human being. Nevertheless, his theory, when addressing the problem of the origin of man and of the human soul in particular, encountered facts that could not be reconciled with it. For since man's intellectual actions manifest the structure of the human soul as immaterial, the soul (just as immaterial) cannot emerge from the potentiality of matter; the soul cannot thus be explained without falling into contradiction as having its origin in material transformations. It was only St. Thomas Aquinas who finally resolved Aristotle's dilemma and brought his thought to its successful conclusion. Aristotle did not know the conception of creation, and that ultimately made it impossible for him to resolve the problem of the origin of the human soul which in its rational action turns out to be immaterial and underivable from matter.

Elements of Aristotelianism in Modern Conceptions of Man

Aristotle's vision of man as a "rational animal" and a product of nature appeared in the history of anthropology in the form of various formulations of evolutionism. Even in the Middle Ages, certain thinkers (Albert the Great, Peter of Auvergne) still believed that intermediate beings exist between the highly organized animal world and man (e.g., Pygmies). Descartes, who made the clear and distinct concept (i.e., a "subjective concept" produced by man) the object of philosophical

analysis, considered *cogito* which manifests the human soul to be a fundamental concept; for reality is either *res extensa* (i.e., matter) or *res cogitans* (i.e., spirit). What our cognition is primarily and undoubtedly given is *cogito, ergo sum* which means *ergo sum cogito* (I am a spirit-soul), since the expression *ergo* cannot indicate a conclusion; for Descartes rejected inference in favor of the evidence of ideas. In such an approach, that which is first, and which is rationally justified as an object of cognition, is the reason for cognition (since the soul cannot be unconscious of itself). Henceforth, to cognize something means to discover the meaning or sense of something in the field of consciousness. In this way, the cognizing subject becomes an *a priori* factor of cognition. This happens explicitly in Kant's system, where the objectivity of cognition is created by the subject. Thus, when receiving impressions, man becomes, as it were, "Plato's cave," in which it is only the shadows of things that are seen; the shadows are interpreted by man's "I" which determines the sense of the things.

The creative consciousness of the German idealists (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), the post-Kantians, and the phenomenologists, shows that modern conceptions of man are still inspired by Platonism. Platonic elements can be found in Bergson's conception of "memoire," that is, the "memory of oneself" in the changeable matter of one's body. The historical sequence of philosophical conceptions of man created by ancient, medieval and modern thinkers undoubtedly bears traces of Plato's views which reduce man to self-consciousness, to a spirit, only temporarily connected to the matter of the human body. It finds its further confirmation in the mind/body dualism in contemporary anthropology.

Theories of evolution after Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley, became popular, especially when—as a result of Hegel's theory which rejected the value of the principle of non-contradiction—some supporters of evolution stopped respecting the principle of non-contradiction in

their formulations of evolutionary theories. That allowed, for instance, Ernest Renan to present a view of man's evolution toward becoming a god, and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin to propose his famous theory of evolution leading to the "Omega" point in which man reaches a state of deification.

Evolutionary theories rightly accent the dynamism of being (which has already been noticed by Aristotle), but when they go beyond the boundaries of the law of non-contradiction, they depart from rationality in explaining reality (for being cannot be produced from non-being, because being and non-being cannot be the same). The conception of the spirit (including the human soul) as a subject of evolution is especially out of step with reality; for all the forms of evolution presuppose a composition of parts, while the spirit (including the human soul) is in its essence uncompounded and simple, and so it is not a subject of evolutionary becoming.

Man as a Personal Being

The questions concerning man, left unanswered by Aristotle, were faced by St. Thomas Aquinas who, when commenting on Aristotle's writings, was interested more in investigating the truth of things, than in being literally faithful to the written works of the great philosopher of Stagira. St. Thomas, keeping in mind the difficulties resulting from Platonism and Aristotelianism, formulated his own conception of man by referring to the problems raised by Aristotle, and by commenting on Aristotle's writings in such a way as to purify them of their internal contradictions. It was all the more successful because Aristotle's general method of philosophizing and his conception of act and potency helped Aquinas to clearly identify problems and propose rationally justified, verifiable solutions.

The Experience of Being a Man

First, Aquinas had to establish the facts concerning the human being and action by subjecting them to a philosophical explanatory interpretation based on the Aristotelian method of decontradictifying explanation which consists in discovering and indicating such real factors (for real facts) that their negation would have to be tantamount to the denial of these facts (in the form of internally contradictory propositions, or in the form of a negation of the facts previously established). In establishing the fact of being a man, Aquinas appealed to internal experience, but he broadened the understanding of experience known to Aristotle as ἐμπειρία—the cognition of the presence (existence) of the object given in sensory cognition. St. Thomas appealed to the internal intellectual experience accessible to every human individual. What is common to the traditional concept of experience and intellectual (spiritual, internal) experience is the affirmation of the existence of the subject; in this case, the subject is one being—the one who experiences and at the same time is experienced. Aquinas thus stated: "[F]or each one is conscious that it is himself who understands . . . it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses."[20] Experience concerns *esse* and *seipsum esse*; my internal experience is thus the experience of the existence of "myself" (*seipsum*); while existing, I simultaneously cognize intellectually and sensually, that is, it is in my cognitive life that I fulfill myself as a man. For a man is "the same one" who cognizes both intellectually and sensually. Existing as a subject who acts both in the spiritual order and the sensory order, a man experiences that the "I" given in experience (*se esse*, *seipsum esse*) exists as a subject of actions recognized by him as "his own" actions (*intelligere* and *sentire* are undoubtedly actions, not subjects; at the same

[20] *S.Th.*, I, q. 76, a. 1, resp.: "Experitur enim unusquisque seipsum esse qui intelligit . . . ipse idem homo est, qui percipit se et intelligere et sentire."

time, however, each of them is an action of a kind that reveals the same subject which has its own existence and identity in action). Therefore, in my internal experience, I monitor my own subjectivity as identical in its spiritual and sensory-material action. The "I" is given to me not from the side of its content, but from the side of the fact (act) of its existence. This means that I experience that I exist (live), but I do not know the content of this experience, that is, I do not know my concrete nature. My nature is given to me only from the side of the subjectivity of my actions. As a subject, I produce (and I feel it) my spiritual actions (e.g., in the form of intellectual cognition) and sensory actions.

The "I" is immanent in the actions that are "mine," for it is I who am the subject of these actions. I am the subject of my actions of intellectual cognition and my actions of sensory cognition; I experience that it is I who thinks, I who understands, I who sees, I who suffers pain. The presence (immanence) of the "I" in all my actions is beyond doubt, for it is constantly experienced by me. At the same time, I experience that none of my actions—spiritual, sensory, or vegetative, although they may at times be extremely intense—have ever exhausted or appropriated the whole content of "I," for I constantly transcend myself (i.e., all my actions: each individual and all together) and experience my self-transcendence; therefore, even when going through the greatest of pains, man is still capable of thinking and loving, or fulfilling himself in other kinds of action. Thus, beside the indubitably experienced immanence of the "I" in my heterogeneous actions, there also exists the transcendence of the "I" over all actions that are "mine," taken individually or together, experienced intensely or mildly. Man is not entirely reducible to his actions already done; he is always capable of producing new actions of other kinds.

The internal experience of one's own "I" is given as the experience of the subject of one's own actions. The subject (*sub-stantia*) is constantly experienced as the same in all its actions, both biological and

psychic, sensory and spiritual—cognitive, volitional and appetitive. The same subject of different actions is given to us basically from the side of its existence, and not from the side of its internal content. This means that I experience that I live, but I do not experience my own nature, and therefore I do not immediately know what my essence is. In order not to conjecture about myself, but rather properly explore and cognize my essence, I must enter another stage of the cognitive process (no longer an immediate experience of the existence of my own subjectivity), namely, I must analyze "my" actions which flow from the same source—my own "I," experienced by me as existing.

In the immediate experience of being a man, I make use of a signless type of cognition; I do not need the mediation of any signs to know that I live as one and the same subject that produces from itself actions which are mine. The cognition of the nature (essence) of the experienced "I," however, cannot be performed directly, but must be mediated by signs-images obtained from my action. I must first analyze the structure and functioning of "my" cognitive (sensory, intellectual, spiritual) and appetitive (emotional and volitional) actions, and then use the obtained data as a foundation for drawing conclusions on (by virtue of the principle of proportionality between act and potency) and assessing the nature of the subject from which those actions come. While roundabout, it is the only available way to cognize the nature of the human being. It necessarily starts with collecting information and creating an image-sign that plays an indispensable role in mediating the cognition of man's nature. The explanation of man's nature which is cognitively mediated requires a detailed description of the analysis of what is called the structure of "my" actions and the way they function; for this is what constitutes the foundation for inferences concerning human nature.

The Source of Activity: The Soul

As one monitors his actions in internal experience, one affirms his identity and unity. Identity is the same as unity, that is, undividedness. The experience of unity—despite the heterogeneous types of "my" action which are not reducible to each other—indicates an identical source of my various actions emerging from the "I." In living beings, this source of action is the soul (ψυχή) which at the same time is the source of the being's identity and of its undividedness, that is, its unity. The fact that man experiences the unity and identity of the "I" operating within actions irreducible to each other and within their ontic structures (for the actions of vegetative, sensory, and spiritual life—intellectual, volitional actions, or those of love—are not the same) means that the factor, called the soul: (1) embraces the whole being and all its parts individually and together, and (2) is one form that organizes the human body, is superior to it, and transcends it by initiating spiritual actions in the form of intellectual cognition, consciousness, and self-consciousness. Man cognizes things within their necessary ontic relationships, and he also knows that it is he himself who cognizes them. Man's intellectual cognition most greatly manifests his "I."

The soul as the source of man's operations, including immaterial operations, appears as immaterial. Where does the soul come from?

According to Plato, the soul is eternal, immaterial, external to the body, but joined to the body as a result of some spiritual fault. In Aristotle, the soul is a form of the body; man is a natural being (resulting from generation), and so the human soul must also be a consequence of natural material-substantial changes (this crack in Aristotle's theory is inexplicable, for it is unthinkable that the immaterial soul could be a natural consequence of material changes—spirit cannot come from matter, just as being cannot come from non-being; and, in the context

of the principle of non-contradiction which says that "non-being is not being," matter in relation to spirit appears as a "non-being").

St. Thomas Aquinas was the only one to provide a satisfactory and rational solution to the problem of the origin of the soul. His solution follows from a general understanding of being as existing and a conception of contingent reality which presupposes a necessary reality which is the absolute being called God who is reality as such, for God is pure existence. All other beings possess existence; they are real beings by the fact that they possess existence, for each thing that exists (that possesses existence) is a being. In this understanding of reality, the human soul as immaterial (for it produces from itself immaterial actions) is in its essence (as a form) simple and uncompounded; it cannot come into existence as a result of evolving changes, for, in what is simple in its nature, there is nothing to change. The fact that the soul produces from itself spiritual operations of cognition and volition means that it exists as a being. Its being a being is not reducible to being a form (i.e., the organizer of the body and of action by the body), because spiritual operations are in their structure[21] independent of the body's matter. The soul which is able to produce from itself immaterial (accidental) beings must exist in itself as a being that is at the same time the form-organizer of its body. The soul, existing in itself as in the subject of its existence, cannot arise as a result of the action of the forces of nature, for it transcends nature. Therefore, since existing in such a way, it is called to existence by a special act, that is, it is created by God. "Being created" is understood here in a basically negative way, for it only separates the origin of the soul from natural factors. In order to explain and rationally justify the coming into existence of the soul (such as manifests itself in man's internal experience) in a positive way, one must refer to an absolute source of being, that is, to the Absolute.

[21] In their structure, but not in their functioning.

Only the Absolute-God can call into independent (subjective) existence a substance that is simple and uncompounded in its essence, that is, an immaterial (spiritual) substance. This state of affairs is the only one which is not contradictory to actions that are immaterial in their ontic structure, that is, actions of intellectual cognition and volitional love.

The Existing Soul: A Reason for Life

Right from the beginning of its functioning, that is, from the moment when male and female gametes join to form a single fertilized cell, the human soul created by God as a being existing in itself organizes a parcel of matter for itself to be a human body; it does this on the basis of a full genetic code, received from the fertilized cell, that with an enormous number of bits of information determines the action of the human body, and thereby influences the overall shape of man's vital actions—range from the origin of the first cell to the moment of biological death. St. Thomas expressed this in the following way:

> The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms.[22]

Since the soul (in consequence of its creation, that is, its being called into existence directly by God) exists in itself as in its own adequate subject, it organizes for itself (on the basis of the genetic code) a parcel

[22] *S.Th.*, I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5: "[A]nima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae."

of matter to be a human body, and at the same time imparts its existence to the body.

The soul not only imparts its existence to the material body it forms, but also acts through this body; otherwise this imparting of existence would be without purpose. Man's experience says nothing about actions performed without the mediation of the body. All his actions (cognitive, appetitive, or motor) are performed with the help of and in connection with his body which is constantly organized by his soul. The functioning of man's vital operations (i.e., the human action) always appears as connected to the body, which does not mean that the ontic structure of some of those operations is not immaterial, as is the case with the spiritual action of man's faculties—the reason and the will. These faculties emerge directly from the soul as so-called active potencies whose intellectual acts (i.e., cognition that takes the form of concepts, judgments, or acts of reasoning) and volitional acts (i.e., love that takes on various expressions) are just immaterial. Neither reason nor will has an organ of its own. The brain and nervous system constitute a system of organs of sensory cognition, whereas acts of intellectual cognition and acts of rational appetition do not emerge from any organ, although they are performed in connection with the action of sensory cognition and appetition (emotions). The action of the senses provides support for the functioning of spiritual action. The human spirit (the human soul), as Aquinas notes, is a spirit "lowest in hierarchy," for the human soul can only act through matter. However, as it exists independently of the body (for it exists in itself as an adequate subject), the soul is a spiritual being; hence, specifically human operations (actions of rational cognition and of rational appetition) are in their ontic structure uncompounded and immaterial—though they function (i.e., they really act) through matter. While the structure of matter is not completely known, such a knowledge is not at all necessary to divide matter from the spirit which cognizes structural relations in a general and non-

accidental way, and thereby is superior to individual, non-necessary, potential cognitive structures in sensory cognition.

It is noteworthy that the natural sciences, including natural anthropology, basically use the Cartesian conception of matter as *res extensa* (extended, i.e., spatial and temporal thing), and thereby restrict the cognition of matter to knowing its integrating parts, apprehended together with quantitative relations. Although it is quantitative elements that basically organize matter (by being appropriately arranged among themselves, as Aristotle stated), yet material beings are also conditioned by their qualities, relations, being somewhere and sometime, acting, and being acted upon.

The immateriality of the structures of actions which emerge from the subject (the soul) is indicative of the nature of the soul itself (the immateriality of the soul). The functional connection of these actions with sensory-material processes, on the other hand, is evidence that man's soul, although existing in itself as in a subject, is at the same time an organizer of matter (a form organizing a parcel of matter to be a human body). The soul thus understood cannot function independently of matter; for matter is an essential correlate of the soul. Hence, in human acts of intellectual cognition and volitional love, there is constantly present a material component in which the human spirit (intellect and will) works. This confirms man's ontic structure to be the only case in nature of a synthesis of matter and spirit. The spirit manifests itself in the structure of acts of intellectual cognition and volitional love, for in these there are no essential features of matter: essential potentiality and individual contingency as the opposites of necessity and generality.

Man—Person

Both rational actions of (intellectual) cognition and those of volition (in the form of love that first appears in choosing, in acts of decision about, a rational motive which is a real good) manifest *in actu ex-*

ercito (i.e., in the course of concomitant reflection) a subject which is called "I." "I"—as a consciously and freely acting subject that explicitly appears in acts of decision in which a practical judgment, being an act of intellectual cognition, is freely chosen—is that which, in the tradition of Christian philosophy, has been called a person.

The conception of the person was formulated in Christian theology to explain the ontic structure of Jesus Christ, who, according to the proclaimed faith, is true man and true God. According to monophysitism (one of the interpretations which appeared in early Christianity), the person of Christ is to be understood as one being—μόνη φύσις, which means that Christ is at the same time one nature: either a divine nature into which His humanity is "fused," or a human nature which is enveloped in His divinity only from outside. The councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon accepted the doctrinal conception that Christ is one being, for He is one divine person (one subject of actions) who has two natures: divine and human. The divine person, who has existed forever, imparts His existence to human nature. Since the subject of actions is an existing being, it is the divine person who (as an existing being) is the subject of all the actions of Jesus Christ. As a man, born in his human nature of Mary of Nazareth, Jesus Christ is not a human person; He has, however, human nature which was received into the subject of the eternally existing Word (Logos). In other words, since all operations are ultimately the operations of an existing subject which in this case is the eternally existing person of the Logos, Mary of Nazareth as the mother of Jesus is the Mother of God (Θεοτόκος). And, since to be a being in the highest degree is to be a person who ultimately is a subject of all the action of a being, all the human actions of Christ are the action of the Word.

The next problem concerned the difference between nature and person. In the rational order, the person appears as a highest form of being; to be a being in its highest and noblest form is to be a person.

Then, what is that which determines that some natures are persons, while others are not? In answering this question, it was emphasized that only a rational being can be a person. The factor constituting a personal being was then searched for in the rational nature; it resulted in various philosophical and theological interpretations which tended toward universally recognized neo-Platonism, or, occasionally, Aristotelianism.

The most widespread definition of the person was the one provided by Boethius: *rationalis naturae individua substantia*.[23] This definition seemed to continue the tradition of Platonism by the expression *individua* (non-divided), that is, a conception that regards "the one" as the element that determines the being of a thing (everything that is real presupposes unity and non-division). Aristotle, on the other hand, saw reality basically in substance—everything that is a being is a substance, or something joined with substance. Boethius's definition was then suited to an irenic solution to the problem of the person. But interpretative controversies surrounding the understanding of the person did not cease due to tendencies to reduce the fact of being a person to certain features of a rational nature (e.g., thought, social rank, substantial modality).

The Person—A Self of a Rational Nature

Aquinas called attention to the fact that, in the order of rational substances, the factor that determines the being of a being at the same time determines the being of a person. The factor that constitutively determines each being is the existence of a being. Something is a real being not because it is, for instance, a man, an animal, a plant, or a mineral, but because it actually exists. Existence is an act, whereby something is a real being, a reality. Therefore, if it actually exists, a concrete being, in the order of rational (human or angelic) natures, is a

[23] "An individual (single) substance of a rational nature."

personal being. It is not a modality or property of a being (positive or negative, as is the case according to Duns Scotus—*negatio dependentiae actualis et aptitudinalis*) that determines that a particular being is a person, but it is the actual existence of a being of a rational nature. It is because (returning to conciliar Christological sources) Jesus Christ exists by the existence of God-Logos, that He is a person; moreover, He is a divine person, not a human person: He is a divine person who possesses a human nature, besides a divine one.

Returning to the problem of man's personal being, it must be admitted that the existence of the subject called "I" is given to man in the internal experience of being a man (in subjective cognitive registration). That this "I" is given to him from the side of its existence means that man knows (experiences) that he exists as a subject in "his" vital acts, but he does not know exactly "who" he is. The cognitive experience of the subjective "I" is a revelation of a personal being. In light of these facts, therefore, it is possible to describe the person as an "I" of a rational nature. This description contains an explanation of the nature of the person, for the "I" is manifested as an existing subject identical in its actions. Thus, the "person" is not deduced from any philosophical or theological system (as is the case in some philosophical or theological types of explanation), but it is given in the internal experience of being a man. The personal being—in the general understanding of man (in both philosophical and theological anthropology) and in explaining the individual fact of being a man—is never an end point, but always a special starting point. This is a fact of great importance, since it puts man in a unique position of being the object of cognition and experience both at external and internal levels. In both types of experience, what essentially matters is the (variously) perceived fact of the existence of an object. The fact of existence, that is, the real being (seen from outside and from inside), constitutes the object of cognitive expe-

rience which in large measure is the basis for the cognitive process.[24] Experience, being the registration of an existing being, constitutes a privileged type of cognition, because it is characterized by immediacy, that is, the absence of necessary mediating factors in the cognition of content. In the process of cognition then, the experience of one's personal being which is manifested as the "I" can be accepted as directly given; it should next be explained philosophically, that is, the personal nature of man should be presented in the framework of philosophical anthropology.

It is most important to consider the character of "my" acts which are manifested in internal experience. They first include biological operations (such as nutrition, growth, generation) in their full spectrum experienced in human life. They also include higher experiences belonging to cognitive, appetitive, or motor orders. Cognitive and appetitive acts manifest themselves as differentiated in both sensory and intellectual orders of life. A philosophical analysis of these acts allows us to outline an image of human nature; this analysis does not embrace our total knowledge of man, but it is necessary in order to establish who man is.[25] Philosophical explanation is characterized by the application of a specific method of explanation, a decontradictifying method,[26] which—due to the fact that it is the only one that is capable of keeping cognition away from the bounds of absurdity—is the basis of rational cognition.

[24] But not all types of cognition are experienced; e.g., the so-called intuition concerns not the fact of the being's existence, but cognitive content; hence the extension of the expression "experience" to different forms of intuitive cognition leads to misunderstandings about how cognition is understood.

[25] For philosophy goes beyong the questions posed by other sciences, such as how man is constructed, or how he functions.

[26] See note 17 above.

The Potency-Act Structure of the Person

It was already Aristotle who applied the conception of act and potency in order to show man's ontic structure. The perception of the formal object of human action shows the content of an act (i.e., a defined human action). The formal object determines an action and shows what it is in its content. This allows one to draw inferences in further cognitive stages concerning the nature of the active potency (potentiality) from which the action comes forth. Besides, the role of the proper object in cognitive action is important. For it allowed Aristotle and St. Thomas to differentiate the external senses (vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch), the internal senses (the common sense, imagination, memory, instinctive estimation), and the intellect (reason). It also allowed them to differentiate the affective (appetitive and irascible) faculties and the will (a faculty of rational appetition).

Human faculties, as active potencies, do not always or constantly act, but only when appropriate (external or internal) stimuli appear. The operations of cognitive and appetitive faculties appear not as completely divergent in their action, or as completely autonomous (which would upset man's ontic unity), but as acting under the cognitive influence of the reason and the rational appetite (will). The coordination of human actions by reason and will is not always completely effective, but it is necessary in order to preserve man's psychic unity and the predictability of human action. It is by the triggering of action in himself as in a subject that man realizes himself: he reveals his potentialities and perfects himself in action. It was already Aristotle who—in his analysis of individual morality (ethics) and in his analysis of social morality (politics)—emphasized the importance of the perfection of human action by virtue, that is, making it efficient with respect to cognitive, appetitive, and motor skills. Since man's faculties, ordered to appropriate actions, are active potencies, the only perfection of a potency is its actualization

(proper to a particular faculty): making it increasingly efficient in acting—as was said in the Middle Ages—*firmiter, prompte et delectabiliter*.[27] Only such actions, made efficient by the reason, can guarantee the development of a man who is predictable in his action, and a man who is perfect, that is, one who can actualize human nature which appears in many-sided, heterogeneous, but always rationally purposeful action.

In order to understand human nature which is a source of action, it is necessary to recognize the existing forms of human action, that is, the action of the reason (its nature, conditions and modes), the action of the will (as rational appetite connected with reason), and the action of emotions and their association with reason and will. The realization of man's freedom in his acts of decision which involve all forms of human action ultimately reveals the nature of man, insofar as nature means being as a source of determinate action, and insofar as determination in man's action is understood as a consequence of his self-determination. The free action of man (as a rational being) most fully reveals human nature which, while synthesizing matter and spirit in one being, manifests its transcendence over matter by ordering matter to its intrinsic transcendent end.

Biblical Doctrine Concerning the Transcendence of the Person

The end revealed in human action (i.e., the good as such) indicates that man is ordered to the Absolute. The desire for happiness (an ordering toward the good as good), which is interpreted as *desiderium naturale, inefficax, videndi Deum*,[28] is inscribed into human nature. In

[27] "Strongly, without wavering, promptly, and with pleasure."

[28] "A natural, while ineffective, desire to see God." Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, bk. III, q. 52 entitled: "That No Created Substance Can, by Its Own Natural Power, Attain the Vision of God in His Essence," trans. Vernon J. Bourke (New York: Hanover House, 1955–57). Available at:

this respect, philosophical anthropology is completed by theology which, while explaining biblical revelation concerning man, calls attention to many important truths connected with human life.

The philosophical explanation of man's nature is basically given in the framework of the so-called essential aspect of man. Aristotle's conception of the essential aspect of human nature is right, but his explanation of the existential aspect of human nature has turned out to be wrong; man's coming into existence cannot be treated as a result of natural evolution, for the human soul which transcends in its action all matter cannot be a consequence only of evolutionary transformations of matter. St. Thomas Aquinas showed that the human soul can arise only as a result of God's act of creation, for no natural power is adequately strong to create the human soul (that exists in itself as in a subject, and imparts its existence to a parcel of matter which it organizes to be its own body). The existence of the soul cannot be derived from any form of matter; it necessarily requires the Absolute's intervention. The Bible reveals that it was God who created man as man and woman.

> God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them.[29] . . . Yahweh God shaped man from the soil of the ground and blew the breath of life into his nostrils, and man became a living being.[30]

The biblical conception sets man apart among all creation by calling attention to his transcendence in relation to other beings which are subject to him; by the act of creation, man is directly connected with God. The moment of God's special intervention in the beginning of man's life calls attention to man's otherness or transcendence (which is manifested in human action). God's calling into existence of man presented by Christian revelation indicates that it is impossible for

https://dhspriory.org/thomas/ContraGentiles3a.htm#52.

