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James K. Farge

Why and How Gilson's Institute of Mediaeval Studies Was Different from Other Medieval Programs

The existence of the Pontifical Institute began with the aspirations of two men: Father Henry Carr CSB[1] and Étienne Gilson.[2] As the local Superior of the Basilian Fathers at St. Michael's College from 1915 to 1925, Father Carr was, practically speaking, both its President and Principal. One of his primary goals was to enhance the level of the philosophy staff at the college by importing a series of professors from the University of Louvain to teach at St. Michael's—each for one year. More significantly, he hired Father Gerald B. Phelan, a Canadian doctoral graduate of Louvain, for a full-time position at St. Michael's. Phelan was to become a major figure in the history of St. Michael's and the Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

In the back of his mind, Father Carr was also searching for a way that St. Michael's could respond to Pope Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical

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This is a revised version of a lecture delivered in a 2019 colloquium at St. Michael's College on the history of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto. For a more detailed account of the first 40 years of the Institute, see Laurence K. Shook, "The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (1929)," in Shook's *Catholic Post-Secondary Education in English-Speaking Canada. A History* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), 210–228.

[1] Edmund J. McCorkell, *Henry Carr – Revolutionary* (Toronto: Griffin House, 1969).

[2] Laurence K. Shook, *Étienne Gilson* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1984).

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Aeterni patris that urged Catholic universities to restore pride of place in Catholic philosophy and theology to Thomas Aquinas. That was why Father Carr had his eye on Étienne Gilson who, by 1926, was already working on a third revised edition of his book about Thomistic philosophy.[3] After service in the First World War in the trenches at Verdun and two years in a German prisoner of war camp, Gilson had resumed his teaching post at the Catholic Université de Lille before being appointed to the Université de Strasbourg where, in conversations with two eminent historians—Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloc, who had formulated the innovative *Annales* approach to history—Gilson began to formulate his own innovative approach to studying and teaching the Middle Ages. In 1921 he was appointed to the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, the graduate division of the Université de Paris/Sorbonne.

Father Carr had taken no steps to contact Gilson when he was lecturing at Harvard and several other universities in 1926. But when he learned that Gilson had returned to Harvard in 1927, he sent two of St. Michael's priests to Boston to invite him to Toronto. In the ensuing conversations, Carr saw that Gilson had wider goals than simply the study of Thomas Aquinas,[4] but he understood that what Gilson had in mind would benefit Catholic studies at St. Michael's. In brief, Gilson was convinced that no university, neither in Europe nor in North America, was training medievalists properly. They were instead producing specialists who knew a lot about a particular medieval author, actor, or incident, but their treatment of the wider milieu and culture of the Mid-

[3] *Le Thomisme* (Strasbourg 1919; Paris 1922, 1927, 1944, 1947, 1965). A pre-publication English translation of the 1927 edition had appeared in 1925. Laurence K. Shook translated the 5th edition as *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York: Random House,1956), and Armand A. Maurer translated the 6th and final edition as *Thomism: The Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas* (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2002).

[4] At that time Gilson was not so much a disciple of Aquinas as an avid researcher into the meaning of his philosophy.

dle Ages in which those persons lived lacked substance. He was convinced that, to study properly Abelard, Dante, Hildegard of Bingen, Gratian, Thomas Aquinas or any other medieval person one must also be familiar with the social and political events in the world in which their particular author or actor lived: the philosophy and theology in vogue where they were educated, the literature being written by others around them, the canon law and civil law that governed or restricted their lives, the liturgy they experienced in their worship of God, and the art and architecture of the places where they lived and travelled.

It became evident to Carr and the St. Michael's staff that Gilson's Catholic faith was a prominent element in his thought. For his part, Gilson was astonished to find that Father Carr and his staff listened with great interest to his proposal for a multidisciplinary approach to Medieval Studies. After returning to Toronto in 1927, Gilson wrote an article for the *University of Toronto Monthly* that is sufficiently important to quote here at some length:

> As I left St. Michael's College in February 1927, my farewell words were the question, "Why not establish an Institute of Mediaeval Studies at the University of Toronto?" What a pleasure it was to ascertain, on my return in November of the same year, that the question "Why not?" had given place to the question, "How can it be done?"!
>
> The central and dominant idea of the whole scheme is simply this: the *history of mediaeval thought is the key to the history of mediaeval civilization*,[5] but there exists no scientific establishment in the whole world expressly devoted to the study of mediaeval thought and doctrine; therefore, one must be created. In their *Summae*, those vast edifices of learning, the thinkers of the Middle Ages deposited and set in order their religious beliefs, their philosophical ideas, their moral convictions, their scientific knowledge, and their political programs. Were it possible to gain a full understanding of these great works we should . . . reach the very heart of mediaeval civilization. Why, then, is the study of

[5] My emphasis.

> these doctrines not further advanced than it is in this age of ours? . . . It is simply because the research has not yet been organized to meet the exigencies of modern historical methods. To create this organization it is necessary . . . to set up an institute where the pioneer work . . . may be brought to a definite issue. The Institute of Mediaeval Studies in the University of Toronto [would aim] at providing that means of study; it is there that this pioneer work is to be undertaken.
>
> Here, two or three men of goodwill are all that is required, provided they grasp the importance of the undertaking and make up their minds to see it through. . . . In St. Michael's College . . . I have met a group of philosophers whose high value is now well known to me: men brought up in [many of] the very traditions which they propose to study; eminently qualified therefore to find the true meaning of those traditions and to define their interpretations; men ready to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the success of the work . . . In writing these lines I am not influenced by any other considerations than the interests of those higher studies to which I have devoted my life. I make no plea either for my own university nor for my own country nor even for my own continent. I trust therefore that I shall be believed when I declare on my honour that I have never encountered either in Europe or America such a combination of favourable conditions to inspire me with confidence in the success of the undertaking [as I have at St. Michael's]. These are the reasons why, after having nurtured this idea during many long years, and having kept it to myself in more than one illustrious university of both the old world and the new, as soon as I grasped the spirit of St. Michael's I declared, "There is the spot! The Institute will be there or it will be nowhere."[6]

In that article Gilson went into some detail about the institute he envisioned as:

> a model laboratory of the history of mediaeval civilization . . . [that] would consist of a library, surrounded by offices and classrooms where introductory courses and seminars to guide specialist research would take place. Courses would include fundamen-

[6] Étienne Gilson, "St Michael's Establishes Institute of Mediaeval Studies," *The University of Toronto Monthly* XXVIII, no. 3 (December 1927): 119–120.

> tals of Latin palaeography, medieval Latin, the study of historical sources, history, philosophical and theological doctrines, history of positive sciences, of political and social doctrines in the Middle Ages; study of the influence exerted by mediaeval systems of art, literature, and politics. Alongside these courses should develop a study of Jewish and Arabic thought and their relation to Western civilization.[7]

The article ends with this phrase: "Through the work of the Institute of Mediaeval Studies we shall be able to reach back to the sources of our spiritual traditions, to drink more deeply of their water, and to draw from them full life-giving strength."[8]

Before leaving Toronto, Gilson wrote to his wife Thérèse: "The project interests me very much because it is the first time that my concept of the Middle Ages has taken form on a foundation that will make possible its surviving me."[9]

The University of Toronto itself became directly involved in the project. In January 1928, its President, Sir Robert Falconer, wrote about it to Jacques Cavalier, director of higher education at the Ministry of Education in France. As a result, Gilson received permission to be absent from the Sorbonne every fall term in order to develop his work in Toronto—at least until he could be assured of its permanent establishment.[10]

Gilson resigned his post as visiting professor at Harvard but had no intention of leaving the Sorbonne. It was clearly understood on both sides of the Atlantic that, while the crux of Gilson's work would be in Toronto, he would return every year to the Sorbonne for the spring semester. This had a double advantage: having one of its professors at the Sorbonne enhanced the status of St. Michael's in Toronto while, at the

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[7] *Ibid*., 120.

[8] *Ibid*., 121.

[9] Quoted in Shook, *Étienne Gilson*, 180.

[10] *Ibid*.

same time, it assured the reputation of the new Toronto Institute in Europe.

The official opening of the Institute of Mediaeval Studies took place on September 30, 1929. Gilson took the title of Director of Studies, a role that allowed him to focus on academic issues and leave administrative work to the President (Henry Carr). With Gerald Phelan as Librarian Gilson could devote time to creating a collection not only of printed sources but also of microfilming hundreds of manuscripts from European libraries that were essential to the wide-ranging curriculum of the Institute. The conviviality at St. Michael's College filled Gilson with enthusiasm. He wrote in a letter, "My work here is in a spirit of mutual affection that gives me great encouragement and pleasure."[11]

History, however, quickly put Gilson's optimism to the test: just thirty days after the opening of the Institute, the disastrous stock market crash in November 1929 took place—with worldwide repercussions of the Great Depression. Although funds had been raised specifically to buy books, the resources to attract competent professors fell short. With the permission of the Basilian General Council, Gilson chose five promising young priests to study in Europe to strengthen the future cadre of the initial faculty.[12]

For its first seven years the Institute was housed in a large Victorian mansion on the campus of St. Michael's. By 1936, however, when

[11] Letter to Mme Thibaudeau (Montreal), 15 décembre 1929 (Shook, *Étienne Gilson*, 193). For a personal, informative reflection of a student at St. Michael's and the Institute in the late 1930s and early 1940s, see Armand Maurer, "Remembrance of Things Past," *Laudemus viros gloriosos: Essays in Honor of Armand Maurer, CSB*, ed. R. E. Houser (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 362–382.

[12] Vincent Kennedy was sent to Rome to study liturgy and ecclesiastical archaeology; Alex Denomy to Harvard for vernacular literature; Terence McLaughlin to Strasbourg for canon law; George Flahiff to the École des Chartes in Paris for diplomatics; and J. Reginald O'Donnell to Krakow for palaeography. When the Second World War was finished he sent five other Basilian priests to study in Cambridge and Paris, with three of them returning to complete their doctorates at universities in North America: Joseph Wey, Ambrose Raftis, Armand Maurer, Walter Principe, and Michael Sheehan.

the Institute was coming into full development, the north wing of a newly constructed student residence had been fitted out to Gilson's specifications. He wrote to one of his friends in Montreal that his dream had come true. Indeed, throughout the 1930s, the number of student registrations increased steadily despite (or perhaps because of) Gilson's stringent curriculum specifications. In addition to becoming proficient in medieval Latin and palaeography, candidates for the Licence in Mediaeval Studies were required to take introductory courses (and to pass exams) in philosophy, theology, history, archaeology, law, liturgy, vernacular literature, and the history of art. A great advantage for the students was that, while qualifying for the Institute's Licence, they could also apply their Institute course credits towards the M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Toronto.

Gilson was also taking steps to have the Institute achieve pontifical status. He saw that this would not only raise the Institute in the eyes of Catholic academics but would also be an advantage for graduates finding positions in Catholic universities. With the support of every bishop in Canada and an influential cardinal in Rome, the unique pontifical status for an Institute of Mediaeval Studies was approved by Pope Pius XI and implemented by Pope Pius XII on October 18, 1939.

History again intervened. Just six weeks prior to its gaining pontifical status, Western European nations had responded to Adolf Hitler's invasion of Poland with a declaration of war against Germany. As a British dominion, Canada entered the alliance immediately, and the United States followed two years later in December 1941. The wartime draft in both Canada and the USA had dire consequences for enrollment at St. Michael's, which was at that time an all-male college; but the Institute's enrollment remained more steady because draft-exempt members of religious orders who would previously have been sent to study in European universities came instead to the Institute, a significant num-

ber of whom went on to teach and to hold administrative positions in North American universities.

During the war, Gilson remained in occupied Paris teaching at the Collège de France and continuing his rigorous pace of research and publication.[13] Mail between occupied France and Canada had been impossible during the war; but, after the liberation of Paris in August 1944, Gilson wrote to Gerald Phelan, president of the Institute, of his desire to remain faithful to Toronto "as long as God [may] give me enough strength to do an honest job."[14] He continued to lecture and direct seminars all through the 1950s and into the 1960s. They are remembered as lively, brilliant, but demanding sessions that always started and ended exactly on the minute. In the late 1960s, however, Gilson's advancing age limited his visits to Toronto to a few weeks each year, during which he gave public lectures. The last of these, three lectures "In Quest of Species," was delivered in January 1972.[15] Retired to his beloved province of Burgundy, he died in September 1978 at the age of ninety-four.

PIMS continued to flourish in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s. It attracted outstanding lay professors like Anton Pegis, Gerhard Ladner, Peter Brieger, Michael Gough, Richard Schoeck, Jocelyn Hillgarth, James Reilly, Brian Stock, Sheila Campbell, Stephen Dumont, Roger Reynolds, Virginia Brown, Deborah Black, John Magee, and Mark Meyerson. Five diocesan priests—Gerald Phelan, Joseph Ryan, E-

[13] His published books and articles number 935 (Margaret McGrath, *Étienne Gilson: A Bibliography / Une bibliographie* [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1982]).

[14] Shook, *Étienne Gilson*, 251.

[15] In the summer of that year he composed three lectures "In Quest of Matter" to complement the lectures on Species, but he was unable to travel to deliver them in Toronto. All six lectures were eventually published together with an English translation of a talk given to students in Montréal in 1963, "The Education of a Philosopher," as *Three Quests in Philosophy*, ed. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 2008).

douard Jeauneau, Edward Synan, and Christopher Ryan—taught at PIMS for a total between them of nearly a hundred years. The Institute continued to rely heavily, however, on members of religious orders: Frances Nims, a Loretto Sister; Ignatius Eschmann, James Weisheipl, Osmund Lewry, Leonard Boyle, and Lawrence Dewan, Dominicans; Joseph Owens, Redemptorist; Nikolaus Häring Palatine Father from Trier; Edmund Colledge, Augustinian, from Liverpool. But the largest contingent continued to be drawn from the Basilian Fathers: Joseph Muckle, George Flahiff, Joseph Wey, Reginald O'Donnell, Terence McLaughlin, Vincent Kennedy, Alexander Denomy, Laurence Shook, Armand Maurer, Ambrose Raftis, Walter Principe, Michael Sheehan, Robert Crooker, Robert Sinkewicz, John Quinn, and Martin Dimnik. Other Basilians and lay staff played important but less public roles as registrars, librarians, and editors in the Department of Publications.

For twenty-five years, Gilson's Pontifical Institute had been the only institution in the world devoted exclusively to the study of the Middle Ages.[16] Starting in the 1950s, other universities began to create "centres" dealing with the Middle Ages; but none of them followed the Gilsonian multidisciplinary curriculum required at PIMS. In 1964 the University of Toronto founded its own Centre for Mediaeval Studies, relying for much of its instruction on Institute Fellows. Toronto's Centre held to the Institute's insistence on exceptional skill in Latin; but it has encouraged students to work primarily in a specific department rather than undertake the Gilsonian curriculum. For thirty years a close cooperation between PIMS and the Centre enhanced the reputation of Toronto and attracted the largest number of students in Mediaeval Studies in the world.

[16] The nearest exception is the École Nationale des Chartes in Paris. Although it preceded PIMS by several decades, its purview extends into modern history.

In the 1980s, however, when the contingent of teaching Fellows reached twenty, financial difficulties at PIMS began to affect its possibility to continue as it had. The major cause of this was the decline in the recruitment of members of religious orders who had always worked for minimal salaries. The consequent need to find competitive salaries for the increasing number of lay faculty was too great a burden on the Institute's shrinking endowment. In an arrangement with the provost of the University of Toronto in 1994–1995, five lay Fellows of the Institute were absorbed into the University's departments. At that same time, the Director of the Centre for Medieval Studies took steps to withdraw U of T credit for the courses offered by the Institute. With that move Gilson's hope that his unique approach to training medievalists would survive him was relegated to history.

In 1996, the new administration of Father James McConica developed an important relationship with the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation of New York. It provided the initial funds for Fellowships that allow young postdoctoral scholars to participate in a program of research and seminars to enhance their academic profile. Father McConica's successor, Richard Alway, has significantly strengthened the Institute's endowment and has incorporated academics with pensions or salaries from other institutions to participate in PIMS programs as Associate Fellows or as full voting Fellows.

In 2005, because the Basilian Fathers had relinquished ownership and control of St. Michael's to a lay board of governors, a perceived canonical conflict ruled that the Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia christiana* under which the Pontifical Institute operated made it necessary to separate canonically from the University of St. Michael's College, which operated under the Constitution *Ex corde ecclesiae*. The President of St. Michael's and the Praeses of PIMS signed an agreement to continue to work as closely as possible, but the change severed the Institute's official ties with the University of Toronto that had existed

since 1929. (That infelicitous separation was remedied in 2019 when all three institutions—the University of Toronto, the University of St. Michael's College, and the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies—signed a new working Memorandum of Agreement.)

As another part of redefining its mission, the Institute has developed its summer Program in Manuscript Studies with instruction in palaeography, codicology, diplomatics, and text editing. The program, which alternates its venue between Toronto and Rome, is permanently endowed. The Institute also maintains the quality of its renowned library that continues to attract researchers from every province in Canada, from many American universities, and from Europe. The Department of Publications, known for its high standards of editing, publishes about ten books each year. Its scholarly journal, *Mediaeval Studies*, is now in its eighty-third year of publication.

In sum, Gilson's project of a multidisciplinary teaching curriculum survived him for only fifteen years; but creative innovations of the last two decades have allowed the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies to continue to play a major role in the medieval enterprise in Toronto and far beyond.

Why and How Gilson's Institute of Mediaeval Studies Was Different from Other Medieval Programs

SUMMARY

Etienne Gilson was convinced that a multi-disciplinary core curriculum was essential to educate scholars properly about the Middle Ages. Having failed to interest universities on both sides of the Atlantic in his vision, he was elated in1927 to find that the priests at St. Michael's College in the University of Toronto were eager to implement his approach. Although enrollment was hindered by both the Great Depression of the 1930s and the subsequent Second World War, Gilson's Institute of Mediaeval Studies ("Pontifical" since 1939) produced a significant number of medievalists who had immersed

themselves in the full Gilsonian curriculum: palaeography, sources of history, philosophy, theology, medieval science, law, art, and literature. For three decades PIMS was the only institution devoted exclusively to mediaeval studies. In the post-War era, however, a number of universities founded centres for medieval studies, but they reverted to the pre-Gilsonian concentration on specialization in one discipline. The sheer number of those programs, together with financial difficulties at PIMS, relegated Gilson's dream of a multidisciplinary curriculum at PIMS to history. The Pontifical Institute has successfully implemented a smaller program of Manuscript Studies, and its library continues to attract scholars from both North America and Europe.

KEYWORDS

Étienne Gilson, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, PIMS, philosophical education, mediaeval studies.

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Scripta Philosophica

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Daniel Fitzpatrick

St. Thomas and the Bard: On Beauty in the *Tempest* and the Limits of Aesthetic Experience

We tend to assume that certain matters admit of no difference of opinion, while others allow for a wide range of viable viewpoints. Understandings of the cosmos, for instance, seem generally to demand acceptance of one viewpoint to the rejection of all others. Those who hold with a flat earth theory cannot also accept that the earth is round. Aristotelian hylomorphism is incompatible with Cartesian dualism. On the other hand, in matters of taste we generally have no difficulty with differences of opinion. We expect that one person will like vanilla ice cream and that the other will like chocolate. And while we could perhaps trace the neuronal paths from the taste buds to the brain to determine on a chemical level why one person prefers vanilla to chocolate, we are also perfectly satisfied to accept the taster's testimony that "I just like vanilla better." "De gustibus non disputandum est," Horace reminds us. There is no disputing when it comes to taste. Experience tells us, of course, that we do engage in such disputes. When my brother tells me he does not care for pickled okra, I find myself gazing at him in astonishment, demanding that he try another piece, extolling the crunch and the spicy flavor of the okra. In the end, though, I can only

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concede the point. He does not like the taste, and no appeal to reason can moderate his dislike.

The same principle tends to hold in matters of aesthetic judgment. We concede as a matter of course that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." And we know that we often have very different tastes in beauty. One listener enjoys Mahler. Another finds his symphonies brutal and turns instead to Mozart. A father enjoys Picasso. The son prefers Braque. One vacationer prefers mountainside vistas. The other likes the roar of the ocean and the laughter of the gulls. As in the case of matters of physical taste, we argue about aesthetic judgments. Engaged in such arguments, we quickly notice something different about aesthetic judgments, though. Namely, in matters of beauty, there seem to be clear cases of superiority and inferiority which exercise a kind of necessity on the mind of the observer. When it comes to a difference of opinion over ice cream, we tend not to think that someone ought to like one over the other. We might argue that someone should prefer a salad to ice cream on the grounds of the health benefits the salad supplies, though we would probably have to admit that as far as taste itself is concerned, we cannot argue that someone should like the taste of salad more than ice cream. We might well argue, however, that Mozart is objectively preferable to, say, the Wiggles. That is, we tend to argue that a listener should prefer the experience of hearing Mozart to that of hearing the Wiggles, though many little children—and even, perhaps, some adults—would prefer the Wiggles. There are degrees of aesthetic excellence, and there are likewise means for the development of aesthetic taste so that the observer recognizes those degrees, and we often act as though those degrees demand to be recognized.

The question of aesthetic taste is set before us in particularly striking fashion in William Shakespeare's play *The Tempest*. Toward the start of the play, Miranda, who has been stranded with her father, Prospero, for fifteen years on his enchanted island, meets Ferdinand, who

has just been shipwrecked in a storm conjured up by Prospero's arcane arts. Amazed, she tells her father that this man, Ferdinand, is the most beautiful creature she has ever beheld. He responds that this is only a matter of relativity and ignorance. Miranda, after all, has only ever seen Prospero and Caliban, the kind of half-man, half-monster enslaved to Prospero. Ferdinand only appears beautiful in comparison with Caliban, but Ferdinand is a Caliban, Prospero insists, when compared to the rest of mankind, and the rest of men are angels when compared with Ferdinand. The scenario raises an array of questions as formidable as is it amusing. As readers, we do not know what Ferdinand looks like, of course, and we are given to believe that Prospero is making sport of the two young would-be lovers. Yet it is entirely possible that Ferdinand is only handsome relative to Prospero. We wait with some level of anxiety to see how Miranda will respond to the sight of other men later. Will she find them more beautiful than Ferdinand and, like Romeo turning from Rosalind to Juliet, turn also from the Ferdinand she has so recently declared the ultimate object of her affection?

St. Thomas Aquinas, in typical fashion, provides us a fairly straightforward way out of our apparent conundrum, our uncertainty as to Miranda's taste, by his definition of beauty: "Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent."[1] The beautiful, that is, is that which, having been seen, pleases in respect of its ability to touch the cognitive power of the observer. The common sense definition provides us with a common sense means of analyzing Miranda's exaltation of Ferdinand's beauty. She looks at him and finds the sight pleasing to such a degree that he strikes her as something almost divine. Therefore, he is beautiful.

[1] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 5, a. 4, ad 1. Available online—see the section *References* for details. Hereafter: *S.Th.*

Yet this understanding of beauty demands further exploration. To that end, we propose to conduct a study of Thomistic aesthetics via the *Tempest*. We shall first lay out some of the aesthetic discussions presented in Shakespeare's play. With those in mind, we shall turn to St. Thomas, first to examine his thinking on genera and their arrangement by contrary opposition of virtual quantum intensities, and second to parse out in greater detail his definition of the beautiful. With our Shakespearean-Thomistic matrix in place, we hope then to address three principle lines of inquiry:

(1) What does beauty require on the part of the beholder?

(2) What characterizes the beautiful thing beheld? And how do we discern degrees of beauty?

(3) How do aesthetic judgments differ from sensual apperceptions? And how can one undergo training in the matter of aesthetic judgment?

Let us dive, then, into the *Tempest*, where we will find the materials of our study laid out for us.

Beauty in the *Tempest*

As we set out, it is worthwhile to note the sheer philosophical richness of Shakespeare's works in general. To look into his plays in the course of philosophical examination is not simply to turn a philosophical eye upon a literary work but rather to engage philosopher with philosopher. Formally, of course, the plays, like Plato's works, deliver most of their content to us through dialogue. More importantly, the dialogue Shakespeare supplies often serves as a vehicle whereby the big questions of the sort Plato or Aristotle raise, the questions about beauty or the best life or virtue, can be brought to the table and addressed from a variety of angles, as we shall see in the *Tempest*.

Much of the wonder of the *Tempest*, one of the last of Shakespeare's plays, stems from the kind of orphanage experienced by both Miranda and Caliban. Miranda, shipwrecked with her father, can hardly remember anything of that life her family knew in Milan, save for the vague and indistinct faces of her several maid servants. Caliban, on the other hand, is a strange creature apparently begotten by the devil upon the witch Sycorax, who held the island in her thrall prior to Prospero's arrival. Finding Caliban alone on the island, Prospero took him on as a servant and, according to Caliban, educated him. We see the mark of that education in Caliban's speech, which even in its cruder moments conveys a kind of poetic beauty which stands in sharp contrast to his unbecoming appearance and even to the crude speech of some of his eventual companions. It is telling that both Miranda and Caliban are interested in making aesthetic judgments and that both are aware of the limitations of their secluded existence in that regard.

Let us look first to Miranda's early encounter with Ferdinand. When she first lays eyes upon him, she says, "I might call him / A thing divine, for nothing natural / I ever saw so noble."[2] She is so struck by his appearance that she is tempted to call him a god, though in her praise there is at least the implicit admission that his beauty transcends only the bounds of her experience. Shortly thereafter, when Prospero has snared Ferdinand and Miranda has begun to advocate for the young prince, she does so primarily on account of his appearance, and Prospero takes her to task for her ignorance.

> Thou think'st there is no more such shapes as he,
> Having seen but him and Caliban: foolish wench!
> To the most of men this is a Caliban
> And they to him are angels.[3]

[2] William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, I, 2, 583–585. Available online—see the section *References* for details.

[3] *Ibid.*, I, 2, 667–670.

As noted above, Prospero here sets us in a strange position as readers. We cannot see Ferdinand, and so we have no way of seeing him save through Prospero and Miranda. It is possible that he is not so lovely as Miranda thinks.[4] Or it could be the case that Prospero and Miranda differ in their perceptions of the beautiful. In any case, Prospero sets up for us an important consideration: namely, the assumption, acted upon by all, that beauty admits of degrees within members of a class.

Miranda, aware of her own limitations as a judge of human beauty, remains steadfast in her admiration. She tells her father, responding to his reproof, that "My affections / Are then most humble; I have no ambition / To see a goodlier man."[5] Whether or not her father is correct that Ferdinand is only beautiful by comparison to other men, Miranda is pleased with the sight of Ferdinand. She recognizes in him a kind of radiant goodness.

We find a similar assessment of beauty in Caliban's description of Miranda. Attempting to use Miranda's beauty as an inducement for Stephano to kill Prospero and become lord of the island, Caliban says

> And that most deeply to consider is
> The beauty of his daughter; he himself
> Calls her a nonpareil: I never saw a woman,
> But only Sycorax my dam and she;
> But she as far surpasseth Sycorax
> As great'st does least.[6]

Like Miranda, Caliban has very limited experience of human beauty. Where women are concerned, he has only ever seen Sycorax and Miranda. And the two occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of beauty, with Miranda the most beautiful of creatures and Sycorax the least. We

[4] It is worth nothing, though, that our sense as readers is that he is, in fact, a very handsome man, and that her education by Prospero, along with innate disposition toward beauty, has allowed her to appraise his appearance rightly.

[5] *Ibid.*, 671–673.

[6] *Ibid.*, II, 3, 1493–1498.

might parse Caliban's comparison in two ways. On the one hand, it is in fact the case that Sycorax is the least beautiful woman, and Miranda the most beautiful woman, that Caliban has ever seen. By default they occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of beauty, given Caliban's ignorance. On the other hand, we sense that Caliban is producing an aesthetic judgment that runs beyond the limitations of his own experience. It would seem that Miranda is not only more beautiful than Sycorax but eminently so. There is a kind of surpassing radiance about her beauty. Sensing the limitations of his own judgment, Caliban even calls Prospero to witness in the matter, noting that he himself says Miranda is without equal when it comes to beauty.

In the cases of both Caliban and Miranda, then, we see an uncertainty about beauty. On the one hand, judgments about beauty seem to depend upon the limitations of the beholder's experience. On the other, there appears to be a kind of real relation among different beautiful things, a relation which exists upon a spectrum discernible to everyone, or at least to anyone reasonably educated. To understand this relation between the observer and the beautiful object, we turn to St. Thomas.

Genus, Contrary Opposition, and Virtual Quantity

Our inquiry will benefit greatly from an understanding of how things within groups relate to each other. And here St. Thomas and Aristotle provide us with guidance in their notions of genera and how genera are organized according to contrariety of their members in terms of their virtual quantum excellence.

A genus may be understood as a substance, as an organization of parts toward an end, with the parts arranged according to differences in their individual intensity of being in relation to that end. In the broadest sense all of being might be said to constitute a genus, with the hierarchy of beings running from God down through the angels and then man to

animals, plants, and elements. This hierarchy is organized according to the degree to which each being approximates the excellence of God as the source of all being. And these degrees of excellence correspond to what St. Thomas calls virtual quantity.[7]

Virtual quantity, simply as a phrase, rings odd to the modern ear. To say something is virtual is often to say it is false, or that it is only like something else. Virtual reality is a false reality, though very like reality in the quality of its illusion. It is so like reality that we could almost think it real. To the modern ear, virtual quantity might seem to indicate some strange or illusory likeness to quantity.

St. Thomas rather intends virtual quantity as a measure of how much virtue, of how much excellence, a thing has, particularly with respect to other members of its genus. The measure is useful, especially since it indicates that excellence is to be measured, in a spiritual sense, not by size or physical strength but rather by a thing's intensity of being. An angel possesses greater virtual quantum intensity than a man does, while a man has much greater virtual quantity than a dog. This will prove of the utmost importance in understanding how, in the *Tempest*, Miranda and Sycorax or Ferdinand and Caliban relate to each other.

We see the same principle at work in more limited genera as well. In an army, for instance, the hierarchy of ranks is determined not by size or physical strength but by proximity to the general. Thus Homer's Agamemnon maintains a kind of ascendancy over Achilles, who is the stronger man, in virtue of his kingship, a role which conveys upon Agamemnon a greater intensity of being.[8]

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[7] *Cf.* Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 157.

[8] *Cf.* Homer, *The Iliad*, trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), Book 1.

The same obtains yet again in even simpler genera. Where human beauty is concerned, we observe that a spectrum obtains according to just such a hierarchy. Here we recall Caliban's claim that Miranda is as far in beauty from Sycorax as greatest is from least, and it is along the spectrum from greatest to least that all genera are organized. It is just this kind of organization, in fact, which begins to account for this strange element of beauty Shakespeare points out, namely, that while beauty within a genus is in some way relative, it also has certain limits. There is a kind of internal organization, according to virtual quantum intensity, among humans in respect to their beauty, and we are able to recognize degrees along that spectrum. It nonetheless remains a spectrum with upper and lower limits.

It is important to note here that while virtual quantity is distinct from physical or numerical quantity, both measures provide a kind of self-contained referential system existing within certain limits. Thus while height does not correspond to spiritual excellence, it still exists along a spectrum within certain limits.[9] Most grown men, for instance, are somewhere between five and six-and-a-half feet tall.

Caliban, it appears, does not mean simply to say that Miranda is as far in beauty from Sycorax as greatest is from least because the two are literally the most and least beautiful women he has seen. Rather, Miranda displays just such intensity of beauty as places her near the upper limit of beauty, while Sycorax occupies a space near the lower limit.

[9] Plato's discussion of participation in forms relies often on just this kind of contrary opposition. Where tall and short are concerned, we see that a man may be tall with respect to one friend and short with respect to another. On Plato's theory of forms this apparent contradiction is difficult to explain. Aristotle's understanding of contrary opposition, on the other hand, affords a means whereby things within a genus may maintain their relative positions while also existing within certain fairly well defined limits.

With this understanding in mind, let us turn to our consideration of the relationship between the perceiver of beauty and the beauty perceived.

Beauty in St. Thomas

St. Thomas has observed for us that the beautiful is that which, having been seen, pleases on a cognitive level. And, as often interpreted, this can be taken to echo the adage that beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Both St. Thomas and the author of the commonplace situate beauty with respect to sight and the pleasure the sight grants to the seer. There is, however, a critical difference between the two definitions. With St. Thomas, it is not that beauty is limited to the eye. Rather, in St. Thomas's definition, beauty resides in a relationship between sense experience and the cognitive pleasure it brings. That is, beauty is not simply in the eye of the beholder, but in the relationship between the eye and the mind of the beholder. How this relationship functions will provide key insights for understanding the relation of perceiver to beauty and for noting the difference between aesthetic experience and mere sense experience.

For St. Thomas, as for Aristotle, sight occupies a privileged place among the senses.[10] Sight is the highest of the senses in that it can provide us with the most useful sense data whereby we can act within the world, and it also gives the grounds for most aesthetic experience in that it is the sight most closely connected with the intellect. It is in virtue of this connection that we are able to use such an expression as "I see what you mean." What we mean when we say that, of course, is that we understand, but sight occupies such an elevated place that it may act as a kind of stand-in for understanding.

[10] *Cf.* St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, trans. John P. Rowan (Chicago, 1961), 1, 1, n. 5.

In virtue of this privilege granted to sight, we may also place sight in a synecdochal relationship with the rest of the senses. That is, by sight, St. Thomas seems here to refer to other senses as well. For we surely admit that music is beautiful, and the experience of that beauty resides not in the sight of the notes written upon the score but in the actual sound of the notes performed.[11] So aesthetic experience, on the Thomistic view, may be said to reside in the cognitive pleasure given by something seen or heard.[12] Or, as St. Thomas puts it himself, "those senses chiefly consider the beautiful which are maximally cognitive: to wit, sight and hearing, ministering to reason; for we call visible (things) beautiful, and (we call) sounds beautiful."[13]

The aesthetic moment does not reside in the sense experience itself but in the pleasure occasioned by the sense experience. And in this we can begin to grasp some of the complexity and flexibility of St. Thomas's definition of beauty. We find ourselves taking aesthetic pleasure, after all, in many things which are not, on a sense level, pleasing. Picasso's *Guernica* springs immediately to mind. The image he gives us is not, in itself, pleasant in the way of a sunset or even of Monet's *Water Lilies*. Likewise the content of the paintings, the destruction of Guernica during the Spanish Civil War, is not pleasant. In the distorted sense data of the painting we find a kind of match for the distortion of humanity, civilization, and nature the painting depicts. There thus obtains a kind of harmony between the sense data and the intellectual content of the work. It is in just such a harmony that the aesthetic experience lies.

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[11] An expert musician, of course, may intuit the sound of the music in the sight of the notes on the score, but most music lovers require the actual sound of the notes for that kind of experience which might properly be deemed aesthetic.

[12] Later we shall address the question of the other senses. For the most part we do not seem to encounter the beautiful through smell, taste, or touch, though a case can be made that there are exceptions.

[13] *S.Th.*, I–II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3.

A still more arresting example may be found in the Grunewald *Crucifixion*. Again, the image Grunewald paints is not pleasant.[14] The crucifixion is here not that sort of Medieval depiction of the triumphant Christ standing in his divinity upon the cross. Rather it is a record of all the agony humanity might endure. It is an agony which presents itself in every detail of the painting, from the contortion of Christ's hands to the curvature of John the Baptist's finger. And all of this is suitable in that it harmonizes with an element of our cognitive understanding of the crucifixion, which Christ undergoes for the forgiveness of sin. The horrors contained in the physical details of the painting harmonize with the spiritual horror to which the painting points, and in this harmony we can take pleasure. And in taking pleasure we make an aesthetic judgment upon the work.[15]

Consider a final example from music. Debussy's *La Mer*, as it flows through the many moods of the sea, often jars the ear. Many passages in the piece do not please us on a sensory level. By evoking the terror of the sea, though, a terror we recognize as somehow fundamental to the human experience in the face of the vast uncaring power of nature, Debussy introduces a consonance between the sense experience and the intellectual apprehension we undergo in listening to the piece.

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[14] On one occasion the author had the opportunity to view il Santo Volto di Mannopello, the sudarium or facial burial cloth imprinted with the image of the face of the crucified Christ. The face was beaten and bloody, and even below the marks of the abuses it did not seem a face beautiful according to our common understanding of the term. Even in this there is perhaps a deepening of the intensity of Christ's beauty. We might expect the incarnate God to be surpassingly handsome, as perhaps were Saul and David. In the highest aesthetic judgment, though, Christ may be considered more beautiful if he foregoes that kingly appearance and instead becomes like one of the lowly of the earth.

[15] It would be interesting to conduct an aesthetic analysis of the film *The Passion* under these terms. Watching the film one night have occasion to wonder whether the intensity of the physical torment portrayed is such as to draw attention from Christ's deeper spiritual torment and whether this proceeds from Mel Gibson's sanguine tendencies.

The Thomistic definition of beauty, then, offers tremendous flexibility. It is not a definition which limits aesthetic experience to the visual field, nor does it reduce it to a kind of elevated sense pleasure, the kind of emotional elevation we might feel on seeing a sunset or viewing a Thomas Kinkade painting. Rather, the beautiful is that which establishes a harmonious relationship between sense experience and cognitive understanding.

With St. Thomas's tools in hand, let us turn our attention back to the *Tempest* and the relation between the aesthetic observer and the beautiful thing perceived.

Beauty in the Beholder

From our discussion of St. Thomas's aesthetic principles, we can begin to enumerate certain characteristics of the one who would experience beauty. In the first place, the experience of the beautiful, or at least the apprehension of its beauty, would seem to require sense and intellectual faculties. A dog may witness a sunset without experiencing the aesthetic pleasure a human might know. Likewise, though dogs display a certain connoisseurship with respect to television, their viewing of a film like Bergman's *The Seventh Seal* probably does not constitute an aesthetic experience.[16] Authentic aesthetic experience requires a being who can both sense the beautiful object and recognize the goodness it contains.

One wonders about the degree to which children are capable of aesthetic experience, or at least of aesthetic judgment. Certainly they

[16] There is a lovely passage in Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea* in which the old man reflects on the terror dusk holds for fish as well as for men. Night is a hard time for fish, the time when their predators emerge to feed. Probably the fish have no higher apprehension of such terror, yet as human observers, ourselves often frightened by the terrors of the night, we feel a kind of sympathy for the fish in or sympathy for the old man out alone in his boat, facing a nature which could easily overwhelm him.

take pleasure in nursery rhymes and songs and in images, and they early establish preferences about such things. Probably in such in-stances there is at least a nascent aesthetic judgment, though it may lack the nuance needed to go beyond the simple instances of beauty—those things which merely by their sense characteristics give pleasure—to that refined aesthetic judgment which may take pleasure in things which are not pleasing on the level of sense.[17]

In any case, the one who would make aesthetic judgments requires at a minimum such sense and intellectual faculties as will allow a harmony to emerge between sense experience and intellectual understanding. Further, the development of aesthetic judgment would seem to depend primarily on education. We recall, for instance, Caliban's uncertainty about his own aesthetic taste. He knows that he has only seen two women and that his own taste might thus be skewed. And so he appeals to Prospero, who has had experience of the broader world and calls Miranda a "nonpareil" in respect to beauty.

We might argue further that Caliban's categorization of Miranda and Sycorax as most and least beautiful of women, respectively, arises not simply from his sense perception of the two but more from his understanding of the place each plays on the island. Part of the horror of Sycorax may have been found in her role as a witch condemned to life on the island for her unspeakable crimes, as one who would breed with the devil, as one who kept the island enslaved to herself. On the other hand, Miranda, who is lovely, on the testimony of Prospero and Ferdinand, represents for Caliban a means to people the island and become king thereover. Caliban himself has once attempted to rape Miranda and bring forth a whole tribe of Calibans, and it is the prospect of such fa-

[17] One wonders, likewise, about the ability of the angels to recognize beauty. The fact that beauty is primarily a cognitive power, on St. Thomas's understanding, makes it seem likely that the angels can recognize beauty in a more immediate way than humans can.

thering—and kingship—which Caliban uses as part of his inducement to Stephano to kill Prospero.

Aesthetic judgment, then, calls for the proper facultative equipment—the proper senses and intellect—as well as for a certain degree of education. Contained in this is the expectation that proper aesthetic judgment will most likely require a broad range of experience. It is on the strength of just such experience that Caliban appeals to Prospero as witness in respect to Miranda's beauty. There is in both Caliban and Miranda a kind of childish appreciation of beauty, and this suits their positions in the play as Prospero's sheltered daughter and his miserable servant.

Beauty in the Beautiful

If aesthetic judgment requires certain faculties, education, and experience on the part of the perceiver, it would also seem to demand certain characteristics in the beautiful thing perceived.

In the first place, a beautiful thing would seem to need to fall within a certain physical and generic range. Aristotle tells us in the poetics that a beautiful thing must occupy just such a range.[18] A creature too small to be seen cannot be called beautiful, nor can a creature so vast that we cannot see it in its entirety be properly called so either. The beautiful thing must fall within the spectrum of experience afforded us by our senses.

There are ways around this matter of physical quantitative limits, of course, ways afforded by advances of the human intellect. With a microscope we become capable of observing the beauty of very small things, and advances in microscopy have in fact yielded ever more astonishing instances of such beauty. Likewise the earth as a whole would

[18] Aristotle, *Poetics*, VII. Available online—see the section *References* for details.

probably have exceeded Aristotle's physical limits for the object of aesthetic judgment. Now, however, spacecraft allow for observations of the whole earth, observations which are quite beautiful. In both the microcosmic and the macrocosmic cases, the experience of beauty depends not only on the sense images technology provides but also on the intellection made possible in such images. To see a photograph of a cell is to wonder on the infinitesimal machinery which makes our own lives possible. To see a picture of the earth is to wonder at the place of humanity in the vastness of space. We see on each end of the physical spectrum a capacity to harmonize sense experience with thought.

It is here worth emphasizing that among members of a genus, physical quantity plays some role in our conceptions of beauty. People who are either very small or very large tend not to be considered the most beautiful. It is rather people of more or less average size who are beautiful, and their beauty resides in a certain kind of radiance, an overwhelming goodness of appearance which commands our attention.

While physical limitations play a role in our capacity for experiencing beauty, the beauty of a being is thus more definitively governed by its virtual quantity than its visual quantity. A beautiful woman may frequently make everyone in a room stop what they are doing and look at her, not because she is extremely large, but simply in virtue of her having entered the room and introduced her own particular radiance.[19]

We see the same in the arts. Novels do not achieve their beauty by being especially long or especially short, but by obtaining such length as needed to tell their story and by doing so with language which may pierce the reader's mind with its excellence. *The Great Gatsby*, though relatively short, compels our admiration, compels our pleasure, by the skill of its language and the emotional heft of its plot. Likewise

[19] Hemingway, in Hotchner's memoir, recounts once having been on board the same trans-Atlantic vessel as Marlene Dietrich. When she appeared at the top of the stairs to enter the dining cabin, all conversation ceased and every eye turned to her.

paintings do not take their beauty from their size. At times, of course, a subject calls for treatment on a large surface, as for example in Picasso's *Guernica*, Monet's *Water Lilies*, and Michelangelo's works in the Sistine Chapel. In each case size contributes to the total effect of harmonization between sense and intellect. On the other hand, Da Vinci's *Mona Lisa* is quite small. But anyone who has been to the Louvre has seen the way in which crowds form about the canvas all throughout the day. The painting exudes a kind of overwhelming radiance which more or less compels the admiration of the viewer.

Beauty, then, depends more on a thing's virtual intensity than its physical intensity, though it is sometimes the case that size may play a role in virtual intensity. With this in mind, we turn back to the *Tempest* and the kind of aesthetic spectrums which exist between Caliban and Ferdinand on the one hand and Sycorax and Miranda on the other. In both cases we see that virtual quantity determines beauty, and that because of this, beauty can only be said truly to exist within certain virtual quantum limits. Caliban is a difficult creature to envision. Though apparently humanoid in many respects, he is also called a monster, a fish, and a tortoise.[20] He is thus at the bottom of the spectrum of human beauty because he is in some sense less than fully human, and true beauty must exist within virtual limits. Ferdinand, on the other hand, seems to strain at the other end of the spectrum. Miranda finds him so beautiful that, as we have seen, she wishes to call him a thing divine. He strains the upper limit of human beauty so that it is almost as if he is something more than human. In the case of the women, we find a parallel case. Sycorax the witch represents the bottom limit of humanity and beauty, whereas Miranda gives us the upper limit, the unparalleled beauty at the very apex of human possibility. And just as Ferdinand is compared to the gods, Miranda is deemed something more like an angel

[20] Shakespeare, *The Tempest*.

than a woman. Alonso, Fedinand's father, asks on seeing Miranda for the first time, "Is she the goddess that hath sever'd us, / And brought us thus together?"[21] So beautiful is Miranda, so intense is the goodness of her appearance, that she causes those around her to wonder whether she is in fact mortal.[22]

Where the beautiful being is concerned, then, we can discern that to be beautiful, it must fall within certain physical and virtual quantitative limits. The two, of course, are intimately connected. To be human is necessarily to have a body which grows and develops within relatively fixed physical quantitative limits. We see, too, that the degrees of beauty within a certain class, whether among humans beings or paintings or poems, depend not so much upon physical size as upon the degree of virtual excellence. The more beautiful something is, the more its radiance tends to command the admiration of observers.

So much, then, for the perceiver of beauty and for the beauty perceived. We turn next to the question of taste and the matter of aesthetic judgment, and to do so, we begin by considering how aesthetic judgments differ from sensual perceptions.

Sense Perception Versus Aesthetic Judgment

We have noted already Horace's dictum that there can be no dispute concerning taste. Where sense perception is concerned, this seems to be the case. Some people enjoy the taste of Brussels sprouts. Others find them abhorrent. While we might feign indignation over someone's sense preferences, we generally accept them without too much difficulty. After all, people simply have different taste buds which more or less

[21] *Ibid.*, V, 1, 2240–2241.

[22] Fans of P. G. Wodehouse's Jeeves books will recall some of Bertie Wooster's more romantic friends as referring to esteemed ladies as "tender goddesses."

dictate what they find pleasant or otherwise. Sense experience has about it an incontrovertible air.

On the other hand, we do tend to think that aesthetic judgments lay some kind of claim to universality. Consider, for instance, the case of the *Mona Lisa*. The crowds which form around it day in and day out would suggest that every person finds the painting beautiful, or that every person at least ought to find the painting beautiful and any failure to do so stems from inadequate education or the like.

The difference between the two cases—the sensitive on the one hand, and the aesthetic on the other—lies in that while sense experience is simply that, that perception conveyed by the physical senses, aesthetic judgment lies in the harmony between sense perception and intellectual understanding. A kind of triangulation thus occurs among the observer of the aesthetic object, the sensory content of the aesthetic object, and the intellectual content the sensory content conveys, embodies, or elaborates.

When I taste a Brussels sprout, for instance, there is no attempt on the part of the sprout to bring my mind into relationship with any sort of reality beyond the sprout itself. I taste the sprout, and that, as it were, is that. Either I enjoy the taste or I do not.

On the other hand, when I look at the *Mona Lisa*, it is not simply that I see the colors on the canvas. Those colors, deployed as they are, set my intellect into motion. I ask myself, for instance, why the woman is smiling. Where is she located? Who was she? Through the canvas I am brought into historical considerations as well as into mystery. What, I might ask, does this portrait convey about femininity? What it conveys seems above all to be the mystery of femininity, and it is in the mystery of the smile that the painting achieves that near perfect beauty which has made it one of the most universally admired works of art.

Because aesthetic judgment depends on the interaction between sense experience and intellectual understanding, it admits of education

in a way that mere sense experience does not. We have seen that Caliban, of course, has been educated in beauty, in a way, by Prospero. He speaks in beautiful language, and he is able to recognize the vast expanse that lies between Sycorax and Miranda as far as beauty is concerned. Likewise Miranda has the ability to perceive that Ferdinand has about him a godly air which reflects not only his outward appearance but also the reality of his role as prince.

In general terms, we find that aesthetic judgment admits of relatively easy teaching. A child who has gone from reading Dr. Seuss to reading Shakespeare will probably at first find the good Dr.'s rhymes more palatable. So intense is Shakespeare's language alone that a first experience of it can be as disorienting as the full light of day is to an owl. With the aid of good teachers, though, one can come to see that the depth of Shakespeare's language more fully reflects the varieties of human experience than Seuss's rhymes and simple (often nonsensical) diction.[23] Shakespeare's dramatic narratives, too, express the reality of lived human experience much more nearly than Seuss's scenarios.[24] Aesthetic education is thus made possible by the interplay of sense experience and intellect. Sense experience tends not to admit of education or dispute. But the intellect may be brought around to an understanding which allows the student to take pleasure where mere sense did not.

It may be argued, of course, that sensual taste can be educated. Our taste in food does change, and particularly in the matters of beer and wine, we observe that a kind of gustatory education can and frequently does take place. This occurs partly through habituation and

[23] It would be very interesting to conduct an aesthetic study of Lewis Carroll's "Jabberwocky." Can such a poem be beautiful if its language is so heavily fabricated?

[24] All this is not to condemn Dr. Seuss. His books are not intended to convey all the depth of human experience in the way that Shakespeare's plays are. His books rather serve as a kind of entrance into the aesthetic education which is very much needed for appreciation of Shakespeare's work.

change of the taste buds. But it also provides grounds for a broadening of the field of aesthetic judgments which is worth here exploring.

We have mentioned already that St. Thomas's definition of beauty allows aesthetic judgment in relation to both visible and audible stimuli. We say that sunsets as well as paintings are beautiful. We say that the song of the mockingbird is beautiful, and we say that Mozart's symphonies are beautiful. But what of the other senses? We do not commonly say that things we smell, touch, or taste are beautiful. Given St. Thomas's definition, though, it seems that aesthetic judgments may be made on the objects of these senses, at least in the modern setting, though St. Thomas himself did not admit such judgments were possible.

Certainly we often take pleasure in scents, whether those of flowers or of fresh-mown grass or of rain. And such natural pleasures could be said to verge on the aesthetic, if they are accompanied by reflection on one's place in the natural world or the like. Then, too, scents often set us in relation to other humans in a particular way. A certain smell may remind us of a deceased relative, and the pleasure thereby produced is probably on some level aesthetic. Consider the importance of the odor of verbena in Faulkner's *The Unvanquished*. The verbena gives Bayard Sartoris to know that his cousin Drusilla has embraced her femininity in the process of calling him to fulfill the dictates of his own manhood. Finally, we experience the beauty of scents in religious ceremony, where chrism and incense not only provide a pleasant smell but also point to spiritual realities, and the pleasure taken in the physical scent and the spiritual reality indicates the presence of real beauty.

Touch may likewise admit of aesthetic experience. A probably disingenuous example can be found in the instance of Braille, which may provide a blind person with a sensory experience which harmonizes with intellectual reflection in such a way as to provide pleasure.

Then, too, the sexual touch shared within marriage provides an aesthetic moment, an elevation of sense pleasure to the spiritual realm.[25]

Finally, where taste is concerned, we recognize a difference between the plain dictates of sense pleasure and the aesthetic experience of connoisseurship. Particularly in the case of fine wines or liquors, the cultivation of taste through study of origins, flavor palettes, and so on, leads to a kind of harmonization of sense experience and intellectual understanding, and in such instances we have moved, perhaps, beyond mere sense experience to aesthetics.

Through all this we can discern two principles of aesthetic education. The first is that, generally speaking, it requires broad experience. One becomes a good judge of paintings by seeing many paintings, and one comes to have taste in poetry by reading across a broad range of poets. The second is that aesthetic judgment often depends on an initial suspension of sense impression. On first glance one may find a painting or poem distasteful, and this can ruin the opportunity to find beauty therein unless judgment is suspended until the intellect can assess the content to which the sense data point. In some sense it is in the possibility of such suspension that aesthetic judgment itself becomes possible, at least in those things which are most beautiful of all. For viewed only in its sensible characteristics, there is nothing so distasteful as the cross of Christ. Considered in relation to the depth of human sin, though, and the possibility of human salvation, there is nothing else so beautiful.

St. Thomas, Shakespeare, and the Beauty that Leads into Mystery

Both St. Thomas and Shakespeare left off writing toward the ends of their lives. St. Thomas, after his vision of Christ, could not complete his Summa, finding that all he had written was as straw.

[25] *Cf.* Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 1, 1, n. 8.

Likewise Shakespeare, retiring to Stratford, eventually gave up writing. The *Tempest* was one of his final plays, and the person of Prospero is often said to represent Shakespeare himself. And certainly it is moving to consider Shakespeare speaking Prospero's last lines to us:

> Gentle breath of yours my sails
> Must fill, or else my project fails,
> Which was to please. Now I want
> Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,
> And my ending is despair,
> Unless I be relieved by prayer,
> Which pierces so that it assaults
> Mercy itself and frees all faults.
> As you from crimes would pardon'd be,
> Let your indulgence set me free.[26]

Shakespeare's end, he tells us, was to please us. He wished to give us beauty. And perhaps it was in his own experience of beauty that he was led into the silence that marked the end of his life. It is to silence that all beauty leads us, to the silent contemplation of the beatific vision which is our own most pleasant end.

St. Thomas and the Bard:
On Beauty in the *Tempest* and the Limits of Aesthetic Experience

SUMMARY

The paper addresses the matter of differences of aesthetic judgment by examining Shakespeare's *Tempest* through the Thomistic understanding of substance and of beauty. It seeks principally to explore three elements of aesthetic inquiry: (1) what characterizes the subject who perceives beauty? (2) what characterizes the object of aesthetic experience? and (3) how do aesthetic judgments differ from sensual perceptions? The *Tempest* serves as particularly fruitful territory for such exploration in virtue of the persons of Miranda and Caliban, who by the limitations of their experience delineate the generic

[26] Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, V, 1, 2414–2423.

borders, the degrees of virtual quantum excellence, which characterize the beautiful object. Their education at the hand of Prospero likewise elucidates somewhat the process of aesthetic training.

KEYWORDS

Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, William Shakespeare, genus, aesthetics, virtual quantity, substance, beauty, perception, taste.

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Specific Research Elements in Andrzej Maryniarczyk's Realistic Metaphysics

In the history of scientific thought one notices the existence of various research conceptions which constitute the process of philosophical explanation of reality. Depending on the philosophy practiced, its nature is influenced by various determinants resulting from the adopted method of philosophizing and the research attitude. Therefore, referring to the research method, it becomes possible to develop a specific philosophical system characteristic for a given conception.

One of the contemporary philosophers who presented an original conception of philosophizing was Andrzej Maryniarczyk (1950–2020). He drew his scientific inspirations from classical philosophy, especially from the rich heritage of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. What was of particular importance to him was classical philosophy in the version of existential Thomism, which constitutes an adequate method of cognition of the world and man. In the philosophy he practiced one may discern references to the thought of the French philosopher Étienne Gilson, thanks to whom a renaissance of Thomistic thought was noticed.[1]

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[1] For more on this, see Étienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1952).

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Maryniarczyk was also a promoter of the achievements of the Lublin School of philosophy in Poland, as well as worldwide.[2] One of the fundamental programs of this school was to build a new version of metaphysical philosophy based on classical realistic metaphysics. Referring to the program of the School (in particular to the philosophical conception of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Stanisław Kamiński), he aimed at developing a modern conception of philosophy, which would be distinguished by methodological autonomy, maximalism, realism and cognitive universalism. However, what distinguished the metaphysical philosophy of the Lublin School in a special way was the elaboration of a new way of comprehending being, the presentation of methods of its justification and the construction, on this plane, of a system of metaphysical explanation of reality. All these factors—according to Maryniarczyk—determined the practice of metaphysics in the Lublin School.[3]

In this research perspective, Maryniarczyk indicated an innovative approach to many philosophical issues. Referring to methodological achievements of realistic metaphysics, he developed and indicated the significance of the method of separation in the philosophical explanation of the world. On this basis, he showed the specificity of the system of metaphysics as a cognitive response to the existence of reality, which is expressed in the analogical-transcendental cognition. He also performed a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the philosophical theory of creationism (*creatio ex nihilo*), which has been mainly interpreted in the theological order since the thirteenth century. In this last issue Maryniarczyk, referring to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas,

[2] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Lublin Philosophical School*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2010), 77–129.

[3] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Philosophy as Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," in *The Lublin Philosophical School. History–Conception–Disputes*, ed. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik, Paweł Gondek (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2020), 109–111.

showed the ontic foundations of this theory and the specificity of the very act of creation. These issues do not remain merely forms of supplementing realistic metaphysics as its detailed development. They are crucial problems for comprehending metaphysical research and affect the ontic value and methodological coherence of such an approach. Conducting a critical reflection on these issues will allow us to present the specific character of realistic metaphysics practiced by A. Maryniarczyk.

Metaphysical Separation as a Philosophical Method of Cognition of Reality

The method of metaphysical separation is the basic element which shows the essence of realistic metaphysics in Maryniarczyk's approach.[4] For it determines the specificity and the manner of justifying metaphysical statements, as well as it presents the methodology of metaphysics.[5] It should be noted that separation becomes in Maryniarczyk's metaphysics the fundamental method of separating the subject and explaining reality. The very term 'separation' indicates a method, as well as a type of cognition, thanks to which necessary and at the same time universal factors of being are separated (Lat.: *separatio*), without which no being can exist.[6]

[4] Maryniarczyk deals with detailed analyses of the method of realistic metaphysics in the book entitled *Metoda metafizyki realistycznej* [The Method of Realistc Metaphysics] (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2005).

[5] Maryniarczyk based his analyses of the method of metaphysics, among others, on the texts of St. Thomas Aquinas, first of all, quoting fragments of Thomas's commentary to the treatise *De Trinitate* by Boethius. In this context he made an attempt to develop it anew and to show the significance of the method of separation for realistic metaphysics. See S. Thomae Aquinatis, *In librum Boethii de Trinitate questiones quinta et sexta*, ed. P. Wyser (Fribourg 1948).

[6] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2015), 132–133.

Metaphysical separation as the fundamental method of metaphysical elucidation of reality is a complex process.[7] Thanks to separation, one forms the object of metaphysical cognition, *i.e.*, being understood as something that exists. The basis for this method are existential judgments, thanks to which the object of metaphysics is distinguished. They provide the grounds for constructing a fundamental type of metaphysical cognition, which is a guarantee of cognition of really existing things. This cognition has a judicial character; it emphasizes the grasp of the totality of being and points to such elements that constitute its existence. In this context, separation can be defined as a cognitive attitude, which expresses itself in an intellectual response to the fact of existence of things by stating and becoming aware of their existence. According to Maryniarczyk, separation conceived of in this manner as a method of metaphysics is accomplished in three basic stages.[8] At the first stage, existential judgments point to the real scope of cognition. This scope is determined by concretely existing objects. In this way, the fact of existence of being is affirmed (*e.g.*, 'John exists'). Thus one accomplishes cognitive contact with reality, which determines the real object context of this cognition. The second stage of metaphysical separation is the analysis of cognitive content, captured in existential judgments. Through this analysis, one obtains information about the necessary and universal factors of being, namely, the content of what is real. What exists is John, that is, it has content-determined individual essence. In the third stage of separation, a transition is made from categorical grasps of essence and existence to transcendental ones. Thus, in the concrete John, such factors are pointed out which constitute the existence of this concrete John, but also his existence as a really existing

[7] Maryniarczyk uses the term 'method' to denote a set of 'conceptual-creative' activities that aim to form the concept of being as being.

[8] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *Discovery of the Internal Structure of Being*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2018), 225–227.

being. It is in this context that the proper object of metaphysics, namely being, is formed.[9]

As already noted, the method of metaphysical separation is closely related to the conception of separation cognition. It is a specific type of metaphysical cognition, which is a development of spontaneous cognition, in which one notices the necessary factors that determine the existence of being. The results of this cognition are verbalized in the content of existential judgments (*e.g.*, 'something exists'). They are an expression of cognitive contact with reality. Thanks to them, metaphysical cognition is consolidated in really existing reality. The foundation of separation cognition, according to Maryniarczyk, is constituted by judgments, which put the human being in direct contact with a real being, without any intermediary. Therefore, existential judgment is a form of superintelligible cognition (Lat.: *surintelligibile*), in which the act of cognition comes into contact with the act of existence. In view of the absence of cognitive intermediaries, the existential judgment becomes an infallible and indisputable act.[10] Therefore, the existential judgment is the starting point for further developed cognition. In this context, the method of metaphysical separation as a cognitive tool is a guarantor of realistic cognition, providing the necessary knowledge of the totality of the existing thing.[11] As Maryniarczyk notes, the method of separation should not be underestimated in the field of realistic metaphysics, because such an action may contribute to the demolition of the entire cognitive realism that constitutes the essence of metaphysics. Consequently, this method needs to be understood as the essential and fundamental tool we utilize on the plane of realistic metaphysics.

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[9] Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality*, 139–141.

[10] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metaphysics. An Outline of the Theory of Being*, trans. T. Sandok (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1991).

[11] Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality*,142–144.

System of Metaphysics

The method of metaphysical separation is closely related to the system of metaphysics, playing a pivotal role in it. A. Maryniarczyk was in favour of systemic practicing of philosophy (metaphysics). He asserted that the fundamental argument in understanding philosophy as a system is the cognized reality, which exists in a systemic fashion. Therefore, the formulation of such a system is important in order to explain reality. The author's main considerations on the system of metaphysics are discussed in the dissertation entitled "The System of Metaphysics. Analysis of Object-Oriented Cognition,"[12] in which the main thesis states that metaphysics is an autonomous cognitive system connected with the notion of being and the process of making it explicit. In the context of metaphysics, the process of making being explicit retains its specific, systemic character, which is conditioned by the existential aspect of reality. According to Maryniarczyk, the conception of being and the way it is made explicit determine the conception of the system of metaphysics.

As part of the process of making being explicit, the following elements-factors constituting the scheme of the system of metaphysics are distinguished. Maryniarczyk includes transcendentals and first principles in the first group. Within metaphysics transcendentals are expressions showing the systemic fashion of existence of being, revealing the deepest foundations of the whole knowledge about being (reality). Through the individual transcendental elements, the universal and comprehensive knowledge of being analogously existing is expressed. Within the system of metaphysics, these elements may appear as new aspects of metaphysical experience, indicating the necessary, objective and boundary (transcendental) aspects of being. Moreover, these factors

[12] More on this see Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *System metafizyki. Analiza „przedmiotowo-zbornego" poznania* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1991).

determine the rational order of the systemic explanation of reality in the general-existential aspect.

Maryniarczyk includes metaphysical notions related to the complexes of being in the second group of the system of metaphysics. This group indicates a change in the perspective of metaphysical cognition—from the transcendental perspective to the categorical one.[13] These elements, cognitively expressed in the form of metaphysical notions (such as: substance, matter, essence, existence, etc.), describe boundary states of existence of an contingent being, determined temporally and spatially. Against this background, Maryniarczyk distinguishes general manners of existence, which he defines as "object states of existence of the contingent being," accomplished by means of 'penetration' of the experience of being.[14] The indicated penetration constitutes a form of separation cognition (in other words, judicial cognition), by virtue of which we affirm the fundamental states of existence of the contingent being.

The last group of elements of metaphysics is constituted by wisdom elements that describe the essence of cognition and metaphysical knowledge. Among these elements the following methods are distinguished: separation, analogy and participation.[15] It should be noted that each of these elements shows the nature of metaphysical cognition from a different aspect. Separation in the system of metaphysics guarantees the wisdom dimension of metaphysical cognition, constituting a method of separating being from non-being. Whereas, according to Maryniarczyk, analogy is a method of cognition of the ultimate cause of exist-

[13] Transcendentals being universal properties of being show reality as a-temporal, a-material, a-spatial, etc., so that cognition applies to everything that exists, while categorical expressions of being show the contingency of being as mutable, material, concrete.

[14] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Is There a 'System' of Metaphysics?," in *Atti del IX Congresso Tomistico Internazionale*, vol. 2: *Noetica, critica e metafisica in chiave tomistica* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991), 245.

[15] *Ibid.*, 246.

ence of being and in metaphysics it fulfills the function of systematic metaphysical cognition. The last third element is participation treated as a manner of wise understanding of being, showing the existential dimension of metaphysical cognition. All the above-mentioned methods within the framework of wisdom elements constitute the crowning of metaphysical cognition, what is more, they reveal the specific nature of the system of metaphysics, which is expressed in the fact that the basis of its understanding is the manner in which being exists.[16]

Undoubtedly, by distinguishing these elements, one can perceive the peculiarity of the system of metaphysics, which manifests itself in the characteristic properties of this system, such as realism, openness, autonomy and coherence. First of all, the system of metaphysics is characterized by realism. In Maryniarczyk's opinion, thanks to the directness of the approach to the object, which is constituted by the existing reality, the realism of the system of metaphysics is perceived. Therefore, the system of metaphysics is not a model of reality, but it is an expression of the 'recognition' of reality in transcendental and necessary relations. In addition, the system of metaphysics refers to analogical cognition, agreeing with the given being-concrete, in which the necessary and transcendental relations are realized proportionally. Therefore, analogy (analogous cognition) becomes the main systemic factor for building realistic metaphysics. Another characteristic of the system of metaphysics that Maryniarczyk mentions is openness. Openness of the system of metaphysics consists in dissemination or transfer of cognition (based on analogy) to the whole existing reality, which means that the horizon of possibilities of human cognition is opened. Within the framework of openness, one discovers transcendental and objective reasons for its existence.[17]

[16] Maryniarczyk, *System metafizyki. Analiza „przedmiotowo-zbornego" poznania*, 253–275.

[17] *Ibid.*, 279–310.

Autonomy of the system of metaphysics, on the other hand, is built on the way it is distinguished and becomes visible first of all in the context of other systems. Metaphysics at the stage of separation does not take as its own object of study the results (systems) defined by other sciences. Metaphysical cognition must be distinct from other types of knowledge, which means that it has its own object, method and goal. The autonomy of metaphysics is closely related to cognitive maximalism.[18] As Maryniarczyk points out, the maximalist attitude to philosophizing imposes such a system which not only captures all the issues of metaphysics, but also strives to formulate a philosophical method of solving various types of non-philosophical problems in the existential order. The purpose of completing the characterization of the system of metaphysics is to point out the aspect of its coherence, which is built on the act of existence as the element unifying all reality, as well as on analogy in existence and participation.[19] By virtue of these factors it is possible to present the specific nature of metaphysics as a coherent philosophical system.

The aforementioned properties reveal the ontic foundations of the system of metaphysics, which unveil the nature of the system of metaphysics and seem to protect it from reduction to other systems. This approach is a guarantor of the distinctiveness, autonomy and peculiarity of the system of metaphysics. Naturally, the presented characteristics of the system of metaphysics involves some imperfections. Nevertheless, the presented interpretation sets the stage for the search for more advanced methodological and logical tools improving the system of metaphysics.

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[18] Stanisław Kamiński, "The Methodological Peculiarity of the Theory of Being," in *On the Methodology of Metaphysics*, trans. Maciej B. Stępień (Lublin–Roma: PTTA, 2018), 207–209.

[19] On this see Andrzej Maryniarczyk, *On Causes, Participation, and Analogy*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2017).

Metaphysical Theory of Creation *Ex Nihilo*

In contemporary philosophical debate, there arises a discussion on creationism and neo-Darwinian evolutionism that concerns the possibility of indicating rational justifications for the beginnings of the existence of the world and man. As Maryniarczyk indicates, contemporary supporters of evolutionism assume that the issues concerning the study of the beginnings of the existence of the world and man have long been closed. Evolutionists justify their argumentation with the fact that the world, man and other individual beings were created through the so-called 'god of evolution', and some are even able to accept the theory of the 'big bang' or eternally evolving matter in their explanation of reality, in order to avoid the theory of creationism as the truth about the creation of the world.[20] Maryniarczyk points out that by rejecting this truth, evolutionists have no grounds for elucidating the rationality and teleology of the world. Therefore, it is necessary to become more familiar with the philosophical/metaphysical theory of creation which is the theory of *creatio ex nihilo* in order to note its validity in answering the question of the ultimate explanation of the world (its teleology and rationality).[21]

[20] As Maryniarczyk points out, posing questions about the ultimate cause of the existence of the world, persons and things, as well as seeking answers to them, lies within the competence of metaphysics, not of the natural-cosmological sciences. All natural-cosmological theories based on a particular method, in this case the method of the natural sciences, fall into the error of methodological incompetence. Due to the limitations of the method, as well as the conclusions and theorems they formulate, they do not elucidate the whole world, but only a fragment of it. Such an action testifies to a certain range of explanation of the world, by pointing only to partial causes of the existence of the world and man. It is only by means of the metaphysical theory of creation that the final causes of the existence of the world and man are searched for, thus encompassing the whole world. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Metaphysical Creationism and the Paradoxes of Evolutionary Theism: A Contribution to the Discussion within Contemporary Thomism," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* [Philosophical Annals] LXVIII, no. 4 (2020): 169–198.

[21] Maryniarczyk, *The Realistic Interpretation of Reality*, 46–47.

In this context, Maryniarczyk's primary task was to reiterate and characterize the metaphysical theory of creationism, which is a cause for discussion within contemporary Thomism. The metaphysical theory of creationism arose from the analysis of really existing things, which are given in human experience, as variable and unnecessary (contingent) in existence. This theory holds that the world did not arise from some pre-existing substrate, but was wholly called into existence by the Creator through an act of intellect and will. The theory of creationism, formulated in the 13th century by St. Thomas Aquinas, is a theory that comes from the philosophical explanation of the origins of the world and man.[22] It is closely related to the understanding of being, which is connected with the discovery of the composition of being, *i.e.*, essence and existence, as well as with the understanding of the Absolute as the cause of the existence of all things (the efficient cause of creation).

Following St Thomas Aquinas, Maryniarczyk commences his analyses by rejecting the thesis that things come into being from something, *i.e.*, that the whole reality is created from eternal matter. Therefore, in the field of philosophy, there appears the problem of so-called *opinio communis*, according to which the world as a whole exists eternally, and 'nothing comes into being from nothing' (*ex nihilo nihil fit*).[23] To this end, Maryniarczyk evokes an argumentation in favor of undermining the eternal existence of reality, which at the same time will become a metaphysical argumentation supporting the theory of *creatio ex nihilo*. An important point is the discovery of the contingent nature of beings and the world, which in their existence are dependent on the ultimate cause, which is the source of all existence, *i.e.*, the Creator. Therefore, at the basis of the understanding of the metaphysical theory of *creatio ex nihilo* lies the fact of the composition of being from

[22] Andrzej Maryniarczyk, "Philosophical Creationism: Thomas Aquinas' Metaphysics of *Creatio ex Nihilo*," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 1 (2016): 220.
[23] *Ibid.*, 242.

essence and existence, as well as the indication of the act of existence as a correlate of every being. It needs to be noted that existence as a constitutive factor of being is not identical with the content determining the essence of things. Therefore, the world as a whole, as well as everything that exists in this world, does not involve the reason for its existence. Such an assertion means that the existence of being demands an external cause. Accordingly, closely related to the act of existence is the understanding of a Being that 'exists in and through itself' (*Ipsum Esse*).[24] We are speaking here of the Absolute Being, *i.e.*, the Creator, being the Pure Act, the Supreme Good, that constitutes the efficient cause of creation. The Creator as the efficient cause of existence acts by virtue of reason and will, without any intermediaries. Creation, as Maryniarczyk notes, is the introduction of beings into existence by an act of the Creator's intellect and will, and therefore the world, as well as particular beings, are carriers of the Creator's thought. The act of creation is also the act of creating the first relations and dependencies in being. With the introduction of beings into existence, the first relations and references are established. Therefore, the introduction of beings into existence indicates the order of philosophical investigations.