[29] *Genesis* 1:27.

[30] *Genesis* 2:7.

man's coming into existence to result from natural causes, that is, from transformations of matter and its forms. Such transformations, if occur for centuries or millennia, are described by the term "evolution." From the biblical point of view, the conception of man's origin as a result of evolution is excluded, for there is no place for God's special intervention in it. Furthermore, from a purely rational point of view, evolution—regardless of whether it lasts centuries or millennia—is not equivalent to the coming into existence of being from nothing. The evolutionary conception of man's origin presupposes that that toward which evolution aims and that in which it concludes should be part of reality as it is found, or belong to its component elements; and so the human psyche should be searched for within the framework of the forces of nature. Some natural scientists thought that matter is really permeated by "dispersed" spiritual particles which—as a result of their appropriate selection, gathering and solidification—arrive at an independent form of a spirit. This assertion obviously results from a naive way of imagination-based thinking which conceives of spirit as matter composed from particles, whereas it is uncompoundedness which constitutes the essence of spirit (as it does not possess matter, it cannot have constituent parts). Hence, there can be no talk of the "diffusion" of spirit in matter (as Pierre Teilhard de Chardin theorized), or of the concentration of spirit and its passing into a "new state" different from diffusion; for all this presupposes an internal subjective-essential composition of parts which is ruled out if spirit is conceived as an immaterial being.

The origin of man and of his spiritual, immaterial soul as a result of an evolutionary process is excluded, since this would be tantamount to being coming from non-being (however, beings cannot come from nothing, unless they are created by the Being). Thus, Aristotle's conception that man is only a product of nature (φύσει τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν

γέγονε ἄνθρωπος) cannot be accepted without falling into contradiction.

The Corporeal-Spiritual Nature of Man

Man's chief property is a special synthesis of matter and spirit, which is also shown in the biblical revelation. The human soul, as all human actions confirm, needs the matter of the human body to act. Although the results of cognition or acts of the will are immaterial in their structure, the functioning of cognition or love in man is always performed through matter. Although the soul (as a spirit) exists as a being in itself (as a subject), which is confirmed by the ontic effects (immaterial in their structure) of spiritual action, the processes of the soul's action occur in the body and through the body; there are no purely immaterial actions, for the human spirit together with matter form one source of action. It is the unique and specific mode of the human spirit's existence: it organizes matter for itself as its own body through which it can act and express itself externally, and enrich itself internally by action of (free) decision proper only to a spirit.

In such a vision, man is an exceptional being which synthesizes in his nature the world of spirit and the world of matter. Matter, however, which enters into the composition of human nature is not ultimately and perfectly mastered by the human spirit, but requires continual renewal. Matter is not completely subject to the power of the human soul, and therefore there is a crack, as it were, in human nature, which the Christian revelation explains by reference to original sin—the human spirit's disobedience and rebellion against God, which St. Augustine expressed in a few short words: *rebellis mens—rebellem carnem obtinuit*.[31] The internal crack in human nature (concerning its action)

[31] "The rebellious spirit received a rebellious body." Cf. St. Augustine, *The City of God*, bk. 13, ch. 13, trans. Marcus Dods: "For, as soon as our first parents had transgressed the commandment . . . [t]hey experienced a new motion of their flesh, which had be-

should be healed by continual acts of the human spirit's free decision, in which man chooses practical judgments about what is truly good, realizes the true good, and thereby constitutes himself as a being that is both rational and free.

Man in Christian Realism

Philosophical anthropology explains the human being in the context of nature, that is, in the context of the portion of reality which is accessible to man in his natural cognition by the senses and reason. This philosophical explanation is the foundation for understanding man as the source of personal actions. But does the traditional philosophical anthropology really cover the whole of human actions? Does man's transcendence that appears in his actions extend to a broader range of problems concerning human life after death, provided that the human personal being is immortal? Does the philosophical understanding of man not require a sort of completion by resorting to some elements of biblical revelation and theological interpretations of what divine revelation has to say about man?

St. Pope John Paul II's explicit statement: "Man cannot be completely understood without Christ,"[32] and his encyclical letter *Fides et ratio* suggest that anthropological thought should be fortified by con-

come disobedient to them, in strict retribution of their own disobedience to God. For the soul, revelling in its own liberty, and scorning to serve God, was itself deprived of the command it had formerly maintained over the body. And because it had willfully deserted its superior Lord, it no longer held its own inferior servant; neither could it hold the flesh subject, as it would always have been able to do had it remained itself subject to God. Then began the flesh to lust against the Spirit . . . in which strife we are born, deriving from the first transgression a seed of death, and bearing in our members, and in our vitiated nature, the contest or even victory of the flesh." (In *From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, First Series, Vol. 2, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887). Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight; available at: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1201.htm.

[32] This statement was given in Warsaw during the Pope's pilgrimage to Poland in 1979.

sidering additional aspects of human action and its causes, which in an essential way supplement the purely philosophical understanding of man who appears as—to use Martin Heidegger's wording—a "being-toward-death." Heidegger also called attention to man's so-called *existentialia* which are a consequence of "Geworfenheit," that is, the involuntary thrownness of man's individual existence into the world: the irrational world which acquires rationality as a consequence of human thought being anchored in it, or perhaps the rational world which imparts the foundations of understanding to man, when he makes contact with it by cognition. Heidegger's *existentialia*—including a special guardianship exercised over things (*Fürsorge, Zunhanden-sein*), man's common-fate (*Mitsorge, Besorge*), a tragic man's fate (*Sorge*) ultimately directed toward death (*zum Todesein*)—lead to persistent questions that man must answer. These questions (addressed by biblical revelation) are those which man cannot avoid in his personal life, but must do his best to reply them with real-life answers—"real-life" answers are those which can direct man's life and make it rational in ultimate terms. These questions concern the possibility of explaining man's being and action, that is, constructing an integral anthropology.

What is then the meaning of the human being? A rationally justified answer to this question is provided by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*. An examination of the *Summa*—as a proposal for an ultimate understanding of what it means to be a human person—leads to a solution (essential for philosophical culture) to the problem of who man is in his being and action.

The Rational Context of Personal Life

The first part of the *Summa*, while discussing problems concerning God and creation, especially the problem of man's ontic structure, addresses the issue of "man's being thrown into the world," including

such questions as: Into what sort of world is man thrown? What does it mean to be thrown? How is man to be understood?

The environment of human life (i.e., the world) appears as a being that is rational in its essence, for it is legible and understandable to its ultimate limits (i.e., the existence of God). The first questions in the *Summa*, in which Aquinas analyzes the problematic of whether God can be known from an examination of really existing being, put human cognition in the field of ontic intelligibility which is the reason for human rationality. The question about the existence and cognizability of God presents human cognition with the problem of understanding being. What is ultimately the being that appears to human cognition? This being is ultimately legible in five different ways (intrinsic to *Aquinas's Five Ways* of proving God's existence) which show the ultimate meaning of being as really existing.

Being primarily appears as constantly being fulfilled in existence, constantly actualizing its existence which is both acquirable and losable. The drama of existence that must constantly be actualized is something fundamental also for man, for his existence is given to him, and he faces the constant risk of losing it. No earthly being imparts existence to itself, for no earthly being is existence. The existence of earthly beings, however, fulfills itself, actualizes itself. Thus, the potency and actualization of the existence of man and all other earthly beings require, as a condition for rationality, the existence of the Being that of and through itself is existence. And this is the first way (*Aquinas's First Way*) that leads to the perception of the world's rationality. That which in earthly beings constitutes their beingness (real existence) is ultimately actualized by the Being that of and through itself is existence, and that is called God. To a certain degree, this conception was already in Aristotle's mind, in the form of his definition of motion: "The fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially, is mo-

tion;"[33] hence the proof *ex motu* to which St. Paul would refer in his speech at the Areopagus: "For in him we . . . move."[34]

The existence of being which is realized in concrete beings finds its subject in these beings in the form of an ontic effect that comes into real existence in a definite content. The coming into existence of an effect that did not previously exist points to the cause of the effect. This cause is ultimately the Being that exists through itself. When a being realizes its existence, it indicates God as the source of its coming into existence. And this is the line of the second way (*Aquinas's Second Way*) in showing the source of reality—God. This state of affairs reveals that the world cannot exist of itself, for it is not the master of its own existence. St. Thomas notes that "that which is possible not to be at some time is not,"[35] but it receives its existence from the Necessary Existence—God.

The first three of *Aquinas's Ways* leading to the perception of God are ways of considering the act of existence in being, for it is the act that constitutes the real order of being.

Aquinas's Fourth Way examines the real content (essence) of being which appears as hierarchized in its universal and transcendental properties. Beings that have come into existence as effects are one, true, and good, to greater or lesser degree; we know this spontaneously, while evaluating and choosing what is better: that which is more undivided (one) and less destructible, that which is truer and less falsified, and that which is less apparent and more attractive as an enduring end (good). The world of beings—characterized by analogical transcendental perfections that only to an incomplete degree are realized in individuals—clearly points to God who alone is *per se* and absolutely perfect,

[33] *Physics*, III, 201 a 10–11: "Ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ᾗ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν."

[34] *Acts* 17:28.

[35] *S.Th.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, resp.: "[Q]uod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est."

in whom alone there is the identity of existence and universal perfections.

Various actions that emerge from the reality dependent in existence indicate the purposefulness of the world's action which is necessarily connected with God as a personal being, and so as a being that knows, loves, and directs the world. The structure of action includes the following: a motive for which action exists rather than not existing, a cognitive determination of ways to achieve the end of action, and the actuality of action. As the source of the world's action, God is a personal being who rationally and lovingly directs the action that really and actually permeates the existing world (*Aquinas's Fifth Way*).

God: A Source, Exemplar, and End

The human reason's reading of the existing world of beings shows that being is intellectually intelligible to the very limit of intelligibility; this limit appears as God, existing through Himself as the source, exemplar, and end (good) of beings that are effects.

Human existence, although contingent and oriented toward death, finds itself in the rational context of a world that comes from God and is completely dependent upon God in its existence (being). A deeper cognition of the world of created beings (especially through *Aquinas's Fourth Way*) indicates, in an analogical sense, what we usually call "God's nature" which—described positively (in a cataphatic way) or negatively (in an apophatic way)—shows God's perfections: goodness, infinity, unity, truth, cognition, love, participative presence in the world, ideative cognition, happiness, etc.

God's cognition, love, and happiness become clearer by the revelation of God's inner life in the Trinity of Persons. God is not "lonely" in His infinite life. He eternally manifests Himself to Himself as the Begotten Thought-Word. This Word passes into the eternal "Breath of God's Love" (*Verbum spirans amorem*) toward Himself and toward

everything that is "in and from God." In his *Summa Theologica*, when considering reality, St. Thomas shows that the cognizable and rational world of beings comes constantly from God (living a perfect personal life), whose infinite creative knowledge and unfailing love give birth to happiness that we can conceive of only by analogy upon the background of our imperfect cognition of beings-effects.

Creativity is God's first action in relation to the world of beings. The latter come into existence in a process of incessant creation which also includes the preservation of beings in existence, for the *conservatio in esse* is nothing other than a *creatio continua*.[36] The conception of the creation of the world from nothing (i.e., from no pre-existing substrate), and thus of the negation of the existence of any form of being apart from God, shows the profound rationality of reality (which comes completely from God), and rules out any idea of emanationism.

When considering the effects created by God, St. Thomas indicates the creation first of the world of rational spirits (whom the Bible calls "angels," i.e., messengers of the divine rule). The world of matter also comes entirely from God and is dependent on Him in its existence. Thus, the act of creation relates to both pure spirits and matter. The creation of the world of spirits (and so, rationality not limited by matter), and of the world of matter, is the context for the creation of man.

Man as an ontic synthesis of spirit and matter is a particular object of God's creative action. God imprints His own image and likeness in man by directly creating man's soul. The soul, existing autonomously, imparts its existence to matter and organizes matter to be a human body. Thus, the human soul exists as one spirit which is uncompounded in its essence and not subjected to the process of evolution in being. In its action, however, the human soul does depend on matter, which it

[36] Cf. *S.Th.*, I, q. 9, a. 2, resp.: "Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence."

organizes for itself and of which it is the form; it means that all man's actions are permeated by materiality, that is, potentiality and dependence on the body. On the other hand, the ontic structure of certain effects of human action turns out to be immaterial; this is the case in man's intellectual (cognitive) and volitional (spiritually emotional) life whose immaterial effects clearly reflect the immateriality of its cause: the human soul. Nevertheless, an analysis of man's ontic structure, based on manifestations of human action, shows the essential ordination of the immaterial soul to the material body, for all the forms of the soul's action (vegetative, sensitive, and spiritual) are performed with the help of the body's powers. Man's spiritual life, then, is conditioned by the matter concretized in his body; it is called, as it were, to perform and manifest a synthesis of the spiritual and material creation.

From the perspective of God's creative process and God's cognition and ideas (where His creative process finds its source), man appears as a person constituted after the model and likeness of God Himself. The human person is a concrete expression of God's perfection and ontic richness; man is not an inert being thrown into the world, but a concrete person who, through his own action, is supposed to realize the perfection of God's idea concerning himself. Man fulfills his task by actualizing his personal potentialities by means of acts of decision, made according to the measure of a person, and so, consciously and freely.

In biblical revelation, the undisturbed process of man's actualization is called paradise. At the same time, however, the biblical paradise turned out to be a scene of the drama of man's free choice: the freedom given to man became an occasion for his evil choice—sin. In consequence of bad decisions on the part of people (as well as some angels), God's rule over the world became complicated. Now, the realization of God's thought concerning the human person requires, as a *conditio sine*

qua non, not only the genuine commitment of a man to making good choices, but also a special assistance on the part of God.[37]

Man's Decision and Its End

The individual man, who lives in the state resulting from the fall of the "first parents," must make his way through life by taking actions which, due to being human, are also moral. The problematic of man's moral attitudes and actions is covered in the *Pars Prima Secundae* of Aquinas's *Summa Theologica*. It sheds light on key factors that make it possible to perform particular acts, so that they constitute the *optimum potentiae* (i.e., the rational and good human action). In human action, the most important thing, since it is the reason for action's coming into existence, is an understanding of the end which is simultaneously the motive for action. Action's end (motive) is man's fulfillment in happiness, for the nature of a contingent being includes its own completion. This completion, considered objectively (as the good in itself—the supreme good) and subjectively (as the good that completes a man who acts rationally), is happiness conceived in the proper sense. The production of an action under the influence of a rationally perceived motive is an action of the will and a manifestation of the volitional side of man's life. For this reason, St. Thomas makes an in-depth analysis of the volitional aspect of human action, especially the most important moment of action—decision (*electio*) that consists in choosing such a concrete practical judgment that indicates the obligation to achieve a particular good in a moral act; the achievement of this good makes it possible to reach (brings closer to) the ultimate end of human life. Such a decision-making choice of the will presupposes corresponding processes of ra-

[37] These matters are presented first in the *Secunda Pars* of the *Summa Theologica*, and then in the *Tertia Pars*, which shows the role of Jesus Christ as man's Mediator, Saviour and Redeemer.

tional deliberation which should culminate in producing a morally good act.

Moral act is constituted by the following factors: the object (good or bad) of an act, the circumstance in which an act is performed, the subjective intentions connected with action, and the engagement of all other human potentialities (apart from the will itself that produces an act). All the factors must be evaluated from the point of view of man—a consciously and freely acting being. Human freedom fulfills itself in the choice of the will, and so, in the act of decision in which a synthesis is made of cognitive and appetite-volitional factors of the human person. A right moral choice (a choice made by the will of a judgment concerning the good that man must realize in action in order to constitute himself as good) indicates man's internal rectitude (or his internal depravity, if a choice is wrong).

In order to understand human moral choices, we should consider man's emotional sphere which is an important factor in the formation of human conduct, and so in the order of human morality. Emotions appear at times to be in disagreement with the commands of reason. When the emotions are too autonomous and independent from the commands of reason, it is very difficult for man to make right decisions. But having known the character of human emotions, their basic manifestations and ontic structure, man can do internal work on subordinating these emotions to rational action. Emotions should be subject to the order of reason, so that man's acts can be truly rational.

St. Thomas makes a detailed analysis of human emotions as factors that mark human action. As emotions facilitate (or at times impede) man's action, so stable skills toward good or evil acquired as the consequence of human actions are a factor conditioning moral rational conduct. These acquired skills are virtues or vices, that is, effective habits of man that are acquired by the repetition of certain acts. The acquired habits improve or worsen human potentials and direct sources of action.

Thus, there is a need to examine immediate subjects of these habits (reason, will, and emotions) from the point of view of their ability to make steady improvement, so that human actions become more human (i.e., more rational and free). A reflection about possible skills (about making the sources of human action virtuous) in the natural order opens the way for seeing possibilities of improving human habits through the supernatural order, that is, the infused virtues: the gifts and beatitudes of the Holy Spirit, as Christian revelation teaches.

As a realist in his approach to man, St. Thomas also considers man's inclination to sin (a consequence of original sin which permanently weakens natural actions of a person) and its effects and manifestations: acquired vices. The problematic of sin is so important and relevant to understanding man that St. Thomas carries out a detailed analysis of it that makes possible a deeper understanding not only of man as a subject of vices and their effects (sins), but also of diverse influences that human sins and their evil effects exercise. Man as a subject of sinful acts, and also as one who generates evil by these acts, constitutes an important object of knowledge which allows for deeper understanding of both human nature as the source of human action (for *agere sequitur esse*) and social life which is filled with perils and failures resulting precisely from man's various sins. One cannot truly understand man without taking into account his evil, sinful action which causes real threats to individuals as well as to communities where evil is particularly destructive. This fact makes it necessary to provide commensurate assistance for man as a source of personal action. While one kind of assistance appears externally in the form of legal regulations, another kind takes the form of God's supernatural action (grace) and reaches the depth of man's soul.

Law, understood in its fundamental ontic (real and intentional) structure, is a particularly important factor in the activity of man, especially of man living in society—both a natural society (the family, so-

cial organizations, the state) and a supernatural society (which is the Church understood in the light of faith). St. Thomas's conception of law is something exceptionally significant in the domain of jurisprudence, because it is built on the foundations of the philosophy of law and permeated by the theological understanding of law.

According to classical philosophical thought, the phenomenon of law is something natural that has come into existence together with man whose life becomes a protected good. Law therefore concerns human interpersonal actions that are due to man on account of his good. Law constitutes a necessary condition for man's life and his personal development. Hence, the good of man achieved by human actions is due to man by virtue of his nature. The good of man is manifested in his natural inclinations ordered to the preservation of life, the transmission of life (by generation in socially accepted conditions), and personal development. Man's personal development occurs in three orders: intellectual cognition, moral conduct (by choosing and realizing the human good), and creativity (in various domains of life that realize the beauty of human actions). The law understood as the realization of the human good is the foundation for all positive laws that regulate human actions, especially in the social order. No regulation of positive law, however, can be in conflict with the real good of man; for it would then be an illusory law that could not bind human conduct which is by nature ordered to the realization of a real good.

St. Thomas extends the general understanding of law to the understanding of the religious laws and precepts of both the Old Testament and the Church of his time. The religious laws and precepts are applied for the sake of the increase of man's good and inner perfection, and they can never disturb man's relationship with God as a person, with whom man is joined in his religious life.

Considering man's being ordered to participating in the life of God as a person, a life that completely exceeds the potentialities of na-

ture, St. Thomas ponders the question of grace as a necessary condition and at the same time a starting point of the supernatural life that continues in the beatific vision.[38] He understands grace as a special trace of the Incarnate Word, and a transformation of the soul after the example of man's Savior and Redeemer. Grace is to make the human person capable of participating in God's knowledge, love, freedom, and happiness, according to the promise of Christ himself. Grace makes possible the beatific vision in which God Himself becomes the content directly experienced by man. Grace which is God's self-imparting ultimately guarantees the realization of God's intention for man, the intention formed at the moment of the creation of man's soul. The supernatural order—built into the structure of the human being and his action transcending matter—supplements the natural potentialities of human nature that, in its deepest content, is obedient to God's action which, in tradition, has been usually called the potency for obedience (*potentia oboedientialis*).

The Actualization of Personal Potentialities

After providing an outline of the natural and supernatural dimension of human action, by which man actualizes his natural and supernatural potentialities, St. Thomas analyzes the specific ways in which these potentialities are actualized, and which lead man to form special habits (virtues). These (supernatural and natural) virtues, and God's particular assistance (called the gifts of the Holy Spirit) in achieving them, are presented in opposition to the vices and sins that deform them; for man, in his action, faces the possibility of choosing either good or evil. Therefore, the understanding of man as a person who actualizes his potentiality cannot be one-sided, that is, without considering the threats to, or even the loss of, the rational meaning of human

[38] See *S.Th.*, I–II.

life. The detailed analysis of the ways in which man actualizes virtues, or loses himself in sins opposed to virtues, is based on experiences which have been collected by mankind for centuries, and which allow us to see the richness and variety of human life as it appears in human knowledge and conduct.

Man's conduct is an expression of his moral life. Morality is an essential form of human action; therefore, analyses of human action are particularly highlighted in the *Summa Theologica*. The action of man as man is characterized by rationality and freedom. Aquinas uses an important distinction made in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle notes that rational cognition occurs at three levels of human cognitive activity: theoretical cognition (ordered to attaining the truth), practical cognition (which is an actualization of human potentialities in attaining the good), and creative (artistic) cognition (which is ordered to the realization of beauty as a special synthesis of truth and good). These cognitive levels overlap with each other to some degree in concrete human action, but there are some specific aspects that determine whether we are dealing with theoretical, practical, or creative cognition. Practical cognition is realized in the personal life of every man, insofar as every man is actualized to action by his acts of decision. Not every man makes scientific discoveries, nor is every man a creator in the field of art, but every man must act in a human way, that is, he must perform acts of decision concerning how he should act. And this is exactly the domain of morality: every action of man should actualize him as a rational and good man, that is, simply as a man. An analysis of the different (virtuous or sinful) ways of man's action essentially determines the understanding of who man is.

St. Thomas begins his consideration of the concrete modes of man's action with an analysis of the so-called theological virtues: faith, hope, and charity. These virtues, highlighted especially in New Testament revelation, are an illustration, as it were, of how a child lives in

the horizon of the care of his parents. This is the way of life that Christ indicated as the right way for us to relate to God for whom we are children, as it is expressed in the daily prayer "Our Father."[39] The fundamental form of the relation of a child to his parents is then the way of living in faith, trust, hope, and love. A child, born in a family, receives from his parents everything that he needs for human life; together with the skill of using speech, he receives information about the world; he must believe this information (which at the beginning is the only source of his knowledge) in order to survive. Faith is then the first source of information; in the process of gaining knowledge, however, elements of faith accompany man throughout his life, since he is not in a position to verify all information. We would not have survived as children, if we had not accepted information as true with trust in our parents. The same attitude and the same way of life—characterized by trust, hope, and love—are also necessary for man in the supernatural dimension of life in which man is grafted, and which is the only real way of man's life in eternity. The analysis of the theological virtues helps us to consciously and concretely take a position on what man should do, and what he should ultimately desire. The development of these virtues leads man into a more conscious human life that aims (through death) toward eternity, and it also allows him to better understand humanity itself as given to man for fulfillment.

The supernatural order of life does not destroy man, but—on the contrary—it is intended to ennoble human nature which acts in the context of experienced natural reality. There is a developed philosophical and theological tradition in which various forms of human conduct have been considered, insofar as this conduct is foreseeable as a consequence of habituated sources of human action; these sources include the human reason, the rational will, and the emotions (in their irascible-

[39] *Matthew* 6:9–13; *Luke* 11:2–4.

combative and appetitive character of action). The many-sided habituation of the action of these faculties—and thereby the ennoblement of man himself as the author of his acts—is expressed in the form of the so-called cardinal virtues which are divided into particular subvirtues, and which have their opposites in vices generated by evil action.

Since man is a rational being, the reason as the indubitable guide of human conduct must be—in its action which is ordered to the realization of the good—properly prepared. The readiness of the reason to efficacious action is called prudence; as a phronetic cognition, prudence was already mentioned by Heraclitus, and then introduced into the domain of ethics by Aristotle. Prudence encompasses a wide domain of actions (those anchored in the past and in the memory of things past, and those grounded in the individual and social present) and concerns forecasting that plays the role of a special individual providence in the rational action of the human person.

Another important domain of human life is covered by justice which ennobles the human will by strengthening it in rational stability to render to each what is due to him. Justice that concerns both the life directed by law and other forms of life in common with other people was treated in biblical and philosophical traditions, especially in the ethics of Socrates and Plato, as a particularily sublime form of perfect human life. Justice is that by which people recognize and respect divine and human laws. A deeper analysis of the problematic of justice allows to discern a correspondence between various forms of conduct and some special forms of justice. The different forms of justice (especially legal, distributive, and commutative justice) find their expression in individual and social judgments on what falls under the judgment of justice; they are seen with special clarity in judgments on unjust action concerning persons or things. Man's attitudes to his parents, family, homeland, and nation, are part of a special domain of action which can

ennoble man and be judged as just, or corrupt man and be judged as unjust.

The rational realization of prudence is conditioned in large measure by the habituation of human emotions, especially those which assist in removing a threatening evil, that is, those which should be ennobled by the virtue of fortitude. Fortitude gives man power to prudently attack an emerging evil in order to conquer, withstand, or not surrender to it. In difficult moments of life, fortitude can find expression in heroic acts, such as martyrdom; in daily life, it concerns matters that may seem to be trivial, such as patience and endurance; sometimes, it can also be expressed in the form of magnanimity and humility.

The demonstration of man's nature in action ennobled by fortitude (or depraved by a lack of fortitude or an abuse of it) is not neutral for the life of individuals or societies. Neither is the case of temperance. The ennoblement of man by submitting his appetitive emotions to the rule of reason in the form of the virtue of temperance completes the vision of human rational conduct. Temperance puts a rational rein on man's emotions, whereby he can curb his spiritual or corporeal greediness in different domains of life. Although temperance is usually situated in the domains of human sexuality and nutrition, it also concerns the movements of the human psyche in spiritual domains, such as: malice, hubris, invasive or unnecessary curiosity, elevating oneself above others. Temperance assists man not only in getting under control important and necessary biological forces connected with the vegetative side of his life, but also in the realm of spiritual desires which, if not controlled or ennobled, cause devastation in man's individual and social life.

The God-Man as the Reason for the Fulfillment of the Human Person

Man's ontic structure is a source of understanding who man is, and how he actualizes himself as a dynamic and potential personality.

The actualization of the human person's potentialities takes place on the way to the end-purpose of his life which concludes with the death of his body (his soul, which is not subject to death, remains alive). At the same time, the question of man's end-purpose entails great difficulties concerning the understanding of the meaning of human life. The human soul—which exists in man despite the corruption of his body, and which itself is not subject to corruption—is capable of a new and perfect life; however, in attaining such a life (implicitly foreshadowed by his spiritual acts), man himself is powerless. Although there is a natural desire in man for God as the ultimate fulfillment of human inclinations, this desire on the part of man is ineffective.[40] Only God can fulfill man's natural desire in this respect. The Bible (especially the New Testament) reveals that it is the Logos (the Incarnate Word) who, as Jesus Christ, is the author of human salvific fulfillment; by His human life, death, and resurrection, Jesus Christ actualizes the deepest (i.e., obedient) potency of the beatific vision of God. He thus stands in the central point of man's personal dynamism as the One who, by His divine power, is capable of ultimately actualizing that which is infused by God Himself (who directly creates the human soul), that is, the desire for ultimate (in the beatific vision), unchanging, and eternal happiness. Christ, as He Himself revealed, actualizes man's eternal life in God. He alone, as God-man, can become the mediator in relation to God the Father and at the same time the Savior of man, thereby fulfilling all the natural desires infused into human nature. Christ's teachings and deeds (in the form of His redemptive martyr's death and salvific resurrection) are an argument of faith for the truth of the rational vision of man.

St. Thomas, taking the position of faith and showing the salvific form of the Incarnate Word, completes the vision of integral anthropology. He indicates and justifies the idea that man, as a concretized (con-

[40] Cf. note 28 above.

densed, as it were) thought of God, has both his own origin and his supra-rational fulfillment; man's fulfillment is achieved not by his own powers, but by the power of God who—by Jesus Christ's human nature that has its subject in the existence of the Logos—crowns human life.

Man is God's creature who, admittedly, succumbs to evil, but who, through his rational and good acts, aims toward his destiny given by God and fulfilled by the God-man—only such a conception completely explains the meaning of being a man and the fulfillment of humanity by the saving power of Jesus Christ in every human person.

The Ultimate Personal Decision

The rational fulfillment of man, through his acts of decision which synthesize human nature as a whole, is something arduous, something that is never perfect or complete over the course of life and in the constant "flow of matter" in the human body. Fully free and perfect acts of decision require a clear and perfect cognition and a will that realizes perfect love—and this is not fulfillable in the course of human earthly life.

In man, however, there is a real prospect for the fulfillment of his humanity at the moment of "passage," that is, the death of his body. The moment of death can be conceived as a man's personal experience, not merely as an "event from outside" (as the disintegration of matter). Death as a man's personal experience can become the ultimate completion of his humanity and lead to the ultimate development of his cognitive acts and acts of love—the development which ultimately makes possible a perfect decision of choosing the good. At the moment of the ultimate choice of the good, the human spirit, in its state of superconsciousness, sees the ultimate meaning of being, and thereby it sees the First Reality in its source, that is, God who clarifies the whole meaning of being; this meaning is that which has been pursued by man's cognition in all his life, and to which all scientific discoveries

have eventually led. God, present to man in his new state, appears as the Good for which human personal decisions have been striving throughout life. All this allows man to make his ultimate personal decision which is the free personal choice of the Good (i.e., God), and not of himself who is a contingent being (a being by participation)—choosing himself would be "hell" and an ontic absurdity.

The act of man's ultimate personal decision finds its consequence in the possibility of subjecting the fundamental forces of matter—which can finally become obedient to a man who has arrived at personal fulfillment—to the spirit. In Christian revelation, this is called the resurrection. The process leading to man's resurrection and fully personal life is conditioned by the salvific intervention of the Incarnate God—Jesus Christ. Hence, the ultimate understanding of man in his personal life is not possible without the revelation culminating in Christ and his salvific mission. The Christian vision of man completes many correct and true cognitive intuitions of Aristotle.

MAN* IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

The author attempts to first review the most general and culturally important statements on the subject of man, and then present the developed and rationally justified conception of man as a personal being who, by his action, transcends nature, society, and himself. This conception, unique in world literature, finds its expression in St. Thomas Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*, which presents a justifying context for man's origin and life, ontic structure, individual and social actions, and his eschatic fulfillment by the intervention of the Incarnate God—Jesus Christ. In his *Summa*, Aquinas not only considers and rationally justifies all the basic aspects of the nature of man who transcends the world by his conscious and free action, but also takes into consideration various anthropological theories developed in ancient Greece and Rome.

KEYWORDS

man, soul, body, creation, death, resurrection, person, decision, nature, second nature, action, morality, fulfillment, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Jesus Christ, Christian philosophy, Christian anthropology, Thomistic personalism, Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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CIVILIZATION IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Civilization (Latin: *civis*—citizen, *civilis*—civil, public, pertaining to the state) is a defined form of man's group life, or man's culture in its social dimension.

History of the Concept

The term "civilization" appeared and spread in the Enlightenment and was understood as that which brings progress, material development, and spiritual development, which allows man to overcome contrary things coming from nature, from man himself, and from human society (Marie J. A. de Condorcet). An understanding of being a polished man who is formed in customs (Victor Riqueti de Mirabeau), in everything that primitive people do not experience, was associated with the term "civilization." This understanding corresponded to an earlier understanding of civilized man in the Renaissance that came from Erasmus of Rotterdam, i.e., a responsible citizen possessing social

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virtues and a necessary refinement of manners, and this understanding had a valuative character. For Stanisław Staszic, civilization is the socialization of man, the family, the nation, and other associations.

During the Enlightenment, by civilization was understood that which permits man to build a new order of social life, different from the existing order that was shaped under the influence of Christianity. The foundations of civilization were thought to be in reason, in nature, in what is human, in what brings benefit and is pleasurable, in what is clear and evident. Civilization so conceived was inscribed into the context of utopian thought and in different, self-redeeming conceptions of humanity. In the Enlightenment, a different understanding and appraisal of civilization appeared, seeing in civilization the cause of the fall and enslavement of man (Jean-Jacques Rousseau) who by nature is good, perfect, and capable of self-realization. According to Rousseau, civilization was the cause of man's corruption and depravity, and therefore it deserves to be condemned and rejected, while man himself should return to a way of life in agreement with nature.

Another meaning of the term "civilization" appeared in the works of Johann G. Herder and François Guizot, for whom civilization (like culture) is a synonym for moral and intellectual progress. According to Wilhelm von Humboldt, we should understand by civilization everything that facilitates people living together in harmony; civilization is manifested in technology, tools, law and customs, and in institutions. Civilization so conceived is externalized and incarnated in matter by culture. For Edward B. Tylor, civilization is the whole of culture produced by any given society from primitive times up to the present moment. Alfred L. Kroeber, like Robert Merton, understands civilization as that by which man and society influence the world of nature and as what man himself has incorporated in material reality.

For many scientists and thinkers, the terms "civilization" and "culture" are strictly connected, since there is no culture without civili-

zation, and no civilization without culture (Feliks Koneczny, Georg Simmel, Christopher Dawson, Thomas S. Eliot, Albert Schweitzer, Jacques Maritain, Jean Laloup, and Jean Néllis).

Modern times, due to the German subjectivist-idealist current of thought (Immanuel Kant), brought ways of understanding culture as sharply contrasted with civilization. Civilization (Zivilisation) is what is outside man (his spirit, psyche), and what has being in matter as a product. Culture (Kultur), on the other hand, is a unique, internal, spiritual reality of man. It represents values (obligations) produced by man himself—a reality separated from the external and real world (Georg W. Hegel, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Wilhelm Dilthey, José Ortega y Gasset, Ernst Troeltsch, Benedetto Croce, Friedrich Meinecke, and Henri Berr).

In the twentieth century, the problematic of civilization was raised in different domains of culture. In academia, Oswald Spengler, Arnold J. Toynbee, and Feliks Koneczny developed a specific understanding of civilization; in art (especially in science fiction literature), Herbert G. Wells, Stanisław Lem, Aldous L. Huxley, and George Orwell meditated on civilization; on the moral and religious plane, the question of civilization was taken up by Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II. Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, and Alvin Toffler with their publications had an important influence on the understanding of the theory of civilization in the twentieth century.

Various reasons led people to take up the problematic of civilization (armed conflicts, the disintegration of man, society, and the state, social, cultural, and economic crises that posed a threat to man; social, cultural, technological, and scientific revolutions; attempts to find a definitive understanding and grasp of man's history as a whole; questions concerning the identity and variety of cultures in the context of the truth about man and the truth revealed on the pages of the Gospel). Civilization was considered in different disciplines, but the historical

sciences, philosophy, and the social sciences with particular consideration of the political sciences had priority. The problems raised in studies of civilization were focused on the following questions: What are civilizations, and where should one seek the reason for their existence? Are we dealing with many different civilizations, or only one, and if there is a plurality of civilizations, what is the reason for this plurality, and how do civilizations differ? Are there rules and laws of the development of history (and if there are, what are they)? In what measure do civilizations influence man and his human life? What is civilization? How and due to what does civilization develop? How do civilizations influence each other, and is a stable synthesis of civilizations possible? What role do the conditions of the natural environment, natural resources, races, languages, religions, and customs perform in the shaping of civilization? What sort of knowledge are investigations of civilization?

The above questions reveal the connection of civilization and the cultures that arose in the bosom of civilization with man himself, his life as a person, and his role in the reality of social life. Considering that man by his nature is a social being, and so is open to forms of group life, the problematic of civilization is strictly connected with anthropological investigations. For this reason—taking appraisals of man's nature as our criterion—we can also distinguish between civilizations that are friendly to man and his nature, which really support man's life as a person, and anti-human civilizations, which hinder the development of man as a person. A plurality of civilizations is generally accepted. In civilization, one can see the foundations for the functioning of law, politics, social life, and family life. Civilization also plays an essential role in the religious life of man, just as religion plays a role in civilization.

Theories of Civilization

The Biological Theory of Civilization

Oswald Spengler's theory of civilization became famous and gave rise to many discussions in the twentieth century. Spengler's thought had an important influence on political actions in Germany during Nazi times. In his work *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (*The Decline of the West*), under the influence of the theories of Friedrich Nietzsche, Hegel, and Gnosticism, Spengler stated that culture and civilization are manifestations of one biological process of life, which is subject to the cosmic and universal law of generation and corruption, birth and death, violent quantitative and qualitative changes. Hence, all the events of the history of humanity are organically and structurally connected; they are a manifestation of one biological life process; humanity is a zoological category. The historical events of humanity (i.e., the process of the development of cultures) pass through stages analogous to the stages in the development of an organism, that is, youth, maturity, and old age. Culture is a stage of maturity in the development of historical events, whereas civilization is a stage aiming at death, that is, the state of the loss of life, a time of regress, decline, lameness, and inefficiency in the history of mankind. For Spengler, civilization appears as a stage of the end of life, twilight (*Untergang*), and at the same time, the stage of completion (*Vollendung*).

Spengler, like Giambattista Vico in his work *Scienza nuova* (*The New Science*), believed in the cyclicity of occurring changes, births and deaths. While Vico saw in history the manifestation and action of divine providence, and history itself passed through the stages of myths (the poetical-religious imagination), heroes (the will), and the reason, Spengler believed that the transformations that occur are irrational, pessimistic, and catastrophic in character (there is no cause for coming-into-being or decline, and no purpose for transformations). Transfor-

mations of culture into civilization occur spontaneously, caused by an inner "irrational and blind" instinct. Spengler distinguished eight civilizations: Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, Indian, Mexican, ancient, Western European, and Russian, which is still being born. Each of the cultures has its own profile, including fine arts, mathematics, physics, philosophy, music, and technology.

According to Spengler, Western culture had entered a time of twilight and completion, and thereby was becoming a civilization. The people of the West faced the task of completing the ultimate possibilities of their culture. The Germans (the "Romans of the culture of the West")—the Prussian socialists represented by an authoritarian state with a Faustian culture—had a special mission here. They were the ones who—after ridding themselves of sentiments, and living boisterously, hard, actively, with will and power—should complete the destiny of cosmic necessary law (death).

> We are born in this time and must bravely follow the path to the destined end. There is no other way. Our duty is to hold on to the lost position, without hope, without rescue. To hold on like that Roman soldier whose bones were found in front of a door in Pompeii, who died because they forgot to relieve him when Vesuvius erupted. That is greatness; that is to have race. This honorable end is the one thing that cannot be taken from Man.[1]

The Historical Theory of Civilization

The English historian Arnold J. Toynbee created an original theory of civilization (*A Study of History* and *Civilization on Trial*). He distinguished over twenty different civilizations; they are not forms of life separate from one another, but between them there is the possibility of contact and rivalry, which is the reason for the development of civi-

[1] Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics: A Contribution to a Philosophy of Life*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson and Michael Putman (Arktos Media Ltd., 2015), 77.

lization. Europe, conceived in geographic terms, is not uniform in its civilization, which explains the many armed conflicts appearing over its history. Western civilization is threatened by Byzantine civilization, represented by Russia. Civilizations arise as the result of the interaction of man and the natural environment. Each civilization—in Toynbee, "the smallest unit of historical study"[2]—is an organized form of human group life, the result of a challenge posed to man and his society by the natural environment. Unless he meets this challenge, man and his society cannot exist; to meet the challenge requires creative solutions and the efficient organization of group life, which leads to the existence of the civilization. The more difficult, richer, and varied the challenge, the richer is the civilization. When human societies lose the ability to react effectively to challenges from the environment, or when the environment stops presenting challenges, or they change into something completely new, then civilizations must fall. A civilization can be leaning toward a fall even over hundreds of years, but by its nature a civilization is not mortal and by creative thoughts it can lift itself from a fall. The development of a civilization cannot be reduced to man's interference in the natural environment or to the development of technology, but it is fundamentally visible in the increasing consolidation of human society. Social elites who are capable of creating and undertaking creative thoughts, of putting together internal solidarity and of alleviating social conflicts play an important role here.

The Sociological Theory of Civilization

Alvin Toffler took up the topic of civilization in his works: *The Third Wave*, *Creating a New Civilization*, and *Future Shock*. According to him, civilizations arise as the result of violent transformations (waves) that include the life of individuals, families, societies, political

[2] *Civilization on Trial* (Oxford University Press, 1949), 222.

communities, and the states. The first wave of transformations arose together with the spread of agrarian culture, and thereby led to the existence of the first civilization, which was connected with land; in this civilization, religion, tradition, and the multi-generational family played an important role. It lasted on the Earth for over 10,000 years.

In the seventeenth century, industrial civilization began to take shape, called into existence by the wave of technological and scientific transformations which caused a shift of life to cities and industrial centers, and thereby it waged war against the agrarian civilization. The friction between two different civilizations became a conflict which occurred fundamental for history. In practice, such conflicts took the form of wars, revolutions, rebellions, or social crises. In the beginnings of industrial civilization, a new model of the family as a small cell was formed, and new ideas of social life appeared, such as progress, the rights of the individual, the theory of the social contract, the idea of separation of religion (the Church) and the state, and the election of rulers by the populace; this was accompanied by mass production and consumption, universal education and information, leading to the creation of a new culture called mass culture; other features of this culture were cheap labor, predatory colonial policies, and the unchecked exploitation of natural resources.

Beginning in the 1970s, a new wave of transformations appears, connected with computer technology, leading to the rise of a new civilization that is globalist and information-based. The foundation of this form of civilization is knowledge and the rapid flow of information. Its universal characteristic is mobility, especially with respect to economic life. It eliminates the existence of independent and sovereign nation states, which are the product of the agrarian and industrial civilizations, and it proposes globalization. It eliminates the family based on indissoluble marriage for business partnerships, and it leads to non-religion. According to Toffler, the ideas of a “borderless world” and “planetary

consciousness" should animate the culture of the "third-wave" civilization.

The Political-Science Theory of Civilization

Toward the end of the twentieth century, the theory of the clash of civilizations developed by the American political scientist and sociologist Samuel P. Huntington resounded throughout the world.[3] According to him, worldwide conflicts in the past and present have their source in clashes and rivalries between civilizations, which in fact play the role of the subjects of political actions in the world. By reason of the different goals that civilizations set for themselves, political actions have a multi-polar character, and the history of the world is the history of civilizations, which include a material and a spiritual heritage. Huntington distinguishes seven existing civilizations (Chinese, Japanese,[4] Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox,[5] Western,[6] Latin American[7]) and African civilization, which is still being created. According to him, the foundation of a civilization is not a language, race, or religion, but culture conceived in a broad sense. He emphasizes that the reception of technical skills and technology by non-Western cultures does not lead to their westernization or to the creation of a single world civilization; on the contrary, it leads to a threat to Western civilization, since there is a permanent rivalry between civilizations. We are witnesses to the weakening of Western culture, being a result of artificial attempts to universalize it (making out of it a global and dominant civilization), which in

[3] See *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

[4] Which emerged from Chinese civilization.

[5] Which has Byzantine and Tatar roots, is based on a bureaucratic despotism, and is represented by Russia.

[6] Which arose in the Middle Ages and includes Europe, South America, and North America.

[7] Which grew on the grounds of Western civilization and Indian cultures.

practice lead to its loss of cultural identity and power, and also to conflicts and clashes of civilizations. The chief threat to Western civilization, according to Huntington, lies in Islamic and Chinese civilizations, while he sees the chief cause of the political setbacks of Western civilization in a failure to perceive differences in civilizations or to take them into account.

The Civilization of Death and the Civilization of Love

Considering that man and his society must be protected from various threats, Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II appealed for the creation of a civilization of love in defiance of a spreading civilization of death. The image of two opposing types of civilizations in rivalry, a civilization of death and a civilization of love, sank deeply into culture and although the image was shaped in a religious context, it became an inspiration and object for philosophical inquiries.

The civilization of death, otherwise called materialistic or utilitarian civilization (or consumer civilization), is in the most general terms a civilization of things (rather than a civilization of persons), a civilization in which persons become objects of use like things. In such a culture, man is in fact a slave of his weaknesses or a tool exploited against his nature and his innate dignity. This culture, which grows from a false understanding of man and the world, poses a threat to man, his life, integrity, and development. By locking man in the world of things and reducing him to finite goods, the civilization of death prefers technology at the cost of the moral goods; it prefers things rather than human persons, "to have" over "to be." The result of this is man's enslavement. While maintaining the appearances of justice, it kills human friendship, benevolence, and love, which are the natural modes of relations between people, and without which there is no human society friendly to man. The civilization of death manifests itself in the violation of inviolable and natural human rights, in murders, genocide, abor-

tion, euthanasia, suicides, torments, slavery, every kind of injustice and violations of human dignity.[8] The civilization of death is a "culture of death" that brings destruction to man by the destruction and perversion of the intellectual, volitional, affective, and religious life, and ultimately, the ruin of material life. Pope John Paul II emphasizes that such a state of affairs is fostered when man rejects the truth and lacks a reference to reality; this is followed by false creative and moral actions, ultimately leading to agnosticism and nihilism. The pope asks a question and explains the answer:

> Why is the "splendor of truth" so important? First of all, by way of contrast: the development of contemporary civilization is linked to a scientific and technological progress which is often achieved in a one-sided way, and thus appears purely positivistic. Positivism, as we know, results in agnosticism in theory and utilitarianism in practice and in ethics. In our own day, history is in a way repeating itself. Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use, a civilization of "things" and not of "persons," a civilization in which persons are used in the same way as things are used.[9]

The civilization of love is a form of community life in which persons have primacy over things, where ethics (moral conduct) has primacy over technology, where being has primacy over possession, and love has primacy over justice.

While in a culture of death, man appears in the role of a thing and lives for things and in the world of things, in the context of the culture of love, man lives the life of a person, and civilization itself serves the full development of man, who is conceived as a personal being, and so as rational and free. A civilization of love created by people who are full of love, faith, and hope, animated by the truth of the Gospel, built

[8] Cf. John Paul II, *Evangelium vitae* (Rome 1995), no. 3, 6, 49, 86, 91.

[9] John Paul II, *Letter to Families "Gratissimam Sane"* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), no. 13.

in peace, which is imparted to man by true love, based on a just and merciful order, becomes for man a natural niche of growth, making it possible for him to achieve the ultimate purpose of life. A civilization of love is created by all people of good will by the toil of their work, in which man plays the role of a subject rather than an instrument or slave. A civilization of love grows out of personalism, out of respect for the good of the human person, whereby it leads to morally good actions untainted by selfishness and individualism, filled with the spirit of truth and responsibility. It also supports human freedom and the responsibility connected with it, which work together in truth. The fulfillment of human love and, at the same time, its deepest expression is love expressed in a voluntary gift of oneself for the good of another person.[10]

The Historical-Philosophical Theory of Civilization

Questions about civilization were also studied by Polish scholars,[11] including Feliks Koneczny, whose achievements in this field have been recognized throughout the world (Arnold J. Toynbee, Anton Hilckman).

Koneczny based his analysis of civilization on historical studies, and he regarded the science concerning civilization as the crowning point of philosophical and historical investigations on human history. Koneczny formulated a coherent theory of civilization. His theory contained general conclusions concerning the social affairs of Poland, Europe, and the world. According to Koneczny, civilization is a method of organizing group life. Civilization is composed of both a material and a spiritual heritage. These overlap and constitute an indissoluble whole. In history there have been many civilizations, and at present there are seven living ones: Latin, Byzantine, Jewish, Arab, Turanian (Musco-

[10] Cf. *ibid.*, no. 14.

[11] E.g., Jan L. Popławski, Erazm Majewski, Florian Znaniecki, Michał Pawlikowski, Jan K. Kochanowski.

vite-Cossack), Brahmin, and Chinese. Within each of these several varieties can arise, but they will have a common civilizational skeleton. According to Koneczny, there is no single European civilization, but in the geographical terrain of Europe, civilizations such as Latin, Byzantine, Jewish, and Muscovite-Cossak exist and are in constant rivalry, and therefore one cannot speak of a single vision or a single understanding (or functioning) of European politics. As long as they are alive, all civilizations are in rivalry with each other, which is manifested also in the form of conflicts (including wars) between states; the rivalry between civilizations is focused on the preservation and extension of their material, moral, and intellectual heritage. The expansive character and rivalry of civilizations seems to be explained by the natural increase of human societies and man's natural tendency to preserve and amass the heritage with which he identifies and whereby he is able to live. However, there are civilizations (such as Turanian) that cannot develop except by the conquest and enslavement of others. In such civilizations, the entire politics and apparatus of power will be subordinated to war and plunder, and for them peacetime and the absence of war will be a destructive factor. Between civilizations, as between religions, no stable synthesis can arise. None of the civilizations is by its nature immortal, and there is no guarantee that any civilization will endure; the existence of a civilization depends on whether it is equal to the challenges of life, while keeping its uniformity and the equal measure of its components. According to Koneczny, civilizations do not depend on race, language, or religion, although these have enormous importance.

There are civilizations that build their structures on religious principles and are guided by them in their social actions. Koneczny calls civilizations of this type sacral; at present this includes the Jewish and Brahmin civilizations. Social actions in these civilizations abstract from the good of man because in them religion is an *a priori* factor that models the reality of social life against man's natural inclinations; and

religiousness is not man's personal contact with God, but rather it is the fulfillment of law (Jewish civilization) or duties commanded by holy books or tradition (Brahmin civilization). Sacralization also leaves an imprint on those who exercise power, who—most often distinguished "by divine anointing"—are seen as the incarnation or instrument of a deity. As such, they become omnipotent, free from all principles of moral conduct. Also, in sacral civilizations the people who compose society are treated generally as means or instruments.

To understand what a particular civilization is, according to Koneczny, we must become familiar with how it relates to five domains of values, five categories of human existence that occur everywhere and in everyone at every time. Koneczny calles these categories the *quincunx*: morality (the good), knowledge (the truth), health (and matters associated with it), property (well-being), and harmony (the beauty). The *quincunx*, although present in all social organizations, is not uniform in individual and public life. Human groups differ because of it, since morality, knowledge, health, property, and beauty are realized in many ways in them. Sometimes the pressure from the *quincunx* is so strong that it makes it impossible, for example, for the family to exist as a sovereign subject emancipated from the clan; this takes place, for example, in Chinese civilization.