The result of Maryniarczyk's research is to show creation as a relation of dependence on the source of existence, which is the Creator. By discovering the dependence of every being on the Creator, attention is drawn to the fact that each thing is willed and cognized by Him. The relation of every being to the Creator, distinguished within the framework of the theory *creatio ex nihilo*, finally explains, in the context of the creative cause, the fact of the contingent nature of beings. The metaphysical theory of creation plays an important role in the reflection on

[24] Maryniarczyk notes that the discovery of the Creator as *Ipsum Esse* (Self-Existence) entails the discovery of the Creator as a Person, and therefore a rational and free being.

the rationality and teleology of the world.[25] The source of existence, which is the Creator, is also the source of the laws governing the existence of things (identity, consistency, excluded middle), which determine the rationality of every accidental being. In this context, the world appears as rational, since it is an act of the Creator's intellect, and thanks to that it can be cognizable. The theory of creation is also closely related to the category of teleology. Maryniarczyk argues that beings are ascribed to the will of the Creator, which means that every contingent being is willed by Him. The whole of reality is characterized by teleology, because it is the effect of the Creator's free will; moreover, the will is inscribed in beings in the form of a purpose, expressing their good.[26] For this reason, the Creator, being the Supreme Good, constitutes the ultimate goal of the pursuit of beings. Therefore, through the metaphysical theory of creation *ex nihilo*, the ultimate dimension of the teleology of reality is indicated and philosophically justified.

In the light of Maryniarczyk's considerations on the metaphysical theory of creation *ex nihilo*, it should be stated that it provides an answer to the question about the ultimate cause of the existence of the world and man, it is also the key to further research on the ontic foundations of reality. Additionally, it should be noted that the metaphysical theory of creation *ex nihilo* shows an important place and role in the philosophical elucidation of the world, as well as demonstrates an inalienable methodological value, being the culmination of the whole system of metaphysics.

[25] Maryniarczyk, "Philosophical Creationism: Thomas Aquinas' Metaphysics of *Creatio ex Nihilo*," 263–265.

[26] Maryniarczyk, "Metaphysical Creationism and the Paradoxes of Evolutionary Theism: A Contribution to the Discussion within Contemporary Thomism," 185.

Conclusion

The conception of realistic metaphysics developed by Andrzej Maryniarczyk is, for methodological and systemic reasons, a kind of research exception on the plane of contemporary philosophical conceptions. The conception of metaphysics he proposes shows an original attempt to formulate important philosophical problems anew.

Maryniarczyk reflected on the system of metaphysics, which constitutes an adequate cognitive response to the way reality exists. He also reflected on the fundamental properties which influence the formulation of such a system. The research on metaphysical separation allowed him to indicate that, on the grounds of his conception of metaphysical philosophy, it constitutes a basic research method. The method of separation was developed on the basis of discerning the object of metaphysics, taking into account the manner of its existence, as well as guaranteeing the realism of cognitive approaches. Maryniarczyk also developed the metaphysical theory of creation *ex nihilo*, which played an important role in his realistic metaphysics by introducing into the area of philosophical research the issue of the existence of the world, as well as the question about its source and ultimate cause.

The problems discussed in this article fully correspond with contemporary philosophical research. The presented considerations concerning Maryniarczyk's concept of metaphysical philosophy provide the starting point for further research on this issue. They might include such issues as: the character of the language of metaphysics, as well as the specific nature of explaining and justifying judgments in metaphysics. Due to the significance of these issues in contemporary literature, there arises a need to study them separately.

Specific Research Elements in Andrzej Maryniarczyk's Realistic Metaphysics

SUMMARY

The paper deals with the specific nature of research in realistic metaphysics by Andrzej Maryniarczyk. The first part presents the method of realistic metaphysics, *i.e.*, metaphysical separation, which constitutes the basic method of forming the understanding of being. The second part focuses on the characteristics of the system of metaphysics as a cognitive response to the existence of reality. The third part concentrates on the metaphysical theory of creation *ex nihilo*, showing the essential aspects of this theory. All the presented issues constitute important complements, which integrate the metaphysics practiced by A. Maryniarczyk into a whole.

KEYWORDS

Andrzej Maryniarczyk, realistic metaphysics, system of metaphysics, separation, being, creation *ex nihilo*.

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Arkadiusz Gudaniec

The Existential Metaphysics of the Person. Part 2: *Esse Personale* and the Metaphysical Turn

This paper is a continuation of my article entitled "The Existential Metaphysics of the Person. Part 1: The Classical Concept of the Person and the Metaphysical Theory of *Esse*."[1] Both papers are designed to present a research project aimed at introducing the concept of the existential metaphysics of the person—a contribution to classical anthropology based on so-called existential metaphysics. The first paper discussed the roots of this concept in the light of the classical concept of the person (especially the philosophical thought of St. Thomas Aquinas), and presented the theoretical model of the metaphysics of the person developed in the Lublin Philosophical School in Poland as a contemporized version of Aquinas's concept. Against the background of the first one, this second paper is an attempt to show the philosophical breakthrough resulting from the adoption of the concept of *esse personale*.

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The Metaphysical Significance of *Esse Personale*

In order to sufficiently emphasize the theoretical significance of the concept of *esse personale* (personal existence), one must point to its distinct reliance on the crucial assertions of the general theory of being. Personal existence functions as a foundation for personal action (*operari sequitur esse*), and this allows personal existence, among others things, to more fervently and more radically justify the thesis claiming that the person cannot be encompassed by the natural sciences alone.[2] Such an understanding of the person and their existence essentially belongs to the order of philosophical considerations: the person is discussed here not on the grounds of some prior theories or definitions, but on the grounds of personal experience as the point of departure. For this reason an in-depth reflection concerning so-called anthropological experience seems necessary.[3]

The inquiries conducted by Karol Wojtyła lead to the conclusion that the concept of *esse personale* in itself is open to dialogue with contemporary thought, assuming the priority of experience and a realistic point of departure. The primacy of existence before action (*operari sequitur esse*) became the basis for the affirmation of the act of personal existence (*esse personale*), thus underlying all of the dynamisms of the person. Since the person is a subject (*suppositum*) of existence and action, then its proper existence (*esse*) is personal, not only individual, in the sense of an individualized nature. The fullness of the notion of a person is expressed by uniqueness rather than by concreteness. A per-

[2] Max Scheler had a similar claim. In the latter part of his intellectual activity he sought for a substantive notion of the human being which could be acquired independently from scientific methods. See *The Human Place in the Cosmos*, trans. Manfred S. Frings (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2009), 6ff.

[3] For more on this topic, see, *e.g.*, Gerd Haeffner, *The Human Situation: A Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. Eric Watkins (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1989), part A, §1 and §4.

son does not solely mean "'individualized humanness'; it actually consists rather in the mode of individual being that pertains (from among all the types of existing beings) to mankind alone. This mode of being stems from the fact that the peculiar type of being proper to mankind is personal."[4]

Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, in his analysis, similarly demonstrates that classical anthropology is prolific, i.e., it can be developed and opens up new research perspectives (assuming the priority of metaphysics and the objective order). Krąpiec's personalism, based on traditional metaphysics in which a crucial role is played by existence as an act of being, turns out to be a fairly intransigent approach, forcing a radical change in the understanding of the person—just as the metaphysical concept of *esse* requires a radical change of thinking about being. The person is a being in the fundamental sense and this constitutes a model of being's self-understanding.[5] The person is already given in primordial experience, not only in a theory or a notion, and is given from the side of existence (the metaphysical primacy of existence over essence).

[4] Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979), 83. Wojtyła explicitly indicated here Thomas Aquinas's concept of *esse*, the extension and specific continuation of which is supposed to be the theory of person's action, thus rooted in personal existence. Wojtyła, whilst agreeing with Aquinas's concept, points to human nature as the appropriate basis of dynamic unity (cohesion), whereas its deepest foundation is *esse*. Humanness is, therefore, the only nature which really exists individually as a person. Hence every human dynamism has a personal trait. This is the so-called integration of nature and humanity in the person. See *ibid*., 83–85.

[5] Under the influence of 19th century tendencies in science, an exemplary form of being was assumed to be the simplest, *i.e.*, the least complex material being. In this way, the simplest material instances of being became the model of rationality and self-understanding, as a result of which personal beings turned out to be rationally the most incomprehensible (the Absolute Being was the most incomprehensible being). See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Odzyskać świat realny* (Lublin: TN KUL, 1993), 612. This model set the standards of rationality in the period of Krąpiec's activities and with regard to that model, based mainly on the postulates of positivism, he formulated his theses. Despite the noticeable changes which took place in recent years in the field of philosophy, the influence of positivism still seems to be quite significant, and the thesis concerning the domination of the level of things in science and culture has not lost its prominence.

The person is also recognized as a paradigm of beingness, as a substance existing within itself (the metaphysical primacy of a person over a thing).[6]

The primacy of existence over essence may be clearly noticed in the direct experience of "I," which is constantly present in experienced acts. I cognize the existence of "I" differently than in the case of affirming the existence of external beings (where the cognizing subject concentrates on substantive aspects), with the constantly accessible view of the being coming from within, whereby the continuous affirmation of the primacy and transcendence of existence over essence (substance, traits, properties) occurs. The subject feels that its acts do not constitute its "I," but they emanate from the "I"; they are (causatively) attributed to it.[7] Recognizing existence as the bridge connecting thinking to objective reality thus enables the unity of the human being with the world. The splitting of reality into the realm of being and the realm of consciousness ("I") therefore may be eliminated on the grounds of philosophy by concepts based on the personal *esse*.

A person, "in the general understanding of man (in both philosophical and theological anthropology) and in explaining the individual fact of being a man, is never an end point, but always a special starting point."[8] The human being, at the very source of experiencing themselves, discovers themselves to be a person, i.e., an "I," an independently existing, autonomous subject, identical with themselves, with their own actions emanating from themselves, thus expressing their personal nature. The personal "I," constituted by *esse* and proportional to the

[6] I presented Krąpiec's metaphysical personalism in: Arkadiusz Gudaniec, "The Foundations of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's Metaphysical Personalism," *Forum Philosophicum* 19, no. 1 (2014): 61–96.

[7] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1988), 110.

[8] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "*Man* in *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*," *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 4 (October–December 2018): 638.

individual subject, is something more familiar to us in our personal actions, more primordial than our nature.[9] The existence of the person is therefore a unique type of existence, which in the case of a human being manifests itself in the perpetual organizing of their "own" nature, thus expressing not only the power of ruling over this nature, but also the need of matter without which the human person cannot express themselves in their own personal action.

In this way the application of the metaphysical concept of *esse* in anthropology opens the path of moving *proprium humanum* from the essential level, where the human being is constituted by traits stemming from human nature, to the existential level (*esse personale*)—with this presenting the uniqueness of the person as an completely different type of existence. A person exists by virtue of their own act of existence, which is a primary act and dynamizes the entire being of a person, i.e., all secondary acts.[10] The extension of this revelatory intuition, included in the inquires of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec and Karol Wojtyła, allows us to formulate a thesis in light of which personal existence lays the foundation for a distinctly understood existential metaphysics of the person. This concept leads to the necessity of a clearer posing of the issue of the person on the grounds of classical philosophy, which may be connected with the substantial modifications of some solutions hitherto assumed in classical anthropology, including those concerning the relations between anthropology and metaphysics.[11] Since *esse* is the most perfect element in being, as it is the act of being itself (that which actualizes being), whereas the person is the most perfect being, then *esse*

[9] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1991), 142; Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Karola Wojtyły 'Osoba i czyn'," in *idem, Człowiek – kultura – uniwersytet* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1998), 76.

[10] For more on this topic, see, among other works, Wojtyła's analyses in *The Acting Person*, 71–85.

[11] It will be discussed more in depth later on in this article.

personale is the most perfect act of being that justifies not only the essential uniqueness and distinctness of being a person, but also establishes the model for beingness at large.[12]

On the one hand, as the pinnacle moment of metaphysics of the person, personal existence presents the human being as one that exists in the world of real beings. And on the other hand, personal existence fundamentally and completely differentiates the human mode of existence among all other forms of existence. This concept, therefore, makes one aware of the necessity to include the double perspective (subjective–objective) in examinations of the human being. In this case the metaphysical theory of analogy turns out to be indispensable,[13] as it guarantees, i.a., a theoretical safeguard from falling into anthropological dualism. Reaching for the theory of analogy in this case turns out to be very creative because it leads to the disclosure of the ultimate foundation for the analogy of personal existence. The personal "I" is a being to such an extent that it can be analogically understood as existence, and at the same time differs so greatly from non-personal beings (understood as things) that it can be seen only as personal existence, i.e., an existence which is entirely unique and radically different.[14]

Pointing to personal existence explains the uniqueness of the person and simultaneously reveals the mystery of the person. Existence,

[12] One must also remember that the principles which are universally binding in existential metaphysics apply to the same degree to *esse personale*; especially the principle of juxtaposing existence to essence, in light of which *esse* is a non-conceptualizable element, apprehensible solely via an existential judgment, as well as the metaphysical priority of existence over essence.

[13] On a global scale, a unique description of the theory of analogy as a predominantly metaphysical theory can be found in Krąpiec's monograph entitled *Teoria analogii bytu* [Theory of the Analogy of Being] (Lublin: RW KUL, 1993). See also Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Analogia," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, vol. 1 (Lublin: PTTA, 2000), 210–220.

[14] Existence is most perfect in the person because it is simultaneously experienced internally, as if "from within," but is also cognized "from outside" by analogy with the existence of all other beings.

however, is not a category of conceptual knowledge. While knowing ourselves from the side of our own existence, which is given to us directly and in an individually unique way, it still remains for us a mystery as to who we are because we do not have a direct insight into our essence. Personal existence, nonetheless, allows us to cognize ourselves as persons and reveals the transcendent dimension, described in short as a reference to the truth. It is impossible to entirely objectivize the experience of being a person because we inevitably encounter an insurmountable barrier: essential aspects of consciousness (especially subjectivity) are also beyond the grasp of the natural sciences. The person is ultimately a mystery which reveals itself only partially and even in the experience of their own "I" largely remains "veiled." This being "veiled," in order to "unveil" the absolute dimension of the person, opens the field for perennial questions on the origins and purpose of a person's life—a realm accessible solely (apart from revealed knowledge) through metaphysically oriented philosophy.

The New Metaphysics of the Person

The basis for existential metaphysics of the person, which is outlined in this article, is the assertion that the distinctive human feature is not human nature as such—though on the grounds of nature specific traits differentiate the human being from other species, similarly as is the case with other *differentiae*—but human existence. The human is constituted by the uniqueness of a completely different mode of existence (*esse personale*), with the simultaneous acceptance of the analogy of existence that guarantees both the realism of persons-subjects and the realness of things. As we have seen, the first attempts of drawing attention to this specificity and uniqueness of the person were initiated by Thomas Aquinas in his reflection on the specificity of the human soul which has its "own" act of existence and "grants it [existence]" to

the body, thus forming a human being.[15] Already in Aquinas's philosophy one could notice the origins of the claim that the basis of human nature is a unique existence, described as personal existence. The same uniqueness was stressed in the many differing theories of the modern age by way of placing subjectivity in the centre of philosophical reflection—however, erroneously by way of reaching a certain extreme within the subjective approach, i.e., immanentism, radical idealism, etc.[16] In the contemporary age, especially in existentialism (mainly in Heidegger and Jaspers), emphasis was put on the uniqueness of human existence and the meaning of the individual's life, thus taking into account the privileged treatment of the context of one's internal life and experiences.

Based on these considerations, both on a systemic and historical levels, we can ascertain that the concept of personal existence has not been clearly formulated and differentiated so far. While remaining in the shadow of classical metaphysics, the concept of *esse personale* as something new and one-of-a-kind has not been sufficiently elaborated upon in a systemic manner, as it was predominantly considered in the context of a general understanding of *esse*. Thus its uniqueness has not been noticed, or indeed has been marginalized. But even if we set out from the concept of personal existence and the metaphysics of the person based on it, treated solely as a continuation or distinct case of general existential metaphysics, we will clearly notice the radicality of personal existence which subsequently gains a voice, comparable to that of the concept of *esse* in metaphysics. *Esse personale*, however, is not on-

[15] *Cf. S.Th.*, I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5: "[A]nima illud esse in quo ipsa subsistit, communicat materiae corporali, ex qua et anima intellectiva fit unum, ita quod illud esse quod est totius compositi, est etiam ipsius animae. Quod non accidit in aliis formis, quae non sunt subsistentes. Et propter hoc anima humana remanet in suo esse, destructo corpore, non autem aliae formae."

[16] Wojtyła, drawing abundantly on early modern and contemporary philosophy, treated this extremum as a warning. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 57–58, 114.

ly a particular type of *esse*, but it constitutes *esse* with a source character: it is in a way an *esse* paradigm. This radically different mode of existence of a person not only goes beyond (transcends) any grades in the hierarchy of being, but more importantly cannot be reduced at all to a categorial difference on account of which the human being is distinguishable on the natural level.

Therefore, the concept of personal existence points to the radical uniqueness of a person in an ontic sense (not only in a phenomenological or axiological one), and is based on strong theoretical foundations thanks to the metaphysical theory of *esse*. The person is a distinctly existing subject who "fulfils" its nature (i.e., humanness), whereas personal existence itself allows one to speak of the human being both as a being (real, existing, given in the context of the world) as well as the self-aware and unique "I," where theoretical discourse intersects with the intimate aspects of experiencing a person as a concrete individual.[17] Moreover, as was demonstrated by the inquiries made at the Lublin Philosophical School, especially by Karol Wojtyła, this approach generates a possibility of harmonizing phenomenological and metaphysical measures. The concept of personal existence is not only a theory of a metaphysical type, but is also a kind of phenomenological description of the original experience of the person.[18]

Such a synthesizing personalistic-metaphysical approach may constitute a foundation for the most comprehensive and fundamental theory of the person and also may point to new ways of resolving numerous theoretical difficulties concerning the essence of the human being. The theory of existence as an act of being connected with the concept of a

[17] Wojtyła drew attention to this hurdle. By concentrating in his research on subjective aspects, he analyzed the experience of the individual, focusing as such not on its objectivization, but rather on its intersubjectivization. See Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, 16–17.

[18] It was discussed in detail in my book *U podstaw jedności bytowej człowieka. Studium z metafizyki osoby* (Lublin: PTTA–KUL, 2016), 323–328, 390–397, 406–411.

person, allows one to transcend essentialist limitations of philosophy to a significant degree: it makes for a solution, for example, to contemporary debates on the classical problem of the incognizability of the soul-body relation.[19] Existence is not conceptualizable—as a personal existence, it can be directly accessed through subjective (intuitive) experience and then expressed by the so-called existential judgments. The personal existence transcends the fundamental contradiction between the subjective and objective perspectives, and reveals itself as a "place" in which these perspectives converge. The objective perspective reaches existence via a direct act of existential judgment that is a natural and spontaneous type of cognition. This act liberates the philosophy of the human being from the constraints of pure essentialism. The subjective perspective, on the other hand, purged of all *a priori* concepts of consciousness, reveals a necessary dependence of the subject on the ontic order, and demonstrates that personal existence is experienced by concrete persons as their irreducibility to things, unrepeatability, uniqueness, etc. These perspectives converge in *esse personale*, which means that the subjective experience of a person is based on the metaphysical *esse* and at the same time the metaphysical *esse* of a person is encompassed in the basic subjective act, i.e., the existential judgment concerning one's own existence. Consequently, the concept of *esse personale*, like no other, is able not only to protect the human experience from idealism and immanentism, but also to retain realism within the subjective experience of the person.

Personal existence is the most profound ontic principle which provides a common perspective for unilateral (objective or subjective)

[19] This is one of the problems which is particularly familiar to classical anthropology and which is also analyzed by contemporary philosophy of mind (where the soul was replaced by the mind). The problem of the incognizability of the mind-body relation was posed, i.a., by C. McGinn (*e.g.*, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?," *Mind* 98 [1989]: 349–366). According to him, our natural cognitive limitations are the reason why we will never be able to resolve the mind-body problem.

approaches in philosophy. Thus, it also shows the fundamental, perhaps insufficiently noticed so far, level of human unity, at which the perspectives of being and consciousness are united as the objective and subjective dimensions of the person. The so-called concomitant reflection is a unifying point on the side of human consciousness. The subjectiveness of the concomitant reflection cannot be reduced to its immanence, because a person must relate to their own thoughts and judgments in order to ascertain the veracity or falsity of these acts. In this way, what emerges in the subjective dimension of the person is an objective element, which is the condition for the functioning of the person as a person.[20] The concept of personal existence allows one to grasp the objective and subjective side of human essence as one thing—in other words, it allows one to understand human subjectivity in a way that at the same time reveals its rootedness in objective reality.[21]

The Metaphysical Turn

While attempting to renew philosophical anthropology, as based on the concept of personal existence, one must be aware of several basic issues.

First, without metaphysical tools it is impossible to cognize the ontic status of a person, i.e., ultimately understand what and whom a human person is. Therefore, the necessity to return to metaphysical reflection on the grounds of philosophical anthropology seems to be the initial and fundamental research postulate which one should clearly make, especially in view of various anti-personalistic threats that are

[20] See Wojciech Chudy, *Rozwój filozofowania a "pułapka refleksji." Filozofia refleksji i próby jej przezwyciężenia* (Lublin: RW KUL, 1995), 89–92.

[21] Consequently, the concept of personal existence, assuming its continued development and systemic clarification, is also capable of regaining theoretical coherence of knowledge about the human being and therefore plays an important role in contemporary anthropological debates.

present in contemporary culture. Consequently, one should defend the assertion that classical metaphysics, rooted in Aristotle's thoughts, is a distinct and theoretically legitimate type of cognition and mode of explanation, and in its existential version (the concept of *esse*) radically deepens the rational insight into reality, thus leading to a particular sort of intellectual contemplation (the so-called "third voyage"[22]). This distinct type of cognition also assumes and requires creative continuation, development, supplementation, acknowledging of new research contexts, etc.

Second, the relation between anthropology (including its original point of departure in the form of the experience of "I") and metaphysics, which postulates the ultimate explanation of the person on the ontic level, needs to be thought through more thoroughly. This relation may be described by pointing to the mutual dependence of its members. Anthropology needs metaphysics because through metaphysical existential judgments a person has access to the world and in a way this binds the person and his (or her) internal experience with genuine reality. Metaphysics, in turn, needs anthropology because, through the anthropological experience of "I," a person reaches directly his (or her) being "from within," where it manifests itself in the most perfect manner. Perhaps it is thanks to its reference to the personal "experience of being" that traditional metaphysics can regain its prominent position in the domain of cognition and conduct dialogue on this ground with other personalist currents.

Third, explanation of the person cannot be encompassed within the limits of some general theory of reality or some general theory of self. In light of the concept of *esse personale*, the understanding of the person as a being turns out to be insufficient, because it is not enough to

[22] This term was promoted and effectively defended by Vittorio Possenti. See his *Nihilism and Metaphysics. The Third Voyage*, trans. Daniel B. Gallagher (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2014).

treat *esse personale* as a regular type of *esse*.[23] On account of this, it seems that one should consider anew the relation between metaphysics and anthropology in order to find out whether the function of anthropology as a particular metaphysics has been entirely thought through. Anthropology cannot encompass the human being solely within objective analysis, and metaphysical methods alone are not enough to fully understand the specificity of the person. It turns out that what is also necessary are both appropriate methods of describing experience (namely phenomenological methods) and methods that could harmonize descriptive approach with metaphysical explanation.[24] One may consistently claim that the concept of personal existence, as discerned and formulated within the field of metaphysics, manifests the pinnacle of metaphysical cognition, as it is cognition which concerns the most perfect type of existence. This fact should be perceived as a need for a special treatment of personal existence on the grounds of metaphysics.

Metaphysical discourse about the person in light of the concept of *esse personale* is conducted differently from the way it is usually the case in traditional anthropology. Such a discourse does not have an objective character because personal existence is given primordially in the experience of one's self. Since, in turn, the inner experience of the person reveals most fully what constitutes being, the anthropological experience of the person's self should have priority over metaphysical theories—indeed, a priority understood as something more than simply permitting data from experience to be the point of departure of the theory of the human being.

[23] It seems that the concept of personal existence, metaphysically understood as *esse personale ut actus essendi personae*, is something more than just a simple application of the general metaphysical theory of *esse ut actus essendi* to the particular case of the person.

[24] Attempts at such a harmonization were undertaken by both Karol Wojtyła and Mieczysław A. Krąpiec.

This research postulate also points to the necessity for the reinterpretation of some approaches within classical anthropology, such as, e.g., the theory of the human soul. Since the soul gives the body its existence, one should more clearly articulate the meaning of this assertion and draw from it all of its most important consequences. The thesis concerning the specificity of the human soul leads to the assertion that personal existence permeates the entirety of human nature, which means that the human body (an organism, i.e., that which in empirical research has a purely naturalistic character) "becomes" a person and exists in a new manner: not like an organized cluster of organic cells, but through attribution to a substantially superior mode of existence that reveals existence as being subjective, self-aware, free, etc. Similarly, taking into account a certain radicalism of the concept of *esse personale*, one must look through the lens of it at such metaphysical theories as the theory of act and potency, the theory of substance, and the theory of life, in a new way.

The postulated metaphysics of the person must also confront theoretical problems concerning the foundations of anthropology: its point of departure and mode of justifying hypotheses. In this case, the foremost role is played by the question regarding the appropriate measure of the subjective factor and its relation to the metaphysical foundations of the person: the subjective factor is that which can expose the objectivity of the person to serious difficulties and even dangers. Influential concepts of modern and contemporary philosophy entangled the theory of the person into subjectivism, and thus attempted to understand the person within the domain of consciousness. It seems that an effective solution to this issue was presented by Karol Wojtyła who managed to successfully distance himself from subjectivist reductions and absolutizations. He left, however, his successors with an uneasy task of improving upon his path of reflection or even discovering similar paths of their own. When considering the rules which were to regulate these issues, a

key role should be played by *esse personale*: since the problems with the subjectivization of the theory of the person fundamentally concern essential aspects, only an adequately understood existence is able to defend personalistic thought against the absolutization of the subjective side. In order, however, to succeed in realizing this postulate, a solid metaphysical foundation is indispensably required.

The concept of personal existence continuously remains a productive area of philosophical investigation. Moreover, it is capable of facing the great anthropological challenges of our time in a new fashion. As was mentioned before, the specificity of personal existence carries with itself a crucial openness. Metaphysics of the person based on *esse personale* opens up a broad field for anthropological discussion and for dialogue with contemporary schools of personalism. It can also be creative and revelatory in a dialogue with other philosophical concepts or solutions resulting from the intersection of empirical sciences and humanities. The important point is to highlight theories which stress the unique character of the person (regardless of critical remarks referring to other elements of these theories). The theory of the existential metaphysics of the person can shed new light on the pursuit of a common ground for philosophical personalism and empirical sciences. It would be acceptable or even desirable for various methods of examining the human being from the perspective of human nature to emerge—provided that they accept the fact of personal existence and the philosophical methods of examining it (as personal existence is accessible only at the philosophical level).

Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to draw attention to the groundbreaking concept of *esse personale* whose theoretical consequence consists in a radically different treatment of the person on the grounds of exis-

tential metaphysics. The theses that were presented, despite the occasionally provocative form in which they were expressed, take form of questions rather than answers and are supposed to encourage further reflection in this field. All the remarks that were made lead to a conclusion that not all (ultimate) inferences have yet been drawn from the concept of *esse personale*. Following further this line of thought, one may rightly ask whether so far we have managed to explore the entire depth of the metaphysics of existence. Perhaps a new philosophical turn —made in the face of contemporary anthropological debates—should reveal anew the metaphysical concept of *esse* as such and demonstrate how creative the enrichment of philosophical cognition through the theoretically deepened concept of *esse personale* can be. For only *esse personale* allows one to know being through its supreme form: the person.

Although until now all the attempts to understand being from the perspective of a knowing subject have turned out to be inaccurate (e.g., the Heideggerian *Dasein*), the intuitions which lie at their basis can be considered accurate to a certain degree. If these intuitions do not concern "forms" of being and the realness of the world as such, but rather existence that is given in the experience of "I," we can ascertain that it is a person that is this type of existence and, what is more, has a direct insight into their own existence. It means that such a manner of revealing existence (in the experience of "I") should be considered to a certain degree superior—provided, however, that it should always remain in the shadow of the existence of reality, primordially given and "awakening" the experience of "I." Surely it is necessary to investigate these philosophical themes deeper by making use of the methods of classical and contemporized metaphysics and by adding new methods of insight which, as one can easily infer from existing attempts, are mostly phenomenological ones. One must hope that such inquiries shall be undertaken, and that the significance of personal existence shall be noticed

and adequately theoretically systematized. It would surely enable us to gain a better understanding of who we are.

The Existential Metaphysics of the Person.
Part 2: *Esse Personale* and the Metaphysical Turn

SUMMARY

Against the background of the model of the metaphysics of the person (presented in the article "The Existential Metaphysics of the Person. Part 1: The Classical Concept of the Person and the Metaphysical Theory of *Esse*," *Studia Gilsoniana* 10, no. 2) which was initiated by Thomas Aquinas and developed in the Lublin Philosophical School, this paper focuses on the attempt to show the philosophical breakthrough that the concept of personal existence can bring, and points out the most important theoretical consequences of adopting this theory in metaphysics. It outlines the elements of a new metaphysics of the person, based on the concept of personal existence, and hypothesizes about the metaphysical turn this concept could make. The investigations undertaken in the paper lead to the conclusion that not all inferences have yet been drawn from the concept of *esse personale*, and that the entire depth of the metaphysics of existence has not yet been explored.

KEYWORDS

Thomas Aquinas, Lublin Philosophical School, Karol Wojtyła, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, man, human being, person, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of man, metaphysics of the person, metaphysical personalism, existence, personal existence, *esse personale*, *esse*, *esse ut actus essendi*, realistic metaphysics, existential metaphysics.

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Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics

If Thomism is to be more than a venerated relic, we must follow Aquinas in engaging contemporary issues. Thus, it was gratifying to see Fr. Michał Chaberek, O.P., consider evolution from a Thomist perspective.[1] Unfortunately, three crucial errors marred his analysis.[2] First, he has an ultra-realist view of species. Second, he misunderstands Darwin's motivation, principles and conclusions. Third, he fails to see that metaphysics is too abstract to critique evolution. Responding to these issues led to reflections on the problem of universals, the nature of species, and the division of sciences in St. Thomas's *Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*.

With regard to universals, I suggested that moderate realists can define species in alternate ways by fixing upon diverse aspects of organisms' intelligibility. This was insufficiently explained. My *projective realism* sees us as approaching reality from multiple perspectives

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[1] Michal Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics and Theistic Evolution: Why Are They Incompatible?" *Studia Gilsoniana* 8, no. 1 (January–March 2019): 47. Here after cited as: "Classical Metaphysics."

[2] Dennis F. Polis, "The Compatibility of Evolution and Classical Metaphysics," *Studia Gilsoniana* 9, no. 4 (October–December 2020): 551. Hereafter cited as: "Compatibility."

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and projecting it into various conceptual spaces.[3] No such projection is exhaustive, but identifying their points of correspondence allows us to integrate several into a fuller understanding—perhaps unearthing points a projection has missed in its own right. The current discussion seeks to reconcile the philosophical and biological projections of species.

Chaberek[4] and Robert A. Delfino[5] published thoughtful responses to my critique. Chaberek disputes virtually every point. Delfino is "sympathetic to at least some kind of Theistic evolution,"[6] but believes my views flawed by nominalism and unappreciation of Aquinas's existential revolution. While I thank them for their courtesy, both mistake my position. This is understandable because of the complexity of the issues.

Chaberek's response convinced me that I had mistaken his position. His references to "evolution," "Darwin," and "the interplay of chance and necessity," led me to think he was criticizing Darwin's theory. Although partially true, I should have grasped that he is narrowly focused on the thesis that species evolve naturally. Thus, much of my criticism was misdirected; nevertheless, I rebutted his thesis that new species require supernatural causation.

Because my critics level similar charges, I offer a combined response to avoid repetition.

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[3] Dennis F. Polis, "Paradigms for an Open Philosophy," *Metaphilosophy* 24, no 1 (1993): 33. "Projections" are named after the complementary views in technical drawings, *e.g.*, the front and rear elevations of a house. We have different conceptual spaces because we have individual potential intellects. *Cf. Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 75, ad. 1.

[4] Michal Chaberek, "Metaphysics and Evolution: A Response to Dennis F. Polis," *Studia Gilsoniana* 10, no. 1 (January–March 2021): 45. Hereafter cited as: "A Response."

[5] Robert A. Delfino, "The Compatibility of Evolution and Thomistic Metaphysics: A Reply to Dennis F. Polis," *Studia Gilsoniana* 10, no. 1 (January–March 2021): 71. Hereafter cited as: "A Reply."

[6] *Ibid.*, 71.

Species and Nominalism

> Both respondents accuse me of nominalism. Delfino writes:
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> > Polis wants to avoid nominalism, and he wants to base species on the properties of populations in reality. However, by reducing species to human concepts, and by denying that natures and species are ultimately grounded in God, his position results in a kind of nominalism.[7]

He continues, saying I deny species members have the same kind of substantial from, which I do not, and suggesting I am a conceptualist, which I cannot be, as I base universals on reality. Chaberek claims "Dr. Polis wrongly interprets Aristotle and Aquinas as nominalists—notions exist only in the intellect, in reality only accidents exist."[8] Again, "On Polis's account natures are only *entia rationis* that are ideas in the mind. This is a formulation of nominalism that strays from classical metaphysics."[9] Neither quotes me to support his accusations and both substitute their wording for my technical terms, *e.g.*, "nature" for "species."

> What is nominalism? Over a century ago Maurice De Wulf wrote,
>
> > Nominalism . . . models the concept on the external object, which it holds to be individual and particular. Nominalism consequently denies the existence of abstract and universal concepts, and refuses to admit that the intellect has the power of engendering them. What are called general ideas are only names, mere verbal designations, serving as labels for a collection of things or a series of particular events.[10]

More recently, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra informed us,

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[7] *Ibid.*, 91.

[8] Chaberek, "A Response," 55.

[9] *Ibid.*, 62.

[10] Maurice De Wulf, "Nominalism, Realism, Conceptualism," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 11 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1911). Available online—see the section *References* for details.

> The word "Nominalism," as used by contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. In one sense, its most traditional sense deriving from the Middle Ages, it implies the rejection of universals. In another, more modern but equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstract objects.[11]

I never wrote only accidents exist, questioned God's creative omnipotence, or said that *natures* are *entia rationis*. I doubt neither universal concepts, nor the intellect's power to engender them. I reject the substantive existence of abstract objects, so I am a nominalist in Rodriguez-Pereyra's second sense, but neither critic refers to it. Still, their confusion is unsurprising. Distinguishing moderate realists from nominalists can be difficult. A number of contemporary thinkers call St. Thomas a nominalist. *E.g.*, Brian Leftow claims he is a "trope nominalist," and says David Armstrong sees him as a "concept nominalist."[12]

Such confusion has a long history. Fredrick Copleston, S.J., notes that "the foundations of the Thomist doctrine of moderate realism had . . . been laid before the thirteenth century, and indeed we may say that it was Abelard who really killed ultra-realism."[13] Despite this, John of Salisbury accused Peter Abelard of nominalism because in *Logica Ingredientibus*, 16, Peter wrote, "it remains to ascribe universals of this sort to words alone." While this seems a definitive statement of nominalism, it is not. In *Logica Nostrum Petitioni Sociorum* Abelard distinguishes *vox* (the voiced word) from *sermo* (the expression of logical content). It is *sermo* that is universal. Since their logical content derives from the objects they signify, this is actually moderate realism.

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[11] Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, "Nominalism in Metaphysics," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2019 Edition). Available online—see the section *References* for details.

[12] Brian Leftow, "Aquinas on Attributes," *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* 11 (2003): 1. *Cf.* Jeffrey E. Brower, "Aquinas on the Problem of Universals," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 92, no. 2 (2016): 715–735.

[13] Fredrick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Westminister, Md.: Newman Books, 1950), 171.

> If we wish, with John of Salisbury, to call Abelard a "nominalist," we must recognise at the same time that his "nominalism" is simply a denial of ultra-realism, and an assertion of the distinction between the logical and real orders, without any denial of the objective foundation of the universal concept. The Abelardian doctrine is an adumbration . . . of the developed theory of moderate realism.[14]

Similarly, in saying that species are *entia rationis*, I am denying Chaberek's Neoplatonism, not that they are founded in individual, created natures. This is Aquinas's position in *Summa Contra Gentiles* I, 65: "Universals . . . are not subsisting things, but have being only in singulars, as proved by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* vii." As we shall see, they are in singulars potentially.

Of course, Aquinas's doctrine is more comprehensive. Copleston summarizes it:

> St. Thomas thus admits (i) the *universale ante rem* . . . for it is God considered as perceiving His Essence as the imitable *ad extra* in a certain type of creation; (ii) the *universale in re*, which is the concrete individual essence alike in the members of the species; and (iii) the *universale post rem*, which is the abstract universal concept.[15]

Compare my position. Following *Categories* i, I note that, as secondary substances, species and genera do not exist as primary substances, which are ostensible unities (*tode ti*). Rather they are concepts, *entia rationis* (*universale post rem*). This is Abelard's distinction of the logical and real orders.

How do universals signify particulars? Each instance of a concept has a specific intelligibility the agent intellect can actualize into that concept. In other words, it has the concept *in potency*. *De Anima* iii, 7, explains that the agent intellect actualizes two potencies simultaneously: the object's intelligibility and the subject's capacity to know.

[14] *Ibid.*, 172.

[15] *Ibid.*, 176.

The object's intelligibility is in its form. Thus, *contra* Delfino, I *do* see universals grounded in the forms of their instances.

Aquinas says, "it is clear that abstraction, which is common to all intellects, makes a form universal."[16] Cardinal Mercier writes:

> According to the thought of Aristotle, Abelard, Alexandre of Hales, Albert the Great, Saint Thomas Aquinas, and the great majority of medieval philosophy masters, there are universal representations, but no universal realities.
>
> How, then, are the first and second to be harmonized? These things are particulars, but we have the power to represent them abstractly.
>
> Now, the *abstract* type, when intellect considers it reflexively, and puts it in touch with the particular subjects in which it is realized or realizable, is found attributable to each and to all.
>
> This applicability of the abstract type to the individuals is its universality.[17]

Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., concurs, "the universal is found only in the intellect, never in the sensible thing that is known by its means."[18] My claim that "a species . . . is not an *ens reale*, but an *ens rationis*" stands firmly in this tradition.

Even though actual species exist only in the mind, we can speak of species *in* their instances by an *analogy of attribution*, for causes may be named after their effects. Thus, food contributing to health is "healthy," even if it is dead, *e.g.*, cooked chicken. Similarly, the intelli-

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[16] *De Veritate*, II, 6, *ad* 1. Again, "[t]he unity or community of the human nature, however, *is not a reality* [italics mine], but is only in the consideration of the mind" (*S.Th.* I, 39, 4, *ad* 3). *Cf. In VII Metaphysica*, lect. 13.

[17] Désiré-Joseph Mercier, *Cours de Philopophie*, vol. IV: *Critériologie* (Louvain: Institut Supériour de Philosophie, 1906), 343f. My translation. Note that a species concept is universal, not because it *is* the nature of its instances, but because it is *applicable* to them. Applicability is a logical property.

[18] Joseph Owens, "Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea," *Medieval Studies* 21 no. 1 (1959): 218.

gibility eliciting a species concept may be called an individual's species. This is the *universale in re*.

Similarly, we may speak of species *in* God—*universale ante rem*. Aquinas argues that God has exemplar ideas insofar as He *intends* to create whatever He creates.[19] He wills, *inter alia*, the *universale in re* as a subset of the creature's intelligibility. Since God is simple, His "ideas" are diversified by terminating in many creatures, not by intrinsic complexity. Since there are no universal creatures, species exemplars cannot be similarly diversified. Thus, there are no *universal* "ideas" in God. Omniscience precludes God prescinding from intelligibility to form universals. Similarly, creating imperfect copies of a species archetype, rather than perfect realizations of His creative intention, insults God's omnipotence.

I questioned[20] Chaberek's claim that "Philosophically, natural species are those forms of life that possess the same substantial form."[21] He responded:

> Aquinas says that genus/species cannot apply to individuals because in an individual there is a lack of universality. But he does not say that individuals of the same genus/species do not share the same substantial form or nature.[22]

Delfino seconds this,[23] but with a nuance to which I shall return. In fact, Aquinas denies that abstracted forms are substantial forms.

> [W]hen we say form is abstracted from matter, we do not mean substantial form, because substantial form and the matter correlative to it are interdependent, so that one is not intelligible without the other, because the appropriate act is in its appropriate matter.

[19] *S.Th.* I, 15, 1, c.

[20] Polis, "Compatibility," 571.

[21] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 52.

[22] Chaberek, "A Response," 56.

[23] Delfino, "A Reply," 85.

> Rather, we mean the *accidental forms of quantity and figure* [italics mine] . . .[24]

This both rebuts Chaberek and endorses species definitions based on sensible accidents.[25] Since each substantial form actualizes *its* correlative matter, it is *unique*.

Delfino is nearer the truth. While acknowledging that substantial forms are unique, he writes, "I think Polis is confusing having the same *individual* substantial form, with having the same *kind* of substantial form."[26] I rejected "*the same* substantial form." Still, "the same *kind* of substantial form," is also inadequate. While species are based on natures, "the same *kind* of substantial form" leaves indeterminate *which* notes of intelligibility must be shared. It is circular to say that their *essential* notes must be shared, because ontological essences are individual.[27] Only abstracted essences are universal, and biological species abstraction is variously implemented.[28]

The same is true of philosophical species. Chaberek wrote, "in the debate about origins we understand species as genera or families according to classical taxonomy. Traditionally they were called natural

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[24] *In De Trinitate Boethius*, V, 3, c. Again, "in the individuals human nature does not have the sort of unity according to which it is some single thing pertaining to all, which the notion of universals requires" (*De Ente et Essentia*, 4).

[25] *Cf. In De Anima*, I, 1: "[A]ccidental qualities contribute much to knowing what a thing essentially is. When we can give an account of such qualities (some or all) according to appearances, then we shall have material for dealing as well as possible with the essence." *S.Th.*, I, 29, 1, ad 3: "Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial."

[26] Delfino, "A Reply," 85.

[27] *In De Trinitate Boethius*, V, 3, c: "[T]his soul, this body, this nail, this bone, etc. These indeed are parts of *the essence of Socrates and Plato* [italics mine], but not of man precisely as man; and therefore the intellect can abstract man from these parts. And this is the abstraction of the universal from the particular."

[28] There are at least twenty-six different ways of defining biological species. John S. Wilkins, "Philosophically Speaking, How Many Species Concepts are There?," *Zootaxa* 2765, no. 1 (2011): 58.

species, such as dog, cat, horse, elephant, etc."[29] Later, he cites Charles De Koninck's taxonomy in which dogs are not a species.

> The ensemble of beings constituting nature is divided into four species: men, animals, plants, and the inorganic. . . . These four species are the only ones philosophically definable. The canine species is not a species in the philosophical sense.[30]

Even here, there is no agreement. Chaberek quotes Mortimer J. Adler proposing "five irreducible species: man, animal, plant, mixture and element," and Norbert Luyten proposing "only three essences: inanimate, animate and human."[31] By the principle of charity, I credit each with a basis in reality for his taxonomy; nevertheless, their species concepts are only analogous.

Chaberek's four philosophical, and Wilkins' twenty-six biological, species concepts show that the kind of similarity marking a species is ill-defined. Consider Aristotle's paradigm, "man is a rational animal." It makes rationality essential, yet some humans fail to become rational, or having been so, suffer dementia. Further, the notion of non-human rational animals on other planets is not self-contradictory. So, this definition, while fixing on a truth, is inadequate. Non-rational people are human by descent. Indeed, the Biblical tradition portrays humanity genealogically, by line of descent, never mentioning "rational animal." Again, we have no direct knowledge of the rationality or descent of people seen at a distance, but *know* them as human by their figure and action. So, even in nontechnical contexts we use alternate, if implicit, definitions, with notes essential to some not required by others.

How does this relate to evolution? First, as exemplar ideas are simply God's intention to create individuals, they do not preclude a line

[29] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 52.

[30] *Ibid.*, 73.

[31] *Ibid.*, 73, n. 39.

of descent beginning with members of one species, and ending with members of another—as evolution proposes.

Second, as regards the *universale in re*, biological species are defined by human taxonomists—not revealed from on high. Delfino recognizes this, but not its implications.[32] Taxonomists use sensible accidents to define species, as St. Thomas contemplated. Take, for example, the taxonomy of the Portuguese man-of-war:

> The monophyletic Cystonectae is defined by the presence of a pneumatophore and siphosome and lack of nectosomal nectophores. The group encompasses only two families, Physaliidae and Rhizophysidae. The pleustonic colonies of Physaliidae are represented by the well known Portuguese man-of-war, *Physalia physalis*, that is easily distinguished by the presence of an enlarged pneumatophore, a sail-shaped, bluish-pinkish structure filled with gas produced by a gas gland.[33]

No mention is made of an intelligible nature, form or quidity—not because the creature has none—but because such principles are not directly sensible. So, for biological species, the *universale in re* is a shared set of accidents (notes of intelligibility) reflecting organisms' natures. This does not mean only accidents exist. Organisms are unities, not collections of accidents.

Third, in De Koninck's and Adler's taxonomies, evolution proposes virtually no new species. Since evolution offers no explanation of

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[32] Delfino, "A Reply," 90: "But just because humans, for epistemological reasons, struggle to understand a given species does not mean that the individual members of a given species do not share the same kind of substantial form, or the same nature, as Polis argues." I do not argue that. As species are *entia rationis*, epistemological limitations are essential limitations.

[33] Juliana Bardi and Antonio C. Marques, "Taxonomic Redescription of the Portuguese Man-of-War, *Physalia physalis* (Cnidaria, Hydrozoa, Siphonophorae, Cystonectae) from Brazil," *Iheringia, Série Zoologia* 97, no. 4 (30 December 2007): 425.

human consciousness, Chaberek's problem reduces to a common ancestor for plants and animals.[34] In Luyten's taxonomy, there is no problem.

My account lacks my critics' Platonism,[35] for Aristotle and Aquinas reject participation in actual universals. *Metaphysics* VII, 13, provides numerous arguments against it.

Delfino writes, "Aquinas argues that human nature in itself, which he calls the nature 'considered absolutely', has no being or unity proper to it. Instead, it is neutral with respect to all kinds of being."[36] I am unsure how this militates against me as I have not attributed existence to natures absolutely considered. His main point seems to be that "by holding that natures, such as human, are existentially neutral—in other words, that existence is accidental to them—Aquinas is able to predicate human identically of each and every individual human that exists."[37] While true, this does not help with Chaberek's question: how can species evolve? Only by seeing that species are *concepts* actualizing notes of intelligibility known via sensible accidents, can we understand how the modification of accidents over generations can lead to populations requiring new species concepts, *i.e.*, evolved species.

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[34] The hypothesis of a Last Universal Common Ancestor (LUCA) of all cells is based on genetic extrapolation. *Cf.* M. Weiss, F. Sousa, N. Mrnjavac, *et al*., "The Physiology and Habitat of the Last Universal Common Ancestor," *Nature Microbiology* 1, 16116 (2016).

[35] *E.g*., evolutionary thought "stems from the very impossibility of talking about nature (and any reality for that matter) without having abstract notions that are derived from *unchangeable elements of the universe* [italics mine]" (Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 52). Aristotle and Aquinas hold that know by sensing mobile being. "If Polis argued that God is the ultimate ground of natures and species, he could try to avoid this relativism, but he explicitly rejects this position" (Delfino, "A Reply," 89). I affirm God is the ultimate ground of reality, including individual natures, the basis of species concepts. I deny God has *universal* exemplars to which our concepts must conform.

[36] Delfino, "A Reply," 86.

[37] *Ibid.*, 88.

Relativism

Delfino characterizes my position as "relativism."[38] He begins:

> Hair color is an accident possessed by human beings. But both Aristotle and Aquinas would agree it is a mistake to divide my students, for example, into different species based on brunette, blond, and red hair color. Indeed, their refusal to do so is based on their commitment to the real distinction between substance and accident in existing things. . . . [I]n order to be faithful to Thomistic metaphysics, Polis must find a way to defend this distinction . . .[39]

He quotes Aquinas's *In Physica,* 150, where, speaking of materialists, St. Thomas says, "But insofar as they said that all forms are accidents, this position is false." Delfino concludes, "Obviously, if the only kinds of forms in matter are accidental forms, then the substance-accident distinction collapses."[40] Chaberek makes a similar point.[41]

Aquinas says we know species via sensible accidents. He adds, "what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents."[42] So, my claim hardly implies that only accidents exist. Still, I am challenged to defend the substance-accident distinction.

Gilson offers a caution that my critics seem to have run afoul of:

> We often hear it said that this philosophy [Thomism] consists in imagining the structure of the real is analogous to that of human language. Because our phrases are made up of a subject and predicates, St. Thomas would have concluded that the real is made up of substances of which accidents are predicated and of acci-

[38] *Ibid.*, 84.

[39] *Ibid.*, 84f.

[40] *Ibid.*, 84, n. 40.

[41] Chaberek, "A Response," 56.

[42] *S.Th* I, 85, 3, *ad* 4.

> dents which are attributed to substances. This is to completely misunderstand his thought and to confuse his logic with his metaphysics.[43]

I said that there are primary substances. Their existence entails an actuality or form, *i.e.*, a substantial form.[44] Organisms are not collections of accidents, but *unities* in which accidents inhere—not as Chaberek seems to think, like raisins in a pudding or ornaments on a tree,[45] but as distinguishable aspects of the whole, *i.e.*, as notes of intelligibility *of* the substance.[46] If substances were the residue after removing all accidents, they would be unintelligible, because we know substances by their action on our senses, and action is an accident. The idea of unintelligible substance can't be, and isn't, right. Since a primary substance is a unity, it encompasses its inherent accidents—for their *esse* is its *esse*.[47]

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[43] Étienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (N.Y.: Random House, 1956), 31.

[44] Substantial forms may be variously conceived: an entity's present actuality, its actuality over a lifetime, and its *telos* or mature form. An organism's *telos* can be ill-defined, *e.g.*, most cnidarians (the phylum of jellyfish, corals and hydras such as the Portuguese man-of-war) have alternate generations: a sessile form reproducing asexually via strobilation (horizontal splitting) and a sexually reproducing swimming form. Rosalind T. Hinde, "The Cnidaria and Ctenophora," in *Invertebrate Zoology*, ed. Donald T. Anderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 28. Since actuality *simpliciter* is actuality now, substantial forms are immutable only *sub specie aeternatatis*—making substantial forms dynamic when viewed temporally.

[45] Chaberek writes of the "fundamental division into substance (substantial form and matter) and accidents that come together to constitute every individual" ("A Response," 56). Accidents *inhere in*, rather than being divided from, substances. Later on the page: without substance, "there would be nothing that the attributes could hang on."

[46] *S.Th.*, I, 29, 1, *ad* 3: "[P]roper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known."

[47] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, VII, 3, 1029^{a}15: "[S]ubstance is rather that to which these [accidents] belong primarily." Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 31: "To speak of things as 'substances' is not to conceive of them as groups of accidents bound by some kind of copula to a subject. . . . It is to say that they set themselves up as units of existence, all of whose constituent parts *are* by virtue of one and the same act of existing, which is that of the substance."

Delfino seems to confound two meanings of "accident." The first is an existent in Aristotle's last nine of categories. Accidents in this sense differ from substances because they lack independent existence. Instead, they are aspects, or notes of intelligibility, *of the substance* in which they inhere. This is the sense in which we know substances by sensible accidents and accidents vary in descendants.

Topics I, 5, defines a different sense of accident. There, substance serves as a substrate of contrariety, *i.e.*, of properties that may or may not be present, which are termed "accidents." Contrariety reoccurs discussing change in *Physics* I, 7. There, the coming to be and passing away of contraries, such as having a hair color or not, are accidental changes, while the generation and corruption of the underlying unity are substantial changes. Neither discussion invokes species archetypes to distinguish substance from accidents. Only by conflating these two senses of "accident" would one think that knowing substances, and defining species, via accidents entails defining humans using hair color.

A second form of Delfino's objection focuses on intersubjective variability.

> By allowing humans to choose which properties count as essential or accidental when producing a concept of a given species, he seems to be implicitly rejecting the reality of the substance-accident distinction in existing things.[48]

First, this seems to confuse the real and logical orders. We can distinguish substance and accident (sense 2) based on the effects of changes. On the other hand, to distinguish essential and accidental properties we must begin with our species *concept*, to see whether *it* requires the property. I hope my critics would agree that properties an individual *must* possess to instantiate a species concept are essential,

[48] Delfino, "A Reply," 85.

while those that it *may or may not* possess are accidental.[49] Since species are *entia rationis*, this is a logical matter, depending on how a species is defined.

Second, an individual's intelligibility stands to its species as potency to act. Just as the marble that became Michaelangelo's *David* could have become a *Moses* or a *Pietà*, so we can actualize intelligibility in many ways by selecting which notes to attend to. Those actualized inhere in the object, but the subject fixes on some while omitting others. Similarly, we can *choose* modes of representation. Mathematicians represent points with various coordinate systems[50] and vector bases,[51] and physicists quantum states with different sets of eigenstates.[52] Thus, objects do not *fully* determine their representations. While neither Aristotle nor Aquinas proposed diverse, well-founded taxonomic schemes, their moderate realism *allows* them.

Third, who, other than humans, is to decide "which properties count as essential or accidental," which notes of intelligibility are actualized in a concept? We are discussing *human* knowledge, not divine omniscience. The *joint* actualization of the object's intelligibility and the subject's capacity to know makes knowledge intrinsically relative. Similarly, Aquinas sees truth as relational—the adequation (approach to equality) of intellect and reality.[53]

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[49] *S.Th.*, I, 9, 2, c: "[S]upposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject."

[50] Philip M. Morse and Herman Feshbach, *Methods of Theoretical Physics*, vol. 1 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1953), 494–523, 655–666.

[51] Paul Richard Halmos, *Finite-Dimensional Vector Spaces* (New York: Springer, 1987), 10.

[52] Stephen Gasiorowicz, *Quantum Physics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), 119.

[53] *E.g.*, *De Veritate*, I, 1, resp.

Eric of Auxerre (841–876) recognized that *limitations of the human mind* force the resort to universal concepts.[54] Modern psychology has shown that our working memories can only maintain 5–9 "chunks" of information.[55] Unable to grasp experience exhaustively, we attend to some aspects, while missing others.[56] Our attention is directed by our will—informed by experience, education, culture, judgements of import, mood and even prejudice. Thus, each subject has a personal *projection* of reality. This merely names something both Aristotle and Aquinas knew. In the account of his predecessors in *Metaphysics* A, Aristotle acknowledges each for his true, but incomplete, insight—his projection of reality. In responding to objections, St. Thomas typically notes their partial truth before showing their inadequacy.

Knowledge is a *projection* in both the mathematical sense of a dimensionally diminished mapping (we know a *subset* of the object's intelligibility) and the existential sense of the object dynamically penetrating our intellect. Just as the builder building the house *is* the house being built by the builder, so *our intellect* being informed by the object is, *identically*, *the object* informing our intellect. Thus, knowledge is inseparable from its object, being its *intentional existence* within us.[57] Experiential content is a projection of the object's form, the Scholas-

[54] Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 164. Eric held that the mind, unable to deal with the multitude of individuals, gathers them together (*coarctat*) to form species concepts.

[55] Donald E. Broadbent, "The Magical Number Seven after Fifteen Years," in *Studies in Long-Term Memory*, ed. Alan Kennedy and Alan Wilkes (New York: Wiley, 1975), 3–18.

[56] As "the intellect passes from potentiality to act it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees . . ." (*S.Th.* I, 85, 5, c).

[57] *De Ente et Essentia*, 2: "For human nature itself exists in the intellect abstracted from all individuating conditions."

tics' *sensible* and *intelligible species*.[58] So, while a *taxonomic species* is an *ens rationis*, it participates in the being of its seminal instance, any encountered instance, and potentially, every instance.

Further, as the *object* being held in existence by God, is, *identically*, *God* holding the object in existence, the object's existential penetration is also an existential penetration of God. So, we have within us the *universale ante rem*, the *universale in re*, and the *universale post rem*. It is this presence of God in the intellect, which can be teased out by analysis, that makes possible knowing His existence from sensible experience—for we cannot find what is not there.

Returning to species definition, my critics and I agree with Aristotle in *Posterior Analytics* II, 3, that proper definitions express the nature of what is defined. Still, species definitions *necessarily* represent *projections* of natures, for God alone is omniscient. While biologists share data and insights, their definitions, however collegial, will be both objective and subjective—both reality-based and the result of *personal* interest, comprehension and synthesis. So, I leave the selection of essential, species-defining, accidents to humans. There is nowhere else to leave it.

Definition Issues

Fr. Chaberek wrote, "By evolution we understand *biological macroevolution*, that is the idea that all living beings come from a single ancestor via natural generation."[59] I noted this was not working biologists' definition. He responds:

[58] *E.g.*, in *S.Th.*, I, 85. *Cf.* Charles Dubray, "Species," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 14 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912). Available online—see the section *References* for details.

[59] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 49.

> Polis mentions three authors, but he does not show how any of them would deny my definition of evolution. My definition skips the particulars of these theories (and many other, including modern ones) and keeps what is essential for them in the context of evolution-creation debate.[60]

No reasonable author would object to another's definitions of terms. His definition is not the issue, but confounding his definition with the modern evolutionary synthesis.

Having defined evolution in purely biological terms, he went on to say that "Biological macroevolution is a theory of origins that has a scientific, a philosophical and a theological layer."[61] Surely, this is inconsistent with his definition, for nothing in it hints at philosophical and theological *layers* as opposed to implications or interpretations.

Chaberek makes an unexplained distinction between the evolution of biological species and macroevolution. I objected that this begs the question, because it is crucial to Darwin's case that species grade into each other gradually—without sharp distinctions.[62] He neither clarified his distinction nor rebutted my objection.

He had written me that evolution "was contrived from the beginning to exclude teleology and design from nature."[63] I showed that both Darwin and Wallace believed in design.[64] He sees this as attacking his definition.[65] It rectifies his history.

Chaberek offers a way forward saying, "the crucial problem is . . . the idea that natural secondary causes can produce the entire variety of

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[60] Chaberek, "A Response," 46. He says an "evolution-creation debate," not an evolution-metaphysics debate.

[61] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 50.

[62] Polis, "Compatibility," 553.

[63] Michal Chaberek, private communication, May 8, 2020.

[64] Polis, "Compatibility," 554f. Darwin was hostile to creationism, defined as the belief "in separate and innumerable acts of creation." Charles Darwin, *The Origin of Species* (London: John Murray, 1859), 186.

[65] Chaberek, "A Response," 47.

species beginning with just one or a few living organisms."[66] Despite his claim that I deny it,[67] I agree that this is "what the vast majority of biologists believe." I further agree that *this idea* (not the theory of evolution) has biological, philosophical and theological layers. Thus, it is best to bracket Darwin's theory, because Chaberek is unconcerned with it. Any mention of Darwin, who explained *how* species evolve, is almost irrelevant because Chaberek only cares about new species emerging *naturally*, which he denies. I say *almost* irrelevant, because if he had studied evolution, he would know that he is attacking a proposition it does not advance, *i.e.*, that species change.

Since Chaberek is concerned only with the thesis that species change naturally, my methodological criticisms[68] become a side issue. As his metaphysics is not directed at Darwin's theory or *its* implications, its confusion of the levels of abstraction in Aquinas's *Commentary of the De Trinitate of Boethius* is unimportant.

He seems motivated by the incompatibility of evolution with creationist *theology*—specifically with the claim that new species require *supernatural* intervention. "The problem is that when one proposes a natural explanation to the origin of species one excludes its supernatural explanation."[69] This fails to appreciate both the power of secondary causality,[70] and that the supernatural order is beyond philosophy. While

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[66] Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 46.

[67] "Dr. Polis implies that Darwin was not a supporter of universal common ancestry (UCA)" (Chaberek, "A Response," 47). I quoted Darwin's support of UCA at length, noting it was not a postulate, but "a hypothesis inferred from 'a deceitful guide'" (Polis, "Compatibility," 553). He sees no difference (page 48) between a postulate (the evident logical foundation of a theory) and a hypothesis (a working guess).

[68] Polis, "Compatibility," 563 ff.

[69] Chaberek, "A Response," 59ff.

[70] *Cf.* Alfred J. Freddoso, "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (1994): 131–156, and Armand A. Maurer, "Darwin, Thomists, and Secondary Causality," *The Review of Metaphysics* 57, no. 3 (March 2004): 491–514.

the theory of evolution is incompatible with Chaberek's demand for a supernatural explanation, it is consonant with Thomism. As my primary concerned is philosophical, I address Chaberek's creationism in an appendix.

Metaphysical Issues

Evolution's compatibility with Thomism does not mean that it is consistent with every text of St. Thomas. It is not. Aquinas was immersed in the science of his time—including immutable superlunary matter,[71] an inadequate theory of gravity,[72] spontaneous generation[73] and fixed biological species. He died before Isaac Newton posited *universal* laws of nature, and Darwin his theory.

I did show that evolution is compatible with the *core principles* of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. Delfino quotes Brian Shanley, O.P.:

> At the heart of Aquinas's philosophy is his understanding of being as ultimately rooted in *esse* as *actus essendi*. . . . Here then is where the ultimate test of allegiance lies. . . . What I am arguing is that to be a Thomist of any stripe requires some primary commitment to Thomas's metaphysics; without that commitment, one may be an interpreter or even a specialist, but one is not a Thomist. It is a matter of debate, of course, what other doctrines of St. Thomas one must adhere to in order to be a Thomist and surely the items are broader than the metaphysics of *esse*. But however one draws the Thomistic circle, the core must be *esse* in St. Thomas's sense, not Frege's.[74]

[71] *De Sub. Sep.*, X, 56.

[72] *De Pot. Dei*, III, 7.

[73] *Ibid.*, III, 8, 9, & 11.

[74] Brian J. Shanley, "Analytical Thomism," *The Thomist* 63, no. 1 (1999): 136f. Frege thought existence was a second intention, and so an *ens rationis*. *Cf.* Ignacio Angelelli, *Studies on Gottlob Frege and Traditional Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1967), 224f. I see existence as convertible with the power to act.

A key principle is that God conveys the *actus essendi* to creatures, which express it through *their own causal efficacy.* Aquinas writes,

> [W]e must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power.[75]

So, the critical question is whether, as Darwin held, *secondary causes* can generate populations requiring new species concepts. We only know powers by observing them *in act*, reading the Book of Nature to see *what is*. Aquinas divides God's productive acts into instantaneous direct creation, and those marked by change and mediated by second causes.[76] The biological consensus is that new species emerge through change. Chaberek disputes neither the truth of evolution's postulates,[77] nor the validity of evolution's logic. Since no postulate confers supernatural power, the argument, if sound, shows that the natural emergence of new species is a reality metaphysicians must explain rather than deny. Even if the argument is hypothetical, as long as no hypothesis is impossible, Chaberek's thesis fails.

I previously argued that contemporary physics implies that, before the advent of man, evolution is fully determined by the initial state

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[75] *De Pot. Dei*, III, 7, c. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas*, 181: "Thomistic philosophy, in which the creature is nothing and does nothing without God, is set off against any teaching which would refuse to confer upon second causes the full share of being and efficacy to which they are entitled."

[76] *De Sub. Sep.*, X, 55.

[77] They are: (1) superfecundity or the generation of more offspring than can survive; (2) the existence of variant descendants; (3) a selection mechanism favoring variations enhancing reproduction and survival; and, (4) inheritability—the capacity to pass on variations. Stephen J. Gould, *The Structure of Evolutionary Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), 125f. Chaberek, affirms (2) and (3): "[N]ature itself generates a multitude of variants within given species according to the accidental factors that determine better adaptations in these or other conditions" ("A Response," 53).

of the universe.[78] Thus, the natural emergence of new species springs *directly* from God's creative power. He created the cosmos, wills its laws, and sustains it in spinning out its fabric. Natural evolution is the work of secondary agents participating in the *Actus Essendi*. This view echos Augustine's *rationes seminales*,[79] which blossom into new species over time—either naturally, or, in the case of man, by providing a ground for the supernatural infusion of spirit. Augustine saw the human body as created "invisibly, potentially, causally, in the way that things are made which are to be but are not yet made."[80]

> Thomas Aquinas refers to Augustine's *rationes seminales* on several occasions in his commentary on the work of six days in *Summa theologiae*, and in his other works, seemingly accepting the idea of all species (except for human species) being virtually present in the outcome of the initial act of creation, as well as accepting both possibilities of their actualization—through gradual development and through instantaneous and direct divine intervention.[81]

Problematic Texts

Chaberek cites two problematic texts. The first is from *De Substantiis Separatis*.

> [W]hen a horse is generated, the generating horse is indeed the reason why the nature of horse begins to exist in this being, but it is not the essential cause of equinity. For that which is essentially the cause of a certain specific nature, must be the cause of that

[78] Dennis F. Polis, "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?" *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* XXII, no. 1/2 (2010): 32–66.

[79] *Cf.* Mariusz Tabaczek, "The Metaphysics of Evolution: From Aquinas's Interpretation of Augustine's Concept of *Rationes Seminales* to the Contemporary Thomistic Account of Species Transformism," *Nova et Vetera* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2020): 945–972.

[80] Augustine, *De Genesi ad Litteram* 6, 5, 8, quoted by Armand A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy*. (New York: Random House, 1962), 15. *Cf.* Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 91f.

[81] Tabaczek, "The Metaphysics of Evolution," 947.

> nature of all the beings that have that species. Since, then, the generating horse has the same nature, it would have to be its own cause, which is impossible. It remains, therefore, that above all those participating in equinity, there must be some universal cause of the whole species. . . . [I]t must be reduced to that which is essentially the cause of that nature, but not to something which participates in that nature in a particular way.[82]

A universal effect does demand a universal cause. Since Aquinas did not contemplate *universal* laws of nature, he placed intelligibility entirely in individual forms.[83] We now understand these laws to be causally efficacious, but not as individual entities are. Rather, they are intentional realities (God's general will for matter), acting directly and teleologically on matter.[84] Their universal operation on organisms with a shared gene pool and environment explains the common nature of descendants—satisfying St. Thomas's demand for a universal cause.

The second text is from the *Summa Theologiae*.

> The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. . . . God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, *without the aid of any preceding material form* [italics mine]. . . . Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.[85]

First, this text neither anticipates nor precludes Darwin's mechanism, which, like Augustine's, sees the human body developing *with* the aid of a preceding material form. Given that humans' essential difference is *infused intellect and will*, humanity's immediate ancestor could have a

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[82] *De Sub. Sep.*, X, 58.

[83] Dennis F. Polis, "A New Reading of Aristotle's *Hyle*," *The Modern Schoolman* 63, no. 8 (March 1991): 225–244.

[84] Polis, "Evolution: Mind or Randomness?," 33ff.

[85] *S.Th.*, I, 91, 2, c.

purely *material* form meeting Aquinas's requirement. Second, an anti-evolutionary interpretation is inconsistent with St. Thomas's view that new species may be immanent in the initial creation and actualized later, via secondary causality.

> Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.[86]

I quoted this previously. Chaberek responded that no one now believes in spontaneous generation, and that medievals appealed to the heavens to explain what they did not understand. While true, this does not rebut Aquinas's acceptance of new species emerging naturally.

Methodological Issues

Following Aquinas, I asserted that scientific, philosophical and theological theses must each be judged according to their own canons. One cannot judge scientific theories by philosophical or theological norms as Fr. Chaberek does. He responds, "questions of origins, by their very nature, go beyond any given discipline as well as science as such."[87]

We must distinguish the absolute origin in creation *ex nihilo*, which is beyond human science, from particular origins, which are within its competence. As Augustine and Aquinas agree,[88] it belongs to natural sciences to examine the origin of their objects. Thus, cosmology

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[86] *S.Th.*, I, 73, 1, ad 3.

[87] Chaberek, "A Response," 50.

[88] Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IV, 16, quoted in *S.Th.*, I, 84, 5, c. "It belongs to the same science to investigate the proper causes of any genus and the genus itself, as for example natural philosophy investigates the principles of natural bodies" (*In Metaphysica Promoemium*, in Armand Maurer, *Thomas Aquinas: The Division and Method of the Sciences* [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1986], 98).

examines the physical causes of the universe, astrophysics of stars, geology of strata and biology of species. In studying secondary causes, natural science trespasses neither metaphysics or theology. Darwin in particular worked in a tradition, traceable to Suarez, explicitly seeking the origin of species in second causes.[89]

Delfino also criticizes my methodological observations. He says, as though I had denied it,

> [T]o the extent that evolutionary biology is making use of metaphysical principles (e.g., causality, the metaphysical law of non-contradiction and its corollaries, such as the effect cannot be greater than the cause, etc.), metaphysicians can comment on the misuse of such principles in evolutionary biology.[90]

I said, "If those canons are inadequate, philosophical analysis should be directed to them."[91] Surely, abusing metaphysical principles betrays inadequate canons and shows that a science is not proceeding "from its own proper principles" as Aquinas requires. Since Chaberek never examines Darwin's reasoning, I had no occasion to say more.

Delfino claims that in denying the evolution of the human intellect, I am applying metaphysics directly to biology, thus "legitimizing the general kind of metaphysical critique that Fr. Chaberek and others have made."[92] While philosophically motivated, I studied naturalistic "explanations" of consciousness and found each flawed on its own grounds.[93] While science cannot disprove sound metaphysics, we should follow Aquinas and explain why objections are unsound.

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[89] Polis, "Compatibility," 552.

[90] Delfino, "A Reply," 75.

[91] Polis, "Compatibility," 550.

[92] Delfino, "A Reply," 75.

[93] Dennis F. Polis, *God, Science and Mind: The Irrationality of Naturalism* (Fontana, Calif.: Xianphil Press, 2012), 94–118.

Delfino has the "impression" that I think "metaphysics does not study change at all."[94] I said evolution's study of "a certain kind of change" falls outside the province of metaphysics.[95] Metaphysical abstraction prescinds from specific modes of change, *e.g.*, predation and mutation.

He concludes that "it should be clear that a metaphysical critique of biological evolution is possible because other sciences borrow principles from metaphysics, and because metaphysics does study material beings and change from the perspective of being."[96] Nothing Delfino argues militates against my position that, if a science's "canons are inadequate, philosophical analysis should be directed to them."

True Science?

Fr. Chaberek seems to support "Intelligent Design" (ID), which imagines God as too unintelligent to design a universe following "fixed ordinances" (*Jeremiah* 31:35–36). In defense of ID, he claims,

> [T]rue science, free from ideological bias, testifies to the inability of nature to produce biodiversity as we know it. The fossil record is incompatible with Darwinian theory and the Darwinian mechanism of random mutation and natural selection (even in its modern form and different variants) is incapable of explaining the origin of any significant biological novelties.[97]

He cites[98] a report on the 2016 Joint Discussion Conference of the British Academy and the Royal Society, "New Trends in Evolutionary Biology." The report was in *Evolution News*, a fundamentalist apologetics

[94] Delfino, "A Reply," 78.
[95] Polis, "Compatibility," 566.
[96] Delfino, "A Reply," 75.
[97] Chaberek, "A Response," 50f.
[98] *Ibid.*, 51, n. 6.

organ hardly "free from ideological bias." The official proceedings[99] do not support Chaberek's claims.