Besides the *quincunx*, every civilization has its own threefold law—a set of norms to guide individual and group life. It is composed of family law, property law, and inheritance law. What is essential is whether in a civilization there is monism or dualism of law. Legal monism and the domination of one kind of law entails important consequences in social actions, for where it occurs, man is doomed to despotism and enslavement, whether by the ruling authority who possesses everything and rules everything (Turanian civilization), or by the state, which leaves its stamp on everything (Byzantine civilization). In all civilizations, except Latin civilization, the law that directs human un-

dertakings does not have to be in agreement with the natural law. Moreover, the law can be immoral and irrational, ignoring really existing human relations, and it can even claim to subordinate the domain of morality to itself. This does not change the fact that the law in every situation has some sort of justification, some foundation; but it is not that morality is this foundation in every civilization.

The *quincunx* and the threefold law, together with other legal norms, reveal the conception of man that functions in a particular civilization. In every civilization, the image of man is different; this can explain why there are many civilizations and why their structures differ, why there are different types of social actions, varied states and varied purposes that states set for themselves. The conception of man may be more or less adequate to reality. From this comes the conclusion that there are no equal civilizations; there are better and worse civilizations—ones that more or less serve the realization of human potentialities. A plurality of civilizations on the territory of one state is a factor that splits and weakens the state. The history of the state of Alexander the Great or of Rome, and today Russia, Yugoslavia, and India, is evidence of this. A state comprising many civilizations can exist only under the condition that it is based on an apparatus of physical coercion that keeps a firm hand on everything and everyone (e.g., a strong army or bureaucratic structures).

Some civilizations build their structures on the basis of physical power, others on that of spiritual power, which causes the political body to come into being either by virtue of force or by virtue of the free decision of its members. Civilizations that prefer to resolve their problems by force are compelled to destroy all manifestations of man's life as a person in the life of the group (freedom, creativity, and responsibility), which causes the spiritual life to perish in society. In this type of civilization, the persons who exercise power will always strive to subordinate everything, including religion, to themselves, since force is the

most effective; the mechanisms by which such a civilization operates cannot be maintained without force. The situation is different in civilizations that are based on the primacy and development of the spiritual powers in man.

Some civilizations order the life of the group after the model of an organism. They esteem and develop all the manifestations of life, its wealth and variety. They do not pose any obstacles to individuality in the belief that the power and future of society, and of civilization itself, reside in this. In this type of civilization, there is no place for the bureaucracy and omnipotence of the state. Other civilizations strive, in every domain of life, to build mechanisms controlled from above by the authorities, and—what follows this—they strive for the omnipotence of the political authority, the state, and the law. A single mode according to which life should be lived is imposed on all forms of contact between people. In this type of civilization, the variety and plurality of human forms of behavior will be treated as the greatest threat.

Some civilizations prefer openness to really existing reality with its variety of forms and manifestations, prefer and creatively develop tradition, and nurture historical awareness in the belief that they are a priceless treasure for the present and future generations. Other civilizations are marked by an omnipotent apriorism in resolving all matters, which in practice concludes by modeling man's life by priorly accepted principles without examining the effects of the actions undertaken; the theoretical rationale for this type of civilization is the belief that man is only an element of a greater whole, a thing and an object that can be shaped arbitrarily.

Not every civilization has arrived at the point where the family is emancipated from the clan or tribe, or what follows this, that members of a clan or tribe are able to achieve maturity while their parents are alive. Not every association can produce a society from itself—a society that calls to mind a living organism, one capable of life for purposes

beyond the biological, one that is varied, able to struggle for existence on its own, possessing autonomy from the state, an autonomy that is expressed in public law and local governments that govern some domains of group life. There are civilizations that do not permit the creation of a society or nation—these are civilizations (e.g., Turanian, Byzantine, Chinese) in which the domain of social actions is reserved only for the political authorities and the state; society and its members cannot undertake any actions unless permitted by the authority of the state. As historical experience shows, of all known civilizations, only Latin civilization enables the freedom of social actions, and at the same time it serves the development and endurance of the state, which is called to protect society, or more precisely, to protect the persons who live in society. In Latin civilization, political life is guided by law based on the good and what is right—law that flows from morality and is in harmony with morality. Latin civilization bases social life on monogamous indissoluble matrimony, on respect for human physical work, it bears justice instead of the revenge (which is characteristic of other civilizations), and on the independence of religion and the Church from secular governing authority.

Koneczny holds that civilizations can build their structures, including political order, on principles of emanationism or creationism. These concepts, although fundamentally linked with religious-philosophical systems, are of capital importance for civilization as a whole, and especially for political matters and the state itself. Emanationism is usually at the basis of claims to the sacralization and omnipotence of the political authority, which has the right to everything, since it is of divine origin. Such a "sanctified" political authority will carry out policies based on the caprice of the "anointed" ones, who will treat their subjects like a herd, and will treat the whole country like their private estate. Emanationism is a factor that has a paralyzing effect in the domain of social actions, and therefore it inseparably bears with it

the belief that one can reach the primary source of being conceived as the end of human life only directly, that is, by rejecting everything that is material, that in any way would mediate man's way to the end-goal of life. The material world is regarded, in a civilization with emanationist foundations, as evil, and for this reason all man's actions, which by their nature must be connected with matter, lose their raison d'etre. There are no actions of man not joined with matter, hence all human actions, including politics, are secondary or basically evil, for they cannot lead to the end-goal of life. Emanationism takes the position that it would be best if there were no such activities at all.

Creationism will always restrain views of this type and the practices that result from them, since it shows an end-goal of man's life that is transcendent to the world, an end to which one can aspire by means of work, creativity, knowledge, and moral perfection, in a word, by the actualization of human potentialities. The whole being-reality, in a civilization whose foundation is creationism, will be perceived as good and rational, worthy that man should live and act in it. Man's life and social actions (politics, the state) are no exception here. According to Koneczny, of all existing civilizations only Latin civilization is free from emanationist influences, and thereby only in it can politics and the state truly serve man.

Latin civilization owes its existence to the culture-creating and educational activity of the Catholic Church. It is a civilization based not only on creationism, but also on personalism (it understands man as the subject and at the same time as the end-goal of social actions, and the good of man here is the measure and criterion of actions). It takes into account the nature of man, whose end is the universal development of the human person, and so this end also contains freedom, for without freedom there is no personal development. Personalism emphasizes man's individual responsibility, while in civilizations without personalism the collective is preferred. Latin civilization's affirmation of the

human person can be exemplified by the fact that no one except the concrete man can have responsibility for the realization and achievement of the end-purpose of his life. Personalism requires that the structures of group life should respect man. These structures include the state, which appears for man as a being less perfect than man, for it does not possess a subjective character of being. Only Latin civilization fully respects human health and life, both at the individual and public levels.

The way Latin civilization operates is based on respect for private property, which ultimately will always remain one of the external foundations of man's freedom. Latin civilization is the only existing civilization to preserve the dualism of public and private law, whereby the primacy of the nation over the state, of the family over society, and the primacy of man over all the associations that exist for him and for his development are grounded. In such a civilization, politics must always conform with morality, and there is no schizophrenic division into one kind of morality in public life and another kind in private life. Also, there is no room for an omnipotent state or law, for apriorism. There is no centralism, which leads to the mechanization of life and to a monotony that is so opposed to personalism and, by the same token, to freedom.

Latin civilization is an *a posteriori* civilization, open to the experience of reality—proof of which is the existence of science—and on the other hand, it is characterized by historicism, without which a nation would not be created, nor would there be tradition and spiritual wealth.

The Church, perceiving man as a person, also caused monogamous marriage and the family based on it to be the foundation of group life; in other civilizations polygamy is dominant, and the clan or family is not in principle indissoluble; by life-long monogamy, the equality of woman and man in dignity is confirmed (an equality that in fact is ab-

sent everywhere else), foundations are provided for children to achieve maturity while their parents are still alive, and foundations are provided for the functioning of private property.

In Latin civilization, as opposed to others, there are no *a priori* factors that would force man's life to be modeled against his nature and natural inclinations. The only demand that it makes of both the individual and all the human associations is to do good and not to undertake individual, public, and state activities that would be immoral. This is the chief principle of Latin civilization and is unknown in all other civilizations.

Latin civilization takes into account existing reality, draws from reality its experiences, and aims to create structures analogous to organisms—ones capable of independent life, guided by their own laws, as opposed to other civilizations that create mechanisms that do not take into account the variety of the manifestations of man's life or man's right to direct himself freely, since they strive to subordinate man to themselves. This *a posteriori* character of Latin civilization is manifested and is possible due to the presence in it of law, fundamentally understood as the order of good and what is right, public law and private law, the source of which is the reading of the moral order of human affairs.

In the Catholic Church, Koneczny sees a factor that creates states, although in no measure does it sacralize the state or politics. The state, like the individual, is not free from the obligation to realize the moral good. The independence of the Church from secular authority is in Latin civilization one more thing that gives strength to man, something that flows out of the belief that spiritual life is higher than the biological and material sphere, and from the belief that human life does not end in temporal biological-sensory existence, and it cannot be reduced to it, but it is completed in the Creator of being, Who is the Truth, the Good, and the Beautiful, and at the same time the End-Purpose of man's life.

CIVILIZATION IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY*

SUMMARY

The author considers the problem of civilization. He defines civilization as a determinate form of man's group life, or man's culture in its social dimension. According to the author, a plurality of civilizations is generally accepted; in civilization, one can see the foundations for the functioning of law, politics, social life, and family life; civilization also plays an essential role in the religious life of man, just as religion plays a role in civilization. The author discusses the following topics: the biological theory of civilization, the historical theory of civilization, the sociological theory of civilization, the political-science theory of civilization, the civilization of death and the civilization of love, and the historical-philosophical theory of civilization.

KEYWORDS

civilization, culture, person, society, family, religion, Oswald Spengler, Alvin Toffler, Arnold J. Toynbee, Samuel P. Huntington, John Paul II, Feliks Koneczny, *quincunx*, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

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FR. JAN SOCHOŃ

ÉTIENNE GILSON IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

Étienne Gilson was a historian of philosophy, medievalist, renewer of the scholastic tradition, proponent of a return to the original doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, philosopher; born June 13, 1884 in Paris, died September 20, 1978 in Cravant near Auxerre (France).

Gilson was the co-founder and co-editor (with Gabriel Théry, O.P.) of a medievalist periodical: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen-Âge*. He was a co-founder of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto, a lecturer in European and American universities, an author of university textbooks, a political activist, musician, expert on art and literature, writer, epistolographer, and a philosopher of language.

Gilson was brought up in a deeply religious atmosphere. He studied at the Minor Seminary of Notre-Dame-des-Champs, where he acquired a thorough knowledge of classical languages and became familiar with European culture (rhetoric, the works of Ovid, Vergil, Plautus, William Shakespeare, Dante Alighieri, Johann W. von Goethe, and Leo

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Tolstoy). He studied at the Sorbonne (where he attended the lectures of Victor Brochard, Gabriel Séailess, André Lalande, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, Emile Durkheim, and Victor Delbos) and in the Collège de France under Henri Bergson. After completing his studies he taught philosophy in French lycees. In 1913 he defend a large doctoral thesis (*La doctrine cartésienne de la liberté et la théologie*) and a small one (*Index scolastico-cartésien*) written under Lévi-Bruhl's direction, and he began to lecture at the University of Lille. During the First World War he fought on the front, and after his military service he returned to Lille. In 1919 he became a professor at the University of Strasbourg. It was there that Gilson's interest in the philosophical tradition and thought of St. Thomas Aquinas was crystallized—thanks to Lucien Febvre's and Marc Bloch's support in medieval studies. Gilson devoted himself to the purpose of reintroducing the history of medieval thought to cultural consciousness and to university teaching. This was the result of his deep conviction that it was necessary to return to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, while leaving aside the "ideological" commentaries of John of St. Thomas and Cajetan.

In 1919 Gilson published his acclaimed book *Le thomisme. Introduction au système de saint Thomas d'Aquin*. The publication of his research results made Gilson famous not only among experts in medieval culture. He moved to Paris where he was given the Chair of the History of Medieval Philosophy at the Sorbonne. Moreover, Gilson became a professor at the École des Hautes Études, took part in international philosophical congresses, and taught in many European schools.

His publications on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas and other medieval thinkers—including monographs devoted to Bonaventure (*La philosophie de saint Bonaventure*)[1] and Duns Scotus (*Pourquoi saint*

[1] Paris: Vrin, 1924. In English: *The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure*, trans. by Dom Illtyd Trethowan and Frank J. Sheed (Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965).

Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin. Suivi de Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot,[2] and *Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales*[3])—led to numerous scholarly controversies. Gilson's opposition to the increasing departure from Christianity in Western societies resulted in violent attacks against him. Some "polemicists" went as far as to state that Thomas Aquinas had done more evil to the Church than did Martin Luther. Opinions of that sort were directed against metaphysical realism, that is, against the recognition of the sphere of natural wisdom in man. Gilson—fascinated by the possibility of contact with the real (non-fictive) world, while retaining respect for the world's mystery and admiration for man's intellect—opposed such opinions in the strongest possible terms, which did not win him many friends. The bitter attacks on his views and person made him leave for North America. He lectured at Harvard University, wrote scholarly papers, and examined the possibility of establishing an institute for medieval studies. In 1929 his dream became a reality: the operation of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto was launched.[4] As its co-founder and director of studies, Gilson began to propagate the ideas that were born in the Institute, while lecturing in Europe and North America. Thereby the school quickly became one of the most important centres of Thomistic studies.

[2] *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Agé* 1 (1926–1927): 5–128.

[3] Paris: Vrin, 1952.

[4] "The *Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies* in Toronto was established in 1929 under the auspice of St. Michael's College, Toronto, and a Roman Catholic religious order, the Congregation of the Priests of St. Basil, with the aim of furthering research on the Middle Ages and, secondarily, to offer graduate academic programmes for a limited number of students. Ten years later Rome granted it pontifical status and a charter empowering it to confer the pontifical Licentiate in Medieval Studies (M.S.L.) and Doctorate in Medieval Studies (M.S.D.)." Harold Remus, William Closson James, Daniel Fraikin, *Religious Studies in Ontario: A State-of-the-Art Review* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press,1992), 80.

During the Second World War, Gilson lived and did research in France, then occupied by the Germans. In 1945 he took part in the conference in the matter of the UN Charter in San Francisco, and the founding conference of UNESCO in London. In 1947–1948 he was elected as Conseiller de la République by the National Assembly of France. He showed a firmly anti-communist attitude, an adherence to Christian values, a devotion to traditional liturgy, and an engagement in the works of the Church. He was opposed to the increasing desacralisation of religion, the blurring of the difference between the clergy and lay people, and the falsification of the history of the Church. When Jean Guitton published an article in *Le Figaro*, in which he publicly supported the position of Paul VI's encyclical *Humanae Vitae* concerning, among other things, the ban on artificial contraception, Gilson did likewise, although the papal document was badly received in many circles—some theologians even denied its canonical value, arguing that it did not have general acceptance or universal consent.

In 1950 Gilson's book *L'être et l'essence* was criticized as suggesting that metaphysical truths could change; attempts were even made to place it on the Index of Forbidden Books. For this reason Gilson came forward to defend his own position and that of his friends—Henri de Lubac and Marie-Dominique Chenu. He was accused of not being open to the signs of the present time, of conservatism, anti-Americanism, and of being insensitive to the growing phenomena of religious indifference and atheism. He was not understood by those who were overly inclined to philosophical and theological innovations. The attacks he was subjected to could be reduced to the assertion—in the words of Fernand Van Steenberghen—that "the epoch of Gilson has already ended." Depressed by the death of his wife and incessant attacks on his work, Gilson limited his public activity. He left Paris and moved to Cravant (the Yonne department), where he died at the age of 94 years.

On Gilson's ninetieth birthday, Pope Paul VI sent a letter written in his own handwriting to him as an expression of the regard of the entire Church. The Pope wrote that with his works Gilson had revived the source of wisdom from which industrial society fascinated by what it "has," but often completed blind to the meaning of "to be" and to its metaphysical roots, would derive great benefit. In France, however, the letter found no echo.

Gilson wrote over 60 books and 800 academic treatises, articles, and journalistic statements. He received over a dozen doctorates *honoris causa* (e.g., from the universities of Harvard, Oxford, and Bologna).

Gilson's most important works are as follows: *Index scolastico-cartésien* (New York 1912), *La liberté chez Descartes et la théologie* (Paris 1913), *Le thomisme. Introduction au système de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Strasbourg 1919),[5] *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (Paris 1929),[6] *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale* (Vol. 1–2, Paris 1932),[7] *Christianisme et philosophie* (Paris 1936), *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York 1937), *Héloíse et Abélard* (Paris 1938),[8] *Dante et la philosophie* (Paris 1939),[9] *Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance* (Paris 1939),[10] *God and Philosophy* (New York 1941), *L'être et l'essence* (Paris 1948), *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto 1949), *Les métamorphoses de la cité de Dieu* (Louvain

[5] *Thomism: The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Laurence K. Shook and Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2002).

[6] *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine*, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (New York: Random House, 1960).

[7] *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936).

[8] *Heloise and Abelard*, trans. L. K. Shook (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965.

[9] *Dante and Philosophy*, trans. David Moore (New York: Harper & Row, 1963).

[10] *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*, trans. Mark A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2012).

1952), *De la Bible à François Villon: Rabelais franciscain*,[11] *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York 1955), *Peinture et réalité* (Paris 1958),[12] *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City 1960), *Le philosophe et la théologie* (Paris 1960),[13] *Introduction aux art du beau* (Paris 1963), *Matières et formes: Poiétiques particulières des arts majeurs* (Paris 1964),[14] *La société de masse et sa culture* (Paris 1967), *Les tribulations de Sophie* (Paris 1967), *Linguistique et philosophie: Essai sur les constants philosophiques du langage* (Paris 1969),[15] *Dante et Béatrice: Études dantesques* (Paris 1974), *L'athéisme difficile* (Paris 1979), *Constantes philosophiques de l'être* (Paris 1983). In English translations also: *Three Quests in Philosophy*, ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto 2008), and *Medieval Essays*, trans. James G. Colbert (Eugene 2011).

The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy

Although he began his education in church schools, Gilson did not encounter a philosophy that could satisfy his expectations. The Sorbonne also taught that scholasticism was a philosophy not worthy learning, because in its history it did not go beyond the framework of a misunderstood Aristotelianism; furthermore, René Descartes had refuted it in an evident way. On the other hand, his research on Cartesianism made Gilson aware of the forgotten treasure of medieval thought, especially the thought of Thomas Aquinas. He arrived at the conviction that

[11] In Étienne Gilson, *Les idées et les lettres* (Paris: Vrin, 1932).

[12] *Painting and Reality* (New York: Pantheon Books 1957).

[13] *The Philosopher and Theology*, trans. Cécile Gilson (New York: Random House, 1962).

[14] *Forms and Substances in the Arts*, trans. Salvator Attanasio (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966).

[15] *Linguistics and Philosophy: An Essay on the Philosophical Constants of Language*, trans. John Lyon (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988).

it cannot be asserted that Descartes's propositions had grown directly from the tradition of ancient philosophy, or that the period of the Middle Ages was a "dark night" in Europe's intellectual history. He tried to better understand that unusual epoch and to describe the spirit of medieval philosophy, which was a spirit of Christian philosophy.

Gilson was convinced that the achievements of medieval philosophical and theological culture were still a living source, and that it was worthwhile to look to it—therefore, he analysed Aquinas's original texts. Almost everything he wrote[16] expressed his opposition both to the so-called philosophical endemism, which had been firmly entrenched in scholasticism since the thirteenth century, and to the views of Yves Congar, Henri de Lubac, and Anton C. Pegis. Although surrounded by an atmosphere unfavourable to realism, he did not become discouraged. He was aware that he was living in times when the *cogito* triumphed over *I create* and provided grounds for an increase in all forms of religious indifference and atheism.

The Problem of the History of Philosophy

According to Gilson, the history of philosophy as an academic discipline should have a philosophical character. At the International Philosophical Congress at Harvard University (October 15, 1926), while considering the role of philosophy in the history of civilization, he said that the history of philosophy is marked by philosophy; philosophy as the love of wisdom must seek the truth, since without truth there is no wisdom. The history of philosophy in no way can be separated from its historical dimension and development. It must be approached teleologically—always started with research on source material, which is and must always be regarded as the most important ele-

[16] I especially mean here the fourth edition of *Le thomisme* (1942) and, perhaps Gilson's most important work, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*.

ment. Then, the central positions of an epoch must be identified—as that taken by the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century. Particular questions posed by particular philosophers are less important—rather, philosophical problems and ideas should be treated as more relevant. It should also be recognized that metaphysics is the heart of philosophy as such, and the questions of metaphysics—despite the development of science—remain unchanged over the ages. Hence, the history of European classical philosophy is a history of metaphysics, and the core of metaphysics is found in the conceptions of Plato and Aristotle, and later in the anthropology and theory of being of St. Thomas Aquinas. The concept of being is what determines the type of metaphysics connected with a particular philosophy. Philosophical ideas should be shown in their historical and cultural context, without overlooking the personal situation in which a particular thinker worked. It is not possible, for example, to understand medieval philosophical thought without taking under consideration the role of the school system of the time, of the Church, theology, politics, or the important scientific achievements of Greek, Arab, and Jewish thinkers.

With these assertions Gilson consistently disproved the conventional belief (held by Victor Cousin, Octave Hamelin, etc.) that there are sharp boundaries between particular periods of history, especially those of the history of culture and of philosophy. He also refuted other deeply rooted, popular beliefs about the "dark Middle Ages focused on penance" and the "atheistic Renaissance," as representing the embarrassing archives of an old methodology.

Gilson's work shows the importance of two terminological categories that build the foundations of his interpretation of the history of philosophy: "Christian philosophy," and "medieval philosophy." The first of them is controversial. Some scholars agree to use it, but only conditionally. Others see in it an empty term: there is no Christian philosophy, just as there is no Christian physics, astronomy or any other

science (Émile Bréhier—the concept of "Christian philosophy" is contradictory). Gilson, however, asserted that without using the category of "Christian philosophy," we cannot make a fair, historical and philosophical synthesis.

When describing the development of Greek philosophy, Gilson emphasizes its orientation toward religion, its special longing for contact with the deity; such an approach automatically directs attention to the connections between philosophy and religion, to the fundamental fact that early Christianity had contact with cultures of Alexandria, Rome, Antioch—with all the cultures that were in preparation for evangelization. The discernment of this fact makes Gilson aware of the need to use the term "Christian philosophy" to designate philosophy cultivated by persons who regard themselves as Christians. For doing philosophy with an awareness of affiliation with Christianity is not without influence on the shape of philosophical achievements.

Only a realistic philosophy of being is regarded by Gilson as valuable. The value of such a philosophy increases in proportion to its realism. Philosophy properly understood does not seek to impose our subjective categories on things, or to satisfy our imagination; it strives to reach objective reality, to interpret it, to meditate on the miraculous character of existence which, precisely as existence, opens man to mysteries conceived in a religious way—this is the fundamental understanding of philosophy and its purpose as Gilson presents it.

The realistic philosophical attitude is necessary for the full development of humanity, and thereby for the development of the Christian life in man. It is all the more essential since, as Gilson showed, contemporary Western culture is inundated with subjectivism and philosophical idealism, which neglect concrete being in favour of what is produced by thought, created by man, possible, and at the same time linguistically expressible. As a consequence of this conviction, Gilson uses the term "medieval philosophy" to designate the medieval combi-

nation of faith and reason, and the rational justification of the thesis that the texts of great scholasticism basically had a theological character. Since the phenomenon of medieval philosophy is a historical fact, then, for example, the legacy of neo-Platonism or that of Pseudo-Dionysius need to be looked at in a different way.

In the article entitled "L'idée de philosophie chez saint Augustin et chez saint Thomas d'Aquin,"[17] Gilson stated emphatically that both Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas were basically theologians, which means that they recognized the primacy of faith. Aquinas ascribed the same role and dignity to faith as did Augustine. Faith contains the plenitude of knowledge that leads to salvation, which means that one who is satisfied with faith alone is already receiving in it the plenitude of all the goods that should be the object of his hope. Unlike philosophy, faith carries a message for all people, the learned and the simple—salvation has been offered to all mankind. The philosopher, on the other hand, can find something in faith especially for himself and benefit from it. Regardless of his intellectual abilities, he remains only a man. The task of gathering into one system all the truths which are necessary for salvation and accessible to the human mind (without polluting them with even the smallest errors, which would consequently destroy the truth) is not impossible, but in practice is exceeds the ability of any man left to his own devices. Even supposing that someone were able to succeed in this task, he would only complete it very late, after dedicating his whole life to it. And yet, we need to know the truth right away, so that we may conform our life to its indications as quickly as possible.

[17] *La Vie Intellectuelle* 3, no. 8 (1930): 46–62; in English: "The Idea of Philosophy in St. Augustine and in St. Thomas Aquinas," in *A Gilson Reader: Selected Writings of Etienne Gilson*, ed. Anton C. Pegis (Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1957), 68–81.