I wrote that "supporters of 'Intelligent Design' . . . typically [posit] evolutionary gaps where 'irreducible complexity' must be bridged by divine intervention."[100] Chaberek asks for documentation. Michael J. Behe writes:

> An irreducibly complex system cannot be produced directly (that is by continuously improving the initial function, which continues to work by the same mechanism) by slight, successive modifications of a precursor system, because any precursor to an irreducibly complex system that is missing a part is by definition nonfunctional.[101]

The supposed inability to evolve gradually creates the gaps that ID advocates believe require divine intervention.

As I am concerned with the interpretation and implications of science, I shall consider nonscientific alternatives no further.

Chaberek's Five Arguments

Chaberek offered five metaphysical arguments against the natural evolution of species. He continues to believe them sound, even though he has not resolved the issues I raised. His response begins with a preamble illustrating his confusion. He writes "on the level of a distinct nature/substance the change may go only this far."[102] The theory of evolution proposes neither a being's nature (its principle of motion and rest) nor its substance (its unity) change. It only says what Cha-

[99] Patrick Bateson, *et al.*, "New Trends in Evolutionary Biology: Biological, Philosophical and Social Science Perspectives," *Interface Focus* 7, no. 5 (2017).

[100] Polis, "Compatibility," 564.

[101] Michael J. Behe, *Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 39. A precursor system may be perfectly functional with respect to another end.

[102] Chaberek, "A Response," 53.

berek admits, *i.e.*, that descendants vary from their forebears. This is not a change in the philosophical sense, for it does not occur in a single substrate (*Categories* I, 5, $4^{a}17–20$), nor is it the actualization of a potency insofar as it is still in potency (*Physics* III, 1, $201^{b}5$). It is simply succession. Thus, Chaberek's "'iron law' of metaphysics . . . that accidental changes impact the accidents while substance is changed by the substantial change,"[103] is inapplicable.

He attacks my reading of Aristotle's *Categories*.

> The core of the mistake in Dr. Polis's argument consists of this statement: "So substances are primarily ostensible unities (*tode ti* = this something) like Socrates or Bucephalus, and, secondarily, species and genera, not because they are ostensible unities, but because of the grammatical fact that they also serve as subjects of predication." The "so" does not follow from the quoted *Categories* or from Aquinas.[104]

Of course, it does. Aristotle is quite clear on the similarities and differences between primary and secondary substances.

> But as regards the secondary substances, though it appears from the form of the name—when one speaks of man or animal—that a secondary substance likewise signifies a certain 'this', this is not really true; rather, it signifies a certain qualification . . .[105]

Argument 1

Chaberek's first argument is based on effects not exceeding the power of their causes. We agree both on the principle and that we must determine the power of causes experientially, not *a priori*. Still, he objects:

> [B]ecause we do not see species evolving into different species (like apes turning into humans or reptiles into birds) via natural

[103] *Ibid.*, 52.

[104] *Ibid.*, 54f.

[105] Aristotle, *Categories*, I, 5, $3^{b}14$ff.

> generation, we cannot conclude that "God has imbued causes" with such powers.[106]

Consider the logic of the case. He wishes to show that natural evolution is impossible. This requires showing that God *cannot* create a creature capable of engendering progeny of a different species. Saying we have not observed it falls well short of the mark.

He seems to think that direct observation and deduction is the only path to knowledge. The scientific method does not *deduce* hypotheses. Rather, it considers falsifying and confirming evidence for competing hypotheses. If only one it is *adequate* to the data, we judge it true, for *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. Here, we infer forebears' power by confirming evolution's postulates, and the fossil forms and genetic similarities they entail. Further, evidence suggests that humans did see wolves evolving into dogs.

I argued that assuming ancestral populations are the sole cause of evolved species ignores environmental factors and the laws of nature. He responds, "From the premise that laws of nature are designed does not follow that they can design."[107] That was not my claim. I argued that "offspring are joint effect the parents and mutagenic factors in their environment, *i.e.*, the state of nature immanent in the initial state of the universe and its laws"[108]—creation and God's will for matter. Earlier I had written:

> Considering the cosmic order in relation to God, we conclude with Aquinas that "it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should preexist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence." Thus, the order or "necessity" underpinning evolu-

[106] Chaberek, "A Response," 58.

[107] *Ibid.*

[108] Polis, "Compatibility," 576.

> tion is not some godless fate, but "ordinances of heaven and earth" ordained by God—the expression of divine providence.[109]

So, Chaberek missed my point that *God's design* of species is immanent in the initial universe and its laws—as St. Augustine suggested.

His confusion about secondary causality continues:

> Bringing God into the equation (as Dr. Polis and other theistic evolutionists do) begs the question, because if God was to overcome the limits of nature in evolution, then it would not be evolution anymore but some kind of creation. I do not argue against "some form of creation," but against natural evolution as producing new species.[110]

God does not *overcome* the limits of nature, but *endows* nature, as His creative instrument, with its own existence, including the power to evolve new species. While God is their ultimate author, secondary causes spin out His designs in time.

Argument 2

Chaberek's second argument is "no accidental change brings about new substance."[111] I wrote, following *Physics* I, 7, "Substantial changes occur when an organism is generated or dies. Everything that happens to it between generation and death is an accidental change, for its substance persists."[112] He responded that I confused "substantial form and individual form, the nature of a thing with its accidents."[113] It is he who is confused. First, substantial forms, being bound to their correlative matter, are individual. Second, the generation of descendants is a substantial, not an accidental, change. Finally, he continues to confuse succession with change.

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[109] *Ibid.*, 561, citing *S.Th.*, I, 22, 1, c.

[110] Chaberek, "A Response," 59.

[111] *Ibid.*, 61.

[112] Polis, "Compatibility," 578.

[113] Chaberek, "A Response," 61.

Argument 3

Chaberek's third argument is one I discussed in connection with problematic texts. He begins by quoting the *Summa Theologia:*

> A perfect thing participating in any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of what human nature is in this man begotten.[114]

He argues:

> If biological evolution were true, it would follow that an individual (or a group) of one species at some point of its development begets an individual of another species. By this the individual would be the cause of the new species.[115]

Certainly, there must be a first member of a new species, but Chaberek's premise is false. Parent(s), together with other factors, generate variant offspring, not new species. The agent intellect, operating on the sensible phantasm, is the efficient cause of the new species concept. It does so because the final variant's sensible accidents fail to elicit the old species concept. There is nothing supernatural in this. The new individual simply falls outside the old definition. Using a different species definition, another individual might be first.

The question Aquinas raises is how many individuals come to have natures *similar enough* to elicit the same species concept. I say "similar" because as Darwin, Chaberek and I agree, there are variations in any species, *i.e.*, individuals whose sensible accidents express slightly variant natures. Since slight variations are common, the puzzle is not that descendants differ from ancestors, but that they are similar enough to elicit the same concept.

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[114] *S.Th.*, I, 45, 5, ad 1.

[115] Chaberek, "A Response," 62f.

Abstractly, the answer lies partly in Darwin's postulate of *inheritability*, and partly in the universal laws of nature guiding all natural processes. Concretely, it lies in inherited DNA being nearly identical to ancestral DNA. Chaberek does not dispute the inheritability of traits, he over-relies on it, thinking enough traits will be inherited that descendants will invariably elicit the same species concept as their forebears. The consensus of biologists reject this thesis. How many and which traits are inherited is contingent matter—to be resolved by studying the Book of Nature. Biologists study it professionally, while Chaberek has little interest in it.[116] Only by understanding how evolution happens (*what is*) can we provide an adequate philosophical account.

He summarizes, "This argument is a variant of the first argument. It boils down to saying that nothing can be the cause of itself, which would be the case if biological macroevolution were true."[117] Darwin proposed no such thing, and I responded accordingly. "Evolution does not suggest that any being causes its own nature, only that descendants may differ from their forebears."[118] He countered:

> If evolution was just about the fact that posterity differs from parents, there would be no debate whatsoever. . . . No, the problem is that the ancestors of one animal, let's say a dinosaur, on evolutionary account are supposed to beget another animal, let's say a horse or a cow.[119]

The reason for the debate is that Chaberek does not understand evolution. He cannot document his claims because *The Origin of Species* proposes no more than he agrees with, *viz*. "posterity differs [slightly] from

[116] *Ibid*., 46: "[M]y discussion is not limited to just the Darwinian type of evolution, because 'Darwinian' in this context signifies the mechanism, but does not have any bearing on the alleged effects of the process in the form of emerging biodiversity." The consensus of biologists is that the mechanism is essential to understanding emerging biodiversity.

[117] *Ibid*., 63.

[118] Polis, "Compatibility," 579.

[119] Chaberek, "A Response," 63.

parents." This is not like dinosaurs begetting horses or cows, but even if it were, a member of one species begetting a member of another is not self-causation.

Argument 4

Chaberek's fourth argument is "that biological macroevolution is contrary to classical metaphysics because it denies two out of four Aristotelian causes."[120] As no biological text was cited, I showed the role of each cause in evolution.[121] He replies I did "not really provide any argument."[122] Surely, identifying the causes rebuts their undocumented denial. Still, I did not deconstruct his argument. I now turn to that task.

He begins by mischaracterizing evolution, saying "On evolutionary accounts, every being is turning into something different from what it is thanks to the processes embedded in nature by the Creator."[123] As we have seen, evolutionary differences occur between generations, not within a single organism. He rejoins:

> (Mind that in the discussion about the origin of species we do not talk about the changes of individuals but species, so if evolution means that a reptile transforms into a bird, we do not mean a particular individual or a population but the species or secondary substance).[124]

This is Platonism and quite problematic. First, *secondary* substances are not beings, but *ens rationis*—nor does Chaberek deny this. "Aristotle and Aquinas say is that universals, once they are derived from individuals, do not exist in the individuals but independently, as ideas in the intellect."[125] Second, species cannot change, as Aquinas explains:

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[120] *Ibid*., 63f.

[121] Polis, "Compatibility," 579f.

[122] Chaberek, "A Response," 64.

[123] *Ibid.*, 63f.

[124] *Ibid.*, 65.

[125] *Ibid.*, 55.

> [A] universal is said to be incorruptible, not because it possesses some form giving it incorruptibility, but because those material qualities which cause corruption in individuals do not belong to it as a universal.[126]

Third, while Chaberek may not mean that evolutionary transformations occur in populations, he knows that biologists do.[127] So, he is attacking a straw man.

He continues, "If this was the case, the efficient cause, the one that 'makes things' would be reduced to changes in matter, such as genetic mutations, environmental influences, natural selection and so forth."[128] This is befuddled. First, it is aimed at Darwinian evolution, not the natural emergence of new species *per se*. Second, his examples fail. Mutations are new *forms*, the *effect* of many efficient causes. Environmental influences are causes, not changes in matter. Natural selection is an informing principle rather than a type of change. Third, efficient causality is not denied. Abstractly, the laws of nature, God's general will for matter, are evolution's efficient cause. Concretely, it is secondary causes, such as cosmic rays, chemical mutagens, disease organisms, predators, competitors and symbiotes—all cooperating to effect God's design.

He adds, "Dr. Polis does not seem to fully understand what the formal cause is. The formal cause makes the thing what it is, it is the cause of the being be itself. It is the form that makes the thing what it is."[129] This seems to confuse formal with efficient causes, which alone *make* things. Aristotle's "causes" are not "causes" in the English sense, but *principles of explanation* (*arché*)—ways of answering "why?" The formal cause is "the form or the archetype, *i.e.*, the statement of the es-

[126] *De Veritate*, V, *ad* 14.
[127] Chaberek, "A Response," 66.
[128] *Ibid.*, 63f.
[129] *Ibid.*, 64.

sence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (*e.g.*, of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition."[130] A being's actuality, its form, does not *make* it because it is realized *with* the being. As for archetypes, statements, parts of definitions and numbers, they make nothing. Agents do.

Chaberek misconstrues final causality as well. "On the classic metaphysical account, the final cause is the idea in divine intellect according to which the Creator produces given species."[131] We just saw Aristotle say archetypes are formal causes. Final causes are the "end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, *e.g.*, health is the cause of walking about."[132] Thus, a being's final cause is its God-given purpose —including its multi-faceted role in evolving later species.

As long as a being is whatever it is, it has a formal "cause." As long as God intends to create whatever He creates, it has a divine exemplar or archetype. As long as there is a state that is good for an entity, it has an end. What it does not have is what Chaberek requires, a Platonic archetype.[133]

I had written, "Evolution posits no unnatural activity. Instead, the activity of each being is the second actualization of its own form."[134] Chaberek claims that "The first two sentences are just, say so, unsupported statements. How does a being that changes into something else not tend to be anything other than it is?"[135] I had quoted evolution's four postulates, which do not claim "a being . . . changes into some-

[130] Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 3, 194^{b}27–9.

[131] Chaberek, "A Response," 65.

[132] *Physics*, II, 3, 194^{b}32.

[133] Chaberek, "A Response," 64: "[I]f we fully adopt the premises of biological macroevolution, there are no species but only the connecting links and thus the formal cause is annihilated." Eliminating archetypal *species* does not annihilate the formal cause, for God still intends each individual form.

[134] Polis, "Compatibility," 580.

[135] Chaberek, "A Response," 65.

thing else." That is Chaberek's invention. "Second act" is the operation of a being already in (first) act, which Aquinas derives[136] from *De Anima* II, 1.

The notion of species archetypes is a strong undercurrent in Scholastic thought. Still, it is based on a theory rejected by Aristotle and Aquinas—Plato's participation in Ideas.

Argument 5

Chaberek's fifth argument is based on the premise "that according to classical metaphysics nature consists of parts that fit each other and work for the perfection of the whole."[137] I pointed out that evolution does not deny that parts are ordered to the good of the whole. His reply fails to document his claim. Instead, he offers two texts from the *Summa Theologiae*. The first is "because [God's] goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures."[138] The second is:

> It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another.[139]

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[136] *S.Th.* I–II, 3, 2, c. Also, "Now, just as be-ing (*ipsum esse*) is the actualisation of an essence or nature, so activity (*operari*) is the actualisation of a power or capacity to act. Each of the two is in actuality as follows: essence or nature in terms of be-ing (*secundum esse*); a power or capacity in terms of activity (*secundum operari*)" (*De Spititualibus Creaturis*, XI, c).

[137] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 61.

[138] *S.Th.*, I, 47, 1, c.

[139] *S.Th.*, I, 47, 2, c. and *ad* 1.

The first suggests that individuals perfectly realizing to God's diverse intentions would better represent His goodness than defective copies of species prototypes. Ignoring this, Chaberek offers his own interpretation.

> The problem is that the theistic evolutionary account of nature denies this principle of creation and proposes something directly opposite. On the evolutionary account, different species compete and struggle to adapt, they must become something else in order to survive, and finally the entire world of biology is supposed to reach ever higher levels of life and complexity. This vision of nature flatly contradicts the principle of gradation laid down by Aquinas. Species are not supposed to evolve, because they represent divine power and wisdom by their complementary existence at different levels of "perfection."[140]

This is fraught with difficulties. First, it addresses Darwinian evolution, not the natural emergence of new species *per se*. So, even if sound, it would not prove his thesis. Second, its premises are false. The gradation of being is a metaphysical concept, outside of the competence of biology. The theory of evolution does not address it—nor does it speak of reaching "higher levels of life and complexity." That is an interpretation. If it did, Chaberek should have documented the transgression. Third, he continues to reify species, saying "they must become something else," when we agree that they are immutable beings of reason.

Chaberek's argument reaffirms his disinterest in the Book of Nature, for it is an empirical *fact*, not an evolutionary hypothesis, that animals compete for food, and plants for light and root space, in the struggle to survive. Saying "Species are not supposed to evolve" presumes to know God's will *a priori* rather than by studying His self-revelation in creation.

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[140] Chaberek, "Classical Metaphysics," 67.

Next, he proves too much. If creation were perfect in the way he believes, the supernatural creation of new species would degrade it as much as their natural evolution. More fundamentally, there would be no change, for all changes involve the acquisition or loss of perfections.

Finally, he continues to distort evolution. I documented the theory's four postulates. He invents undocumented substitutes: "The theory of evolution . . . postulates that one species, such as hippopotamus (or some ancient artiodactyl), changed into another species, such as whale . . ."[141]

Since the Book of Nature reveals that God has created a world of change, natural perfection cannot be a static, but a dynamic process ordered to ends only God fully understands.

Conclusion

Chaberek's thesis rests, first, on a consistent refusal to consider the actual postulates, structure, claims and evidence of evolution and, second, on the Neoplatonic reification of species as a secondary substance. His alternate portrayal of evolution is an undocumented straw man for his attacks.

Two thinkers responded to my critique of Chaberek. Neither refers to the Book of Nature, to *what is*, in making their case. Chaberek seems not to have read Darwin, or any other treatise on evolution. Delfino supports theistic evolution, but considers none of Chaberek's arguments, and offers no alternative to my critique. I answered their charges of nominalism and relativism—affirming Thomistic moderate realism while rejecting Platonism. Evolution is compatible with the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition because it does not trespass into metaphysical speculation.

[141] *Ibid.*

Appendix

The Theological Issue

I am not a theologian. Still, research shows that Chaberek's creationism conflicts with the views of Augustine, Aquinas and recent popes.

Obviously, a literal interpretation of *Genesis* 1 involves his sort of creationism. The famous Jesuit exegete Cornelius à Lapide (1567–1637), known for his encyclopedic knowledge of Patristic literature, says that most Fathers took the *Hexaemeron* (the six days of creation) literally.[142] Still, early Christians understood the theological points of dependence and intrinsic goodness, not the days of creation, to be the central message of *Genesis* 1.[143] Nonliteral interpretations were not deemed heretical. Irenaeus uses one or seven days depending on which provides a better theological metaphor. Origin explicitly says that the creation account was universally understood figuratively, not literally.

> For who that has understanding would think that the first second and third day—and the evening and the morning—existed without a sun, moon and stars? Or, too, would think that the first day was, as it were, without a sky? . . . *I do not think that anyone doubts* [italics mine] that these things figuratively indicate certain mysteries—the history having taken place in appearance, not literally.[144]

As we have seen, St. Augustine believed that creation included *rationes seminales* which would actualize into new species through natural processes. While not envisioning one species evolving from another, he saw new species appearing *naturally* over the course of time,

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[142] Fr. John Lawrence, F.F.I. (Michael F. Polis), private communication.

[143] John R. Willis, *The Teachings of the Church Fathers* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1966), 203–213, and *A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs*, ed. David W. Bercot (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson Publishers, Inc., 1998), 179ff, 189.

[144] Quoted in *A Dictionary of Early Christian Beliefs*, 189.

foreshadowing modern physics, in which later material states are immanent in prior states and the laws of nature.

Similarly, Aquinas explicitly accepts the idea of new species emerging via secondary causality in the *Summa Theologiae* I, 73, 1, ad 3. While he saw both direct creation and the elaboration of creation over time as theologically acceptable, he says Augustine's interpretation "is the more subtle, and is a better defense of Scripture against the ridicule of unbelievers."[145]

Catholic thinkers quickly accepted Darwin's theory. In 1909, Erich Wasmann wrote in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*,

> [Evolution] is in perfect agreement with the Christian conception of the universe; for Scripture does not tell us in what form the present species of plants and of animals were originally created by God. As early as 1877 Knabenbauer stated "that there is no objection, so far as faith is concerned, to assuming the descent of all plant and animal species from a few types" (*Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, XIII, p. 72).[146]

More recently, in *Humani generis* (1950), Pope Pius XII found no intrinsic conflict between the Catholic faith and the evolution of the human body.[147] Pope John Paul II, addressing the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on October 22, 1996, said "new findings lead us toward the recognition of evolution as more than a hypothesis."[148] Cardinal Joseph

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[145] *De Pot. Dei*, IV, 2, c.

[146] Erich Wasmann. "Catholics and Evolution," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 5 (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1909). Available online—see the section *References* for details. Joseph Knabenbauer, S.J., was a leading light in the Catholic acceptance of evolution. See Ctirad V. Pospíšil, "Joseph Knabenbauer SJ (1839–1911) a otázka evolučního vzniku člověka," *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica* 7, no. 1 (January 8, 2017): 143–155.

[147] Pope Pius XII, *Humani Generis* (August 12, 1950). Available online—see the section *References* for details.

[148] Pope John Paul II. "Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution" (October 22, 1996). Available online—see the section *References* for details. The original French is "la theorie de l'evolution plus qu'une hypothese." Translating *une* as "a" instead of "one" is justified by the context.

Ratzinger, later to be Pope Benedict XVI, was president of the International Theological Commission in July 2004 when it released a statement that said:

> While there is little consensus among scientists about how the origin of this first microscopic life is to be explained, there is general agreement among them that the first organism dwelt on this planet about 3.5–4 billion years ago. Since it has been demonstrated that all living organisms on earth are genetically related, *it is virtually certain that all living organisms have descended from this first organism* [italics mine]. Converging evidence from many studies in the physical and biological sciences furnishes mounting support for some theory of evolution to account for the development and diversification of life on earth, while controversy continues over the pace and mechanisms of evolution.[149]

Thus, Fr. Chaberek's creationism, while theologically *acceptable*, is out of step with the positions of Sts. Augustine and Thomas, current theology, and science.

Metaphysics and Evolution: Response to Critics

SUMMARY

I respond to Michał Chaberek's and Robert A. Delfino's criticisms of my argument that evolution is compatible with Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics. Biological species, as secondary substances, are beings of reason founded in the natures of their instances. They are traceable to God's creative intent, but not to universal exemplars. Aquinas teaches that concepts are derived from sensible accidents. Thus, evolution's directed variation of such accidents will eventually require new *species concepts*. This accords with *projective realism*, which allows diverse, well-founded concepts based on the multiple perspectives and conceptual spaces of knowing subjects. Charges that this is nominalism, not moderate realism, are rebutted; however, it is relativism because knowl-

[149] International Theological Commission, *Communion and Stewardship: Human Persons Created in the Image of* God, Plenary sessions, Rome 2000–2002 (July 2004), 63. Available online—see the section *References* for details.

edge is a subject-object relation. Other metaphysical issues are considered. Chaberek's thesis that species cannot evolve naturally fails because he: (1) reifies the species concept, (2) misrepresents the motivation, structure and conclusions of evolution, (3) confuses Aristotle's four causes and (4) limits God's creative omnipotence. Finally, Chaberek is out of step with contemporary theology.

KEYWORDS

Aristotelianism, Thomism, evolution, substance-accident distinction, epistemology, moderate realism, projective realism, nominalism, relativism, intentional existence, teleology, laws of nature, species problem, intelligent design, problem of universals, abstraction, exemplar ideas, creationism.

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Filozoficzne, teologiczne i afektywne racje uzasadniające powołanie

W Boga nie tylko się wierzy, oddaje Mu cześć, rozmawia z Nim, poszukuje lub odchodzi od Niego, lecz również uzasadnia się Jego istnienie. Tak samo dzieje się z powołaniem, które najpierw się odkrywa, potem podejmuje, realizuje i wypełnia albo zaniedbuje lub porzuca. Na różnych etapach rozwoju powołania, a zwłaszcza w trudnych doświadczeniach życia dokłada się także starań, aby wzmocnić przekonanie, że podjęte powołanie jest właściwe i prawdziwe, a nie pozorne lub błędne.

Podobnie jak z punktu widzenia filozofii Boga czy też samej wiary istotne znaczenie ma uzasadnienie tego, że Bóg istnieje, tak również z pozycji osoby powołanej nie bez znaczenia pozostaje to, czy istnieją jakieś racje przemawiające na rzecz rozpoznawanego powołania. Gdyby okazało się, że istnienie Boga nie ma racji ani nie przemawiają za nim żadne argumenty, to przekonanie o Jego istnieniu stałoby się absurdem. To samo należałoby powiedzieć o powołaniu. Dlatego w kontekście poznania całej rzeczywistości, a także życia konkretnej osoby istotne znaczenie ma uzasadnienie zarówno istnienia Boga, jak i powołania.

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest próba ukazania racji uzasadniających powołanie (oraz relacji zachodzących między nimi). Wprawdzie dokona się to na przykładzie powołania kapłańskiego, ale równie do-

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brze przy użyciu proponowanych tu narzędzi można uzasadniać powołanie każdego typu. Za środki niezbędne do wykonania tego zadania posłużą te same racje, które zwykle przytacza się w celu uzasadnienia istnienia Boga. Jest to zatem próba wykorzystania argumentów uzasadniających istnienie Boga do uzasadnienia powołania. Ponieważ powołanie, podobnie jak kwestia Boga, stanowi złożoną problematykę, argumentowanie na jego rzecz nie ogranicza się tylko do pojedynczych racji, ale uwzględnia szereg przesłanek pochodzących z różnych dziedzin aktywności człowieka, głównie poznania i postępowania. Stąd też na rzecz powołania zostaną wskazane racje należące do porządku filozoficznego (rozum), teologicznego (wiara), a także pragmatycznego (doświadczenie).

Pojęcie powołania

Pojęcie powołania może być rozpatrywane zarówno na płaszczyźnie naturalnej, jak i nadprzyrodzonej. W języku potocznym terminu "powołanie" używa się m.in. w kontekście obsadzenia jakiegoś stanowiska (np. powołanie na sędziego) lub w celu podkreślenia całkowitego poświęcenia się wykonywanej pracy (np. nauczyciel z powołania). Jednakże zwykle pojęcie to funkcjonuje na płaszczyźnie religijnej i najczęściej z nią jest kojarzone. Dlatego w tym opracowaniu pojęcie powołania jest rozpatrywane w sensie nadprzyrodzonym.

W wyjaśnieniu (rozumieniu) istoty powołania pomocne są kategorie filozoficzne. W oparciu o nie można powiedzieć, że powołanie jest pewnego rodzaju bytem i to bytem realnym. Wynika to z tego, że posiada ono realne istnienie i określoną treść. Odpowiedź na pytanie, jakim jest ono bytem, zależy od tego, jaki rodzaj istnienia mu przysługuje. Ponieważ powołanie istnieje w łączności z osobą, która je posiada, nie jest ono bytem substancjalnym. Jego podmiotem jest człowiek. Dlatego można by sądzić, że powołanie jest bytem przypadłościowym,

skoro jest zapodmiotowione w substancji. Ponieważ jednak bytowość powołania określa się również na podstawie tego, co jest jego źródłem i celem, czyli przyporządkowaniem do czegoś, co konstytuuje powołanie, to jest ono bytem relacyjnym. Wynika to z tego, że powołanie nie zależy tylko od człowieka, ale również od źródła, które jest jego przyczyną (Bóg). W ten sposób na gruncie metafizyki klasycznej powołanie jest rozumiane jako byt relacyjny międzyosobowy.[1] Można mu przypisać nazwę "bytu pomiędzy" lub "bytu towarzyszącego." W tej perspektywie racje powołania mogą dotyczyć jednego, jak i drugiego krańca relacji, czyli osoby powołanej oraz powołującej.

O powołaniu można mówić zarówno w sensie szerokim (powołanie powszechne), jak i w sensie wąskim (powołanie indywidualne). Dostrzeżenie tych dwóch wymiarów ułatwia wskazanie racji powołania. Lokalizują się one po obu kresach relacji. Dlatego należy ich poszukiwać tak po stronie człowieka, jak i Boga.

Najogólniej rzecz biorąc powszechne powołanie w sensie nadprzyrodzonym rozumie się jako realizowanie Bożego zamysłu (woli) w stosunku do (doczesnego i wiecznego) życia człowieka. Na gruncie religii chrześcijańskiej powołanie w sensie wąskim to sposób (środek) realizowania powszechnego powołania (celu) do świętości (zbawienia). Dlatego zasadne jest mówienie o dwóch rodzajach powołania. Jedno z nich jest celem ostatecznym, a drugie sposobem osiągnięcia tego celu.[2] Przy czym oba rodzaje powołania są ze sobą ściśle związane.

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[1] Por. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Metafizyka. Zarys teorii bytu* (Lublin 1984), 329; Tomasz Duma, *Metafizyka relacji. U podstaw rozumienia relacji bytowych* (Lublin 2017), 569.

[2] Na temat powołania powszechnego i szczegółowego zob. np. *Konstytucja dogmatyczna o Kościele* "*Lumen Gentium*," nr 40; Jan Paweł II, *Pastores dabo vobis*, nr 19–20. Na temat kryteriów decydujących o podziale nazwy "powołanie" zob. Marcin Sieńkowski, "Filozoficzne aspekty powołania na przykładzie adhortacji *Pastores dabo vobis* i *Christus vivit*," *Studia Ełckie* 22, nr 3 (2020): 343–354.

Niezależnie od rodzaju powołania można wskazać poszczególne typy jego racji. Powołanie czy to jako cel ostateczny, czy środek do celu posiada racje naturalne i nadprzyrodzone. Człowiek jako istota rozumna jest zdolny wskazać źródło i rozpoznać cel swego życia. W pierwszej kolejności dokonuje się to dzięki intelektowi, a na poziomie nadprzyrodzonym dzięki intelektowi, woli i łasce.

Racja i uzasadnienie

Jednym z praw rządzących istnieniem i poznaniem bytu, które wyodrębnia się na gruncie filozofii realistycznej jest zasada racji. Głosi ona, że wszystko, co istnieje posiada swoje racje. Chodzi tu o racje tego, że dany byt jest (istnienie) oraz racje tego, dlaczego jest taki a taki (natura).[3] Racja każdego typu świadczy o tym, że byt jest uwarunkowany. Wobec tego racją jest jakiś czynnik lub element w bycie albo poza nim, który wyjaśnia dany byt lub stan rzeczy. Zamiennie z pojęciem racji używa się określeń: motyw, powód, przyczyna, podstawa, zasada.[4]

Podać racje bytu znaczy to samo, co uzasadnić (wyjaśnić) byt. Z kolei uzasadnienie prowadzi do rozumienia. Tak więc rozumienie czegoś następuje w wyniku wskazania racji. A ponieważ żaden byt przygodny nie ma racji swego istnienia w sobie, znajdują się one poza nim. To znaczy, że uzasadnienia jakiegoś bytu poszukuje się w innym bycie. Można powiedzieć, że byty dzielą się na uzasadniane i uzasadniające (warunkowane i warunkujące).[5]

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[3] Por. Bogusław Paź, "Ratio/racja," w: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, t. 8, red. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2007), 647; tenże, *Naczelna zasada racjonalizmu. Od Kartezjusza do wczesnego Kanta* (Wrocław 2006), 40–41; Józef Herbut, "Uzasadnienie," w: *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, t. 9, red. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2008), 629.

[4] Por. *Mały słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych*, oprac. A. Podsiad, Z. Więckowski (Warszawa 1983), 325–326.

[5] Wyjątkiem od tej zasady jest to, co jest pierwsze, czyli Bóg.

Uzasadnienie (poznanie) Boga (istnienia i natury) zasadniczo dokonuje się na trzy sposoby. Jednym z nich jest sposób (droga) wstępujący, w którym ze stworzeń wnioskuje się o Stwórcy (teologia naturalna), drugi sposób zwany zstępującym, polega na przyjęciu treści (prawdy), które Bóg objawia (teologia nadprzyrodzona). Istotną rolę odgrywa w nim wiara. Trzeci ze sposobów to afektywne poznania Boga, które polega na doświadczaniu (przeżyciu) Jego istnienia i działania.[6] Każdy z trzech sposobów uzasadnienia (poznania) Boga odwołuje się do innego typu racji. Wobec tego mamy do czynienia z racjami naturalnymi, którymi są realnie istniejące rzeczy (świat), z racjami nadprzyrodzonymi, czyli z tym, co Bóg objawia (racje podane przez Boga) oraz z racjami odkrywanymi w wyniku indywidualnego doświadczenia.[7] Ponieważ powołanie w sensie nadprzyrodzonym jest rzeczywistością, która ściśle wiąże się z Bogiem, zasadne jest wykorzystanie argumentów uzasadniających Boga w celu uzasadnienia powołania. Jeśli powołanie jest bytem relacyjnym międzyosobowym, to siłą rzeczy posiada swoje racje. Dotyczą one obu krańców tej relacji.

Racje naturalne (uzasadnienie filozoficzne)

Punktem wyjścia w naturalnym sposobie uzasadnienia istnienia Boga jest to, czego człowiek doświadcza bezpośrednio jako istniejącego niezależnie od siebie. Tego rodzaju doświadczenie może dotyczyć realnie istniejących rzeczy, ich własności, zdarzeń, innych ludzi czy własnych wytworów. Zwykle sumę wszystkich bytów dostępnych człowiekowi w ten sposób nazywa się światem. Dlatego uzasadnienie istnienia Boga w tym porządku rozpoczyna się od rzeczy (bytów, stworzeń, świata). Natomiast punktem dojścia jest wskazanie ich przyczyn,

[6] Por. *S.Th.*, I, q. 2, a. 2; Piotr Moskal, *Religia i prawda* (Lublin 2008), 130.

[7] Tomasz z Akwinu wymienia również poznanie Boga w drodze doskonałego oglądania rzeczy objawionych. Por. *S.C.G.*, IV, 1.

spośród których najistotniejsze są przyczyny ostateczne.[8] Zgodnie z tym poznanie rzeczy wiedzie do wskazania istnienia Boga, którego określa się jako ostateczną przyczynę ich istnienia. Naturalne uzasadnienie istnienia Boga przyjmuje postać rozumowania, w którym poszukuje się przyczyny (punkt dojścia) dla dostępnych skutków w postaci realnie istniejących rzeczy (punkt wyjścia). Realność skutków jest gwarantowana realnością ich przyczyny.

W celu zastosowania tej metody do ukazania racji uzasadniających powołanie (np. kapłańskie), wpierw należy wskazać skutki, które mogą pochodzić od niego jak od swej przyczyny. Należy jednak rozstrzygnąć, czy przyczyną tych skutków jest faktycznie powołanie kapłańskie czy inne. Zdarza się, że ten sam skutek mogą wywołać różne przyczyny. Dlatego najistotniejsze, a zarazem najtrudniejsze jest dotarcie do przyczyny realnej, a nie tylko myślnej. Ponadto w porządku naturalnym skutków powołania może być wiele. Na ich podstawie wnosi się, że wywołuje (wyjaśnia) je określone powołanie.[9]

Podstawowym skutkiem każdego powołania jest to, że ono w ogóle zachodzi, czyli jest podjęte i realizowane w sposób wolny i świadomy. Natomiast na poziomie poszukiwania powołania, czyli jego rozeznawania, dostępne są jedynie pewne oznaki, które wskazują na jego ewentualne istnienie.

Z punktu widzenia dociekania racji na rzecz powołania ważną rolę pełnią predyspozycje, które umożliwiają podjęcie decyzji dotyczącej drogi życiowej. Na poziomie rozeznawania powołania istotne jest

[8] Przyczyny mogą być różnego rodzaju. Ostateczne, dalsze i bliższe, wewnętrzne i zewnętrzne, sprawcze i celowe itd. Por. Piotr Moskal, "Transcendencja i immanencja Boga w stosunku do świata," w: *Wierność rzeczywistości. Księga Pamiątkowa z okazji jubileuszu 50-lecia pracy naukowej na KUL O. prof. Mieczysława A. Krąpca*, red. Z. J. Zdybicka i in. (Lublin 2001), 145–153.

[9] O tego typu skutkach mówi się w ramach tego, co zwie się rozeznawaniem czy rozpoznawaniem powołania. Por. Franciszek, *Christus vivit*, nr 278–298; Andrzej J. Najda, "Rodzina miejscem rozpoznania i dojrzewania powołania," *Studia Ełckie* 19, nr 4 (2017): 451–461.

samo pragnienie jego poznania (odkrycia). Świadomość tego, że życie ma sens, wyzwala w człowieku poszukiwanie jego źródła i celu. Towarzyszą temu wysiłki związane z poznaniem źródła własnego istnienia, a także poszukiwanie drogi, która wiedzie do celu. Wewnętrzne pragnienia wiążą się również z dążeniem do szczęścia, z nadzieją na zrealizowanie swego człowieczeństwa i mądrego pokierowania własnym życiem, a przy tym ustrzeżenia się od błędu czy zaprzepaszczenia go. Kto w takim kontekście spogląda na swoje życie, ten potwierdza, że przynależy mu jakieś powołanie. Już samo poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na fundamentalne pytania dotyczące egzystencji może oznaczać, że są one podyktowane istniejącym, aczkolwiek jeszcze nie rozpoznanym powołaniem.[10]

Podobne spostrzeżenia wynikają z posiadanych pragnień, dążeń, planów i marzeń dotyczących życia. Z drugiej strony zasada wyjaśniająca realne skutki może wiązać się z doświadczeniem własnej bezradności wobec wyboru drogi życiowej. Świadomość niezdecydowania, niewiedzy, wątpliwości, braku wizji swego powołania rodzi szansę na jego wytrwałe poszukiwanie, a przy tym na otwarcie się na Boży plan. W przypadku zauważenia, że świat nie daje pełnej satysfakcji i nie prowadzi do spełnienia najgłębszych pragnień, poszukiwania mogą pójść w kierunku nadprzyrodzonym, w którym przedmiotem pragnień staje się Bóg.

Oprócz predyspozycji wnioskowanie o istnieniu powołania umożliwiają oznaki powołania. To pewnego rodzaju cechy czy właściwości, które mogą wskazywać na istnienie konkretnego powołania. Chodzi tu głównie o różnego rodzaju zainteresowania i uwarunkowania. W przypadku powołania kapłańskiego jest nim np. zainteresowanie Bogiem i tym, co się z Nim wiąże. Poświęcanie uwagi religii, ewangelizacji, li-

[10] Zdaniem papieża Franciszka istotne znaczenie ma odpowiedź na pytanie, dla kogo jestem? Świadczy to o tym, że powołanie jest bytem w relacji do kogoś innego. Por. Franciszek, *Christus vivit*, nr 286.

turgii, służba przy ołtarzu, lektura Pisma św., przynależność do wspólnoty formacyjnej czy udział w rekolekcjach wskazuje na powołanie kapłańskie bardziej niż u osób, które nie przejawiają tego typu zainteresowań.[11] Pomocne w dotarciu do właściwego powołania mogą też być pewne widoczne skutki w postaci np. umiejętności słuchania, inicjowania i prowadzenia modlitwy, podejmowania rozmów na tematy z powołaniem związane czy z osobami, które już realizują określone powołanie.[12]

Ważną rolę w dociekaniu powołania pełni historia życia, czyli osoby, wydarzenia i doświadczenia w nim obecne. Ich poprawna interpretacja jest możliwa przy pewnym stopniu urobienia (formacji), a niekiedy przy pomocy innych osób (formatorów). Potraktowanie ich jako

[11] Wielu księży przyznaje, że ma takie doświadczenia sprzed wstąpienia do seminarium. "Moje *przygotowanie seminaryjne* do kapłaństwa *zostało poniekąd zaantycypowane, uprzedzone*. W jakimś sensie przyczynili się do tego moi *Rodzice* w domu rodzinnym, a zwłaszcza *mój Ojciec*, który wcześnie owdowiał . . . Nieraz zdarzało mi się budzić w nocy i wtedy zastawałem mojego Ojca na kolanach, tak jak na kolanach widywałem go zawsze w kościele parafialnym. Nigdy nie mówiliśmy z sobą o powołaniu kapłańskim, ale ten *przykład mojego Ojca był jakimś pierwszym domowym seminarium*." Jan Paweł II, *Dar i Tajemnica. W pięćdziesiątą rocznicę moich święceń kapłańskich* (Kraków 1996), 21–22; por. Konferencja Episkopatu Polski, "List do kapłanów na Wielki Czwartek 2011. Kapłan kształtowany przez słowo Boże," *Formatio Permanens* 11 (2011): 12–21; Marian Salamon, "Geneza i motywacje powołań kapłańskich na terenie obecnej diecezji ełckiej w latach 1945-1998," *Studia Ełckie* 22, nr 1 (2020): 89–98; Piotr M. Gajda, *Wybrany, konsekrowany i posłany. Kapłan w świetle dokumentów Nauczycielskiego Urzędu Kościoła* (Tranów 2006), 51.

[12] "Aby uchronić się przed wywózką na przymusowe roboty do Niemiec, jesienią roku 1940 zacząłem pracę jako robotnik fizyczny w kamieniołomie, związanym z fabryką chemiczną Solvay. Odpowiedzialni za kamieniołom, którzy byli Polakami, starali się nas studentów ochronić od najcięższych prac. Tak więc na przykład przydzielono mnie do pomocy tak zwanemu strzałowemu. Nazywał się on Franciszek Łabuś. Wspominam go dlatego, że nieraz tak się do mnie odzywał: 'Karolu, wy to byście poszli na księdza. Dobrze byście śpiewali, bo macie ładny głos i byłoby wam dobrze . . .'. Mówił to z całą poczciwością . . . Te słowa starego robotnika zachowały się w mojej pamięci." Jan Paweł II, *Dar i Tajemnica*, 12–13.

skutków wyzwala pragnienie zrozumienia poprzez powiązania skutkowo-przyczynowe.[13]

Zależnie od znajomości siebie i stopnia zaangażowania w proces poszukiwania drogi życiowej można wskazać jeszcze inne oznaki powołania.[14] Jednakże w sensie skutków wszystkie one odsyłają do swojej przyczyny. Wprawdzie możliwe jest podanie podstawowych kryteriów i oznak powołania, a także formułowanie wymagań stawianych kandydatom do kapłaństwa, jednakże mają one sens tylko i wyłącznie w powiązaniu z realnie istniejącym powołaniem, które je wywołuje.[15]

Wszelka aktywność (teoretyczna i praktyczna) związana z poznaniem siebie i odkryciem powołania świadczy o tym, że posiada ono swoje przyczyny. Potraktowanie ich jako skutków pozostaje niezrozumiałe dopóty, dopóki nie wskaże się ich źródła. Wskazanie naturalnych racji na rzecz powołania może okazać się punktem wyjścia w jego odkryciu.[16] Natomiast same racje naturalne nie są wystarczające. Może się okazać, że te same predyspozycje da się wyjaśnić więcej niż jednym ro-

[13] "Każde powołanie kapłańskie ma swoją odrębną historię i ściśle się wiąże z jakimś określonym momentem życia, zazwyczaj nie bywa jednak zaskoczeniem. Chrystus, zanim skieruje do człowieka te słowa, które skierował do Apostołów i które od dwóch tysięcy lat kieruje do tylu ludzi, najpierw długo go przygotowuje, często od najwcześniejszych lat życia, nie chce bowiem, by decyzja pójścia za Nim była pochopna, nieprzemyślana, powzięta pod wpływem chwili i emocji." Tadeusz Borutka, *Refleksja nad kapłaństwem w świetle nauczania Kościoła* (Kraków 2009), 27; por. Amedeo Cencini, *Kryteria rozeznawania powołania*, tłum. D. Piekarz (Kraków 2008).

[14] W przypadku niedostrzegania w sobie tych cech z pomocą często przychodzą inni. Widzą oni więcej i z innej perspektywy. Dlatego ich ocena może okazać się pomocna.

[15] Por. *Droga formacji prezbiterów w Polsce. Ratio institutionis sacerdotalis pro Polonia*, nr 150–161; Amedeo Cencini, "Znaki rozpoznania powołania (1)," tłum. A. Kania, w: *Wybory i decyzje*, red. K. Wons (Kraków 2002), 51–58; Marek Dziewiecki, *Kapłan świadek miłości* (Kraków 2005), 10; *Kodeks Prawa Kanonicznego* (Poznań 1984), kan. 1024–1032.

[16] Oprócz racji na rzecz powołania mogą występować też takie, które świadczą o przeszkodach do jego podjęcia lub braku powołania. Por. Beata Zarzycka, "Psychologiczne czynniki ułatwiające i utrudniające formację kapłańską," *Studia Ełckie* 19, nr specjalny (2017): 561–563; Franciszek L. Leśniak, Remigiusz Popowski, *Formacja ludzka powołanych do kapłaństwa* (Lublin 2006), 127–138.

dzajem powołania. Z drugiej strony można nie dostrzegać oznak, a mieć powołanie.[17] Tego rodzaju trudności wynikają głównie z tego, że rozumowania, jakie służą do wyciągania wniosków to rozumowania redukcyjne, czyli takie, w których prawdziwe przesłanki nie muszą prowadzić do prawdziwych wniosków. Wobec tego niezbędne jest poszukiwanie silniejszych argumentów. Trudności związane z racjami naturalnymi mogą być przezwyciężone przez motywy i uzasadnienie nadprzyrodzone.

Racje nadprzyrodzone (uzasadnienie teologiczne)

Chociaż wskazany wyżej naturalny (filozoficzny) sposób poznania istnienia Boga (oraz powołania) jest możliwy dla intelektu człowieka, to praktycznie nie jest on dostępny wszystkim ludziom. Tomasz z Akwinu zauważa, że w taki sposób tylko nieliczni poznają Boga.[18] Dlatego niezbędne jest posiłkowanie się innymi drogami dotarcia do prawdy, że Bóg istnieje. Jedną z nich jest teologiczny sposób poznania. Jego punkt wyjścia stanowi Bóg, a w zasadzie objawienie, czyli to, co Bóg mówi sam o sobie. Ten sposób rozumowania przyjmuje kierunek zstępujący, a więc odwrotny do poznania filozoficznego (wstępującego).[19]

Nadprzyrodzone uzasadnienie istnienia Boga ściśle wiąże się z wiarą. Dzięki niej następuje uznanie za prawdę treści objawionych, wśród których znajduje się twierdzenie o istnieniu Boga. Mówi o nim np. Księga Wyjścia, w której Bóg objawia siebie jako tego, który jest (por. Wj 3, 14). Przyjęcie tej, jak i innych treści objawionych jest jed-

[17] Np. prorok Jeremiasz (por. Jr 1, 6).

[18] Por. *S.C.G.*, I, 4.

[19] Por. *S.Th.*, II–II, q. 2, a. 4; *S.C.G.*, IV, 1.

nym ze sposobów poznania Boga.[20] Ponieważ jednak człowiek sam z siębie (swoim intelektem) nie dostrzega prawdziwości twierdzeń objawionych, przyjmuje je w drodze wiary. Tomasz z Akwinu wyjaśnia, że wiara to akt rozumu, który uznaje objawienie za prawdziwe pod wpływem woli. Ponadto władze te funkcjonują w wierze na skutek usprawnienia łaską. Wola jest zdolna nakłonić intelekt do przyjęcia prawdy tylko wtedy, gdy sama jest poruszona dobrem, które Bóg obiecuje wierzącym.[21]

Ten sposób poznania Boga (głównie Jego natury) można wykorzystać do argumentowania na rzecz powołania. Chodzi o to, aby rozpoznać, że jest ono pochodne od Boga, a przede wszystkim, że Bóg sam je objawia osobie powołanej. Wiąże się to z zagadnieniem źródła powołania. Na gruncie poznania teologicznego i wiary katolickiej przyjmuje się, że do kapłaństwa powołuje tylko i wyłącznie Bóg. Przemawia za tym wiele świadectw zawartych w objawieniu.[22] Wobec tego nie moż-

[20] W tym miejscu należy wskazać na pewnego rodzaju trudność związaną z uzasadnieniem istnienia Boga na podstawie objawienia. Chodzi o to, że objawienie, które mówi o Bogu zakłada Jego istnienie. Dlatego argument z objawienia jest raczej potwierdzeniem istnienia Boga, które uzyskuje się w inny sposób, najczęściej zdroworozsądkowy lub filozoficzny. Ponieważ nadprzyrodzony argument na rzecz Boga całkowicie opiera się na wierze, to zarazem zakłada poznanie poprzedzające wiarę. "Akt wiary Bogu w Jego objawienie nie może być sposobem poznania tego, że Bóg istnieje. Gdyby tak było, realizowałaby się następująca sprzeczność: człowiek wierzący posiadałby informację o istnieniu Boga, skoro by Mu wierzył, i zarazem tej informacji by nie posiadał, skoro dopiero w drodze wiary by ją uzyskiwał. Skąd bierze się to uprzednie w stosunku do wiary w objawienie poznanie Boga? Wydaje się, że w grę wchodzi poznanie pośrednie Boga jako pierwszej przyczyny rzeczy danych w doświadczeniu (poznanie filozoficzne i przedfilozoficzne, to jest potoczne) oraz wiara w społeczny przekaz prawdy o Bogu (wiara ludziom)." Moskal, *Religia i prawda*, 167; por. Marcin Sieńkowski, "Zdroworozsądkowe a filozoficzne poznanie atrybutów Boga," *Studia Philosophiae Christianae* 57, nr 1 (2021): 73–92.

[21] Por. *S.Th.*, II–II, q. 2, a. 9; *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 12; Marcin Sieńkowski, *Wiara a racjonalność* (Ełk 2020), 198.

[22] Oto przykładowe biblijne opisy powołania: "Nie wyście Mnie wybrali, ale Ja was wybrałem i przeznaczyłem was na to, abyście szli i owoc przynosili, i by owoc wasz trwał . . ." (J 15, 16); "I nikt sam sobie nie bierze tej godności, lecz tylko ten, kto jest powołany przez Boga jak Aaron" (Hbr 5, 4); "Powołał Mnie Pan już z łona mej matki,

na być powołanym ani przez siebie samego, ani przez drugiego człowieka.[23]

Ponieważ do kapłaństwa powołuje Bóg, niezbędne jest rozpoznanie, że powołanie to pochodzi od Niego. Dokonuje się to w szczególnych warunkach, a ich podstawę stanowi relacja z Bogiem.[24] Dzięki niej powołanie ma szansę być usłyszane, a następnie podjęte i realizowane. Ponieważ Bóg przemawia do człowieka i dzieli się z nim swoimi zamysłami, człowiek nie musi trwać w niewiedzy, niepewności czy błędzie w kwestii swego powołania. Odkąd Bóg wchodzi w kontakt z człowiekiem wiedza na temat powołania przestaje być tajemnicą. Koresponduje to z ludzkim pragnieniem poznania wiedzy Boga dotyczącej życia człowieka. Kto szuka swojej drogi ze świadomością, że Bóg stanowi jego źródło, ten docieka, co ma On do powiedzenia na temat powołania.

Usłyszane wezwanie i pójście za Chrystusem jest indywidualne do tego stopnia, że staje się wręcz niepowtarzalne, z trudem przekazywane czy nazywane. Wprawdzie mówi się o ogólnym schemacie powołania, ale w szczegółach każde powołanie jest odmienne i niesprowadzalne do innego, co świadczy o tym, że Bóg dociera do istoty człowieka niezależnie od różnego rodzaju uwarunkowań. Nawet jeśli powołani słyszą to samo "Pójdź za mną," to jest ono odbierane w innych oko-

od jej wnętrzności wspomniał moje imię" (Iz 49, 1); "Gdy [Jezus] przechodził obok Jeziora Galilejskiego, ujrzał dwóch braci: Szymona, zwanego Piotrem, i brata jego, Andrzeja, jak zarzucali sieć w jezioro; byli bowiem rybakami. I rzekł do nich: 'Pójdźcie za Mną, a uczynię was rybakami ludzi'. Oni natychmiast zostawili sieci i poszli za Nim. A gdy poszedł stamtąd dalej, ujrzał innych dwóch braci: Jakuba, syna Zebedeusza, i brata jego, Jana, jak z ojcem swym Zebedeuszem naprawiali w łodzi swe sieci. Ich też powołał. A oni natychmiast zostawili łódź i ojca i poszli za Nim" (Mt 4, 18–22).

[23] "Szukam źródła mego powołania. Ono pulsuje tam . . . w jerozolimskim Wieczerniku." Jan Paweł II, *Wstańcie, chodźmy!* (Kraków 2004), 10. "Nikt poza Chrystusem nie może nam objawić naszego powołania." Dziewiecki, *Kapłan świadek miłości*, 11.

[24] O okolicznościach sprzyjających rozpoznaniu powołania zob. np. Franciszek, *Christus vivit*, nr 283–286.

licznościach, w różnym wieku, w kontekście innych wydarzeń i doświadczeń. Niezależnie od tej różnorodności jest ono wezwaniem do realizowania tego samego powołania (np. kapłańskiego).[25]

Istotą argumentu nadprzyrodzonego na rzecz powołania jest zaufanie Bogu (*credere Deo*). Wynika ono z uznania Go za autorytet epistemiczny, który zna powołanie (prawdę), objawia je i nie wprowadza w błąd. Wobec tego nie ma żadnych podstaw, aby człowiek wątpił w prawdziwość i realność powołania pochodzącego do Boga. Dlatego zasadne jest jego przyjęcie.

Argument nadprzyrodzony to najważniejsza racja spośród wszystkich możliwych motywów powołania. Jego podstawą jest pewność oparta na Bogu, który zna i mówi prawdę. Natomiast po stronie człowieka pewność podjęcia powołania pochodzącego do Boga opiera się na wierze. Dlatego w przypadku powołania chrześcijańskiego pewność dotyczy wiary, a nie wiedzy.[26] Nie chodzi o to, aby wiedzieć, że ma się powołanie, lecz wierzyć, że jest ono powołaniem od Boga.

Objawienie informuje, że powołanie kapłańskie nie jest dla każdego. Otrzymuje je ten, kogo Bóg nim obdarzył (wybrał).[27] Ponieważ powołanie można podjąć tylko w wolności, zdarzają się przypadki, gdy osoba powołana je odrzuca. Ewangelia zawiera także historie powołań, w których pojawiają się wątpliwości, zwlekanie albo stawianie warun-

[25] Z pomocą w rozpoznaniu powołania mogą przyjść inni, jak to miało miejsce w przypadku Samuela: "I znów Pan powtórzył po raz trzeci swe wołanie: 'Samuelu!' Wstał więc i poszedł do Helego, mówiąc: 'Oto jestem: przecież mię wołałeś'. Heli spostrzegł się, że to Pan woła chłopca. Rzekł więc Heli do Samuela: 'Idź spać! Gdyby jednak kto cię wołał, odpowiedz: Mów, Panie, bo sługa Twój słucha'" (1 Sm 3, 8–9).

[26] Por. *De veritate*, q. 14, a. 1, ad 7; Jean-Marie Lustiger, *Kapłani, których daje Bóg*, przeł. Z. Pająk (Kraków 2002), 153.

[27] "Kapłaństwo nie jest darem dla każdego, ale charyzmatem ofiarowanym 'wybranym', niektórym. Komu? Tu ludzkich kryteriów nie ma, choć są oczywiście warunki. Jeśli ktoś nie posiada łaski powołania, wówczas 'rozbudzanie motywacji', pełniejsze zaangażowanie w życie duchowe, zwiększona pomoc ojca duchownego itp. niczego nie zmienią." Józef Augustyn, *Kapłańskie ojcostwo. Rozważania dla kleryków, ich rodziców i wychowawców oraz dla księży* (Kraków 2013), 76.

ków Jezusowi.[28] Usłyszane "Pójdź za mną" domaga się zdecydowanej i jednoznacznej odpowiedzi. Bóg czeka na wolną odpowiedź, a przy tym nikogo nie przymusza do podjęcia powołania.

Motywy nadprzyrodzone, czyli to, co Bóg mówi na temat powołania, pozwalają widzieć siebie i swoje powołanie z szerszej perspektywy, a także skonfrontować się z tym, co przekracza ludzkie ograniczenia typu lęk czy strach oraz poczucie własnej niegodności. Niewątpliwie wymaga też wysiłku i osobistego zaangażowania, aby wpierw odkryć (usłyszeć), a następnie odpowiedzieć na zamysł Boga (odnieść go do siebie i realizować).

W połączeniu z uzasadnieniem filozoficznym racje nadprzyrodzone stanowią argument decydujący. Dzięki niemu możliwe jest dostrzeżenie, że źródłem predyspozycji i właściwości człowieka jest powołanie pochodzące od Boga. Jeśli jednak oznaki tego rodzaju nie występują lub nie są dostrzegalne, dzięki powołaniu podjętemu z przyczyn nadprzyrodzonych rodzi się perspektywa ich wypracowania.[29]

Racje przeżyciowe (uzasadnienie afektywne)

Uzasadnienia istnienia Boga, jak i powołania można dokonać również w oparciu o tzw. poznanie afektywne. Od omówionych wyżej metod różni się ono m.in. tym, że występuje w porządku praktycznym,

[28] Por. fragment o trzech naśladowcach Jezusa (Łk 9, 51–62). Przykładem ucieczki jest chociażby prorok Jonasz, który ucieka od woli Bożej (powołania) i od samego Boga: "Pan skierował do Jonasza, syna Amittaja, te słowa: 'Wstań, idź do Niniwy – wielkiego miasta – i upomnij ją, albowiem nieprawość jej dotarła przed moje oblicze'. A Jonasz wstał, aby uciec do Tarszisz przed Panem. Zszedł do Jafy, znalazł okręt płynący do Tarszisz, uiścił należną opłatę i wsiadł na niego, by udać się nim do Tarszisz, daleko od Pana" (Jon 1, 1–3).

[29] Niedostrzeganie w sobie naturalnych oznak powołania może być przyczyną ich wypracowania. Formacja seminaryjna ma na celu ich zaszczepienie (zainicjowanie), wykształcenie i pielęgnowanie. Na tym polega nabywanie cnót, czyli dodatnich sprawności moralnych i intelektualnych.

podczas gdy uzasadnienie filozoficzne i teologiczne dotyczy płaszczyzny teoretycznej. Praktyczny wymiar życia ludzkiego ma to do siebie, że jest przede wszystkim wyakcentowaniem działania moralnego, w którym najważniejszą rolę odgrywa wola i jej akty, a zwłaszcza akt decyzji.[30] Człowiek, który ma problemy z podejmowaniem decyzji w ogóle, ma również trudności z obraniem konkretnej drogi życiowej.[31] Oprócz woli w ten typ poznania zaangażowane są również uczucia.

Poznanie afektywne to inaczej poznanie eksperymentalne, doświadczalne, przeżyciowe.[32] W kontekście uzasadnienia istnienia Boga polega ono na wejściu w Bożą rzeczywistość, na poddaniu się Jego działaniu. Inaczej jest to poznanie przez miłość. Dokonuje się ono poprzez nawiązanie relacji (miłości-przyjaźni) z Bogiem.[33]

Nawet jeśli w literaturze poświęconej poznaniu afektywnemu omawia się problem dotyczący możliwości poznawczych sfery afektywnej, to przede wszystkim chodzi o to, że za pomocą intelektu człowiek może wykonywać czynności poznawcze również wtedy, gdy jest motywowany dziedziną wolitywno-emocjonalną.[34] Ściśle rzecz biorąc, poznania nie przypisuje się władzom pożądawczym, lecz intelektowi. Nie zmienia to faktu, że czynności poznawcze mogą być inicjowane przez inne władze człowieka.

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[30] Por. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Decyzja – realnym źródłem działania," w: Tomasz z Akwinu, Dysputy problemowe *O dobru*, *O pożądaniu dobra i o woli*, tłum. A. Białek (Lublin 2010), 225–242.

[31] Por. Piotr S. Mazur, "Formowanie i deformacja obrazu osoby ludzkiej – zagrożenia cywilizacyjne," *Człowiek w Kulturze* 28 (2018): 140; Marian Z. Stepulak, *Religijny wymiar rozwoju osobowego w systemie rodzinnym. Studium teologicznopastoralne* (Lublin 2010), 214–215.

[32] Por. Piotr Moskal, "Afektywne poznanie Boga," w: *Filozofia Boga*, cz. 2, red. S. Janeczek, A. Starościc (Lublin 2017), 157–168.

[33] Por. Franciszek, *Christus vivit*, nr 287–290.

[34] Por. *S.Th.*, I, q. 82, a. 4; Stefan Swieżawski, "Wstęp do kwestii 82," w: Tomasz z Akwinu, *Traktat o człowieku. Summa teologii 1, 75-89*, przeł. S. Swieżawski (Kęty 2000), 384.

Tomasz z Akwinu twierdzi, że poznaniu przynależy prymat wobec woli. Jednakże w sprawach odnoszących się do Boga porządek ten się odwraca. To znaczy, że wola zyskuje pierwszeństwo i możliwość oddziaływania na intelekt. W tym wypadku nadrzędność woli wynika z tego, że człowiek nie może mieć pełnego poznania Boga. Natomiast miłowanie Boga może przewyższać zakres Jego poznania i osiągać wyższy poziom.[35] Można powiedzieć, że w stosunku do Boga poznanie afektywne przekracza poznanie intelektualne. W sprawach odnoszących się do Niego istotną rolę odkrywa doświadczenie (kosztowanie). Dopiero w jego następstwie pojawia się rozumienie.[36]

Sfera wolitywno-uczuciowa może być zaangażowana w proces poznania Boga (nie znaczy to, że zajmuje ona miejsce intelektu, a jedynie to, że na niego oddziaływuje). Afektywny sposób uzasadnienia polega na doświadczeniu skutków wynikających z założenia, że Bóg istnieje. Trafnie ujmuje to J. Ratzinger, gdy zachęca niewierzących do tego, aby zaczęli żyć tak, jakby Bóg istniał.[37] Bezpośrednie doświadczenie tego, że spełnia się i realizuje Boża obietnica, że Bóg okazuje dobroć i troskę, że udziela odpowiedzi na istotne pytania, że daje przebaczenie grzechów, że prowadzi do celu, może skutkować przekonaniem się, że Bóg istnieje.[38]

P. Moskal zauważa, że poznanie afektywne, którym dysponuje człowiek ma miejsce zarówno w porządku naturalnej inklinacji do Boga, jak również w ramach religijnego ukierunkowania na Boga.[39] Tego

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[35] Por. *S.Th.*, I, q. 82, a. 3.

[36] "Skosztujcie i zobaczcie, jak dobry jest Pan, szczęśliwy człowiek, który się do Niego ucieka" (Ps 34, 9). "Jeśli kto chce pójść za Mną, niech się zaprze samego siebie, niech weźmie krzyż swój i niech Mnie naśladuje" (Mt 16, 24).

[37] Por. Joseph Ratzinger, *Europa Benedykta w kryzysie kultur*, tłum. W. Dzieża (Częstochowa 2005), 105–114; Tomas Halik, *Teatr dla aniołów. Życie jako religijny eksperyment* (Kraków 2011), 76.

[38] Widoczna jest tu pewna analogia do zakładu Pascala.

[39] Por. Moskal, *Afektywne poznanie Boga*, 160.

rodzaju otwartość człowieka przejawia się głównie tym, że w świecie nie znajduje on niczego, co całkowicie odpowiadałoby jego pragnieniom i aspiracjom. Pragnieniu szczęścia, najwyższego dobra czy życia wiecznego w pełni może odpowiedzieć tylko Bóg.[40]

Na poziomie poszukiwania racji uzasadniających powołanie poznanie afektywne dostarcza istotnych racji. Dzięki zaangażowaniu i osobistemu doświadczeniu staje się możliwe rozpoznanie (i podjęcie) powołania. Chodzi o to, że ten typ poznania umożliwia życie w taki sposób, jakby to powołanie nie było tylko domysłem czy przypuszczeniem, lecz faktycznie miało miejsce. W wyniku tego doświadczenia, które można nazwać sprawdzianem lub próbą urzeczywistnienia powołania można się przekonać, czy jest ono tym, co przynosi satysfakcję, zadowolenie, spełnienie. Szereg odczuć, które mu towarzyszą może wpływać na intelekt, dzięki któremu człowiek ma możliwość dojścia do przekonania, że to powołanie jest (lub nie) jego powołaniem.

Podsumowanie

Powyższe analizy wykazują, że racje wysuwane na rzecz istnienia Boga mogą być wykorzystane do uzasadnienia powołania (np. kapłańskiego). Argumenty naturalne (od skutku do przyczyny), nadprzyrodzone (objawienie Boże) i pragmatyczne (doświadczenie) wydobywają dostateczne racje uzasadniające tak Boga, jak i powołanie. Wskazanie wielu racji pochodzących z różnych porządków dostarcza większej pewności o istnieniu powołania aniżeli tylko jeden ich rodzaj.

Za powołaniem w porządku naturalnym przemawiają głównie predyspozycje, oznaki, pragnienia. W punkcie wyjścia stanowią one skutki, których zrozumienie następuje w wyniku wskazania ich przy-

[40] Por. Tomasz z Akwinu, "Wykład Składu Apostolskiego czyli 'Wierzę w Boga'," tłum. K. Suszyło, w: tenże, *Wykład pacierza* (Poznań 1987), 57; *Katechizm Kościoła Katolickiego* (Poznań 1994), nr 27.

czyny. Wprawdzie ich obecność ułatwia rozpoznanie powołania, jednakże nie wystarcza do stwierdzenia całkowitej pewności jego istnienia. Z drugiej strony ich brak nie może być ostatecznym powodem niepodjęcia powołania. Tego rodzaju trudności związane z racjami naturalnymi wyzwalają poszukiwanie innych argumentów na rzecz powołania.

Ponieważ źródłem powołania chrześcijańskiego jest tylko Bóg, to jedynie On ma zupełną pewność o jego istnieniu.[41] Nadprzyrodzone racje powołania bezpośrednio pochodzą od Boga. Jak racje naturalne dostarczają pewności obiektywnej, tak racje nadprzyrodzone subiektywnie upewniają o powołaniu. Ich przyjęcie dokonuje się w drodze wiary.

Argumenty przeżyciowe mogą być odpowiedzią na niepewność i wątpliwości związane z powołaniem tak w porządku naturalnym, jak i nadprzyrodzonym. Dzięki nim pozyskuje się racje praktyczne, które pozwalają doświadczyć określonego sposobu życia. Ten rodzaj uzasadnienia syntetyzuje dwa poprzednie typy argumentowania. Pozwala rozumieć wydarzenia i doświadczenia (oznaki) w sensie nadprzyrodzonym (wiara).

Ze względu na swą relacyjność powyższe rodzaje argumentów lokalizują się po jednej z dwóch stron relacji powołania. Racje naturalne i przeżyciowe dotyczą człowieka, chociaż ich ostatecznym źródłem jest Bóg. Natomiast racje nadprzyrodzone znajdują się w Bogu.

Racje czerpane z różnych porządków ludzkiego poznania i działania pozostają wobec siebie w stosunku zależności. Dzięki temu uzupełniają się i umożliwiają przemyślaną i ugruntowaną decyzję dotyczącą wyboru powołania. Podstawową racją na rzecz powołania jest argument nadprzyrodzony. Jest on konieczny i wystarczający. Bez niego

[41] "Historia mojego powołania kapłańskiego? Historia ta znana jest przede wszystkim Bogu samemu." Jan Paweł II, *Dar i Tajemnica*, 7.

mówienie o powołaniu (kapłańskim) nie ma sensu. Dwa pozostałe argumenty nie są konieczne, ale również niewystarczające.

Philosophical, Theological and Affective Reasons for Vocation

SUMMARY

The article deals with the problem of justifying a vocation. The arguments used to justify the existence of God were used for this. It has been shown that for the existence of a vocation one can present natural (philosophical), supernatural (theological) and affective (experimental) reasons. The supernatural reasons are necessary and sufficient for understanding the vocation; natural and affective reasons are helpful, but they do not ultimately determine the existence of a vocation.

KEYWORDS

vocation, reason, justification, philosophy, theology, faith, affective cognition.

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Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's Metaphysics of Law

This year we celebrate centennial anniversary of the birth of Professor Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec OP (1921–2008). Krąpiec was one of the outstanding Polish philosophers. He was the chief creator of the Lublin Philosophical School, which was a center of free philosophical thought in Poland after the II World War. The Lublin School remains one of the very few centers of realistic philosophy all over the world. Krąpiec developed a coherent metaphysical system to explain the whole reality.[1] His philosophy is the biggest achievement in the field of realistic and wisdom-oriented classical philosophy (realistic metaphysics) both in Poland and abroad in 20th century. Krąpiec was eminent rector of the Catholic University of Lublin during the most difficult period of the communist regime in Poland, and he had the longest term in office as reactor (for thirteen years, since 1970 up to 1983).[2] He was the initiator figure in the publication of the very first Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy in Poland and became the chairman of the Scientific Committee for this undertaking (published in 2000–2009).

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[1] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Metaphysics in the Lublin Philosophical School," *Studia Gilsoniana* 5, no. 2 (2016): 391–427; and Wojciech Chudy, "*Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec* in *The Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy*," *Studia Gilsoniana* 7, no. 4 (October–December 2018): 549–566.

[2] Marian Kurdziałek, *Biography*. Available online—see the section *References* for details.

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One of the fields of Krąpiec's philosophical interest was law and philosophy (metaphysics) of law and human rights. The object-matter of the philosophy (metaphysics) of law developed by Krąpiec is the existence of natural law, the ways in which the content of this law is formulated, the basis of established law and justice, the relationship between established law and natural law, and the conditions of law's implementation in various communities. Krąpiec proposed, firstly, a realistic interpretation of law as a real, interpersonal relation; secondly, the concept of an analogical natural law; thirdly, the interpretation of human rights as the ways of realizing the personal nature of the human being—the ways which were read into the social context and proclaimed particularly in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). In the philosophy of politics, Krąpiec considered the issue of the sovereignty of the human person in relation to society, nation, and the State, as well as the issue of politics understood as the realizing of the common good in a prudent manner. Krąpiec also referred to the Polish tradition of defending the rights of nations, thus building the foundations of the philosophy of nation.

The Object of the Metaphysics of Law: Law as a Relation

Krąpiec's considerations of law can be called the metaphysics of law—these considerations are a particularization of philosophical anthropology (the metaphysics of person) and general metaphysics.[3] The

[3] The most important works of M. A. Krąpiec concerning the philosophy of law include, among others: *Person and Natural Law*, trans. M. Szymańska (New York: Peter Lang 1993 [in Polish: Lublin: RW KUL 1993]); *Suwerenność – czyja?* [Sovereignty, But Whose Sovereignty?] (Lublin 1996); "Dobro wspólne [Common Good]," in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii* [Universal Encyclopedia of Philosophy (PEF)], vol. 2, ed. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2001), 628–639; "Filozofia prawa [Philosophy of Law]," in PEF, vol. 3, ed. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2002), 500–512; *O prawie. Z Ojcem prof. Mieczysławem A. Krąpcem rozmawia K. Wroczyński* [On Law. K. Wroczyński speaks

starting point of such a philosophy (metaphysics) of law is the fact of human existence and functioning under law.[4] A description and determination of this fact is made on the basis of an analysis of external experience (we can see the relation of one human being to another as manifesting itself in different types of interaction), as well as on the basis of the internal experience of being bound by the law.

In order to describe and capture the complex structure of the law, Krąpiec recalls the distinction between law in the sense of *ius* and *lex*, thus following the Roman tradition. *Ius* expresses the order of the existence of law (material, existential, obliging), while *lex* (formal, content-related) expresses the formulation of law as the rule of law within a specific content: a specific precept or prohibition issued by a legislator as a rule and measure of action based on interpersonal relations.[5] *Ius* is associated with the natural right of every human being to act; law-*ius* concerns conduct in accordance with justice (*iustitia*), and therefore in accordance with other due states of affairs (*ipsa res iusta*); law-*ius* creates a natural legal order (*ordo iuris*, *ius naturale*). *Lex* expresses the contentual determination of law in the sense of *ius*; it is an object-related norm that obliges the recipient of law-*lex* to act for a specific purpose—a norm that comes from a legislator and is binding by virtue of his authority.

In explaining the fact of law, Krąpiec emphasizes its metaphysical foundations. Law, according to Krąpiec, has its foundations in real

with Fr. Prof. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec] (Lublin 2011). Other works of Krąpiec are referred to in subsequent footnotes.