Existential Thomism

It is impossible to engage in the history of philosophy without showing one's own vision of philosophy. For Gilson, the history of philosophy became a tool to help him create his own philosophical reflection, which was realistic and directed to the contemplation of reality. Although he was said to be a Thomist without being a Thomist, Gilson created, together with Jacques Maritain, a new version of Thomism, called "existential Thomism." In 1945 he introduced the concept of the "existential boundary of philosophy" to his reflections—the concept which did not imply any connection with existentialism, but applied only to Thomism.[18]

In the 1930s Gilson, like Maritain, discovered and appreciated the role of existence in Thomas's conception of being. *Esse* is what is most deep (it is hard to rid ourselves of spatial descriptions), most hidden (*magis intimum*) in being; it is something that cannot be apprehended in concepts, but is what connects real reality with the pure Being. It is the common property that beings have in virtue of their act of existence. But "forgetting about existence" and directing attention exclusively to the order of content (essence) will still remain a great temptation for philosophy and philosophers. Therefore, the only way to hold to the truth of philosophical reflection (i.e., to avoid isolation from existence) is to establish existence as a boundary of philosophy—a boundary which in a certain sense would possess a common essence with philosophy ("coessentielle"), and which philosophy would have to include in the definition of its object. In this way the category of existence became a call sign for existential Thomism. Thanks to existence, we move about in the real world, not a realm of manifestations, relations, or dreams. We cannot forget about existence if we intend to phi-

[18] See Étienne Gilson, "Limites existentielles de la philosophie," in *L'Existence* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 69–87.

losophize within the context of the world that is real. "Forgetting about existence" means a passage to the order of speculative thought of the Hegelian type, or to arbitrary assumptions of historical existentialism which identifies existence with "being in the world." Remaining within the boundaries established by existence guarantees cognitive realism, in which the highest act of cognition is the judgment, and not the concept. The outcomes of essentialisms and existentialisms are based on the category of "experiencing" someone else and, consequently, the identification of existence with the experience of the absurd, terror, nothingness, or reification. Existence thus understood cannot lead to the truth.

The existential reading of Thomas's thought brings wisdom which leads directly to the recognition of the personal God and the acceptance of a religious way of life. When we distinguish between the order of philosophy and that of theology, we must recognize the influence of Christian revelation on the philosophical attitude of a Christian. The fact that we attempt to philosophize as Christians is not without significance: it constantly requires us to take efforts. The task of philosophical reflection consists in a wisdom-based contemplation of reality, a contemplation that brings us closer to the truth and the affirmation of God. The category of truth is independent: neither society nor the creative abilities of philosophers can erase the objectivity (independence from the human factor) of truth. Therefore, Gilson strongly defended the thesis that honest philosophical reflection does not stop with itself, but directs itself toward theology that "operates" in the realm of revealed contents by rationally approaching what God says to man. The experience of faith is not a fideistic experience; it has rational grounds. While it is true that religious faith puts man in relation to a mystery, the mystery does not mean absolute unknowability, but rather it makes the man who knows aware of his cognitive openness. The existence of the mystery precludes the presence of contradiction. It is man's reason that

causes that he accepts mystery to rid himself of the burdensome feeling of the absurd.

Discussions with Atheism

Gilson lived and worked in an epoch that could hardly be called religiously courageous. Even if the atheistic attitude was not dominant in it, more and more people became religiously indifferent, as they believed that the concept of God explains nothing and even multiplies intellectual difficulties. Therefore, they preferred to live as if there were no God. In the 1930s, philosophical centers in France entered into a discussion on atheism, which was becoming a social problem as it influenced everything that man "cultivated," that is, culture in a broad sense. Beginning with René Descartes (although he himself interpreted the subjective world from positions that excluded the possibility of God's non-existence) whose thought, historically speaking, became one of the main sources of contemporary atheism, through Immanuel Kant, David Hume, Auguste Comte, and their successors who referred to positivist, scientist, and neo-positivist models of doing philosophy, to the scientific gnosis of the present, theodicy was not so much expressly negated as tacitly eliminated from the sphere of man's cognitive interests. God was accepted—but only marginally—in moral, aesthetic, or political orders. Philosophers, who referred to Hegel's conceptual-logical thought, effectively transformed the transcendent Absolute into some forms of divinity (often conceived in a strange way). The history of philosophy is also familiar with the attempts of showing that God is nothing but a product of man's imagination. According to Gilson, whatever philosophers' motivations are—be it to appreciate man, preserve the unity and coherence of a system, or create a revolutionary and economic utopia—they always lead to a confrontation with the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and do not result from metaphysical lines

of reasoning. Seeing the signs of atheistic imagination, the attitudes marked by libertinism or paganism, and those intolerantly demanding respect for tolerance or striving not only to theoretically eliminate faith in God, but to destroy the Church and the Jewish nation (Karl Marx), Gilson tried to capture the essence of these phenomena. When he discovered the authentic philosophy of St. Thomas, he made an attempt to appraise the value of contemporary atheism in the light of Aquinas's views. He not only discussed the matter with specialists, but—because atheism was spreading wider and wider—also engaged in a "journalistic battle." In the weekly periodical *Sept* and other more specialized periodicals, he published a series of articles discussing various aspects of culture influenced by atheism; he gave radio talks and lectures about how authentic Christian thought was distorted. He persuaded his opponents to accept the following assertion: philosophers cannot close the case of God before it is opened. His active involvement in discussion on atheism bore fruit in the form of the book *L'athéisme difficile* in which he posed the questions: How is atheism possible in light of man's natural wisdom and metaphysical realism? Does an appeal to Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics justify the conviction that atheism as a philosophical position does not exist, and even cannot exist?

Gilson could formulate the problem in this way, because he accepted a fundamental fact, namely, that atheism in its various forms, together with secularism and paganism, is secondary in relation to the affirmation of God. Man's first natural attitude is to believe in God's existence. For man must first presuppose some idea of God in order to deny it. There are, of course, some basic questions to be answered here: What is the basis for the affirmation of God? How can we explain the fact that God is constantly present in human thought and culture? Where does the extraordinary constancy of thinking about God come from?

Gilson expressed the belief that we acquire elementary knowledge of God in spontaneous contact with real reality. Thus, the philosophical problem of God's existence (of the negation of God's existence too) appears in the context of, and is conditioned by, a spontaneous contact with the world. The natural affirmation of reality shows that man desires to prolong his existence beyond the material dimension; and this is equally true when he experiences both the fragility of his own existence and the joy of the fullness of life. In his every act, man spontaneously sees his insufficiency—he has the feeling of possessing existence, but not of being existence. At the level of the spontaneous encounter with reality, man does not think of any principles of cognition, but only notices that he knows "something" that is independent of him. It is an affirmation which is prior to human self-knowledge. This spontaneous reading of reality, while it is not yet philosophy, is the place where man's natural religious dispositions come out. They are undoubted, because they express the religiosity that belongs to the human mind by virtue of its nature. Before man arrives at a positive or negative belief about God's existence, he first becomes aware of the fact that some intuition about the existence of God, or at least about the real possibility of God's existence, grows in him. Prior to religious faith, then, and prior to philosophical knowledge, there is another kind of knowledge of God—natural knowledge acquired in a spontaneous way.

Atheism, thus, as a conception that negates any kind of absolute or divinity, essentially does not appear in the framework of man's spontaneous encounter with reality, but only as a result of a philosophical analysis of the contingency of human rootedness in reality. When we try to transform the spontaneously acquired concept of God into rationally justified knowledge, we enter the terrain of philosophy. Since he understands that our vision of being determines how we understand God, Gilson appeals to Thomas Aquinas who presented the problem of

God in the light of the metaphysical approach to being. Hence, the cognition of God which occurs in the framework of metaphysics both provides an answer to the essential question: "Why does something rather than nothing exist?" and shows that composite and changing beings that possess transcendental properties (truth, good, beauty) require the existence of the personal Absolute, namely God, as their efficient, exemplar, and final cause.

Atheism has taken different forms over the course of history; Gilson enumerates the following: scientific atheism, proletarian atheism, the atheism of distraction and indifference, practical atheism, philosophical atheism, as well as freethinking, secularism, and paganism; according to him, all these forms of atheism do not use philosophical arguments; neither in the past nor in the present do they find rational justification in reality, because they are based on arbitrarily accepted assumptions and a complete misunderstanding of the fact of religiosity and the essence of religion, especially in its ontic dimension. Nevertheless, philosophical atheism concerns the ontic order, and thus it accepts a certain idea of God.

The culmination of Gilson's thoughts on atheism is the assertion that philosophical atheism does not exist, and basically it is not possible at all. The non-existence of God, to be sure, is the main question. For the supporters of atheism, the indestructibility and permanence of the belief about God's existence is one of the most difficult intellectual obstacles to overcome. What is binding in philosophy, as Gilson underscores, includes the laws of reality (which are independent of man's cognition and volition), the natural abilities of the human person (who is endowed with intellect and will), and the nature of real reality (which requires ultimate reasons for its existence). Therefore, the question of God is properly posed by metaphysics, but only those who accept metaphysics understand it. From the metaphysical perspective, then, philosophical atheism appears as a secondary product of philosophical

thought—the thought that erred in explaining reality or in understanding human cognition. Among the various forms of atheism, Gilson also considers that which proclaims "God's death;" according to him, it is a consequence of a universal crisis of values, a crisis in understanding being, and a departure from the metaphysical apprehension of reality.

Realistic philosophy, focused on knowing reality, brings wisdom which leads to the recognition of God's existence and the acceptance of a religious way of life. Of course, this kind of philosophy cannot annul—and essentially does not annul—the free act of man's decision. Every man is free in his own measure. Man's freedom appears in the form of his free choices. But in order for man to understand and properly use his individual freedom, he needs to be introduced to Christian culture (or, in a narrow sense, to Christian civilization and history), that is, to such a culture whose "everydayness" is permeated by God's forgiveness and mercy. According to Gilson, the development of Christian culture is a unique opportunity for Europe to get out of its cultural crisis.

Thoughts on Literature and Art

The questions of art, aesthetic experience, and the connections between religion and literature, although not too popular in philosophical circles, were an important area to which Gilson devoted much attention.[19] In order to consider the problems of aesthetics (a distinct discipline since Hegel's times), he applied the same methods as those developed for the metaphysical explanation of the world. He started from the assumption that to understand how works of art exist we must learn both to make distinctions between them and to grasp properly what makes an artefact a work of art. Applying the method of exclusion, he

[19] These questions were also of great interest to other neo-Thomists of the time, especially Maritain and de Wulf.

came to the conclusion that neither action, cognition, expression, symbolization, intuition, nor moral position can belong to the order of art as such, although all of them are traceable in various manifestations of creative activity. Art can be defined as a form of production (*la factivité*) supported by both an intellectual virtue that operates within the knowledge of definite rules of artistic action and a gift of grace (mysterious, if not irrational) that encourages internal dispositions to perform creative acts.

Beauty is the main aim of the artist's activity. The artist works for the sake of "transcendent uselessness." The work of art is connected with philosophy; Gilson accentuates this connection in his commentaries on the *Divine Comedy*. According to him, the *Comedy* reflects the main philosophical tendencies of the epoch, especially questions connected with political and social justice. Dante Alighieri wanted to express not so much his metaphysical views as his moral views; his poetic trilogy (*Vita nuova*, *Convivio*, *La Divina Comedia*) is in this respect an exemplary artistic achievement.

Conclusion

Gilson's studies lead to the following conclusions: God exists, truth exists, love and the gift of the sacred sacraments exist. There is also classical philosophy—while it is true that it does not provide complete solutions, it makes it possible to find a way out of contradictory explanations of the world, and enables us, while remaining in the depth of mystery, to reconcile our doubts with real reality—or, speaking more precisely, to retrieve that reality. It also allows us to live in openness to the voice of Revelation that constantly flows from reality.

ÉTIENNE GILSON IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY*

SUMMARY

The article aims at presenting the life and work of Étienne Gilson (1884–1978)—a historian of philosophy, medievalist, renewer of the scholastic tradition, proponent of a return to the original doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, and philosopher. It is focused on selected areas of Gilson's philosophical interest, such as: medieval philosophy, the history of philosophy, existential Thomism, atheism, literature and art. In the final analysis, Gilson appears as a firm advocate of philosophical realism which makes it possible to find a way out of contradictory explanations of the world, and allows man to live in openness to the voice of God's revelation that constantly flows from reality.

KEYWORDS

Étienne Gilson, Thomas Aquinas, medieval philosophy, existential Thomism, atheism, literature, art, Christian philosophy, metaphysics, realism, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

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ATHEISM IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY* *

As a term, atheism (Greek: ἀ—negation, denial, θεός—God) is a Latinized form of the Greek word ἀθεός, which arose at the turn of the 17th century and means:

1. A doctrine or a man's existential attitude expressing a negation of the existence of God understood as a fully perfect and transcendent being who is independent of the world and man, who is necessary (unconditioned), the cause of all reality, the personal Absolute, with whom man can enter into conscious relations (religion).

2. A doctrine that recognizes the Absolute but as lacking in one or more attributes of God (pantheism, panentheism, deism).

3. A doctrine that holds that it is impossible to prove God's existence or that His existence cannot be determined (agnosticism, skepticism).

Atheism is a complex phenomenon in which we may distinguish the following aspects:

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1. A *philosophical* aspect that means: (a) at the level of being—a negation of God's existence or a deformation of the conception of God (metaphysical atheism); (b) at the level of knowledge—agnosticism (which holds that God is completely unknowable) or skepticism (which holds that the problem of God's existence cannot be resolved—epistemological atheism); (c) at the level of language—the opinion that metaphysical theses concerning God are nonsensical (the contradiction of the concept of God—semiotic atheism); and (d) on the level of values—ascribing to man divine attributes (anthropological atheism).

2. A *religious* aspect—a personal severing of bonds with God, the lack of any influence of faith in God upon moral life (infidelity, irreligion, impiety).

3. A *psychological* aspect—the creation of vicarious forms of religiousness, so-called religions of escape.

4. A *sociological* aspect—the disappearance of religious practices, the laicization and secularization of life, indifferentism (indifference to matters of God and religion), anti-theism, post-atheism.

There are some particular forms of atheism, including:

1. *Anti-theism*—a theoretical negation of God associated with enmity toward religion in practice and with activities aimed at eliminating God and religion from the life of man and of human culture.

2. *Pseudo-atheism*—the conviction that one has negated God while in fact one unconsciously believes in God, because the one whose existence is denied is not God but something else.

3. *Post-atheism*—absolute ignorance (absence) in the theory and practice of the problem of God and religion.

Atheism is primarily a religious and cultural phenomenon in which an important role is played by a philosophical (cognitive-thought) element associated with an understanding of the Divine Being.

In all its forms (theoretical and practical), atheism is a secondary attitude compared with the thought about God (divinity) that appears in

man's mind as the result of personal knowledge or is received from the social-cultural milieu. The negation (rejection) of God cannot be a primordial position, for it implies at least a certain acquaintance with that which is negated.

As the history of human culture shows, no culture has ever existed without religion. The presence of religion in all cultures is testimony to man's ability to know spontaneously and naturally and to affirm some perfect being (God, divinity), the understanding of which (whom) takes a definite shape in a given religion and culture. Man's relation to the Transcendent forms the center of every culture.

The many representations and conceptions of divinity that have existed throughout history and have served as the foundation for the formation of various religions are conditioned by culture, and in light of this, the problem of atheism as the negation of divinity in the widest sense of this word has a religious-cultural frame of reference.

In the European cultural milieu, there was an encounter between Greek thought (which was rich both in religious experiences and in philosophical investigations concerning the Absolute) and Judeo-Christian Revelation (which presents God as the absolute Person). As a result, there was shaped (in the Christian religion) a philosophical and religious conception of God as the Absolute of Existence, the Most Perfect Being, the Absolute Person, the Fullness of Good, the free Creator of the world and man, and the reason for man's personal life—his knowledge, love and creativity. Thus understood, God is the object of philosophical investigations, the essential factor in religion and all Christian culture.

The non-Christian cultures associated with the great religions of the Far East (India, China) are non-theistic (a-theistic) from the point of view of Christian theism, but this cannot be interpreted to mean that they radically reject the Absolute and religion. In these religions, the understanding of the divinity most often has a pantheistic character.

Thus, we should distinguish atheism as irreligion, that is, as the negation of everything divine and the rejection of any claims to the truth of religious propositions, from atheism as non-theism, or the rejection of a particular theism (e.g., of monotheism).

The History of Atheism

The Ancient World and the Middle Ages

The world of Greek culture was saturated with the presence of the gods and religiousness. The "theological" poets, such as Homer and Hesiod, testify to this, as do the philosophers at a later period. The dominant form of religion was polytheism (apart from the Orphic religion). The gods personified the powers of nature or human characteristics. The life of individual Greeks and that of the Greek polis were dedicated to the gods. Even the emerging philosophical thought that investigated the ἀρχή of reality, and in this way arrived at a constantly more perfect understanding of the absolute, held that all things are full of gods (Thales). For the Greeks, nature and the universe (cosmos) as a whole manifested itself as divine.

In Greece, a mythological polytheistic religion encountered emerging philosophical conceptions of the absolute, which in the case of some of the most eminent representatives of Greek philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus), were close to the understanding of the absolute as God.

In Greek culture, atheists (i.e., those who negated the existence of the gods) were few and existed at the margins of social life. The oldest examples of the use of the term ἀθεότης occur among Greek poets in the 6th century BC (e.g., in Bacchylides, Pindar, Sophocles) to mean abandonment by the gods.

In the ancient Greek world, we may distinguish three forms of atheism:

1. The atheism of Greek polytheistic and political religion, in which the gods are the personified powers of nature or history.

2. Atheism as the result of an encounter between the mythological religion and philosophical reflection, where philosophers were accused of atheism. The philosophers criticized and undermined the existence of the gods as being burdened with imperfections, contrasting the gods with the Absolute whom they had come to know and recognize as the result of their philosophical investigations. Plato was the first to use the term atheism to mean the negation of the existence of the gods; atheism as this was sanctioned by the state.[1] The most eminent among ancient philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, and especially Socrates) were accused of atheism in this sense.[2]

3. Explicit atheism was associated, in Greece, with materialistic monism and with agnosticism and skepticism, which occurred as: (a) the materialistic monism of Democritus and Leuccipus, a materialistic understanding of Nature in Epicurus and the Epicureans (who in fact did not deny the existence of the gods but held that the gods existed in the next world and were not interested in man—the seeds of deism); (b) a naturalistic trend in sophistry (the politician-sophists, e.g. Critias, who de-sacralized the concept of divinity and held that it was contrived by politicians in order to increase respect for the laws); (c) some cynics with materialistic views radically opposed the deities recognized by the state (e.g., according to Antisthenes, the existence of many gods is simply a declaration of "law," since "by nature" God is one, cannot be compared to anything else, and cannot be known with the help of images); (d) the gods are merely deified heroes, kings or leaders (Euhemerus of Messina); (e) the epistemological atheism of Protagoras, who advanced arguments "for" and "against" God's existence and took a skep-

[1] Cf. *Apologia Socratis*, 26 C 3.

[2] These philosophers did not proclaim atheism in a strict sense, but their views were rather close to theism.

tical position: "Concerning the gods, I have no means of knowing whether they exist or not or of what sort they may be. Many things prevent knowledge including the obscurity of the subject and the brevity of human life."[3]

In Greece, there were known trials for impiety (ἀσέβεια) and blasphemy (ἀθεότης). Someone who denied the existence of the gods (an atheist) was regarded as an enemy of the state. The classic example of this attitude was the trial of Socrates and his condemnation to death for the crime of "atheism."

Sparta and Rome were more tolerant than Athens; they were content with external expressions of devotion to the official gods, and did not interfere in personal convictions or discussions among philosophers. In ancient Rome, Lucretius (a continuator of Epicureanism and the author of *De rerum natura*) proclaimed atheistic views. He proposed materialism, naturalism and sensualism, and he saw the genesis of religion in an ignorance and fear of the powers of nature.

Christian thinkers of the first centuries AD, with the most eminent among them being St. Augustine, focused their investigations upon the problem of understanding God's essence (who God is). They searched for the best ways to know Him and the most intelligible language with which to speak of Him. They drew upon the accomplishments of the most eminent philosophers, especially Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, and modified their views so that they would be in agreement with the revealed truth about God as Love, the Creator and man's Redeemer.

Centuries of meditations by Christian thinkers led to an accumulation of reflections on God's existence and nature, and His relation to the world and to man. The greatest achievement was the discovery of the ways of natural knowledge about God—independent of religion,

[3] Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Zurich: Weidmann, 1985), 80 B 4. Cit. after William K. Ch. Guthrie, *The Greek Philosophers: From Thales to Aristotle* (Harper & Row, 1975), 68.

and showing the bonds between the world and man (the theory of participation). By the development of a philosophy of being (metaphysics) that was independent of Revelation (although done in the context of Revelation), they developed the conception of the "God of the philosophers" who is identical (the same designate) with the "God of religion" (the God of Christian Revelation).

In Christian antiquity and in the Middle Ages, explicit and declared atheism does not occur. However, in the understanding of God's essence (nature) and His relation to the world, certain tendencies appeared which deformed the conception of the Christian God (e.g., in antiquity, there were Gnostic and selective movements—heresies). In the Middle Ages, there were trends that had views departing from the accepted image of God, which distorted the concept of God or attacked the possibility of knowing God by reason; these were:

1. *Pantheistic* tendencies: John Scotus Eriugena (that God is beyond the world, as in Pseudo-Dionysius and Plotinus), Amalric (Amaury) of Bène, David of Dinant;

2. *Nominalistic-agnostic* (*anti-metaphysical*) tendencies initiated by William Ockham (14th century), who limited the range of human knowledge to singular objects and denied any possibility of knowing philosophical and theological truths (including truths concerning the existence of God). Ockham's disciples, John of Mirecourt and Nicholas of Autricourt, attacked the principle of causality and substance, and proclaimed that God's existence could not be known rationally. Nicholas de Cusa was influenced by neo-Platonism and held to a unique kind of agnosticism: God is beyond all categories and individual beings; our knowledge of Him, described as *docta ignorantia*, relies upon conjectures.

The nominalistic position of Ockham and other nominalists facilitated a divorce between faith and reason in the knowledge of God. The ideology of John Wycliffe, John Huss and Martin Luther came out of

this trend. Nominalism also paved the way for modern agnosticism and empiricism.

Modern Times

The Renaissance was a transition from the Middle Ages, in which metaphysical, religious and theological interests were dominant, to modern times. The Renaissance marked a turning away from metaphysical-religious problems toward man and nature, especially man's freedom in the various domains of life. The humanistic tendencies of this period were associated with a skeptical attitude toward explanations in ultimate terms, and with an empirical and practical attitude.

Modern skepticism was recognized as the proper method of a practically oriented philosophy that was understood as the art of living (Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Charron, Francisco Sanches, Pierre Bayle).

Montaigne held that the problem of the existence of God and the soul cannot be resolved; that it is a waste to spend one's life on such problems which, as is known beforehand, cannot be resolved; thus it is better to abstain from considering them. Montaigne connected his skepticism with naturalism and rationalism; his humanism was naturalistic—he regarded man as a part of nature. Despite skeptical tendencies, he held that the human reason is the measure of truth.

Charron, like Montaigne, regarded skepticism as the only correct cognitive position for man. He held that religion was a merely human construct and thereby denied the reality of God's existence.

The methodological tendencies of the Renaissance, especially empiricism, were clearly manifested in the philosophy of Francis Bacon. Bacon presented a new attitude in which science was treated no longer as a way to know the truth about reality but as a means for achieving practical ends. With this statement, he exchanged the criterion of truth for the criterion of efficiency and progress. Science should

serve man's domination over nature. The program of empirical science formulated by Bacon excluded from the field of scientific knowledge the truths of the faith, including the truth about God, which—according to him—lies outside the reach of philosophy (agnosticism, an anti-metaphysical attitude).

Herbert of Cherbury represented rationalism joined with naturalism. He was the author of a conception of natural religion and a natural system of culture. According to his conception, all the domains of culture should be regulated in accordance with the principles of natural reason. His conception of natural religion, a purely rational religion beyond particular confessions, was based on his conviction that the reason is the single source of truth. The truths of natural religion are innate, which means they were grafted upon man by nature, and nature is infallible. Thus, religious truths are infallible. While Herbert accepted the existence of the Supreme Being, this was a deistic interpretation.

René Descartes brought about a radical change in the way philosophy was done, and he is rightly regarded as the creator of modern philosophy. He made the self-knowledge of the thinking "I," the thinking substance (*res cogitans*) which is man, into the starting point of philosophy. It is thought (*cogito*), and not knowledge understood as man's contact with existing extra-subjective reality, which became the source of truth and certainty in knowledge. In this way, there was a break with the hitherto prevalent paradigm of the philosophy of being, which connected the affirmation of God's existence with the knowledge of the really existing extra-subjective world, with metaphysical knowledge which searched for the ontic reason that would explain in ultimate terms the existence of non-necessary, changing beings. Descartes started a new direction in philosophical reflection in which thought dominated knowledge, the idea dominated really existing being, and the human subject became the source and creator of truth. In this philosophy of the subject, the idea of God as the idea of an infinite

being was innate in human consciousness. This connection of the problem of God with consciousness (thought), rather than with knowledge, was inherited by the majority of modern and contemporary thinkers.

Descartes did not deny God's existence. He assigned an important place to the idea of God in his philosophy (as the guarantee of the truth and the source of certainty of knowledge). But by connecting the problem of God with human consciousness, reducing the idea of God to a philosophical principle, reducing the function of God to being the creator and preserver of a world understood in mechanistic terms, and making a radical division between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, his philosophy became the source of various positions on the problem of God: pantheism (as the identification of God with the world; e.g., Baruch Spinoza), German idealism, deism (the idea that God created the world but has no connections with it), and atheism (both materialistic and existential atheism).

The principle of immanence established by Descartes also became the source of various positions with respect to knowledge: radical rationalism, agnosticism, skepticism, sensualism, empiricism, positivism and scientism. All these positions contributed, at least indirectly, to a distortion of the idea of God and the elimination of this problem from the field of rational knowledge, which often led to a rejection of God's existence, especially to practical atheism.