[4] For a wider elaboration on the philosophical and legal thought of Krąpiec, see Marek Piechowiak, "Mieczysława Alberta Krąpca koncepcja filozofii prawa [Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's Philosophy of Law]," in *W trosce o godziwe prawo* [For the Sake of Just Law], ed. A. Maryniarczyk, *et al*. (Lublin 2013), 23–72.

[5] *Cf*. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "*Ius*. Rozumienie prawa [*Ius*: Understanding the Law]," in PEF, vol. 5, ed. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2004), 115–126, and the articles authored by K. Wroczyński: "*Ius*" (*ibid*., 115–116) and "*Lex*" (PEF, vol. 6 [Lublin 2005], 377–380).

existential states, in substantial beings, as well as in real relational states (as expressed in a rational order determined by the causes of being). Finally, law also has its foundation in the order of justice understood as something that is due to the other or to the acting person, and what the man is able to read from the objective order of reality.[6] According to Krąpiec, law is "a certain reality, a fact to which one must respond. It is not only a fact given to us in laws, regulations, in writing, but it is an existential state, occurring in between people."[7] Law is a kind of being and takes the form of a real interpersonal relation characterized by the obligation to act (or to cease acting) for the good of the other as a person.[8] Krąpiec proposes a finalistic (*i.e.*, purpose-oriented) definition: "Law must be understood as a real relation between acting persons whose actions (or cases of inaction) are owed to them by virtue of their proportionally shared ordering to the common good as the purpose of all their actions in their capacity as persons."[9]

The next stage of explanation of the fact of law—as well as content formulations thereof in the form of legal norms—is carried out with reference to the objective nature of the human being as a person (*i.e.*, with reference to natural law), wherein philosophical explanations of the human being and its actions are invoked. Final explanation is provided by pointing to the ontic participation of being (eternal law: ultimately, the objective common good is the Supreme Being, the Absolute, God).[10] For this reason, Krąpiec accepts and explains, in a purely rational way, the basic metaphysical definition of natural law as *participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura* (Thomas Aquinas) and understands the Absolute as "the ultimate, final, efficient and exemplary

[6] *Cf.* Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 15–16.
[7] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 15.
[8] *Cf. ibid.*, 16.
[9] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 41.
[10] *Cf.* Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 71–72.

reason ('exemplary' because of external causation) of all human activities and of the order of established laws (through natural law—doing good)."[11] Krąpiec also emphasizes that "in the philosophy of law, the first and the most fundamental thing is to determine the origin of law."[12]

The metaphysics of law, understood in this way, differs radically from other contemporary approaches, which reduce the philosophy of law to a general theory of law which considers the law as a mere linguistic norm-statement. Krąpiec defends the autonomy of the philosophy of law as a strictly philosophical domain in relation to the so-called particular legal sciences and the reflection thereon, which is itself limited to the topic of established law. Krąpiec's conception has been developed in discussion with historically relevant approaches to law in general, to natural law, to justice, as well as in discussion with contemporary legal positivism. Krąpiec's concept differs from all these approaches in its connection with the metaphysics of man and being; in its object and with having a much broader scope (different types of law, not only established law, are included); in its causal explanation of law with there being an emphasis on the role of final causation, and in its attempt at an ultimate justification of law. In disputes between rationalism and legal voluntarism, between natural law (Fr. *jusnaturalisme*) and positivism (conventionalism), his conception defends rationalism (law is a product, an act of reason—"the whole field of law is a rational way of realizing the good"[13]) and natural law (*jusnaturalisme*: the natural legal order that exists and is binding for man in his actions).

[11] *Cf.* Krzysztof Wroczyński, Katarzyna Stępień, "Filozofia prawa w ujęciu Krąpca [Philosophy of Law According to Krąpiec]," in *Encyklopedia Filozofii Polskiej* [Encyclopedia of Polish Philosophy], vol. 1, ed. A. Maryniarczyk (Lublin 2011), 379.

[12] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 19.

[13] *Ibid.*, 24.

Natural Law and the Nature of Being

Krąpiec's theory of natural law is at the center of his philosophical considerations of the fact of law.[14] According to this theory, "human reason should derive its norms of conduct from an understanding of the human structure as a whole, considered both in the context of individual and social life."[15] Man brings with him this law into the world—"human nature is ordered to the good"[16]—and then reads into it and elaborates upon it. "The human nature associated with the good is the widest field in which law applies and in which more detailed legal formulations can be sought."[17] This attribution of human nature to the good is expressed by the judgment of the *synderesis*: "Good must be done, evil must be avoided."[18] This judgment expresses the fact of the first, essential, and most primordial motive of human action; it is a vision of the aforementioned ordering toward the good. Krąpiec says:

> The supreme judgment of practical reason—"do good"—which underlies human rational action, is an essential expression of the natural right of man, because it reveals reality itself as the supreme motive for human action, and expresses human nature, which is a contingent, potentialized, and thus dynamic being; one that is intellectually fulfilled in the discernment of "my" good

[14] *Cf.* Wroczyński & Stępień, *Filozofia prawa w ujęciu Krąpca*, 378–382. Wroczyński points to the special position of natural law issues in Krąpiec's philosophy: "Starting from metaphysics and philosophical anthropology (an analysis of the structure and nature of man as being), Krąpiec constructs and explains the philosophical theory of natural law, creating a basis for an evaluation of various, historically relevant philosophical-legal concepts and ethical concepts, various systems of established law, ideologies, theories of State, politics, human rights, etc. He even calls this 'radiation' of natural law to various areas of human social life. This is why references to natural law appear in many [of his] works devoted to different areas of culture" (*ibid.*, 378).

[15] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 25.

[16] *Ibid.*, 34.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] *Cf.* Katarzyna Stępień, "Synderesis and Natural Law," *Studia Gilsoniana* 3 (2014): 377–398.

> and in the achievement of various goods in human action—goods that characterize an action itself.[19]

Human nature is ordered to the realization of the good through its innate inclinations. The first inclination expresses the drive present in the nature of beings to preserve their lives to the measure of each particular nature, according to which living beings (including man in a specific, personal way) strive to preserve and defend themselves as acting beings who actualize their potentiality.

The second inclination concerns the procreation of human being in the natural relationship between man and woman (marriage) and sets the basis for the realization of the good in this area of human life (the family): "In order for human life to continue in the cosmos, in order to overcome the course of matter, it is necessary for it to be transmitted."[20] Nevertheless, Krąpiec indicates: "On the other hand, what is implanted in the human nature, is the desire to transmit life which is not only biological but also rational (the issues of learning and interpersonal communication also belong to the sphere of personal transmission of life)."[21] In this understanding of these inclinations, Krąpiec emphasizes their personal, and not only necessary and biological, dimension.

The third inclination of human nature concerns the social and dynamic character of man's nature and especially what is specifically human, personal, rational, and free in this nature. It covers the area of the "common good," that is, the comprehensive intellectual, moral, creative, and religious development of a society which lives in conditions of order and peace. Inclinations—together with the guiding principle of

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[19] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Prawo naturalne a etyka (moralność) [Natural Law and Ethics (Morality)]," in *Filozofia prawa a tworzenie i stosowanie prawa. Materiały Ogólnopolskiej Konferencji Naukowej 11–12 VI 1991 w Katowicach* [Philosophy of Law and Creation and Application of Law: Materials of the all-Poland Scientific Conference in Katowice, 11–12 June 1991], ed. B. Czech (Katowice 1992), 47.

[20] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 35.

[21] *Ibid.*

the *synderesis* "the good must be done," which are formally expressed in the practical judgment of reason as a natural right—guide toward what belongs to man because of his individual and social nature. The judgment of *synderesis* (the natural disposition of reason to read the first principles of action) and the knowledge of natural inclinations form the basis for particular acts of practical reason (conscience) and acts of will in choosing to conduct the good in a concrete action (decision): "In the main sense, therefore," says Krąpiec, "I am, in a way, the legislator of myself, for I am making a specific practical judgment, which orders me to do this, here, now, and in such-and-such way. I choose the concrete legal norm of my action."[22] The act of decision (self-determination) is "that focal point of understanding of the real law."[23] Krąpiec emphasizes: "The moment of internal decision is the main reference for understanding the validity of law."[24]

Human Rights as the Way to Realize Human Nature

Another area of interest for M. A. Krąpiec, in terms of the philosophy of law, is the issue of human rights, which is generally the object-matter of research in the legal sciences, international law, and in terms of the sociological justifications of these rights as not found in the field of philosophy of law.[25] Krąpiec seeks the foundations and jus-

[22] *Ibid.*, 58.

[23] *Ibid.*, 58–59.

[24] *Ibid.*, 59.

[25] *Cf.* Katarzyna Stępień, "Antropologiczno-metafizyczne podstawy praw człowieka [Anthropological and Metaphysical Foundations of Human Rights]," in *O prawach człowieka nieco inaczej. Praca zbiorowa* [About Human Rights a Little Differently: A Collective Volume], ed. R. Moń, A. Kobyliński (Warszawa 2011), 63–76; Katarzyna Stępień, "Prawa człowieka jako aksjologiczna podstawa dla stanowienia prawa w ujęciu Mieczysława A. Krąpca [Human Rights as an Axiological Basis for Lawmaking in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's View]," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* [Scientific Journals of Catholic University of Lublin] 55, no. 1 (2012): 51–60.

tifications for human rights on the anthropological and metaphysical level (within the human person and relations, respectively). He understands these rights as ways of realizing the human nature of the person. Human rights, although they have always existed and are inextricably linked to their subject (the human person), have particularly been socially identified and proclaimed in the context of the events of World War II and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Krąpiec believes that at the heart of this Declaration is an affirmation of a common sense understanding of man—an understanding known to all people from experience and from their personal and spontaneous lived experience in society[26]—which includes universal elements common to all people and uses the sociological-empirical method to identify the most important laws and the content thereof.[27] This implies an understanding of man himself as the subject of these rights.[28] Krąpiec formulates this as follows: "The basis for the binding force and validity of human rights is the human person itself. The understanding of the structure of the person becomes a condition, or basis, for understanding the value of human rights."[29]

In the Declaration, according to Krąpiec, we find a reference to traditional, Stoic, and Roman natural inclinations.[30] This gives rise to an interpretation of human rights in relation to natural law. In his analysis of human rights, therefore, Krąpiec puts these rights in the context of the above mentioned elements of his conception: law as a real inter-

[26] *Cf.* Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek i polityka* [Man and Politics] (Lublin 2007), 146.

[27] *Cf. ibid.*

[28] *Cf.* Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Porządek prawny – rzeczywistość czy fikcja? [The Order of the Law: Reality or Fiction?]," *Człowiek w Kulturze* [Man in Culture] 11 (1998): 22–24.

[29] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i polityka*, 146.

[30] *Cf.* Krąpiec, "Porządek prawny – rzeczywistość czy fikcja?," 15–26; Krąpiec, *Człowiek i polityka*, 157.

personal relation; the supreme, analogical precept-judgment of the *synderesis* "good must be done" ("do good"), and the inclinations that define the essential areas for the realization of good. These inclinations (to preserve existence/life, to transmit life, to develop the person in a community) express certain directions of human action and their ordering toward certain goods. Krąpiec emphasizes: "The most important is the existence of man, human life, and human action. From the existential structure of man, from the necessity of his action, comes the entitlement. And therefore, this entitlement is natural."[31]

Krąpiec constantly emphasizes the internal, essential relationship of law as a rule of action with the good, which is the goal and *raison d'être* of law: "The natural purpose that man is, as it were, forced by his nature to achieve the good."[32] In fact, it is only by doing good that "one is entitled to act."[33] And, further on, Krąpiec indicates the good as the basis of any legal obligation:

> What is due to us is a certain *debitum* that someone else must fulfill. Why does he have to fulfill it? Because this is where the essential good of man (which is to be human) lies; this is the good, through which man finally fulfills himself as a personal being, [*i.e.*, through which he] comes to the full development of his personality: intellectually, morally, and creatively. In order for man to fulfill himself as a personal being, he deserves to be allowed to perform certain actions or have others cease certain actions they have undertaken. And this is exactly law.[34]

In contemporary human rights doctrine, the first natural inclination corresponds to the right to life, which is the ontic basis of other hu-

[31] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 19.

[32] *Ibid.*, 24.

[33] Wroczyński & Stępień, *Filozofia prawa*, 379. "As the second premise of Krąpiec's philosophy of law one can mention his conviction (justified in his system) that all human behaviour is 'legitimate' (in the field of morality, established laws, customs, various fields of culture and creativity, and also in religion) in so far as it derives its legitimacy from the natural law expressed in the judgment 'the good must be done'" (*ibid.*).

[34] *Ibid.*, 17.

man rights. The second inclination—to the transmission of life—corresponds to the right to marry and to start a family, the rights of the family, the rights of parents to raise their children, to decide upon their education, etc. The third inclination—to personal development—corresponds to the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, to participation in culture, the right to education, the right to establish social organizations, political rights, etc. Human rights express, according to Krąpiec, the orientation of human nature to what should be achieved by man according to his nature: the particularly precious human goods such as life, health, religion, freedom, security, integrity, family, work, peace, culture, knowledge, property, and those others necessary for the individual and social fulfillment of man. Around these goods, signaled in the Universal Declaration, the activities of both the individual and the people around him are focused, creating a social context—a culture—of respect for the rights and dignity of the person.

These basic personal activities of the human being and the goods protected by the Declaration constitute the axiological (or rather agathological) basis of established law, the necessary conditions for its application, and the criteria for the assessment of its value. In this way, by means of the Declaration, natural human rights become a point of reference and a test of the quality of established law, which, as it turns out, cannot retain its character without a connection with the good (morality, natural law). As Krąpiec points out:

> The good is readable by reason, it is objective. . . . If we denied knowledge of the good, and thus removed the basis for the validity of natural law, we would give up our humanity. The renunciation of natural law, and thus of the precept to do good, is the renunciation of humanity, because then man would no longer distinguish between good and evil.[35]

[35] *Ibid.*, 74.

The Human Person as the Subject of Law

What is characteristic of Krąpiec is that, in his considerations of law, he constantly evokes the understanding of man as a person (which reveals the methodological status of the philosophy of law as a part of philosophical anthropology), thus indicating that the solution to the centuries-old dispute about the basis of the validity of law must be based on a realistic understanding of man—which in turn is shaped by external and internal experience, and systemic analyses which explain man in terms of his existence and functioning. Man is a person, that is, an individual and substantial being endowed with a rational and free nature (understood as the internal autonomous source of action); a being capable of intellectual cognition, acts of love and freedom, and open to transcendence; a being that is complete from the beginning of its existence (from the moment of conception), having dignity and subjectivity before the law, preserving its identity and unity in all phases of its development and in all material and spiritual planes of its own life and actions.[36]

Thus, the personal dimension of human life is expressed by such properties or abilities as: intellectual cognition, love, freedom and legal subjectivity, existential completeness and uniqueness (sovereignty), dignity, and religiousness. The possibility of knowing the truth and the rational choice of goodness is actualized in the individual life of a human being, while love, dignity, and religiousness actualize as acts of affirmation of others—from human beings to the Personal Absolute. Moreover, legal subjectivity, completeness, and existential sovereignty imply social relations.

The social and legal subjectivity of man, however, according to Krąpiec, is not based on one's activity or ability to perform these social

[36] *Cf*. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ja – człowiek. Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* [I—Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology] (Lublin 2005).

relations, but above all on the subjectivity of being, of substance. The human being exists as a subject in itself and for itself. Being a self-sustained spiritual-corporeal substance, the human being exists as a whole and as a unified being through the act of spiritual existence.

In the context of understanding law, the issue of the potentiality of human nature and its ordering toward development, ordering toward the good is particularly important. "And only in the person does the real good in itself and for itself realize itself as an end-purpose."[37] Krąpiec emphasizes the inner finality of human nature. Human life and actions are oriented to these main objectives: sustaining life, life's transmission, and personal development (in its cognitive, moral, creative, and religious aspects). This understanding of man as a person justifies the existence of an objective order of human natural entitlements.[38]

The Foundations of Analogy of Natural Law

Another concept Krąpiec also discusses is the concept of analogical natural law. According to Krąpiec, the basis for the proper approach to rights and goods due concerns analogical and transcendental cognition. According to K. Wroczyński, this is a very particular and original element of Krąpiec considerations in the philosophy of law.[39] Krąpiec, namely, believes that knowledge of the content of natural law and human rights entails a specific, analogical, and concrete-oriented type of transcendentalizing cognition (as opposed to universalizing cognition), which lies at the basis of all decision-making acts—acts which themselves are normative as a result of practical cognition.[40] In the first

[37] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 16.

[38] *Cf*. Josef Seifert, "Antropologia praw człowieka [The Anthropology of Human Rights]," trans. J. Merecki, *Ethos* 12, no. 1–2 (1999): 141.

[39] *Cf*. Wroczyński & Stępień, *Filozofia prawa w ujęciu Krąpca*, 378–382.

[40] More on this topic in *ibid*.

type of cognition, we use analogical expressions such as truth, the good, and being, and we predicate these expressions analogically, while, in the second type of cognition, we unambiguously comprehend/grasp the content of being in general concepts. The content of natural law and human rights is always revealed in contact with concrete beings (hence the inalienable role of existential judgments in the affirmation of this concrete beings), in acts of decision. Even if we formulate the principles of natural law in a general (*i.e.*, universalizing) manner, they preserve their analogical and concrete-oriented sense.[41]

According to Krąpiec, the difficulties experienced by the school of natural law were due to a lack of awareness of the specificity of transcendentalizing and analogical cognition. And although

> [I]n the seed stage, in universalizing language . . . we can read in a real set of persons and things what is just and right (*sensibile per se est intelligibile per accidens*)—just as in empirical data we can read with our intellect content that is sensually inaccessible, "abstract" in the exact sense of the term—after all cognition of the foundations of law is not achieved through processes of abstraction only, but through the more complex processes of a transcendentalizing, strictly analogical cognition.[42]

If it is important for the law to first cognize the good as that which needs to be done, then such a cognition must be analogical, not unambiguous.[43]

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[41] *Cf. ibid.*

[42] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 40.

[43] "Therefore, real natural law as a law characterized by relativity is something analogous because a number of real relations enter into this very law's understanding. Real, analogical law is very often grasped cognitively only in a general manner, unambiguously, and in isolation from the condition of an individual being. For sometimes the individual elements of being, captured in cognition spontaneously, do not change the general, cognitively constructed pattern of the law, which in some cases is connected only with certain elements in being. Nevertheless, a real understanding of laws as analogical laws calls for the taking into account of concrete structures of being that are substantially different from one another" (Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Teoria analogii bytu* [The Theory of Analogy of Being] [Lublin 1993], 189).

> It must be first comprehended that there is a real being (an existing content: a concrete thing that is fully and specifically determind by existence), which is desired because it exists—because it is real. In this type of cognition, the affirmation of existence (expressed in the existential judgment) is combined with an increasingly precise approach to this really existing content (and it took, in some instances, whole centuries to establish this precision).[44]

Action under law (whether established or natural) is done for the sake of the good—and with this always being an analogical-concrete good, which therefore requires a transcendentalizing cognition to be expressed and affirmed. "The precept 'do good' is analogical; it changes in different circumstances, according to what has been perceived as good, which, nonetheless, is always the motive for action."[45]

In Krąpiec's concept, as Wroczyński points out:

> The ultimate point of reference for understanding the validity of the law, both in an objective and subjective order, is the human decision. In it, as in the lens, the whole personal life of a human being is focused, including the cognition of legal obligation. Man self-determines himself to act: he "entitles" himself. This is the first analogate of understanding law. . . . Decision always chooses a concrete good (being), and it is precisely the analysis of the human decision that reveals, according to Krąpiec, the basic structural elements of understanding natural law. There are three main elements here: the judgment, which says "the good must be done" (natural law in the formal sense), the pre-judgmental orientation toward the good (*synderesis*), and natural inclinations which are expressed in natural human goals as a material basis for judgments of the concrete good. The main analogate is, of course, judgment as a result of a decision; *synderesis* and natural inclinations are lesser analogates of understanding natural law.[46]

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[44] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 41.

[45] *Ibid*., 61–62.

[46] Wroczyński & Stępień, *Filozofia prawa*, 379. Wroczyński goes on to point out: "Based on the above assumptions (explained in detail in the philosophical analyses) Krąpiec formulates the view that all formulated principles of natural law have analogical sense (he makes an exception to the general principle: *bonum est faciendum*)—the

Politics as the Realization of the Common Good

Krąpiec complements his strictly philosophical studies of law with philosophical-social reflection, and considers the concept of politics not as amoral "art" but as the prudent realization of the common good.[47] Since established law regulates human actions in a community, the reason for these legally sanctioned actions is the common good. Actions are always individualistic and pertain to particular matters, but as such they can be related to the good understood as a common goal (final cause).[48] The law, which is an imperative of practical reason, is ordered (in a necessary way) to the common good.

However, the common good (analogical identity of purpose[49]) can be considered from different points of view. The common good in the community "shall be called the object of human action, which can become an individual goal of every personal aspiration and, in this sense, be analogically common to all persons living in society."[50] According to Krąpiec, the good means for man "to actualize more and more fully the potentiality of his nature, different in each individual case, analogical."[51] Such a good is, therefore—as the only non-antagonizing common goal, both individual and universal—the concrete person itself and that person's

sense which does not conclude in strictly legal reasoning (silogisms) as seen in jurisprudence. Hence, this concerns not the derivation of established laws from the principles of natural law, but rather demonstrates the non-contradiction of established laws with the natural law that is fundamental and essential for social order and justice. Such a process of demonstrating the non-contradiction of natural law with established law is, moreover, constantly carried out in the form of studies of the fairness of the law, both in scientific reflection and in spontaneous, concrete considerations" (*ibid.*, 380).

[47] *Cf.* Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *O ludzką politykę!* [For the Sake of Human Politics!] (Katowice 1993).

[48] *Cf.* Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Dobro wspólne [Common Good]," in *Encyklopedia "Białych Plam"* [Ecyclopedia of "Blank Spaces"], vol. 5 (Radom 2001), 90.

[49] *Ibid.*

[50] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 67.

[51] *Ibid.*, 68.

life from conception to natural death in the perspective of eternal life. Since law applies to persons living in society, its purpose is the perfection of those who make up that society. One of the rich aspects of the common good, therefore, is the full actualization of the human being, and to this very purpose law is ordered.[52] Law, therefore, with the common good as the purpose, is intended to promote the development of the human person. The purpose of law, therefore, is not only a specific action, but a certain state of the subject (the development of the person), that is to say, to bring about the actualization of what is in potency within the person. Man as a person is not merely a specimen representing a species; his aim, therefore, is not to realize perfection as marked by one model common to all people, but to realize himself as a unique individual.[53]

Prudent concern for this good, that is, for human life in its various dimensions and manifestations, is politics, viz.: the morality of social life. Human rights currently determine the most basic planes for the realization of the common good. These rights order man (read from his very nature) as a potential, dynamic being (a being in development), to the good-purpose and the conditions-means for the realization thereof. The common good also includes the material conditions under which a law can actually be law (the conditions of material justice).[54]

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[52] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 38.

[53] *Cf.* Marek Piechowiak, "Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego [Philosophical Foundations of Understanding the Common Good]," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* [Philosophical Quarterly] 31, no. 2 (2003): 25. "A person's end-purpose is not to realize the nature of the species, but to actualize him- or herself in what is specific to him or her. . . . The manner in which this actualization is carried out is not clearly determined by the natural inclinations inherent in the species nature of man or, even more broadly, not by what people have in common as persons. Therefore, there is no single, universal way of actualizing that can be determined by the knowledge of the structures of being and the circumstances of action common to all people. Only natural law defines individual goals" (Marek Piechowiak: Filozofia praw człowieka. Prawa człowieka w świetle ich międzynarodowej ochrony [Philosophy of human rights. Human rights in light of their international protection] [Lublin 1999], 300).

[54] Piechowiak, "Filozoficzne podstawy rozumienia dobra wspólnego," 23.

It is therefore necessary for the rational life of an organized society to determine the legal rules of conduct based on the read order of good.[55] The order of good, which is open to the intellect of every human being, is realized in concrete actions in an analogical manner, and is not clearly determined by the nature or arrangement of things. This order requires determination on the path of free choices. It is only in the acts of lawmaking that certain ways of achieving the common good-goal of both the person and society are unambiguously clarified.[56] The order of rational lawmaking should reveal a set or system of rational relations, cognitively grasped by man and thus binding his action (the real rational legal order, primary and independent of legislation).

The task of politics is to prudently pursue the common good:

> Prudence, on the other hand, is to choose the various means so wisely as to be able to help the realization of the good itself most effectively. For this, a politician needs to be both educated and righteous in his character. Education is needed in order for him to know the history, the law, and the character of a society, and therefore the role of the family, of the nation, and of the state, and in this context to guide the realization of the good of the person; righteousness of character is needed in order to prevent him from converting this aim into a means and from not making the means of pursuing the common good the goal of one's own political endeavors.[57]

The Existential Foundations of Justice

Krąpiec points out that justice is always "ordered to man to give what is due to him"—and he means the things due to a real individual, a concrete personal being, and not an idea, utopia, or abstraction. So, what is justice about? Justice concerns the concrete person and his basic ac-

[55] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 47, 231.

[56] However, established law does not regulate everything that serves to actualize a human person (*Cf. ibid*.).

[57] Krąpiec, *Człowiek i polityka*, 6.

tions. Our actions (or inactions/lack of actions) are done toward others.[58] The order of law and justice (*ordo iuris*) is therefore an objectively existing arrangement involving a set of interpersonal relations in which people organize their actions on the basis of them recognizing their actual relations with others, which is the basis of the obligation to act for the good of the other person.

This situation, as already mentioned, presupposes the transcendental nature and cognoscibility of good:

> If I want to know why I should do good, I can immediately see that the understanding of good is not unequivocal but analogical, because there are really existing beings that are desirable not because of their single aspect, but because of their often mutually exclusive aspects, which nonetheless do not deny the real good that exists in such beings. On the contrary, such mutually exclusive aspects only affirm the good more strongly.[59]

The imperativeness of the obligation to act or to refrain from acting toward the other is a result of the necessity to agree with the objective truth of the human being (this truth takes on a normative character). Justice therefore concerns:

> the human being and its essential actions, which stem from its nature: (1) in the biological aspect, it eats, grows, and multiplies—enabling man to be by virtue of human nature; (2) in the sensual and emotional aspect, with these actions involving the senses, memory, and imagination; (3) in the aspect of intellectual life, involving reason. Justice in this sense—justice to man, to his needs, to his desires, and to the fulfillment of them all—is fundamental.[60]

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[58] *Cf*. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, "Bytowe podstawy sprawiedliwości [Existential Foundations of Justice]," in *Sprawiedliwość – idee a rzeczywistość* [Justice: Ideas and Reality], ed. P. Jaroszyński, I. Chłodna, P. Tarasiewicz (Lublin 2009), 11.

[59] *Cf*. Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 15–16; Krąpiec, "Porządek prawny," 16–19.

[60] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 81. *Cf*. Krąpiec, "Bytowe podstawy sprawiedliwości," 9–13.

The subjects of legal relations are personal beings, as the law defines interpersonal relations due to the natural ordering of one human individual to another.[61] The state of the mutual ordering of individuals and the fact of a relation between them is objective state of things and as such demand to be intellectually apprehended and recognized due to the proportional end-purpose (the good) of these same individuals. The fact of their existence in a legal reality—which is understood as an interpersonal relation—results in a specific bond between the subjects of this relation on the level of both the occurrence and the content of an action.[62] The binding power thereof is a property of duty (*debitum*), conditioned by the specific structure of beings who are persons.[63] Krąpiec remarks:

> In law . . . one, very fundamental aspect of my action or inaction is crucial, namely another person, who should not, in any way, be diminished in his good by my action (or inaction). Therefore, the law guarantees the interpersonal good, *i.e.*, the good of the acting person and of the others who are affected by the action taken. Lawfulness, liability, duty—all that *debitum* of an act in the legal aspect—comes from the other person.[64]

So, what is due to one person (who is the correlate of the legal relation), the other person should do. The legal relation that binds two persons as correlates is characterized by "that which is due, that which should be done" as the moment that distinguishes the moral order of justice and law from any other dimension of morality.[65]

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[61] *Cf.* Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 16.

[62] *Cf.* Tomasz Duma, *Metafizyka relacji. U podstaw rozumienia relacji bytowych* [Metaphysics of Relations: Foundations of Understanding of Ontic Relations] (Lublin 2017).

[63] *Cf.* Krąpiec, *Człowiek i prawo naturalne*, 34.

[64] *Ibid.*, 33–34.

[65] *Cf. ibid.*, 34–35.

The Sovereignty of the Human Person

Krąpiec referred to the term "sovereignty" used in the philosophy of politics. In recent centuries, there has been a tendency to settle the issue of the sources of power by indicating that peoples (nations) are sovereign, and it is them who convey certain attributes of this sovereignty by electing the authorities of the state—or that the main sovereign is the State. But where does the sovereignty of a nation, in its social and political dimensions, come from?

Krąpiec analyzes the problem of sovereignty in the context of the subjectivity of beings (this is original element of his understanding of sovereignty). Sovereignty is related to being human because of human dignity.[66] Krąpiec sees the basis of social independence, therefore, as residing in the sovereignty of the human person as an ontologically stronger being (a substance, subsisting in its own subjective existence) than a society, a nation, or a State, which do not exist independently, being merely relational beings: a network of relations (the weakest mode of existence) between persons. And it is not these relations that are the purpose of actions, but what causes them to occur.[67] "The human person is the first sovereign—the first subject of human rights and duties, thanks to the fact that only the human being can embrace himself, the world, and all that surrounds him, with his knowledge and love, and make acts of decision."[68]

However, the human person remains a social being; together with other people he creates communities of which he is part. Social life is naturally necessary to secure the material aspect of man's life and to fully actualize his personal abilities. Hence the antinomy of the individ-

[66] *Cf.* Krzysztof Wroczyński, "*Naturalis ratio* jako podstawa praw człowieka [*Naturalis Ratio* as the Basis of Human Rights]," *Filozofia* 1 (23) (1993), 67.

[67] Krąpiec, *O prawie*, 126.

[68] *Ibid.*, 82.

ual and community is explained by Krąpiec in showing that man is sovereign in setting the goal of personal life, while the community remains sovereign in the field of the material means of the realization of this goal, but has no competence whatsoever in setting people's life goals. Civil sovereignty is therefore secondary to personal sovereignty. Alienation would consist in the appropriation by the State of the goals of human life, with individuals being excessively concerned about resources. The State and law should only guarantee the possibility of the intellectual development of man, his moral development, as well as his development in the field of art and religion—for the sake of the good of the person, leaving the individual with the initiative in this respect—and limit itself to organizing the material conditions of man's development and to supporting the natural circles of his life (family, nation).

The ultimate basis for the sovereignty of the State is the sovereign decision of person.[69] "No society has the right to command him what is right and wrong and to create morality through the legal system, to establish rules for its creation."[70] Society can at most make up for the shortcomings of individuals and support human actions (according to the principle of complementarity). Krąpiec constantly emphasizes that the truth about person is an unchanging criterion according to which all cultures and forms of social life are judged.[71]

Rights of Human Person as the Basis of Rights of Nations

Another field of Krąpiec's considerations is a philosophy of nation based on the example of the specificity of the Polish nation and care for the rights of nations in accordance with the tradition of Polish

[69] *Ibid.*

[70] *Ibid.*, 132.

[71] *Ibid.*, 159–160.

thought concerning freedom.[72] With this reflection, Krąpiec's work joins the canon of the most important reflections of eminent Polish thinkers concerning the nation.[73] He remarks: "For me and my peers, Polishness was not something abstract, but a clearly shaped way of life. In the East, we lived Polishness as a form of cultural presence, and a very, very high form of it."[74] However, "Polishness is not the goal of human life, but it is a valuable instrument of human development."[75] Krąpiec sees, first of all, the importance of national culture as that through which one's inclusion in the general cultural current is achieved and through which the humanity of particular individuals is realized. Hence, defense of national culture is for Krąpiec, in fact, defense of the identity of human beings as persons.[76] Krąpiec emphasized the rational-emotional character of the Polish nation, thus connected with the necessity of a centuries-long defense of freedom—a good that was and is constantly threatened.

Among the rights of nations, Krąpiec emphasized the right to existence, culture, and the most important right to freedom, manifesting itself in the possibility of making sovereign decisions concerning action.[77] Just as freedom, and rationality, is a property of the human per-

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[72] On this topic, see Jan Sochoń, "Katolicka filozofia społeczna. Ujęcie Mieczysława A. Krąpca [Catholic Social Philosophy. The Approach of Mieczysław A. Krąpiec]," in *Państwo – Kościół – Naród* [The State – the Church – the Nation], ed. S. Kowolik (Tarnowskie Góry 2018), 39–51.

[73] This is a passage from the book by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec *Rozważania o narodzie* [Considerations of the Nation] (Lublin 2000) reprinted in the collection of texts prepared by the Polish Academy of Sciences, Department of Nationality Studies in Poznań, entitled *Polska refleksja nad narodem. Wybór tekstów* [Polish Reflection on the Nation: A Collection of Works] (Poznań 2002), 238–246.

[74] Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Rozważania o narodzie* [Considerations of the Nation] (Lublin 2004), 81.

[75] *Ibid.*

[76] *Ibid.*, 5.

[77] *Ibid.*, 9. *Cf.* Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Ludzka wolność i jej granice* [Human Freedom and Its Limits] (Lublin 2008).

son in the dimension of individual conduct, thus enabling a person's fulfillment, so too in the social dimension does rational freedom enable the responsible realization of the common good. It is the particularly strong experience of personal and national freedom in situations where they are threatened that determines the characteristic features of Polish culture, its heritage, and the ever-present task of building a civilization of freedom and love.[78]

In this area, as well as in those previously mentioned, we can see the independence and autonomy of Krąpiec's thinking. Although he strongly embeds his considerations in the current of classical philosophy and respects historicism, Krąpiec still remains a distinct, original, and independent philosopher.[79]

Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's Metaphysics of Law

SUMMARY

The subject of interest of the philosophy (metaphysics) of law developed by Mieczysław A. Krąpiec is the existence of natural law, the ways in which the content of this law is formulated, the basis of established law and justice, the relationship between established law and natural law, and the conditions of law's implementation in various communities. Krąpiec proposed, firstly, a realistic interpretation of law as a real and interpersonal relation; secondly, a concept of the analogical natural law; and thirdly, the interpretation of human rights as ways of realizing the personal nature of the human being—as the ways which are found in the social context and proclaimed particularly in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Concerning the philosophy of politics, Krąpiec considered the issue of the sovereignty of the human person in relation to sovereignty of society, nation, and the State, as well as the issue of politics understood as the realization of the common good in a prudent manner. Krąpiec also re-

[78] Krąpiec, *Rozważania o narodzie*, 11.

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ferred to the Polish tradition of defending the rights of nations, thus building the foundations of the philosophy of nation.

KEYWORDS

Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, philosophy of law, metaphysics of law, natural law, human rights, common good, sovereingty, justice, relations.

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Book Reviews

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Brian Welter

Science and the Christian Faith by Christopher C. Knight*

Christopher Knight combines his insights as an Orthodox priest and holder of a PhD in astrophysics to make a notable contribution to the field of religion-science dialogue. He sheds light on the wide differences between Orthodox and western theology on the nature of humans, sin, and the created order. Many readers, accustomed to a Catholic-oriented dialogue, may need to reset their stance on religion and science if they accept Knight's claims. The author applies his Orthodox-inspired perspective to many key aspects and terms, such as the fall and its ramifications, miracles, grace, the sacraments, the western distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and the link between the *Logos* and the *logoi*. Some of the theological issues may be unfamiliar to Catholic readers, which makes *Science and the Christian Faith* all the more fascinating though quite challenging at times.