Spinoza developed the inspirations of Descartes in a monistic spirit. He rethought Descartes's method in a logical and, in his opinion, consistent manner and as a result developed a theory of God as the reality of all things. According to Spinoza, only one substance exists—the Infinite and Divine Substance which is identical with nature (*Deus sive natura*). Extension and thought are two among the many attributes of the Infinite Substance. Man exists and is in God, and nothing can either exist or be understood without God. Finite minds are modifications that belong to the attribute of thinking, and finite bodies are modifications

belonging to the attribute of extension. God is the absolute essence. Particular things follow in infinite numbers and in infinite ways from the eternal necessity of God's nature: "Every idea of every body, or of every particular thing actually existing, necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God."[4]

Spinoza's pantheistic monism paved the way for new forms of monism as an ontological structure that reduced all reality to one principle or form of being (materialistic monism, idealistic monism). These new forms of monism either involved a rejection of God (materialism) or a distortion of His image (idealistic pantheism). Spinoza's philosophy as a naturalistic interpretation of the world (an explanation that did not call upon efficient and final causes) led indirectly to the treatment of nature as an autonomous system that can be scientifically investigated; it was the proclamation of a fully scientific view of the world in which there was no place for the problem of God (the horizons of knowledge are closed to God).

In the 17th century, Thomas Hobbes was an advocate for the renewal of the ancient naturalism of the Stoics and Epicureans. As a materialist (he recognized only the existence of matter), he accepted a mechanistic vision of the world. According to him, spiritual objects—God and the soul—are fictions. Also, the process of knowledge has a mechanistic nature, and man is governed by the same mechanical laws as is nature. Hobbes, a resolute atheist and opponent of religion, was the creator of "ethical sociologism"—the theory that makes moral judgments and norms dependent upon the decisions of individuals (relativism).

The naturalistic, rationalistic and empirical tendencies of the Renaissance became a theoretical foundation for the thought of the Enlightenment in which there was a sharp critique of religion, especially

[4] Baruch Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York 1951), pt. II, prop. 45.

Christianity. The philosophers of the Enlightenment set before themselves primarily practical and cultural aims; they recognized the human reason as the only source of truth and wanted to cleanse philosophy and culture of "prejudices," which they understood as faith in a supernatural reality.

The tendencies of the Enlightenment appeared first in England, where they were first prepared by the views of Francis Bacon and John Locke, and then most clearly expressed in David Hume. As a deist, Locke recognized a rationalistic and philosophical religion, that is, a religion in accordance with reason. Unlike Herbert, Locke recognized that ideas that agree with reason do not need to be innate, but can be acquired by experience (empiricism). Hume criticized the principles of causality and substance, which inevitably led to the questioning of metaphysics and a critique of the rational proofs for the existence of God. He held that the problem of God and religion belongs to the domain of faith, not knowledge. No rational theory of God is possible. With his idea that religion is a necessary construct of the human psyche, he initiated the psychological and historical study of religion.

The French Enlightenment was inspired by the thought of Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle and Pierre Bayle, and then developed by Voltaire, whose ideas were continued by the encyclopedists. Fontenelle held a naturalistic-mechanistic image of the world; the first organizer of the world was God understood in mechanistic terms. He was skeptical of tradition, whether ancient or Christian, and he undertook one of the first attempts in the Enlightenment at a critique of religion (a rationalistic and naturalistic critique of religion). Bayle, who preceded Voltaire and the encyclopedists, is regarded as the first apologist for atheism in the West. He stated that the concept of God contained a contradiction, for immutability and freedom cannot be reconciled with each other. Thus, revealed religious truths are in contradiction to the data of reason.

He also advanced the postulate that ethics be independent of metaphysics and religion.

Voltaire, the most typical representative of deism, held that God created the world but has no interest in the world. He held to a radical rationalism according to which reason demands the rejection of all sources of truth apart from reason. He was both a philosopher and a popular writer with the practical aim of doing battle with backwardness and prejudice. As a naturalist, he held that only the natural world exists (there are no supernatural phenomena). He had a radical anti-metaphysical and anti-religious (anti-Christian) attitude.

Voltaire's tendencies were carried on by the encyclopedists, who were Voltaire's collaborators on the *Great Encyclopedia* published by Denis Diderot. Diderot's own views regarding the problem of God underwent an evolution. At the beginning he was a theist, then he accepted deism, and finally he rejected the existence of God and embraced atheism as he adopted a materialistic conception of reality and a sensualist conception of knowledge (sense experience is the only source of knowledge). At the end, he held that religion is a construct of society.

The naturalistic and materialistic tendencies characteristic of the Enlightenment found expression in materialistic systems that were essentially atheistic. The chief follower of materialism in France, Julien Offray de La Mettrie, was inspired by a mechanistic understanding of nature. He held that everything that exists is material, including man. The soul is dependent upon the body and must be a body. Everything, including man, operates by virtue of a mechanistically constructed system. The consequence of this materialistic monism was the negation of God and the immortal soul.

Helvetius, like La Mettrie, accepted materialism, sensualism and a naturalistic conception of man. He was clearly opposed to metaphysics and religion, and in his critique of religion he professed atheism. Jean Meslier rejected any transcendent causes of the world and thought

that man had originated in matter; he criticized Christianity and, in keeping with his materialistic monism, he denied the existence of God.

In Germany in the 19th century, Jacob Molechot, Karl Vogt and Ludwig Büchner proclaimed an atheistic mechanistic materialism which reduced all reality to matter as it develops mechanistically. In the biological sciences, Ernst Haeckel propagated this trend.

Kant, although he was a religious man, by his theory of knowledge, his new conception of science, his radical agnosticism and his elimination of metaphysics from the field of scientific knowledge, played an important role in the devaluation of the problem of God. He gave a new form to the principle of the immanence of knowledge that had been introduced by Descartes. In Kant's philosophy, radically rationalistic (*a priori*) tendencies, directly inspired by Wolff, came together with empirical tendencies, especially those of Hume. Kant tried to make a synthesis of the two. This became possible by bringing about a revolution in the theory of knowledge in which the subject, who is endowed with an *a priori* structure, imposes this structure upon the object, and the object of knowledge is the result of impressions provided by sensibly knowable things and subjective *a priori* categories. Kant created a new conception of science in which *a priori* factors played the leading role. The reason imposes its own structures upon reality and cannot transcend the range of sense experience. Therefore, only mathematics and pure natural science can be recognized as science. There is no place for metaphysics among the sciences. Things in themselves—including God, the world and the human soul—are unknowable (agnosticism). The world, God, and the soul are *a priori* ideas of the theoretical reason, and their existence cannot be resolved within the framework of rational knowledge.

Kant thought that by criticizing the metaphysical proofs for the existence of God and rejecting metaphysics he was making room for faith. He associated the problem of God's existence with the practical

reason, which was guided by the postulates of the will and action. In this view, it is not the reason but the will which is decisive in the affirmation or denial of God. Ultimately, whether one accepts God's existence is an option without rational grounds.

This new way of understanding God (the absolute) was inherited by the representatives of German idealism: Johann G. Fichte, Friedrich W. J. Schelling and Georg W. F. Hegel. The philosophy of Fichte holds the priority of ideas over reality, of act over substance, of the subject over the object, of the self over the external world, of freedom over necessity, and of the will over reason; it was a unique synthesis of Spinozism and Kantianism.

Fichte accepted an absolute, pure, non-substantial and unconscious self to which he ascribed absoluteness. The "absolute I" has a theoretical-practical character. Reality has the same nature as thought and the self. The products of the self separate from it and stand opposite to it as object to subject. The object and the subject have the same source—they come from the self. Thought and being are identical. The "absolute I" is unlimited activity that aspires to an awareness of its own freedom. Consciousness exists only in the form of individual consciousness. The "absolute I" is thus expressed in the community of finite subjects, of finite selves, each of whom aspires to achieve true freedom. In Fichte's philosophy, the absolute has an immanent character, both with respect to the world of nature and with respect to human selves, and it has an evolutionary character. Thus, this is an idealistic pantheism in which there is no place for an absolute and transcendent personal God.

Like Fichte, Schelling accepted an absolute which transcended the self and matter, from which all reality came forth. The absolute is the identity of real and ideal being, of nature and spirit. Nature and the self are only secondary forms of being. They come from the absolute (pure consciousness). The absolute has an evolutionary character. It is a

process that transcends the opposition of self and nature. While in the second phase of his creative work, Schelling emphasized the personal nature of God and the freedom of His creative act, even after transforming the impersonal metaphysical absolute of idealism into the personal God that is revealed to religious consciousnesses, he remained more a pantheist than a theist.

Hegel was the most influential thinker in the movement of idealistic pantheism. He considered Spinoza's conception of the Absolute to be inadequate with respect to its designate. God, according to Hegel, should be conceived as Spirit. In Hegel's philosophy, the Absolute is the whole of reality, but this was understood differently than in Spinoza. According to Hegel, all reality can be reduced to the point where truth is apprehended and expressed not only as substance, but also as subject. In Hegel's philosophy, the Absolute-God is the Spirit, the "absolute idea," the "absolute concept." It is the "thought that thinks itself" or the "self-thinking thought." It is a spirit and a self-illuminating subject (substance-everything). The Absolute is the whole of reality, and wholeness is a process of self-reflection: reality arrives at a knowledge of itself in and through the human spirit. Nature is a necessary introductory condition for human consciousness (that which is objective). Nature and human consciousness are moments in the life of the Absolute. In nature, the Absolute passes into objectivity or expresses itself in it. In the human sphere of consciousness, the Absolute returns to itself, which means it returns as a spirit. It is the world's knowing of itself. Nature and the sphere of the human spirit are the region in which the eternal idea (or eternal essence) manifests itself. Human knowledge concerning the Absolute and the Absolute's knowledge are the same. Hegel does not identify God with man. God is the whole, but man is not. However, the whole comes to true knowledge about itself in and through man's spirit. This happens at different levels: (a) at the level of imaginative thought—in religious consciousness; (b) at the level of

conceptual knowledge—in science; (c) at the level of the philosophy of history, the ideal term of which is the full truth about reality as it occurs in the form of the Absolute's knowledge of itself.

Hegel reduced God to the Absolute, to a logical process and a subjective concept of the absolute idea that developed in three stages: thesis—antithesis—synthesis. Thus, Hegel identified divinity with the whole, with the totality of existence, life and truth. This was a peculiar transformation of the Infinite into the finite and of the finite into the Infinite. God without the world and without man would not be God. Although Hegel did not deny the existence of God, his conception of the evolving and open Absolute was a starting point for various interpretations. All forms of contemporary atheism in greater or lesser degree make appeal to the Hegelian conception of the Absolute.

In the 19th and 20th centuries, the negation of the existence of God and the negative evaluation of religion became more intense and radical. This had many causes:

1. The connection of the idea of God with human consciousness rather than with the extra-subjective world, as this was initiated by Descartes and grounded by Kant, and Hegel's making of human consciousness into the place where the Absolute becomes aware of itself—this ultimately bore fruit in the idea that human consciousness creates God and religion.

2. Epistemological immanentism and ontological immanentism, idealistic and materialistic forms of monism that negated God's transcendence and made of Him an idea that is immanent in relation to consciousness, or a being within the world of nature and history.

3. Agnosticism and rationalism (the rejection of all sources of knowledge except the purely rational) excluded everything which is transcendent and supernatural.

4. The imperialism of the positivist conception of science, which regarded metaphysics and theology as non-scientific (and thus of no

value) and therefore held that these fields should be replaced by science, and which regarded as non-scientific any reference to God as the cause of the physical world.

The immediate horizon of thought that the authors of the negation of God looked to was Hegel's transcendental idealism, which regarded fundamental Christian dogmas as moments in which human transcendent subjectivity was actualized within the world and within history.

The connection of Ludwig Feuerbach's and Karl Marx's theories with Hegelianism is obvious. The Hegelian Absolute Spirit was replaced in these theories by man. Existence *per se* (a prerogative of God) was ascribed to man. Man's choice became an absolute which took God's place (the deification of man). Man became autonomous and was saved by right action.

Most importantly, the Hegelian conception of the Absolute became the starting point for the process of the anthropomorphization of God and the deification of man, which inevitably led to the rejection of God and the rise of anthropological atheism (man in the place of God), which was called positive or humanistic atheism.

The representatives of the Hegelian left played a significant role in this process: Bruno Bauer, David F. Strauss, and most importantly Feuerbach. They all had a negative attitude toward religion, especially toward Christianity. Bauer was inspired by certain ideas of Hegel's philosophy and produced a naturalistic interpretation of Holy Scripture. He regarded Christianity as a phase of Hellenism. According to Strauss, Christ is only a personification of the idea of humanity, and God is only the name of infinity.

Feuerbach was the most extreme in his views, drawing out radical consequences from the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, in which the human subject had almost divine attributes. However, Feuerbach held to different philosophical presuppositions than those of He-

gel—nominalism (concepts as constructs of the mind), naturalism and materialism (everything is matter or a manifestation of matter). These presuppositions made it easier for Feuerbach to state that God and religion are a construct of man, that only man can be a god for man. The rejection of God thus became a condition for man's development and full affirmation. Man's religious consciousness is a falsified consciousness. God does not exist apart from human consciousness. He is simply a construct of human desires and frustration that want to achieve in something illusory that which cannot be realized in real human life. The idea of God is thus nothing more than a projection of human consciousness, the hypostatized idea of the human species.

> Religion is the disuniting of man from himself; he sets God before him as the antithesis of himself. God is not what man is—man is not what God is. God is the infinite, man the finite being; God is perfect, man imperfect; God eternal, man temporal; God almighty, man weak; God holy, man sinful. God and man are extremes: God is the absolutely positive, the sum of all realities; man the absolutely negative, comprehending all negations.[5]

When he accepts God, man reduces himself to the rank of a miserable and sinful creature. The religious man recognizes all the values of the human race not in man, but in God, and thus cancels himself out. In this conception, God and religion have a negative function. They act as a brake upon morality and all human culture. They are the cause of the dehumanization of man. The rejection of religious transcendence restores to man his true being—his species being. When he eliminates God, man becomes the ultimate end for himself: *Homo homini Deus est*—then the highest and first law becomes the love of man for man.[6]

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[5] Ludwig Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, trans. Marian Evans (London: John Chapman, 1854), 32.

[6] *Ibid.*, 268.

Man is a social being. Therefore, man's fulfillment requires a social environment. Society, or more strictly the state, is the proper perspective standing before man. Society or the state is the unity of men and the objective expression of the awareness of this unity. According to Feuerbach,

> In the State the powers of man divide and develop only to constitute an infinite being through this division and through their reunion; many human beings, many powers are one power. The State is the essence of all realities, the State is the providence of man. . . . The true State is the unlimited, infinite, true, complete, divine Man . . . the absolute Man.[7]

Feuerbach draws a startling conclusion: "politics must become our religion."[8] The negation of God (atheism) is the condition for the "new religion." The state can become absolute only when God is replaced by man, and theology by anthropology.

With regard to the understanding of God and religion, Marx assumed Feuerbach's main thesis: God and religion are a construct of man. In Marx's philosophy, the rejection of God and religion is a necessary condition for giving value to man. Marx introduced new elements to the interpretation of religion. He pointed to economic and social factors as playing a fundamental role in the creation of culture and religion. According to Marx, religion is a form of the alienation of man. Man creates the idea of God and religious reality in a disadvantageous economic-social situation which evokes the need for an ideal world. Religious alienation is thus a secondary form of alienation compared with the economic-social alienation that is caused by the unjust social relations that predominate in capitalism.

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[7] Ludwig Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. II, ed. Friedrich Jodl and Wilhelm Bolin (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1959), 220. Cit. after Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. VII (New York: DOUBLEDAY, 1994), 299.

[8] Feuerbach, *Sämtliche Werke*, 219. Cit. after Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. VII, 299.

> The foundation of irreligious criticism this: man makes religion; religion does not make man. Religion is, in fact, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has either not yet gained himself or has lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. This state, this society produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world. Religion . . . is the fantastic realization of the human being because the human being has attained no true reality. Thus, the struggle against religion is indirectly the struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma.[9]

Religion is thus an "idealist delusion." It is a deformation in the sphere of ideology, the awareness of man's own insufficiency, his incompleteness and his completion by a "non-real" reality, and as such it has a negative influence upon human action or human praxis.

According to classical Marxism, religion has a twofold action: (a) it fortifies, which consists in maintaining (sanctifying) the prevailing unjust social order (for it is associated with the class of owners); (b) it puts to sleep ("Religion . . . is the opium of the people"[10]) and paralyzes the oppressed class (the proletariat). It deforms human needs and thereby contributes to the prolongation of the dependencies from which religious consciousness was a form of escape (it organizes an escape into an "imaginary" world). Religion thus performs a function of justification and consolation, and thereby it puts the reason to sleep and lessens the feeling of responsibility, shifting it into responsibility before God rather than before society. It diminishes man's creative attitude toward his milieu and leads to a limitation of the historical process of the transformation of nature and the creation of the human social environment. It makes man passive and maintains him in illusion and slav-

[9] Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, trans. Annette Jolin and Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 131.
[10] *Ibid.*

ery, and in this way it makes it difficult for man to pull himself out of his tragic situation. In a word, religion hinders revolution.

The result of such views on the genesis and character of religion was the strong demand that religion be eliminated from social and individual life and from human culture. Everything that stands in the way of transformations of the intended revolutionary act is evil and should be liquidated. Since religion was recognized as being associated with the bourgeoisie, it is an obstacle in the proletarian revolution. Thus, God must be "killed" and religion must be destroyed in order that society (the proletariat) not be hindered in the transformation of economic-social structures. The front of the struggle with religion was advanced by the means and methods most suited to place and circumstances. The struggle extended beyond the social manifestations of religion and Churches to the very depth of man: "[I]t was no longer a question of the layman's struggle against the priest outside of him, but of his struggle against his own inner priest, his priestly nature."[11]

Atheism and the struggle against religion in Marxism ultimately has the character of a decision. It is not the result of investigations or reasoned conclusions. The justifications provided (materialism) are secondary to the *a priori* acceptance of atheism. The element of decision in Marxist and communist atheism is well expressed in the Communist Manifesto: "Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality."[12] The struggle with religion became the aim of communist regimes that closed the entire transcendental horizon to man.

Engels, in principle, accepted and professed Marx's theses on God and religion. He also emphasized the political conditions for religion: the ruling class accepts and uses religion, while the progressive

[11] *Ibid.*, 138.

[12] Cit. after Philip J. Kain, *Marx and Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 117.

class accepts a revolutionary religion. Engels, like Marx, was convinced that religion itself will disappear and die a natural death when its base is removed. Science is the greatest ally in the struggle against religion, according to Engels, hence the need to propagate a scientific view of the world.

Lenin accepted the views of Marx and Engels on religion. He emphasized the restraining function of religion on revolutionary activity ("the opium of the people"). Religion is a non-scientific view of the world and an illusory reality. It is a harmful phenomenon and it puts the will to "sleep." It is a hindrance in social actions. This was the basic reason why Lenin described religion as an enemy that must be fought, and he demanded an active struggle against religion.

A new link in the philosophical and cultural process of man's being put in the place of God is the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. He referred to certain ideas of Hegel and German historicism and relied on sensualism and relativism. He thought that in our culture (Christian culture), the time had come to resign from God and the Christian religion and to ascribe divine attributes to man. This required a radical transvaluation of all previously recognized values, especially values associated with the relation between God and man. Nietzsche entered history as the one who pronounced the impressive words: "God hath died: now do *we* desire—the Superman to live."[13]

Nietzche was regarded as a prophet called to bring about a cultural and moral revolution. The essential goal was to dethrone God and establish man in His place.

According to Nietzsche, God existed for centuries in human consciousness as a myth. God is a construct of man that contains the projections of human desires and lower needs, especially the need to have

[13] Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Thomas Common (Logos Publishing, 2017), 167.

a lord. God is thus treated by Nietzsche as someone who lords over man and prevents him from achieving full maturity and autonomy. According to Nietzsche, this myth is beginning to vanish from human consciousness. It is a good occasion to eliminate God from man's life and to transvaluate values so that the development of the life of the more powerful not be hindered by the weak. The cult of God, and the cult of transcendent values that have been externally imposed upon man in the form of a codified morality that distinguishes good and evil, demean and enslave man. Nietzsche wanted to rise above good and evil and above the order of the false values that had been imposed upon man from above by some non-existent God. Only when freed from this myth, man will freely and maturely be able to establish his own values and thus become himself, a full man, a superman.

According to Nietzsche, what has died is the God of traditional Christian morality, which he called the morality of slaves. To blaspheme against the God who has died is no sin. It is a sin to blaspheme against the earth and to assign it a lesser value than religion and God. It is a sin to honor man less than God. Nietzsche writes: "I conjure you, my brethren, *remain true to the earth*, and believe not those who speak unto you of superearthly hopes!"[14]

After the death of God as the source of morality, man is obliged to make a great effort to create the superman. The will to power is necessary for this: "If we do not make a great renunciation and a lasting victory over ourselves out of the death of God, then we must bear the loss."[15] Together with the new god who will be the superman, Nietzsche preserved religion, which is the cosmic "ladder" of power.

Atheism in the name of man, especially in the name of his freedom, took a clear and sharp form in the trends of existentialism repre-

[14] *Ibid.*, 9.

[15] Cit. after Liliana Frey-Rohn, *Friedrich Nietzsche: A Psychological Approach to His Life and Work* (Zürich: Daimon Verlag, 1988), 87.

sented by Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Sartre expressed the most radical form of atheism in his attitude of life and his philosophy. He drew out the ultimate consequences of consciousness as the starting point of philosophy and of man as *res cogitans*. According to Sartre, man is a pure and creative consciousness. He identifies this consciousness with man's freedom. Human consciousness constitutes the meaning of all things and it creates the essence of man by his free and unconditioned decisions. Man does not possess a stable nature that could define and determine the direction of his action. Sartre replaced nature with history. Man creates himself in time (he has a history), and he gives an essence to his existence; existence precedes essence. All of man's assessments and choices are dictated only by factors within consciousness.

When he adopts the conception of man as absolute freedom, Sartre has to make a choice between man (his freedom) and God, who in order to be man's Creator, objectifies man. Sartre denies the existence of God in the name of his conception of man: God must be rejected in order to save man's freedom, which cannot admit any conditions. He who chooses man must eliminate everything that is opposed to his self-realization. God and man are competing realities. This makes it necessary for man to choose: either God or himself. In religion, Sartre sees only a negative aspect. Religion alienates man psychologically and neglects his human obligations. Sartre always arrives at the same conclusion: one must be a man among other men and so one must firmly reject God. The rejection and denial of God has the character of a fundamental decision and of an option for man, yet Sartre tries to provide a philosophical justification for his decision. He creates an ontology and within it he develops two kinds of argumentation.

The first is built on the Sartrean understanding of absolute freedom: if man was created by God, he would not possess freedom, for if God created man, He would have to follow a plan (model) of humanity;

then man would have a definite nature which would put a limit to his possibilities and his possible actions; man would be reduced to the role of a slave who acts out the impulses that God has grafted onto him. However, if man is to be truly free, he must possess absolute freedom which would enable him to create himself and his own essence. Man is dependent only upon himself, and this decides his fate. He is an autonomous subject and is absolutely free. Since man is absolutely free, God's existence must be excluded.

In his second argument, Sartre tries to show the contradiction in the very idea of God. He relies upon an ontology that categorizes the beings that are in the world. He distinguishes "being-in-itself," which is a thing that is always full of itself (identical) and has a definite nature, and "being-for-itself," which is a conscious being that by its own consciousness knows both that he exists and that other beings exist apart from it. In this ontology, what sort of being could God be? It is impossible for God to be a synthesis of "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself," because these are mutually exclusive. God could be either a "being-in-itself," but then He would realize "massivity" or fullness like things and would be deprived of consciousness and freedom, or "being-for-itself," but then, while conscious and free, He would not be absolute, because He would be filled with nothingness. Sartre concludes that the idea of God is internally contradictory, and thus God does not exist.

Sartre's arguments presuppose a conception of God and a conception of human freedom that are not in accord with reality. For Sartre, God is not a transcendent being but an absolutized man. God as the Creator of the world of nature (determined beings) would not be a problem for Sartre. When He created will and freedom, God created the possibility of rebellion against Himself. The essence of Sartre's position is precisely rebellion—*non serviam* that results from succumbing

to the temptation: "you will be like gods"[16]—and the desire to be independent in the area of truth and the good, to be absolutely free and not conditioned by a creator.

Camus analyzed the human lot and concluded that life is absurd. The absurdity of existence affects all people and evokes the need for an inter-human solidarity that would help to overcome a burdensome and meaningless life. Solidarity with others excludes the affirmation of God. God is separate from men because he is jealous of man's love. Consequently, Camus drew a conclusion—which is clearly in opposition to Christianity—that men may be loved only in opposition to God.

Merleau-Ponty regarded man as a "project" of the world who must be understood by establishing connections with this world. The world is man's horizon, thus man's destiny should not be associated with God. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty thought that the acceptance of God would destroy human freedom, that God's perfection or absoluteness would leave no room for man's free activity: if God exists, there is no man. The contradictory character of the concept of God and the presence of evil in the world testify, according to Merleau-Ponty, to the impossibility of God's existence.

Sigmund Freud, the creator of psychoanalysis, approached the problems of God and religion in a spirit of radical atheism. Although Freud described himself as an atheist at the beginning of his scientific career, religion was one of his chief interests. As an adherent of scientism, he thought that science and technology can resolve all human problems. He also tried to explain religion scientifically without reference to any supernatural factors. Freud, like Feuerbach, thought that the idea of God is a product of man, his fears and desires, and that God is nothing other than the concept of an "idealized" father. He went further

[16] Gen. 3:5.

than Feuerbach in his explanation of religion by claiming that the subconsciousness was the source of religion.

Freud drew an analogy between neurosis and religion, saying that they have a common origin. Neurosis is rooted in the individual psyche, while religion is rooted in the collective psyche that was formed at the beginning of humankind (the childhood stage of mankind). Religion is a collective neurosis associated with a universal Oedipus complex. Religion is a way of fighting the feeling of guilt and dread, and God is an "idealized" father.

In this view, religion is formed of psychic experiences that have been projected upon the external world. These experiences receive their shape in culture (the "super-ego"). Religious conduct is a socially institutionalized repetition of the relation of son and father. The religious reality is an illusion. Religion, like neurosis, is the result of a certain compromise, the investment of psychic energy into socially accepted domains such as literature and art (culture).

There is a certain ambiguity in Freud's evaluation of the function of religion: religion provides a certain consolation and compensates man for the burden of life. Religion demands acts of renunciation and dedication. Yet religion is an illusory consolation. Religion urges man to search for an honest answer to the human drama of guilt, suffering and death.

Freud saw the significance of the great religions, especially the monotheistic religions, as leading mankind to form higher forms of morality and spiritual culture. He emphasized the role of religion in the Jewish nation and recognized the great figures of Judaism and Christianity (Moses, St. Paul and St. Francis of Assisi). This did not alter his decidedly negative opinion of religion. Religion is a delusion, which means that it provides the hope of realizing certain desires such as the need to possess a father, the existence of providence, and immortality. This is a false hope and it operates like a narcotic. While by accepting

the universal neurosis of religion, a man can avoid personal neurosis, religion does not allow man to be fully mature and autonomous. Religion does not, and cannot, become the road to man's happiness. Only modern science can fully eliminate and replace religion. The man of the scientific era can break away from the illusory God the Father. He can become "mature" and dominate the world by science and technology. According to Freud, it is an illusion to think that what science and technology cannot provide can be obtained anywhere else. Death must be accepted as an irrevocable fate and we must reconcile ourselves to it.

The conception of God and religion formulated by Freud is based on a naturalistic (controversial) conception of man according to which man is the seat of various drives, among which the sexual drive (a one-dimensional unconsciousness) dominates. The impossibility to fulfill these unconscious drives, especially the sexual drive, leads to universal sexual frustration. Other psychoanalysts criticized Freud's interpretation of man's basic needs and pointed to other needs and aims (e.g., Erich Fromm, who saw the need for social bonds as the basic drive, and Viktor Frankl, who saw the need for meaning).

This allegedly scientific explanation of the sources of religion is in fact based upon an absolutely unverifiable fantasy. The myth of the omnipotence of science and technology does not make Freud's theory any stronger. This myth has not been verified. Freud himself was outside of his scientific competence when he advanced the metaphysical thesis that God is an exclusively psychological reality.

The positivism of the 19th and 20th centuries had an indirect influence on the problem of God and religion. The influence of positivism occurred in two ways:

1. Auguste Comte advanced the theory of the three stages of human thought. After the religious-theological stage which appealed to religious elements to explain reality, and after the philosophical stage in which the world was explained by reasons that were transcendent in

relation to experience, there came the positive period—the time of the particular sciences correlated with practice (technology).

2. A new conception of science was created, and according to Comte, the chief scientific questions are about how the things and phenomena given in sense experience are and function (empiricism, sensualism), and how they can be interpreted by applying a mathematical method. Scientific knowledge grasps the quantitative and measurable aspect of reality, and thus refers primarily to the material world. By eliminating such questions as: On what account? Why? For what purpose?, science excludes metaphysics and theology from the range of rational knowledge and makes our perspectives of knowledge horizontal. This took place mainly in radical forms of positivism, especially in scientism which proclaimed an epistemological monism and would not accept anything that could not be scientifically proven or proven by the methods of mathematical physics.

Strictly speaking, neither positivism nor even scientism necessarily lead to the negation of God. By their method, the particular sciences do not have the necessary competence to present and resolve metaphysical problems, such as the problem of the existence of God, the beginning of the world, or the meaning of human life. Science should be neutral concerning the existence or non-existence of God, for there are no scientific arguments either for or against God's existence.

The actual position of individual men of science is another matter. Some recognize that science is not sufficient for resolving the essential problems of life; they allow for other types of knowledge (e.g., philosophy), and they state that science and religion neither contradict nor exclude each other. Others, who are most often inspired by certain philosophical options, hold that God does not exist or that the problem of God's existence belongs to the domain of myth and not to rational knowledge.

The actual domination of scientific knowledge and the associated horizontalization of human knowledge or thought, the practical orientation of applied science, and the successes of science and technology may contribute to a certain mentality or way of thinking where people conclude that, by science and technology, all problems can be solved and that we have mastered the world. The scientific-technological mentality can contribute to a loss of interest in matters that are not connected with the present life and its organization on earth, and to an indifference or even contempt for everything that is beyond the scope of applied science. In this way, it is not science directly, but the scientific-technological mentality that can become a reason for practical atheism.

The problem of the negation of God explicitly occurs in trends that have developed out of positivism and scientism: neo-positivism, analytical philosophy, structuralism, and naturalism.

Neo-positivism and analytical philosophy are associated with epistemological nominalism and radical empiricism, and they encompass important domains of life. This also finds expression in a variety of solutions with respect to the affirmation and negation of God. In its first period of development, neo-positivism was strongly opposed to classical rationalism and metaphysics. Its representatives rejected the existence of God. One of the creators of neo-positivism, Bertrand Russell, made an explicit declaration of atheism and was known for his attacks against the Christian religion and theology. He was a zealous apostle of radical rationalism and non-religious humanism.

In the first period of his work, Ludwig Wittgenstein eliminated statements about God and all metaphysical statements from the level of rational language. He transferred them to what he described as "mystical" terrain. Alfred J. Ayer presented an explicitly atheistic position. He regarded religious statements as meaningless because they are not empirically verifiable (the dogma of logical positivism). His well-known attack upon metaphysics and theology arose from his conviction that

the entire body of facts lies within the world as it can be known by the empirical sciences (empirical scientism). John N. Findlay, John J. Smart and others are known for their attempts to show that the concept of God as necessary being is logically contradictory.

Structuralism is represented especially by Claude Lévi-Strauss. It applies the structuralist method to the analysis of religious language and holds that religious language is chiefly a construct of man's subconsciousness and has no real and transcendent meaning. Not only has God died, even His name should no longer occur within the horizon of knowledge because it has no meaning.

Naturalism developed especially in the USA. It regards nature as the whole of being and as the basis of all phenomena. The creators of naturalism deny the existence of God and the immortality of the human soul. John Dewey held that the acceptance of the existence of God in a certain way destroys the uniformity of reality and leads to a devaluation of the world (materialistic monism).

Forms of Atheism

Various forms of the negation of God have appeared throughout history and in our times. Atheism is a complex phenomenon that is affected by philosophical, psychological, social and cultural conditions. It is difficult to speak of any absolutely pure form of atheism, but in particular forms of the denial of God's existence we can distinguish the domination of a particular factor, most often a philosophical factor which allows us to make a certain systematization. There have been many attempts to systematize the forms of atheism. The first to do so was Johann H. Alsted in the 17th century in his *Encyclopedia*. Philosophical and theological encyclopedias systematize the manifestations of atheism in different ways. The most general and systematic is the division of atheism into theoretical and practical.

Theoretical Atheism

If we accept the classical conception of truth as the agreement of human knowledge with extra-subjective reality, and we follow Aristotle in accepting theoretical knowledge (beside practical and poetic knowledge), and recognize that man has a natural ability to know God, then theoretical atheism in the strict sense of the word cannot exist. God as a spiritual being is not an object of direct knowledge, and so we cannot state with certainty that He does not exist. As the history of philosophy shows, there are no metaphysical arguments for the non-existence of God. Atheism as it appears in philosophy and culture is either secondary to the accepted conception of the world and man (and especially of knowledge), or it is accepted *a priori*, or it has the character of a choice (a decision or option).

The situation in modern and contemporary philosophy, which accepts consciousness as its starting point, in a certain way facilitates the negation of God. The principle of reflection (immanence) blocks the way for man's natural inclination to know the truth about the extra-subjective world, including God.

Either human consciousness (the *cogito*) contains an *a priori* idea of God (as in the philosophy of Descartes and Kant), or it is directed toward various speculations resulting in a deformation of the idea of God, or it arranges man's thought so that the Absolute is meaningless or does not exist. From this philosophical perspective, the problem of God is locked either in the immanence of human consciousness (in human thought) or in the immanence of the world.

In theoretical atheism, there is a strict connection between metaphysical and epistemological solutions. Theoretical atheism may assume the following forms:

1. *Metaphysical atheism.* This includes all doctrines that hold to metaphysical monism (the homogeneity of reality). Metaphysical athe-

ism may be either (a) absolute—an explicit denial of God's existence associated with materialistic monism (all materialistic trends, both in ancient and modern times), or (b) relative—the implicit denial of God in all philosophies that, while they accept the existence of an absolute, conceive of the Absolute as not possessing any of the attributes proper to God: transcendence, a personal character, or unity. Relative atheism is associated with idealistic monism (pantheism, panentheism, deism).

Pantheism and panentheism are doctrines that deprive the Absolute of transcendence to the world and man; this includes all doctrines that do not recognize any metaphysical difference between God and the world. Idealistic monism leads not so much to a denial of God as to a deformation of the idea of God. It has different forms, like:

○ Spinoza's pantheism, according to which only God is a real substance, while the world is a manifestation and emanation of that substance but does not possess any being distinct from the absolute substance of being. Hegel described Spinoza's pantheism as acosmic, which is opposed to atheism insofar as the world is absorbed by God, and so it is something more than atheism.

○ Idealistic pantheism, according to which God is the whole of reality as the absolute Idea, Spirit, or Self, which by a necessary (dialectical) development attains absoluteness, perfection and unity in many aspects (Plotinus, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel).

○ Pantheism as pancosmism, according to which only the world is real, and God is the sum of all that exists (materialistic pantheism—Paul H. Holbach, Diderot, the Hegelian left).

○ Naturalistic pantheism, according to which nature is the source of life and vivifies everything (the Stoics, the hylezoists, David F. Strauss, Ernst Haeckel).

○ Panentheism which recognizes a partial difference between God and the world and establishes a new form of God's immanence in the world. God is the immanent act in every organism in the world.

God's necessary relation to the world is an essential attribute of God (the philosophy of process—Alfred N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne).

Deism includes doctrines that recognize God as the creator or organizer of the world, while denying that God has any relations to the world and man. The deists deny divine providence, any difference between good and evil and the moral attributes of God. They are opposed to Revelation, especially Christian Revelation (Wolter, the Encyclopedists).

2. *Epistemological atheism.* This is proper to all philosophical concepts that deny that man can know God or resolve the problem of God's existence. Agnosticism is the basic attitude of atheism for epistemological reasons and takes various forms, like:

○ The agnosticism of immanence associated with the philosophy of consciousness or the philosophy of the subject, which leads human thought to the state where it is locked within the subject (consciousness) and where all differences between thought and being are removed, and ultimately consciousness is regarded as an absolute.

○ The rationalistic agnosticism of Kant (and the entire Enlightenment), which rejects all sources of knowledge except reason.

○ Skepticism—the position that we cannot resolve the problem of whether or not God exists (Pythagoras, Montaigne, Charron and Bayle).

○ Methodological agnosticism—the position that recognizes only the particular sciences as having cognitive value and denies that science can go beyond the area of empirical experience. Methodological monism excludes metaphysics and theology, which are essentially connected with the problem of God, from the field of rationality (sensualism, empiricism, positivism and scientism).

○ The agnosticism of the subconsciousness—this includes positions that exclude the problem of God from their natural philosophical or theological environment and connect the genesis of the idea of God

and religion with a purely fantastic hypothesis. Atheism becomes here a horizon of thought, a phenomenological domain or a doctrinal system (Freudianism, Marxism).

3. *Axiological (positive) atheism*. This chiefly anthropological atheism includes positions that reject the existence of God in the name of other values which are regarded as being in competition with God (a radical alternative). This is called positive or constructive atheism. It accepts a "higher" absolute and therefore negates the existence of God. This absolute may be Humanity, Science, Progress, History, and especially Man. The most radical and widespread are forms of atheism that absolutize or deify man and ascribe to him ontic and axiological self-sufficiency and the ability to resolve all problems without resorting to God. This is associated with the acceptance of new paths for man's liberation (salvation), with man's achievement of full development, with new ways of achieving happiness (Marxism, Nietzsche, Freud, and Sartre). The attitude of the representatives of anthropological atheism (humanistic atheism, Promethean atheism, atheistic humanism) is expressed well by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's saying: "Man becomes an atheist when he feels better than his God."[17]

Practical Atheism

Practical atheism is the attitude of a person who lives *as if God did not exist*, who does not recognize any existential connections with God: God and religion do not have any existential value for him, especially, he does not see in God the end-purpose of his life (the good, love, salvation). Even if he does not deny God in his thoughts, he does not recognize any influence of God upon individual and social life.

[17] "L'homme devient athée lorsqu'il se sent meilleur que son Dieu." J. Lacroix, *Sens et valeur de l'athéisme contemporain*, 45. Cit. after André Charron, *Les catholiques face à l'athéisme contemporain* (Montréal: Fides, 1973), 349.

Purely practical atheism, like purely theoretical atheism, does not exist. There are common conditions between the theoretical denial of God (in thought) and the elimination of God from concrete life. The acceptance of the truth about the existence of God entails practical consequences, especially the acceptance of moral principles.

Practical atheism takes various forms:

1. It may occur among people who do not deny God's existence and who even regard themselves as religious believers, but who are not guided by any religious principles in moral life, who do not have any sense of sin, among whom prayer and religious practices disappear.

2. Laicization, which consists in excluding the problem of God and religion from intellectual pursuits and practical action at the individual or social level.

3. The atheism of indifference (indifferentism) is the lack of interest in the problems of God and religion, where people are absorbed in temporal matters (secularization, the influence of atheism upon daily life). An indifference to the problem of God presupposes that (a) human life runs its entire course upon earth (worldliness, secularism); (b) religion has failed to lead men to full happiness and to create the ideal conditions for life upon earth; (c) only a world from which God is absent can create the conditions for man to be fully present. People must build a "new world" without God and religion in the name of man (salvation without God).

4. The atheism of ignorance is the most dangerous form of practical atheism which consists in the complete absence of the idea of God in man's life. Marx advanced this type of atheism as the ideal attitude of man toward God. Marx held that God did not exist, but he stated that even if God did exist, nothing would change in his attitude toward God. Marx presented absolute indifference and ignorance of God as a fact and as an ideal—as an expression of man's ideal maturity at the individual and social level. The mature man not only denies the existence

of God, but also ignores God. Marxists call for a transition from anti-theism (the struggle against God and religion) to post-atheism as a structural element of the consciousness of the liberated man. Ignorance of God would be a higher form of the negation of God than atheism. According to the Marxists, the history of mankind after atheism would have a post-atheistic character.

The Causes and Motives of Atheism

The standpoint of atheism as a negation of God is secondary to the thought about God that spontaneously arises in man, is developed in different branches of philosophy (chiefly metaphysics), and is completed in religion (e.g., Christianity, by accepting revealed truths, provides a basis for the philosophical knowledge of God and broadens it). In the Christian world, reason and faith complement each other in knowing God; thus, atheism is primarily a negation (or deformation) of the idea of God as He is conceived in Christianity and associated with Christian culture.

How is the negation of God possible? And what are the causes of the phenomenon of atheism in its various forms?

The possibility of negating the existence of God is ultimately connected with the ontic and cognitive status of God and man. God as an ontically transcendent being is also transcendent with respect to our knowledge. God's existence is not directly accessible to man in knowledge by virtue of experience. Man's knowledge of God is indirect and is based on man's knowledge of the world of beings accessible in experience as he searches for their reason of existence. We are dealing here with a line of reasoning (an inference, a reflective act of knowledge) which is exposed to and can be misled by error. Furthermore, man may affirm that the thesis of God's existence must be accepted, yet he cannot know God's Essence (Nature) in an exhaustive

manner—neither in philosophical knowledge, nor even in religion and theology. God never ceases to be the Mystery to man, and man can never fully know God. God remains "known as unknown."

On the part of man, many conditions come into play. Man is able to know that God exists. He is *capax Dei*. He possesses a natural desire to know God, yet in his natural (rational) investigations of God, he encounters many difficulties and obstacles and may err. St. Thomas Aquinas affirms this when he says that "the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors."[18]

There are objective reasons for the difficulties in recognizing the existence of God and there are objective reasons for the negation of God's existence. Aquinas called these to attention, and they are always present. They are as follows:

1. Physical and moral evil exists, and this poses a difficulty for many people in accepting the existence of God as the Creator of the world. The world seems too evil to be the world of an omnipotent God who is the Fullness of Good. The Good God and the presence of evil in His works seem to be irreconcilable to many people, and this may become a reason for rejecting God.

2. It may be due to the character of the human reason and the human will by which man acts. By reason, man knows the truth. By will, he adheres to the good (love). These faculties are part of man's essence, yet since they are faculties of man as a contingent being, these faculties are not absolute. The reason and will should cooperate in harmony, yet they are exposed to the danger of errors and improper relations in the area of knowing the truth about God. The most frequent reasons for the negation of God are epistemological (cognitive) and

[18] *S.Th.*, I, q. 1, art. 1, resp., in *The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Second and Revised Edition, 1920). Available at: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/.

volitional (moral). They are: (a) the principle of immanence or agnosticism in all its forms, the horizontalization of knowledge (Kant, Hume, Comte); (b) the decentralization and depersonification of God (Spinoza, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel); (c) the deification of man (Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre); (d) the domination of the will over the reason (choice, option).

Our knowledge of reality existing outside the human subject—spontaneously acquired in germinal form, in the light of the first principles (identity, non-contradiction, the reason of being), by virtue of the very human nature—raises the question of the reason for these beings which do not have to exist, that is, the question of God who transcends reality as it is accessible in immediate experience. This knowledge is developed and cultivated in the philosophy of being (metaphysics), which looks at reality under the general aspect of existence and is guided by the scientific question: "By what do those beings exist whose existence does not belong to their nature?" Thus, knowledge is based on causes (*habitudo principii*) and comprehends all beings (the transcendental character of cognition), and therefore it can step beyond the world of immediately knowable beings which are unintelligible (absurd) unless we accept the Absolute Being as the ultimate cause of their existence.

In modern philosophy, because of Descartes, the essential connection between human knowledge and the world as it exists outside the subject was broken. Consequently, the connection between human thought or human consciousness and the God who exists outside of it was broken. Since Descartes, the problem of God has been connected with the *cogito*, with human thought or consciousness. The direction of cognition has been reversed. Instead of knowledge beginning from the existing world and moving to the subject, it is regarded as starting from the thinking subject and moving in the direction of extra-subjective reality.

Immanentism, Agnosticism, the Horizontalization of Knowledge

Descartes's principle of immanence inevitably leads to cognitive and ontological immanentism. Consciousness has itself as its object and does not need to search for its object outside of itself. Consciousness becomes the source and measure of existence. "To be" is the same as "to be in the consciousness." Human subjectivity, the transcendental act of the *cogito* as originating in the subject gives structure and presence to the object. Human thought (consciousness) is thus grounded in itself. Only that which corresponds to human thought has meaning. The truth of thought ceases to be important. What becomes important is appearance in consciousness. The absolutization of human consciousness or human subjectivity leads toward "pure" consciousness, toward an absolute which is thought itself.

Although Descartes accepted the existence of God (the idea of God is an innate *a priori* idea in human consciousness), the Cartesian *cogito* became an embryo for a deformation of the idea of God and the negation of God. By confining knowledge within human consciousness (which by its nature excludes transcendence), various systems (various ways of *cogitatio*) gave rise either to a conception of God as immanent to human thought or to an understanding of the human reason in which the problem of God is eliminated from the perspective of knowledge.

In his own way, Kant held on to the principle of the *cogito*. He regarded the human reason as constituting in part the object of knowledge. Although he did not negate the existence of God, he regarded the idea of God as an *a priori* idea of the theoretical reason. By his conception of science, he eliminated any possibility of knowing God from the rational (scientific) order and he definitively denied any possibility of metaphysical knowledge (any possibility of metaphysics as a science). He connected the problem of God (a postulate of God) with the practical order that was dominated by the will. He was con-

vinced that by eliminating God from the rational order, he was making room for faith in God, whereas in fact he provided the beginning of a radical epistemological agnosticism which in many cases led to atheism and the domination of will over knowledge.

In Comte, we see the confinement of the field of rationality and the horizontalization of human nature. These conceptions were widely propagated by his new conception of science in which man can know things given in immediate experience, describe and interpret them by expressing them in mathematical relations. This was the final elimination of the scientific question of "On what account?" and "For what purpose?" (efficient and final causes) from the field of rational knowledge, and thereby also the elimination of metaphysics. Positivism and scientism held the conception of knowledge that eliminated the problem of God from the horizons of knowledge.

Positivistic (scientistic) agnosticism contributed to the creation of a scientific (technological) mentality that in turn could lead to practical atheism. Since it is impossible to resolve, within the confines of science, the question of whether or not God exists, and since the thesis that God exists cannot be verified empirically nor can it be proven by the methods of mathematical physics, people often conclude by establishing a norm of individual and social action: "Act as if God did not exist."

The Decentralization and Depersonification of God

Descartes's immanentism and Kant's rationalism and transcendentalism found expression in the absolutization of human thought and the human self, in the elimination of any difference between thought and being, and in the association of the problem of God with human thought and its speculative development. This found expression primarily in German idealism, in the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Their Absolute was confined within the immanence of human

thought and the world. God was subsequently detranscendentalized and deprived of subjective personal being. The Absolute became a product of evolution and was organically connected with human consciousness. Man stood in the place of God. God and man evolve in history to achieve their fulfillment in the future. In Hegel's interpretation, Christianity is the history of salvation, in which God emerges as the future resulting from a necessary development of the "idea of being" (the "absolute spirit").

The motif of the "God who becomes," the "Absolute of history," and of man as the place necessary for the becoming of God was taken up by the Hegelian left and radicalized by Feuerbach. Feuerbach advanced a thesis that in large measure became the source of contemporary atheism—man created God, God is a construct of man, and religion is a falsified consciousness.

Marx took up this motif. He replaced the Hegelian absolute idea with the absolute of evolving and self-sufficient matter. He made history into the place of man's becoming. Others replaced the idea of God as essentially connected with human consciousness with the idea of man as not only the place where God becomes, but man as God himself.

The Deification of Man

The dominant ideologies and philosophies of the 20th century propose a vision of God and man as competing and mutually exclusive realities. The philosophies of consciousness held that man is the source of truth, that he is self-sufficient in knowledge, and that he possesses within himself an unlimited source of power and freedom. At the same time, these philosophies held a concept of God that was deformed by pantheism, panentheism or deism. This point of view made it easier to present God as opposed to man, and man as opposed to God, and it contributed to the idea that we must make a choice between these realities: either God or man (*aut Deus aut homo*).

The opposition of God and man, and in a radical version, the positioning of man in the place of God, is characteristic of so-called positive atheism (the negation of God for the sake of a full affirmation of man)—Promethean (humanistic) atheism, which found its fullest expression in the philosophies of Marx, Nietzsche and Sartre. The negation of God became a necessary condition for the full affirmation of man, who was regarded as the only efficient cause and demiurge of his own history and the history of the world.

The Domination of the Will over the Reason

Atheism in the name of man and in the name of the absolutization of human values (such as freedom) ultimately has the character of a choice, a personal decision of the creator of a given ideology or philosophy. It can be exemplified by a passage from Marx's doctoral dissertation:

> Philosophy makes no secret of it. The confession of Prometheus, "In a word, I hate all the gods," is its own confession, its own verdict against all gods heavenly and earthly who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the supreme deity. There shall be none beside it.[19]

Or, by Sartre's statement:

> Existentialism is not so much an atheism in the sense that it would exhaust itself attempting to demonstrate the nonexistence of God; rather, it affirms that even if God were to exist, it would make no difference—that is our point of view.[20]

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[19] Marx, *Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem Anhang*, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, part I, I/I (Frankfurt 1927), 10. Cit. after *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*, vol. 5, ed. Manfred Henningsen (University of Missouri Press, 2000), 269.

[20] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007), 53.

Even in philosophies that attempt to show a theoretical foundation for the negation of God, the underlying motive is a decision to reject all dependence upon God, or a rebellion against Christian moral doctrine at either the individual or social level.

Thus, there are some forms of atheism in which the will is the deciding factor which refuses to accept the transcendent First Being, in which man says to God: "Non serviam," with conviction that he will be "like the gods." Moreover, various psychical, social and cultural factors may either help or hinder the discovery and affirmation of the truth about the existence of God. While the truth about God is a theoretical (metaphysical) truth, it is also a practical truth.[21] God is the Highest Good for man and the affirmation of God is expressed in man's entire moral and religious life. Dissent from the moral principles associated with religion may become a reason for the negation of God.

Man learns and achieves the ultimate truths and highest values together with others in society. Other persons may either help or hinder his access to transcendent truths and values. The cultural climate of the last two centuries did not favor the affirmation of God: the dominant trends of thought and the most influential ideologies were atheistic or even anti-theistic.

The contemporary forms of atheism were born in Christian culture. In the documents of Vatican II, the Church acknowledges that religious people may have contributed to the rise of atheism:

> [T]aken as a whole, atheism is not a spontaneous development but stems from a variety of causes, including a critical reaction against religious beliefs, and in some places against the Christian religion in particular. Hence believers can have more than a little to do with the birth of atheism. To the extent that they neglect their own training in the faith, or teach erroneous doctrine, or are

[21] Moreover, religious experience (man's recognition of God as the ultimate source of life and the Highest Good) is implicit in metaphysical experience.

deficient in their religious, moral or social life, they must be said to conceal rather than reveal the authentic face of God and religion.[22]

Conclusion

The history of modern and contemporary atheism—which is a mirror of human (mainly cognitive) errors (cf. the conception of knowledge as the ultimate source of the negation of God) in the area of the understanding of the meaning of life and its full development—shows that:

1. The history of the negation of God indirectly confirms the endurance of the idea of God and the affirmation of God throughout time; although there are various forms of the negation of God, the idea of God persists, for there is no ultimate negation that could resolve this question once and for all.

2. An erroneous conception of God could be a motivation for seeking a better understanding and expression of the truth about God in a more suitable and more easily understood language.

3. Systems that presuppose absolute atheism (like those of Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre) show that with the negation of God all other values collapse and are supplanted by relativism and, eventually, nihilism.

4. The myth of the "deified" man has not been verified in practical Marxism nor in the "supermanhood" of certain nations. The various absolutes that man has established—Man, Humanity, Nature, Science, History—are not sufficient, and ultimately along with the "death of God" they lead to the "death of man."

[22] *Gaudium et Spes*, no. 19. Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, promulgated by Pope Paul VI (December 7, 1965). Available at: http://w2.vatican.va/content/vatican/it.html.

The experience of atheism thereby calls and challenges us to profit from its purifying character, cleansing us of false gods and deified men, and to come to a deeper understanding of the truth about man as a person who finds his true dignity, freedom and dynamism in God and in His creative and salvific love—"You must therefore be perfect, just as your heavenly Father is perfect."[23]

Since man is not God but has been created by God in His image and likeness, he may become like God by participation. He may become the co-creator of himself and the co-creator of the history of humankind so that by the power and will of God that history may lead to man's full development, to salvation and to happiness.

ATHEISM* IN *THE UNIVERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY

SUMMARY

The author considers the problem of atheism. She discusses the history of atheism, forms of atheism, and the causes and motives of atheism. She concludes that (a) the history of the negation of God indirectly confirms the endurance of the idea of God and the affirmation of God throughout time; although there are various forms of the negation of God, the idea of God persists, for there is no ultimate negation that could resolve this question once and for all; (b) an erroneous conception of God could be a motivation for seeking a better understanding and expression of the truth about God in a more suitable and more easily understood language; (c) systems that presuppose absolute atheism (like those of Marx, Nietzsche, Sartre) show that with the negation of God all other values collapse and are supplanted by relativism and, ultimately, nihilism; (d) the myth of the "deified" man has not been verified in practical Marxism nor in the "supermanhood" of certain nations; the various absolutes that man has established—Man, Humanity, Nature, Science, History—are not sufficient, and ultimately along with the "death of God" they lead to the "death of man."

[23] Matt. 5:48.

KEYWORDS

atheism, God, Absolute, man, religion, pantheism, panentheism, deism, agnosticism, skepticism, anti-theism, pseudo-atheism, post-atheism, Christian philosophy, *Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

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Appendix

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PETER A. REDPATH

MEMORIAL EULOGY: MAX WEISMANN—ONE OF GOD'S GREAT IDEAS *

I begin my remembrances of Ronald "Max" Weismann with an expression of deepest and most heart-felt gratitude to Max's unconditional-loving wife Elaine for inviting me to deliver this eulogy at this beautiful St. John Chrysostom Church to celebrate the exceptional life and accomplishments of this great man: One of God's Great Ideas. This invitation is one *my life's* greatest honors, one that, despite the ravages of old age daily besetting me bodily and mentally, I will never forget.

Shortly after Mortimer Adler had died on 28 June 2001, I was shocked when his partner in crime at the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas, and my friend, Max Weismann, had contacted me and asked me to pen a short eulogy in honor of Mortimer. Because parts of that eulogy equally describe Max's nature, I take liberty to refer to them now in relation to Max: "Men were much bigger and wiser in those days," I said, "not like they are now. Just as in the time of Odysseus breaker of horses, and honey-tongued Nestor, these were men bigger than life, men about whom and by whom great books are written." Though Max is not with us in the sense of not jolting us out of lethargy

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* This eulogy was delivered by Dr. Peter A. Redpath (Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of The Great Ideas) on the occasion of the funeral of Ronald "Max" Weismann (1936–2017) on 06 May 2017 at St. John Chrysostom Church, Chicago, USA.

APPENDIX — Received: Oct. 30, 2018 ▪ Accepted: Nov. 17, 2018

by his living presence, he is gone in no other sense. To paraphrase Mortimer, to dismiss him as not being in touch with us in any other way "is to repeat the folly of the Ancient Athenians who supposed that Socrates died when he drank the hemlock."

During the 20th century, Max Weismann was world famous as an inventor, consultant in the fields of architecture, construction management, and exhibit design and fabrication. His architectural and design talents enabled famous people like Walt Disney, Buckminster Fuller, Frank Lloyd Wright, Jacques Cousteau, and many others to have the good fortune to rub elbows with him; and for Max to work on celebrated projects like the Century 21 Exposition, and the 1964 New York World's Fair and Expo '67 (which I still remember). People in parts of Chicago have long known Max as somewhat of a home-town celebrity, for, among other things, overseeing design and construction of the Chicago botanical garden (which still flourishes), the Restoration of the Rochester City Hall in New York State, and for different newspaper articles written about him and his different doings.

For many years, going back at least as far as the 1990s (when Professor Curtis Hancock and I were hosting national conferences for the American Maritain Association), Max would help us organize sessions co-sponsored by the Center (suggest possible topics and, at no financial charge, provide us with Center materials), something that, on an international level, the Center continues to do to this day.

Shortly before Mortimer Adler died, Mortimer and Max helped Pat Carmack, Steve Bertucci, and several other colleagues from the Western Civilization Foundation establish the Great Books Academy and Angelicum Academy homeschool programs. These programs (which conduct live, online Socratic-style discussions from the 5th grade on) currently have more than 2000 students full- and part-time from approximately 40 different countries enrolled from pre-K through college, providing upper-level elementary and high school students

with a curriculum based upon the Great Books of the Western World at a cost tens-to-hundreds of thousands of dollars less than what would be spent at different American college and university campuses.

Since its inception, Max had been Chairman of the Board of the Great Books Academy and a member of the Board of the Angelicum Academy. A few years ago, Max helped these programs partner with Ignatius Press (whose founder is Fr. Joseph Fessio) to form the Ignatius-Angelicum Liberal Studies program. This program enables our students to graduate high school with an associate degree. Upon graduation, students are then able to enroll in Holy Apostles College and Seminary, where they may complete their Bachelor's degree totally online within less than two years.

Shortly after founding these home school programs, the Western Civilization Foundation established the Adler-Aquinas Institute, chiefly an international, renaissance academy, and "online-monastery of sorts," designed, in this age of educational, cultural, and civilizational decadence, just as in the early parts of the Middle Ages, to unite professionals throughout the world to help preserve the best of classical Western learning and Western culture and spread and pass these on to future generations. Without hesitation, when we asked him to join our group of Institute "Fellows" and promote our work, Max agreed.

While Max was internationally recognized apart from his affiliation with Mortimer Adler and the Center's work (and was greatly appreciated by members of the philosophically-inspired groups I have mentioned), during the 20th and 21st centuries, Max and the Center did not receive due recognition from many other "professional philosophers" for the great contribution they made to Western philosophy and preservation of the West's cultural heritage. Understandable. If the realist and personalistic notion of philosophy that Max and Mortimer had promoted through the Center was right, reasonable to conclude would be that what most contemporary philosophers do is not philosophy.

As I get older and more of my friends pass over to what Christians call the "Communion of Saints," increasingly I get the sense of the reality of this organization. One reason I say this is because most of what I consider to be my best, most original, ideas tend to come to me while I am asleep. While this has been happening to me for decades, it has been increasingly occurring over the past few years. While I appreciate the fact that my great conversation with colleagues like Max and others continues unbroken as they immerse themselves in greater conversations to which, hopefully, some day, I might be invited to join, since I tend to have a weak memory, at times, I find this interruption of my sleep most annoying: I have to jump out of bed, find a pen and paper, jot down the thought before I lose it; and increasingly take afternoon naps to make up for nightly sleep deprivation.

In Max's case, while awake, I had no problem thinking of 5 points to include in this eulogy, 5 prescriptive statements I knew he would throw my way: (1) "Don't say anything stupid." (2) "This is a Center-sponsored event. So, if you can, say something original related to one of the Great Books authors that will capture the audience's attention, require them to stay awake, and think." (3) "Don't embarrass me or the Center. Make me proud of you!" (4) "If this eulogy ever gets printed and publicized, make sure that the Center's complete title is spelled correctly. Make sure that the second 'The' is capitalized. The Center's name is the 'Center for the Study of *The* (with a capital 'T') Great Ideas.'" (5) "Do not eulogize me without, also, eulogizing the Center."

While the meaning of the first 4 points was clear to me, precisely what the 5th meant did not become exact until, while asleep one night, I connected what Max was telling me to what Socrates had told Criton and some other friends who, at the start of Plato's dialogue the *Crito*, had come to encourage Socrates to let them bribe his guards and break him out of prison. Among other reasons, Socrates said he could not

allow them to do so because he owed his whole life to the laws of Athens. Disobeying these laws was something he was not entitled to do. In short, Socrates so much identified himself with Athens that he considered breaking her laws tantamount to suicide: an act so heinous he could not conceive committing it.

Just as Socrates could no more separate his identity from that of his beloved city of Athens, despite his many professional achievements in architectural design and as an inventor, separating the nature of Max Weismann from the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas is not possible. Max was, is, "The Center." In a sense, to Max, whatever greatness he might have, or ever had, is, by providence, essentially and existentially connected to this Center and its past, present, and future success. This personal identification of Max with the Center speaks volumes about the humility and boundless energy and charity of this man. Hence, his prescription to me: "Eulogize the Center, too."

What, however, precisely could this possibly mean? Certainly, it could not mean fondly to remember a now-departed Center. No, it must mean to speak well, say good things about, the past and existing Center, and the Center's future. But, how to do this? That became my problem—until again, while sleeping, I started to think about the idea of being "great" and how this idea relates to Max, Mortimer, and the Center.

Today, the idea of being and becoming great is part of a national and international conversation recently generated chiefly in the area of politics. But, decades ago, in relation to education and politics, Adler had started to recognize the crucial import of the nature of the idea "great," having "great" ideas, and doing "great" deeds. We strikingly see this recognition in his bristling critiques of American educational "snowflakes" in his 1940 lecture, "God and the Professors" and his *Harper's Magazine* article of the same year, entitled "This Prewar Generation." Therein, Adler savaged American college and university pro-

fessors and students for not recognizing the essential superiority of the classical Western conception of the human person and of Western political and educational institutions to those of Fascism and Nazism. Most odd, then, is that Adler appears not to have included this idea of "great" within the more than 100 ideas extant within the Great Books of the Western World program.

Not so odd, however, when we consider that this idea *actually is* contained within Aristotle's understanding of the great idea of "quantity." While most students of Aristotle are familiar with his division of the category of quantity that geometricians and arithmeticians study (dimensive, or bulk, quantity) into the species of continuous (geometrical figures) and discrete (numbers), few are aware that Aristotle makes a more primitive, generic distinction between bulk quantity and intensive, or virtual, quantity (translated by later Latin thinkers as *quantitatis intensiva*, or *quantitatis virtutis*); by which Aristotle meant *qualitative* greatness or intensity (such as we notice in the heat of one thing being qualitatively greater than that of another, not in physical bulk, but in intensity). Analogously, Aristotle attributed this qualitative property (which contemporary physicists study, among other ways, in relation to physical properties like bodily "mass") to a personal quality that Latin thinkers later rendered as "virtue" (*virtus*), or more precisely, to "greatness of soul" (what many people in the English-speaking world, especially in business today, call "gravitas" or "heft").

I mention this peculiar property of greatness of soul (*megalopsychia*, *magnanimity*) because this is precisely the quality that I think best characterizes Max's nature and accounts for some other great properties he possessed, and still possesses, including his unusual organizational abilities and common sense: qualities for which most academics and "Great Bookies" do not often tend to be known or celebrated. How do we explain Max's speculative and practical organizational genius, his academic abilities coupled with possession of practical talents, what

many people call "common sense," and many Americans refer to as "street smarts?" I suggest the answer to this question lies precisely in understanding qualitative greatness of soul, "gravitas," "heft," being an essential quality of any organizational genius and the property of virtual quantity likewise being an essential quality of any great organization.

For most of my life I have been fascinated by the nature of organizations and the nature of organizational geniuses. In part, I suspect this has been due to my being raised in a largely Italian neighborhood in Brooklyn where some of my friends' families (and some of their Chicago relatives) were internationally famous for being great organizers. More than this, however, something is essentially fascinating about the existence of organizations and of organizational geniuses.

My decades of study of Western intellectual history have convinced me that the whole of ancient Greek philosophy was essentially an investigation of principles and causes of organizational activity, consisted in an organizational psychology that chiefly sought to understand the nature of qualitatively different organizations, the parts that essentially generate their specific operations (including the organization of parts of the human soul and its activities). What Aristotle famously called a "substance" today most of us in the West would call an "operational organization:" an organization equipped with all the parts needed to execute some chief activity.

This has convinced me, and some colleagues of mine as well, that, decades ago, when Mortimer Adler abandoned the study of modern psychology (which tends to think of psychology as a study of something called the "mind"), he did not give up the study of psychology altogether. He abandoned contemporary psychology in favor of the study of Aristotelian psychology, especially the psychology contained within Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. While many of us today incline to think of psychology as the study of the mind, in Greek, *psyche* refers the *soul*. Ancient Greeks considered psychology essentially to involve

study of the soul. Viscerally, like the ancient Greeks, Adler and Max were always convinced that philosophy is a psychological activity (an act of the human soul) differentiated by qualitatively-diverse habits of organizational interest. Knowingly or not, *both became Aristotelian psychologists*. To a large extent, this explains the unusual quality of psychological "heft" both men possessed.

Over many decades, I have especially noticed how reading the works of classical authors like Plato, Aristotle, and St. Thomas Aquinas often qualitatively transforms people (sometimes almost overnight) from being perhaps somewhat serious students, academics, politicians, or business professionals into intensely-driven leaders. Consider, for example, the great 20th-century Thomistic scholar Étienne Gilson (whose known publications amount to 935 works: including 172 individually-authored books [monographs], 8 edited books, 4 series editions, 2 anthologies, 307 scholarly articles, 36 prefaces, 296 general interest articles, and 104 book reviews) and what Gilson had to say in his intellectual biography, *The Philosopher and Theology*, about the day a person discovers that he or she has become a Thomist:

> A man becomes aware of being a Thomist on the day he realizes that from then on he will no longer be able to live without the company of St. Thomas Aquinas. He feels in the *Summa Theologiae* as a fish in the sea; away from it he feels out of his element, and cannot wait to go back to it. More deeply, this is what gives the Thomist the joyous feeling that he is free. Essentially a Thomist is a free mind. His freedom does not consist in having neither master nor God but in having no master other than God. And indeed God is for man the only bulwark against the tyrannies of other men. God alone delivers from fears and timidities a mind that otherwise would die of starvation in the midst of plenty. Left to itself, it will be unable to choose and will die either from starvation or indigestion. The happiness of a Thomist is the joy he experiences in feeling free to welcome all the truth from whichever side it may come. The perfect expression of such liberty of

> the Christian man is that of Saint Augustine: *Dilige et quod vis fac*: *Love and do what you will*. Like charity, faith is a liberator. Incidentally, this is why the Christian should willingly accept being considered as a rather unusual specimen by non-Christian thinkers.[1]

This experience need not come from reading St. Thomas Aquinas. It could come just as easily from reading a host of classically-educated thinkers (like Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, St. Augustine, the great Jewish theologian Moses Maimonides, or the great Islamic scholar Avicenna) from whom St. Thomas learned much. Whatever the case about its literary origin, I submit that this sort of life-transforming experience, which Gilson and other Thomists tend to have, is essentially due, among other factors, to a "psychological greatness," "heft," they sense about the organizational genius of St. Thomas Aquinas. Additionally, I submit that this is the sort of experience Max Weismann had when he first came into contact with the organizational genius of Mortimer J. Adler. Once he had experienced Adler's psychological greatness, I suspect Max felt much the same way when reading Adler that Thomists like Gilson experience reading St. Thomas.

How else to explain the radical transformation of this exceptionally-talented man into a devoted, selfless, promoter of the work of another? As part of this tribute to Max and his beloved Center, I want to probe a bit deeper into precisely why I think this quality helps explain what causes ordinary people *to gravitate into* leaders and ordinary leaders into speculative educational masters and practical and productive organizational geniuses like Max Weismann.

To do this, at this point, I need to turn to a twentieth-century classic work in Christian wisdom: C. S. Lewis's little book entitled *The Abolition of Man*. As Lewis explains in the first chapter of this book,

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[1] Étienne Gilson, *The Philosopher and Theology* (New York: Random House, 1962), 204.

"Men without Chests," without the existence of a reasoning principle existing within an embodied soul (a rational center of magnanimity existing within the body) essentially connected to the human body as a command and control mechanism able rationally to regulate and constrain the human passions so as to enable an abstract intellect to execute rational commands within the human emotions (*without a chest to connect cerebral man to visceral man*), "man is not man," and, strictly speaking, "Christian" man can never be "Christian" man.

As Lewis says, "The Chest-Magnanimity-Sentiment" (what St. Thomas Aquinas considered to be an "animal rationalty," a specific difference unique to a human animal, allowing an immortal, rational soul to overflow into a sentient part of the same soul, where St. Thomas locates "common sense," deliberative "choice," and the moral virtue of "prudence")—"these are the indispensable liaison officers between cerebral man and visceral man."[2]

Lewis and St. Thomas maintain that, without embodiment, what is thought to be, and is called, a "human soul" is actually a disembodied spirit, or disembodied intellect. Such a disembodied entity does not correspond to the Christian understanding of a *human soul*. And a soulless body (a body in which spirit is not an animating principle of life, growth, and development of a living, sentient, organic matter) does not correspond to a Christian understanding of a *human body*.

Lewis adds, "It may even be said that it is by this middle element (the rationally-sentient soul) that man is man: for by his intellect he is mere spirit and by his appetite mere animal."[3]

While St. Thomas considers human reason to be a faculty of an immortal human soul, *remarkably*, like Lewis (who writes centuries

[2] C. S. Lewis, *The Abolition of Man: Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of School* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 34.

[3] *Ibid.*

after Aquinas), St. Thomas maintains the specific difference of a human being resides in the genus "animal," not in the genus "spirit." Strictly speaking, according to St. Thomas, *human beings are not incarnate spirits*. Human beings do not belong to the genus "spirit." We are not differentiated in our genus by being on the lowest level of intellectual spirit, being the dumbest of angels. Essentially, we belong to the highest rank within the genus animal (the qualitative maximum [leaders, rulers] in and of the animal genus), which is specifically divided into rational and irrational. *St. Thomas locates our human, specific difference in an otherness, an animal rationality, existing within the sensitive, or animal, part of the intellectual soul*:

> Sed tamen considerandum est quod ea quae sunt per accidens, non diversificant speciem. Quia enim coloratum accidit animali, non diversificantur species animalis per differentiam coloris, sed per differentiam eius quod per se accidit animali, per differentiam scilicet animae sensitivae, quae quandoque invenitur cum ratione, quandoque sine ratione. Unde rationale et irrationale sunt differentiae divisivae animalis, diversas eius species constituentes. Sic igitur non quaecumque diversitas obiectorum diversificat potentias animae; sed differentia eius ad quod per se potentia respicit.[4]

In the case of the human soul, St. Thomas understands the soul's relation to an animal body to consist in essentially connecting, through human sense faculties (like memory and imagination) of an animal body, an immortal intellectual soul and the activities of the whole human person to sense reality. He maintains that doing so enables the animal genus to become perfectly itself. The "sensitive soul" (the generic part of the human nature) causes *animal* rationality (a reason in touch with sense reality), not a disembodied, or abstract, rationality.

[4] *S.Th.*, I, q. 77, a. 3, resp.

What had been reason acting abstractly, syllogistically, overflows into the appetitive part of the soul, and, through its activity, into the whole of material creation. In so doing, human reason exists in a concrete, uniquely-animal, command-and-control way (as a kind of appetitive, sensory, reasoning establishing personal relations throughout the material world). It is within reason existing as such a command-and-control principle of the sense faculties and emotions in the animal part of the human soul that St. Thomas most precisely locates deliberative choice, common sense, the moral virtue of prudence, and our specific, human difference!

The resulting composite, as Gilson has said (*Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge*), is an animal that senses with its intellect and intellectualizes with its senses: an animal able personally to execute animal activity in its highest form: simultaneously abstractly (calmly), and commonsensically, deliberatively, passionately, with prudence, in touch with sense reality! By generating the faculty of sensory reasoning, sentient, command-and-control reason (a faculty St. Thomas calls "particular reason," which he claims corresponds to "instinct" in brute animals,[5] St. Thomas Aquinas maintains that the intellectual soul generates a personally-human rationality (one that reasons abstractly and syllogistically when not focusing attention on concrete, individual, animal activity) *to overflow through the sensitive part of the soul into the human body and sense reality as a personally-animal, command-and-control, ruling principle of the sensitive faculties, passions, and all their activities*.[6]

In so doing, the rational part of the soul enables the sensitive part to achieve its animal perfection as an acting, sensitive soul, an acting person (as St. John Paul II was fond of saying), something that no other

[5] *S.Th.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, resp.
[6] *S.Th.*, I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 5.

animal soul can achieve: being a deliberative (free) animal! More: Through the sensory part of the soul, the rational part of the soul inclines the whole of the created, material order naturally *to gravitate toward* (*not resist*) *being ruled by metaphysically-and-morally-virtuous human directive*. *It causes the morally-and-metaphysically-virtuous person to become the first principle of healthy social life and personal rule within and throughout the material universe*!

As Lewis prudently observes, "Without the aid of trained emotions, the intellect is powerless against the animal organism."[7] To this sage observation, in words with which, *if I know Max*, he would unhesitatingly agree, Lewis adds:

> In battle it is not syllogisms that will keep the reluctant nerves and muscles to their post in the third hour of bombardment. The crudest sentimentalism . . . about a flag, or a country, or a regiment will be of more use. We were told it all long ago by Plato. As the king governs by his executive, so Reason in man must rule the mere appetites by means of the spirited element. The head rules the belly through the chest—as Alanus tells us, of Magnanimity, of emotions organized by trained habit into stable sentiments.[8]

Absent such training, Lewis maintains, "We make men without chests (what, today, we commonly call 'snowflakes') and expect of them virtue and enterprise. We laugh at honour and are shocked to find traitors in our midst. We castrate and bid the geldings to be fruitful."[9] As Aristotle realized centuries ago, to the extent that we take no pleasure in what we do, we can never develop into, or habitually remain, morally-virtuous agents, or into and long remain liberal artists, philosophers, scientists, completely-rational human beings: *men with chests*.

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[7] Lewis, *The Abolition of Man*, 33–34.

[8] *Ibid.*, 34.

[9] *Ibid.*, 35.

In other words, without an embodied reason (*a reason in touch with sense reality* akin to what St. Thomas calls "particular reason" existing within the sentient part of the human soul) capable of rationally and rightly commanding and constraining (ordering) the human sense faculties and passions, a human being is not human. *Strictly speaking, the embodied, passion-related, soul inclined to be directed by right reason makes us specifically human, perfect as persons*; *and inclines the entire material universe naturally to gravitate to being ruled by healthy personal relations that virtuously-qualified, human reason establishes*! *Strictly speaking, human reason as our specific human difference is rightly-ordered, virtue-directed, reason acting in touch with sense reality as the chief principle of rightly-ordered personal relations, behavior, and rule throughout the whole of material creation*!

During the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas recognized that only a faculty psychology, and especially recognition of the faculty of a sentient, particular, reason in touch with sense reality, can enable development of the kind of self-understanding human beings (acting persons) capable of generating healthy educational institutions able to produce men like Max Weismann: "Men with chests." And, as Lewis and Max have tried to warn us, the practical result of an education that denies such a reason and such a reality must be, as Lewis says, "the destruction of the society which accepts it." Among other reasons, Max and Mortimer founded the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas to counteract the negative cultural and civilizational disorder that necessarily follows from habitual application of psychologically-unhealthy, mis-educational principles (human viciousness) to widespread living of everyday life. No wonder should exist, then, why those of us assembled here today in this beautiful Church should embrace as part of our tribute to Max to do what we reasonably can to insure that the Center Max so loved as part of his very being will survive and flourish well into the future.

Thank you, Max, my friend. See you soon. Hope I did not let you down.

MEMORIAL EULOGY:
MAX WEISMANN—ONE OF GOD'S GREAT IDEAS

SUMMARY

This paper is the eulogy which was delivered by Dr. Peter A. Redpath (Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of The Great Ideas) on the occasion of the funeral of Ronald "Max" Weismann (1936–2017) on 06 May 2017 at St. John Chrysostom Church, Chicago, USA.

KEYWORDS

Ronald Max Weismann, Center for the Study of The Great Ideas, Western civilization, Thomism, Christian philosophy, Christian education, organizational psychology, human soul, human person, rational animal.

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