The author provides the Christian with a clear method and attitude to adopt when discussing science and religion. He notes the importance in Orthodox theology of following the "mind of the Fathers." Even though the Church Fathers had no notion of modern science and technology, we can follow their attitude when evaluating these. Just as

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the Fathers accepted the Greek science of their day and even employed it in their apologetic work, so we can accept the science of our day and use it to defend and develop a Christian view on various issues. Yet Knight issues the Orthodox caveat that the chaff of the Fathers must be separated from the wheat. Thus even the Fathers must be read critically. We must avoid becoming patristic fundamentalists in the discussion with science. What this means is a flexible spirit, the same one that prompts an allegorical reading of Scripture, particularly with passages such as the creation accounts in Genesis, which we can read in a nonliteral sense. Knight, practical and well-grounded in Orthodoxy, notes how this allegorical reading of the Bible parallels an analogical reading of the created world. Scientific findings can be interpreted in analogical ways, as ways for us to learn more about God. This turns science into a kind of theological endeavor, much as it was for some medieval western scientists such as Robert Grosseteste.

Throughout *Science and the Christian Faith*, the author highlights the limits of science and warns against science overstepping its boundaries. He also underscores the theological significance of scientific views and practice. As with many Catholic writers such as John Paul II or Stanley Jaki, he warns against *scientism*, which he characterizes as a philosophical position that some overzealous scientists take when they dismiss metaphysics or God because these cannot be experimentally verified or measured. He notes that most scientists make for lousy philosophers given their typical lack of training in this area. But western theology is not innocent. Its "tendency to separate grace and nature" has contributed to a split in its vision of the world, such as between metaphysics and the material world.[1] The Orthodox see God as present in nature far more powerfully than western theologians do. The latter mostly envision God as operating upon nature from the outside.

[1] Knight, *Science and the Christian Faith*, 19.

Knight accuses western theology of practicing a type of Deism, as reflected in the natural-supernatural split, which separates grace and nature.[2] God seemingly acts in a special way to temporarily suspend the laws of nature which He established when he made the world. The Orthodox view of nature, including the lack of a natural-supernatural split, shows how Catholic thinkers may be misguided when trying to reconcile science and religion. Nothing needs reconciling. The theory of evolution, for instance, poses no threat to Christian belief. Some Church Fathers, both Latin and Greek, hinted at "a gradual unfolding of the potential of what God created 'in the beginning'."[3] St. Augustine developed the notion of "created potentialities," which remain dormant like seeds until the right time.[4] St. Basil espoused something similar. If anything, the theory of evolution reflects the prescience of certain Church Fathers.

Another key to resolving the science-religion split is the Orthodox theology of the fall. Knight appeals to the Orthodox idea of the fall to help develop his argument in a bold and beautiful way. With Adam's sin, the natural world, the world that God intended, fell into a "subnatural" state. That explains natural evil such as tsunamis and tornadoes, and why the Bible promises that in the eschatological age to come the lion will lie down with the lamb. But even now, God is never outside of nature, suddenly inputting grace and producing a miracle. Grace and the miraculous are always present. Crucial to this argument is the notion that "miraculous events represent, not the 'supernatural' action of an outside agent, but an anticipation of the character of the 'world to come'. The state that these events unveil is *above nature* only in the sense that it is above the *subnatural* state in which, because of the fall, we now find ourselves. Miracles [and, later, the author includes the sac-

[2] *Ibid.*, 165.
[3] *Ibid.*, 46.
[4] *Ibid.*, 47.

raments] represent the *true nature* of the world intended by God in his creation of it."[5] This "cosmos shot through with the radiance of divinity."[6] is a beautiful, hopeful, and (for westerners) even revolutionary vision.

The author is just as challenging in his rejection of the oft-accepted mind-body duality. He refers to exciting advances in neuroscience which seem to question this duality by showing that humans are embodied beings. In other words, the mind is very closely tied to the brain's physical structure. Knight expresses no theological alarm over this. His fascinating discussion of the *nous* supports his Orthodox vision of the human being as the microcosm of the universe. The *nous* is the psychological element that allows a human to connect to God. This has been imperfectly translated into Latin as the *intellectus*. The *nous*-centered connection leads to the illumination that Augustine also identified. Yet western theologians failed to capture the entire notion. Knight notes the crucial role of *apophatic* theology for the Orthodox. This "negative theology," which has often been ignored by western theologians, differs from "positive," or *cataphatic*, theology. The author defines these terms clearly, and outlines their influence on the spiritual life: "cataphatic affirmations are seen primarily as providing a kind of ladder towards an increasingly contemplative and non-conceptual knowledge of God."[7] How does this impact the religion-science debate? St. Basil noted that not only is God's essence unknowable, but the essence of created things can also not be fully expressed. This points to a significant epistemological lack which scientists need to come to terms with: "it is the unknowable depth of things, that which constitutes their true, indefinable essence."[8] Such a belief invites scientists to reconsider

[5] *Ibid.*, 20.
[6] *Ibid.*, 143.
[7] *Ibid.*, 93.
[8] *Ibid.*, 94.

the vital role of metaphysics in describing the cosmos, as St. Basil's teaching implies that this unknowable essence is an ontological issue.

This metaphysical stance could help scientists better understand how they see the world, particularly in the extent to which scientific theories can explain reality. Knight discusses Popper's *critical realism*, Kuhn's *anti-realism*, and Mary Hesse's *structural realism*. Knight identifies a correspondence between structural realism and St. Basil's teaching on the unknowability of the essence of things. Structural realism includes the idea that "we should . . . be realists about the structures that science claims to reveal, but not about the ontology that is assumed in the description and investigation of these structures."[9] Such a philosophy of science may provide the best antidote to scientism by providing the meeting place of "scientific rationality" and "theological rationality." More specifically, this indicates the meeting of scientific realism with theological realism. Knight helpfully clarifies what he means by such realism. Quarks can only be inferred "through theoretical exploration of experimental results."[10] This parallels Christians "when they speak about the God whom they cannot observe directly."[11] The methodologies of theologians and scientists seem to have unanticipated yet fascinating parallels.

One parallel is the way that theology, like physics, requires a both-and mindset. Both Newtonian physics and general relativity provide workable models for scientists, depending on the level at which they are working. Also, light behaves as both waves and particles. In the same way, God is both immanent and transcendent. Knight refers to St. Athanasius, "for whom God has no affinity with the world in his *essence*, but by his *powers* pervades the whole cosmos."[12] The author is

[9] *Ibid.*, 90.
[10] *Ibid.*, 87.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*, 143.

at his most convincing when he invokes St. Gregory Palamas's teachings on the divine energies and the divine essence because this type of theological thinking remains undeveloped in the West, and has therefore made no contribution to the religion-science dialogue. Yet this essence-energies distinction, or *antinomy* as Knight calls it, encapsulates the *panentheism* (not to be confused with pantheism) that Knight argues is found in the Orthodox view of creation: "in his energies—which are nothing less than God himself in action—God is inexhaustibly immanent, maintaining all things in being, animating them, making each of them a sacrament of his dynamic presence."[13] Along with the discussion on the *nous*, this insight could add tremendously to the science-religion dialogue by showing that the gap or conflict between science and religion is not as deep or unbridgeable as some may assume.

Knight also applies the *Logos-logoi* connection to God's immanence and the Orthodox teaching of panentheism. The things of nature each possess their unique essence because of their individual logos, but these individual logoi are connected to the one Logos of the Godhead, which is the creative principle of the universe. This echoes in Christianized form the Platonic teaching of the *idea* or *form* that each created thing participates in. The author is very coherent here in showing how this panentheism avoids becoming heresy because it shows how nature and God remain separate even though nature is imbued with the Creator. He also notes St. Maximos the Confessor's teaching that the logoi also denote the teleology of a thing of nature, and how this pulls this thing toward God: "The *logos* of each created thing is—as Metropolitan Kallistos has put it—'God's intention for that thing, its inner essence, which makes it distinctively itself and at the same time draws it towards the divine realm'."[14] The fact that the cosmos has a purpose is a meta-

[13] *Ibid.*, 144.
[14] *Ibid.*, 146.

physical, not scientific, issue, though this teaching could help scientists see the limits of their discipline. Science tells us *how* and *what*, but not *why*.

The author succeeds at conveying how the individual pieces of Orthodox teaching on the cosmos fit together into a balanced and coherent whole. Knight describes this teaching as without the gaps in logic or unresolvable tensions that western Christians have wrestled with. The Orthodox vision of the universe is not in competition with science. Much of Orthodox theology seems to be interwoven with other parts of theology. So much of this vision can also be interwoven with science because science complements Orthodox theology. In this way, scientists and theologians can learn from each other.

***Science and the Christian Faith* by Christopher C. Knight**

SUMMARY

This paper is a review of Christopher C. Knight's book, *Science and the Christian Faith*. According to the author, Knight's book sheds light on the wide differences between Orthodox and western theology and applies Orthodox-inspired perspectives to explaining many key aspects and terms, such as the fall and its ramifications, miracles, grace, the sacraments, the western distinction between the natural and the supernatural, and the link between the *Logos* and the *logoi*. The author concludes that Knight's book is an attempt to show that the Orthodox vision of the universe is not in competition with science.

KEYWORDS

Christopher C. Knight, science, Christianity, Orthodox theology, western theology, the natural, the supernatural, *Logos*, *logoi*.

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Essays

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Pedro García Casas

What Is the Gift?

This paper discusses the nature of gift from the perspective of philosophical personalism. Since there are different doctrines of gift, it will first provide an overview of anthropological, sociological, philosophical, ethical, and religious approaches to the problem of gift. Then, it will delineate the essential notes of the gift and its structure, and relate the gift to duties of justice. Finally, it will show that the gift is not immanent, but constitutes an anthropological transcendental that helps us to better understand man and his supernatural dimension.

Anthropological and Sociological Approaches

In contemporary thought, the starting point for the theme of the gift is found in M. Mauss's work *Essai sur le don*. The author studied the societies of North America, South America, Melanesia, Papua, Africa, Polynesia, etc., and came to the conclusion that giving is the most archaic social form of exchange, according to the triad *give-receive-return*. For Mauss, the most primitive societies were built on donations or gifts, as they impregnated their contracts and economic interests, which in the end obliged and gave rights.[1] Let us note that Mauss un-

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[1] *Cf.* Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur le don. Forme et raison de l'échange dans les sociétés archaïques," in *Sociologie et anthropologie* (Paris: PUF, 1950), 145–279.

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derstands donation as a mixture of *freedom* and *moral obligation*; therefore the gift is both *interested* and *disinterested*, *free* and *obligatory*—always of great importance, since societies progress to the extent that they themselves, their subgroups and their individuals are able to establish their own give-receive-return relationships.[2] Consequently, these exchanges and contracts are the primary basis of the market, and include most radical moral, legal and economic principles into any human transaction.[3]

The gift, according to Mauss, is essential in human society and a central element of the archaic economy. Exchanges are respected whenever there is a need to return them not out of legal justice but out of moral duty. The exchange is what articulates the relations between the groups, as it is a measure of whether and how much a donation exalts its giver and its recipient. Mauss even thinks that developed societies could improve their economic structures by recognizing the humanistic aspect of gift exchange—for to give something to someone is to give a part of oneself.

J. T. Gobout and A. Caillé extend the primacy of gift to all societies by defining it as "any provision of goods and services without guarantee of return or consideration, in order to create, nourish or recreate the social bond of people."[4] Thus, the gift is to become a way to turn conflict into alliance through the threefold obligation to *give*, *receive*, and *return*. The gift is also to represent the most encompassing and original social reality that can be conceived beyond the concepts of debt, symbol, sacrifice or religion, which are but moments of the general system of the gift.

Ignacio Falgueras summarizes the position of these authors as follows:

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[2] *Cf. ibid.*, 258.

[3] *Cf. ibid.*, 147–148.

[4] Jacques T. Godbout, Alain Caillé, *L'esprit du don* (París: La Découverte, 2000), 29.

> Only the gift is capable of practically overcoming the opposition between the individual and the collectivity, making people members of a larger concrete whole. From the perspective of the gift, society can therefore be understood as a network constituted by the sum of the unique relationships that each member has with others, or also as a group of individuals who permanently try to reduce and familiarize themselves with each other, creating and breaking personal bonds. On these primary links the state and the economy create new but secondary social links.[5]

The Strictly Philosophical Approach

C. Bruaire proposes to elevate the notion of gift to the ontological plane, to develop what he calls "ontodology." Bruaire situates the gift at the level of the spiritual being, as a dialectical going out of oneself and denying in man the body to which he is bound by nature.[6] For Bruaire, if giving is postponed due to having, the most authentic part of the gift is falsified, as it is reduced to an economic, legal or any other field that refers to the action. The characteristic of the gift, in turn, is that it is *given in its being by giving*, without having to be based on a record of possibilities that previously defined it. In other words, what is given (who is given) is a spirit in its being when it manifests itself or comes out of itself. It is in this sense that it is affirmed that the gift is an attribute by which the act of being is primarily identified:

> [T]he fact of being and being that there is in fact, being as a verb and being as a noun are indiscernible; the fact of being given cannot be distinguished really or modally from the gift itself.

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[5] Ignacio Falgueras, "El dar, actividad plena de la libertad trascendental," *Studia Poliana* 15 (2013): 75 (my translation).

[6] *Cf.* Jacques Derrida, "Justicia y perdón," in *¡Palabra! Instantáneas filosóficas* (Madrid: Trotta, 2001), 96: "To pronounce the 'I am' is to affirm 'I am not my body'." My translation.

> Identifying in its sense the active and the passive, the gift is a being in and by its act of being.[7]

Bruaire distinguishes two senses in the "giving" that should be differentiated. On the one hand, it is a matter of giving oneself as a manifestation in which the spirit is recognized; giving oneself is in this sense the "manifesting of" what is more, of that which is not exhausted in its appearance but rather manifests itself as being beyond its appearance. On the other hand, giving oneself implies "giving oneself to" someone who welcomes you as new, as something primeval or inderivable. Being in oneself in his apparition and being someone else who recognizes him in his gift are the two co-implied ways in which the gift is made present.[8]

J. Maritain's position, in turn, can be described as follows:

> On the other hand . . . we find the approach of Jacques Maritain, who sees the person as not integrated in the Universe or in some other whole other than himself, but who is able to enter into himself through self-knowledge and mastery of his own acts and can also leave himself by giving himself to other personal beings, without getting lost through it. . . . [I]ndividuality in man means deficiency and lowering towards the non-being, the personality introduces the opposite perspective of the overabundance in the being which makes him surpass himself until he reaches the fullness of the being entrusted to him.[9]

Maritain's position could be objected to as entailing a duplicity in man: on the one hand, man's individuality and, on the other, man's being a person. However, such a dichotomization is far from Maritain's thought which is expressed in the following terms:

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[7] Claude Bruaire, *El ser y el espíritu* (Madrid: Caparrós, 1995), 75 (my translation).

[8] According to U. Ferrer, Bruaire does not sufficiently distinguish in the gift the activity of giving and the reception of the giver. *Cf.* Urbano Ferrer, *Acción, deber, donación* (Madrid: Dykinson, 2015), 147.

[9] Urbano Ferrer, "Introducción al análisis filosófico del dar en los autores franceses contemporáneos" (my translation). Available online—see the section *References* for details.

> There is no reality in me that is called my individual and another reality that is called my person. The same being, the whole being, is an individual in one sense and a person in another. We do not distinguish personality and individuality in the human being as we distinguish hydrogen and oxygen in water. If we have to look for comparisons, we think rather of a poem which by its technique belongs to a certain form of versification, to the form of ode, for example, and which by its inspiration is fresh and delicate . . . The ode form is like the individuality of the poem; its freshness and delicacy are like its personality. Individuality and personality are two metaphysical lines that intersect in the unity of each man.[10]

It is to emphasize that, for Maritain, it is not that the personal part of man makes the opposite material part of man disappear, as if it were a Manichean dualism, but the latter is put by the former at the service of the person's capacity for the gift: this is the point that interests us most.

The Phenomenology of Giving

In the phenomenological current, there are two authors of mandatory reference: M. Henry and J. L. Marion. In the opinion of the former, the intentionality of consciousness, as presented by E. Husserl, directs us to what comes to us from outside, leaving this "outside" ascribed to the horizontality of the world. The world, by the way, is that which is external to the consciousness, so that the world's "appearing" to the consciousness does not coincide with that which appears, but is limited to sketching it by means of figures in inappropriate perceptions.

Thus, the mundane as a phenomenon leads to accentuate by contrast the intrinsic phenomenality of life, where giving oneself as a phenomenon is no longer external to it. Life is not housed as one more component among mundane things. In the appearance of the world and

[10] Jacques Maritain, "Persona e individuo," in *Para una filosofía de la persona humana* (Buenos Aires: Club de Lectores, 1984), 160–161 (my translation).

that of life we are dealing with different phenomena, of which only the second is properly and entirely a giving. For a gift of life in the living is originally prior to the world's giving from the outside.

Consequently, in this phenomenological approach, intentionality ceases to be the gateway to what is given as are, for example, the objects that stand out from the horizon of the world. Donation is prior to intentionality. For, in contrast to intentionality and in its strictest sense, donation is self-donation, as it shows itself. From this point of view, what M. Henry wants is to recover the *interiority of the ego* that is generally absent in modern philosophy.

The phenomenological connection of the theme of donation in M. Henry can only take place since Husserl's discovery of the ego as a *transcendence in immanence*. For this reason, in donation *the donor himself is given to himself*, transcending his own appearing to the consciousness, not limiting himself to being with presence before the consciousness, to the way objects are.

On the other hand, more complex and explicit is the line proposed by J. L. Marion who brings together the contributions of J. Derrida, M. Henry and C. Bruaire and, by drawing on Husserl's phenomenology, seeks to perfect both the understanding of phenomenology and that of gift. His motto "as much reduction as donation" can be interpreted as the more phenomenology the more gift, and the more gift the more phenomenology.[11] The nucleus of this interpretation resides in the transition from the theoretical consideration of a phenomenological truth to the practical and experiential consideration of a phenomenon, that of the gift, estimated in a special way. For J. L. Marion goes from an interpretation of the *es gibt* (there is) or the *Gegebenheit*, as a defining characteristic of the truth that can be reached by the phenomenological method, to a thematic interpretation of the gift as a privileged

[11] Falgueras, "El dar, actividad plena de la libertad trascendental," 80.

phenomenon. This transition is based on the relationship or nominal similarity that exists between the terms *data*, *gift* and *donation.*

Although Marion's project is inconclusive, his approach is clear: to bring the phenomenological method to its most radical purity and, at the same time, to theme the gift phenomenologically until it is reduced to its strictest essence; in other words, his purpose is to make the gift the data par excellence and in the most radical way.

The phenomenological reduction, however, is not the most appropriate procedure to make the act of donation present, since the gift received precedes the awareness that one has of it. When we become conscious of the gift, it is because it has already been given to us; consequently, giving cannot be surprised in its originality in a phenomenological way. Giving is accomplished in the consciousness of the one who receives a gift without any reference to a giver, otherwise we would have to speak of an objectified gift. Therefore, beyond the phenomenon of donation, as Marion says, it is similar to the fold that is hidden behind its unfolding in its phenomenological elements.

The Ethical and Religious Approach

The ethical and religious line allows us to see the gift in relation to responsibility and guilt. In this context, we find J. Derrida who separates the gift from the exchange of goods and places emphasis on the non-reciprocity and non-obligatory nature of every true gift, and on its disinterested character that *does not expect any reward*. While criticizing Mauss, Derrida drastically separates the donational from the economic, showing how Mauss does not understand the difference between the economic and donational exchanges.

Donation as an Ethical Principle and Ethical Gift without Reciprocity[12]

From an ethical point of view, we can say that giving is what allows us to distinguish between moral attitudes that are authentic and those that are simulated. Giving is present in its intimate relation with the inexhaustibility of the person who, at the same time, is announced and shown in giving.

Certainly, giving branches out into a multiplicity of particular and concrete dares in which the freedom of the person intervenes, cooperating with all these "dares" and lending them their ethical fiber. Therefore, giving without getting involved in what is given, and receiving without getting involved in what is taken, can result in a true caricature of giving.

It is, thus, not a sum of giving and receiving that identifies the gift but the reciprocity in the structure that makes them up. This is viable only if receiving is transformed into active giving, accepting or giving acceptance.

It must be borne in mind that even if the intention of the giver is not to seek restitution (and here lies the authenticity of the true gift), it is equally true that an unrequited gift, at least with the gratitude of the one who benefits from it, could be frustrated as a gift. Nevertheless, even if the case of this frustration were to arise due to a lack of acceptance on the part of the recipient, if the one who gives does so with purity of intention, this will have repercussions on his own good and on his perfection even without being reciprocated. For, in our opinion, unrequited giving has more merit than when it is given by obtaining reward, even if it is not sought. Perhaps the reason for this giving (even to

[12] See Robert Spaemann, "Antinomien der Liebe," in *Schritte über uns hinaus. Gesammelte Reden und Aufsätze*, Bd. II (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2011), 9–26; Josef Seifert, *¿Qué es y qué motiva una acción moral?* (Madrid: Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, 1995).

enemies) has to be sought in supernatural reasons that transcend all human calculation: not in the other but in the Other with a capital letter.

For Lévinas, the gift is presented within the framework of the intersubjective relationship as directed to Another. This Other is given asymmetrically for the freedom which is questioned by him and which takes charge of his ipseity. In this sense, hospitality is the gift of welcome to the call of the Other. So the ethical relationship is characterized by responsibility to the Other, being such a responsibility that it cannot be delegated. It is an irreversible responsibility that explains the ethical relationship with the other.

In Lévinas the donation is concentrated on the other's face that points to the infinite; hence, the graphic expression "the epiphany of the face": the face is "another who" and has meaning by itself without having to refer to a higher logical genre. Lévinas affirms that the donation of objects in the world is the first step to warn that there is some Other behind, while it is a donation that breaks the circle of immanent needs and at the same time breaks the circuit of giving and taking. Things are given to me inasmuch as they put me in debt with Another, who in turn cannot be given as an object, but rather from transcendence becomes the "encountered" and asks me for help. In this sense, the donation is a function of the otherness of someone. The Other is certainly for an "I," but not as its analog or alter ego, but rather by linking it with the burden of responsibility. It is, therefore, a gift that demands effort and for that reason it is received as a task entrusted to me by the Other. The emphasis, as can be seen, is placed not so much on the gratuity of the donation as on the task associated with the gift.

Gift and Sacrifice

Sacrifice can be a gift made to a superior being through the destruction of a victim. Destruction symbolizes renouncing something one possesses in order to placate, ask for, or worship the divinity to which

one belongs. Typical of these sacrifices is the shedding of blood, since it symbolizes the beginning of life, thus returning with its outpouring to the supreme source of life. The essence of sacrifice, however, is not the bloody death of a victim, but the oblation or offering of self that is made by returning to its origin *the gift* that has been given.

Sacrifice comes from the Latin word *sacer-facere*. It would be a question of putting aside something that one possesses, subtracting it from one's own use or consumption. It is not so much wild animals, but animals that belong to one's farm or are useful for agriculture. In this way, sacrifice becomes a visible expression of voluntariness, an opposite to what would be given under coercion.

Love as an Eminent Form of Donation

Interpersonal love is a response in which the whole person participates intrinsically.[13] While it is a response to the value of a person, it is not an immanent deployment of capacities, nor is it an appetite that is satisfied in what is desired, since in none of these cases is the person identified with them. Pure love is a gift that is given and received for free.

Love is an answer to another person who not only gives something, but implies the gift of self. Only this type of love-response, self-giving, can do justice to personal dignity. So if we consider love as a response, it is no longer possible to dissociate the personal being from its qualities, which are often those that provoke loving access to the person transcending them, to those who in their freedom reveal themselves irreducible to them.

[13] *Cf.* Josef Seifert, *True Love* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2015), 18.

Love as a gift (donation love) is the fullest form of donation and, therefore, contains all possible forms of donation, such as gratuity, forgiveness,[14] friendship, mercy, clemency, congratulation, etc.

In sum, the structure of gift (giving and receiving) is mirrored in the structure of love (a loving person and a loved one).[15] And if the gift is not reified in the margin of giving (as it is always linked to giving), love does not remain substantively in man as a person different from the one he loves, but makes it manifest (as love with works) that one loves. It is to hold that loving self-giving is prior to any expressed unilateral will. Therefore, love accompanies the person in his or her being directed beyond, toward a transcendent destiny: God Himself. It is the personal God who places in a concrete man the loving orientation toward Him. For only He who is the origin of love can also be the destiny of love.

Essential Notes on Giving

We must distinguish between *giver*, *gift* and *given*. According to St. Thomas Aquinas, in the name *gift* the *aptitude* to be given is implicit: "[W]hat is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his."[16]

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[14] On the relationship between gift and forgiveness, see Mariano Crespo, *Das Verzeihen. Eine philosophische Untersuchung* (Heidelberg 2002), translated into Spanish under the title: *El perdón una investigación filosófica* (Madrid: Encuentro, 2004); Mariano Crespo, "El perdón y sus efectos curativos frente al sufrimiento y la muerte," *El valor ético de la afectividad. Estudios de ética fenomenológica* (Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 2012); Antonio Malo, "Don, culpa y perdón (Elementos para una fenomenología del perdón)," *Metafísica y Persona* 4, no. 7 (Enero–Junio 2012): 55–67.

[15] Urbano Ferrer, "Filosofía del amor y del don como manifestación de la persona," *Quien* 3 (2016): 23–33.

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q, 38, a. 1. Available online—see the section *References* for details.

Therefore, *donation* is the best word to express *gift*, which is characterized mainly by its gratuitousness, or being unnecessary. It is given voluntarily: if it were a business transaction, we could no longer speak of a gift.

The donation has a threefold structure which comprises a giver, a recipient and a gift. This can lead us to misunderstandings or misinterpretations, since we can find ourselves with reference to a gift without mentioning a giver or a recipient, which implies a reductive view of it. It should also be noted that the gift is not that which mediates between a giver and a recipient in the form of something separable from them, but that which includes the one "who gives himself" in "what he gives" to others. In other words, the gift contains the whole person who is a giver. Moreover, the donation in a proper sense requires to be not only gratuitous on the part of a giver, but also freely accepted on the part of a recipient: if the recipient were forced to accept it, the donation would cease to be a gift. It implies that a genuine gift also demands to be free in what is given. This can be called a "congruence of giving."[17]

It follows then that the recipient is not passive, but rather active equally to the giver, although in a subordinate way, since the initiative always belongs to the giver. For this reason, the gift is not consumed until an active acceptance by the recipient takes place, which means that the donation cannot be a gift until it is received in the formal sense: *the gift is built on giving*. Falgueras, however, finds the scholastic adage *nemo dat quod non habet* insufficient, and says that this is a causal principle, not a gift, since the gift neither pre-exists nor follows the donation—it is made *jointly* by the giver and the recipient in the same act of giving, a fruit of the gratuitousness on one another's part.[18]

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[17] Ignacio Falgueras, "Causar, producir, dar," in *Crisis y renovación de la metafísica* (Málaga: Universidad de Málaga, 1997), 64.

[18] *Cf. ibid.*, 65.

Another characteristic of a gift, perhaps the most striking one, is that in order to be pure *it excludes any loss* concerning both the one who receives and the one who gives. The receiver does not experience any loss but rather profit, provided that the gift is understood in the terms described above. Likewise, in the case of the giver there is no loss either. Moreover, we can also affirm that in pure giving there is nothing but profit. Even if there can be a loss in terms of the material aspect of what is given, the spiritual aspect of gift giving is that which always perfects the giver in terms of intransitive results of his or her acts of giving. The nobler and purer a gift is, the fewer losses it entails. For example, "giving" or sharing spiritual goods does not impoverish any giver, but is that which enriches them.

The Relationship of Giving with the Obligations of Justice

With regard to the reconciliation of giving and the obligation of justice, it was Paul Ricoeur who carried out a detailed study on the gratuitousness of giving, the duties and their imperative character.[19]

There are two allegories by which justice is represented. On the one hand, the blindfolded lady with scales, and on the other, the sword of Damocles suspended by a hair. Both images seem utterly alien to the nature of gift. It seems that the distance separating giving from doing justice is huge, and the attempt to reconcile them is forced; nevertheless, there is a link that needs to be pointed out here in order to better understand what giving is in its essence.

In that which is determined as just we find a triadic structure that has some similarity to the triad analyzed above regarding donation. Here a subject A does justice to B by giving him what corresponds to C. Likewise, in the act of doing collective justice the different parts are

[19] Paul Ricoeur, *Amor y justicia* (Madrid: Trotta, 2008).

determined (it is clear who-what is A, B and C), establishing in their being the boundaries between them, giving them what they are entitled to as parties. However, unlike what happens with the gift, when we receive what is just, we do not incur a debt of disinterestedness or the like; rather, the opposite is assumed, for when we receive an act of justice, the first debt is liquidated or settled.

Paradoxically, it is at this point that justice and self-giving come together, for the demands of justice arise from being a debtor, and it is precisely being a debtor that arises from receiving some gift gratuitously. In this way, we see how the relation of justice to gift is presented as a task that must be continually re-established, rather than as an act accomplished once and for all. As Ferrer states:

> Whenever we act in social life, and when our action has a recipient, we become debtors or creditors to the latter and face a demand—in terms of justice—to establish a balance between the parties which comes from a need for full satisfaction . . . For this reason, the giver's situation does not allow the omission or substitution of this need, since it always comes first, while the duty of justice is an ethical obligation to pay the debt, although it cannot be paid completely, given the initial difference between the donation and the repayment.[20]

While it is true that this debt has its origin in a gift that cannot be repaid, the duty of justice consists in paying debts to others. In both gift and justice there is a difference between the giver and the recipient, for not only they are different persons, but also in the case of gift there is no prior debt or obligation, as is the case with justice, but there is someone who voluntarily gives it.

Another difference between justice and gift is that justice requires recourse to a third party to act as an arbiter between the parties (since one cannot be both a judge and a party), hence justice requires institutionalization. In this sense, the impartiality and equality of par-

[20] Ferrer, *Acción, deber, donación*, 196. My translation.

ties, that characterize the *iustitia commutativa*, do not represent the ultimate ideal of justice, but rather are conventional adjustments measured by market prices or sanctions imposed by authority.

In a different order of things, what justice brings to donation *is the seriousness of not treating it as a game* or something one does only when certain conditions are met in a subjective way (be it a whim, a desire of a moment, etc.), but makes us see that donation is the only adequate attitude in social relations and that it is just without remaining in the arbitrary and elusive nature of personal desires of a moment.

A Conclusion: The Gift of Love as an Anthropological Transcendental[21]

The question of the gift is the same question that we find in relation to the person. Therefore, in order to clarify and enter into the depths of its mystery, we will try to inscribe the gift in the person on the basis of the doctrine of anthropological transcendentals, distinguished from metaphysical transcendentals. We will use the doctrine of anthropological transcendentals given by Leonardo Polo.

To be precise, anthropological transcendentals are those that constitute the person in his act of being. There is a hierarchical order in them from less to more, and thus we can find and name them by going from the lower to the highest: coexistence, freedom, cognition, and love. Let us say that they are not properties derived from human nature, but rather those that allow us to identify and recognize the personal being in each person. Let us look at each of these transcendentals and the interrelationship between them.

With regard to *coexistence*, we immediately see that the person not only exists, but also coexists with others. He is not a finite being

[21] *Cf.* Leonardo Polo, *Antropología trascendental*, Vol. I: *La persona humana* (Navarra: Eunsa, 2010), 195–237; Ferrer, *Acción, deber, donación*, 199–209.

that can be closed off, but needs coexistence—otherwise he could not exercise his freedom, he could not know himself, and finally he could not give himself in love to others. Coexistence means that the person exists in company, is open from within, like a door that opens from within. In Ferrer's view:

> [C]oexistence is not an essential manifestation of the person . . . but its first transcendental note, distinct from, though convertible with, personal freedom. The distinctive feature of coexistence is that it primarily reveals the duality of the human act and transfers it to the four radical characteristics of the person: intimacy (i.e., the person's character coexistent with his personal being), freedom, rationality, and love . . . According to his coexistence, the person—the who of each one—is irreducible or incommunicable. This is not, of course, an individuation of the universal concept (i.e., *unum in multis*), for the person does not exist as a universal, but coexists in his being. Coexistence, then, is not a categorical mode of existence among others, i.e., a limitation of existence in general, but is an extension of existence, a second existence which accompanies the being of the universe, itself in its essence and nature, other persons, and in some way God in his personal, uncreated being.[22]

Freedom, in turn, is not a private property, but identifies people as individuals. We find a duality in it: on the one hand, it must accept itself as having a future that is given to it, and on the other hand, it is inseparable from the search for its purpose. In this sense, freedom is not a property of human acts but exists in personal coexistence and makes it possible to determine the who (the person). In this way, freedom belongs to the order of the person's being and, from that order, is given to the person's powers and actions.

We can also contemplate freedom from the perspective of the temporality, characteristic of the person, meaning that the person is not inserted in a before-and-after line, but is a future that never loses its char-

[22] Urbano Ferrer, "Coexistencia y trascendencia," *Studia Poliana* 14 (2012): 40–41. My translation.

acteristic. The future is important in relation to freedom because it does not come now, but reveals the primacy of freedom over time; it thus opens freedom to the future that is not destined for the past. In the same way, the future is not determined by human freedom, but it allows us to enter into the created condition of the person.

Besides coexistence and freedom, there also is *knowledge*. For the man knows himself as a person and knows that he coexists. Although the knowledge of the personal being is not complete, it is prior to and superior to the knowledge of a being known intentionally as an object which reveals nothing of the personal being. In the knowledge-freedom relation, knowledge brings a motive toward which freedom is oriented and which gives freedom a direction that it would not find on its own.

Coexistence, freedom and knowledge converge in love, i.e., the gift of self. It is to remember that what is given in love is not something foreign to or different from the person, but it is the person himself. And only in this way love or gift-giving is a genuine transcendence and not a mere external service. In other words, to quote Ferrer: "*to give a gift* is another way of saying *to give without getting lost*."[23]

In short, it can be said that when the person gives something of himself to another, even if he forgets the reason why he gave his gift, the one who initiated the communication and was the recipient of it will remain in his memory. It is impossible to separate communication and its content from persons and what is personal.

The relationship between the anthropological transcendentals is only possible through the person; it is in this relationship that the anthropological transcendentals meet in a hierarchical manner, which in turn is the basis for the metaphysical transcendentals (being, truth, and goodness). If this were not the case, without a personal being what was

[23] Ferrer, *Acción, deber, donación*, 205.

communicated would remain material as a set of truths in itself without real support, and man would fall prey to either philosophical idealism or nominalist voluntarism. However, being as the first transcendental is what makes the realism of transcendentals possible.

What Is the Gift?

SUMMARY

This article discusses the problem of gift from the perspective of philosophical personalism. Since there are different doctrines of gift, it first provides an overview of anthropological, sociological, philosophical, ethical, and religious approaches to the nature of gift. Then, it delineates the essential notes of the gift and its structure, and relates the gift to duties of justice. Finally, it shows that the gift constitutes an anthropological transcendental that helps us to better understand man and his supernatural dimension.

KEYWORDS

Gift, donation, love, sacrifice, justice, anthropological transcendental.

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Pragmatist Idea of Democracy in Education and Its Meaning for Educational Innovation in Vietnam Today

The pragmatist philosophy of education aspires to build a universal education to teach people how to break old habits and switch to new creative thinking. Pragmatism offers an educational philosophy that sees students attending school in order to learn how to live in a community that gives them real, guided experiences focusing on their ability to contribute to society. Pragmatism led to education reform in the 19th century and contributed to the development of modern world education. Vietnam fundamentally and comprehensively renews its own education to integrate with global education. This paper uses analytical, comparative and explanatory methods to explain the foundations of the philosophy of pragmatism. The pragmatist philosophy of education is the basis for building democratic education in Vietnam today.

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Research Questions

In what does the educational philosophy of pragmatism manifest itself? What is the educational philosophy of the pragmatist teacher in Vietnam?

Methods

This paper uses the philosophical methods employed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey to formulate pragmatism's basic ideas about education. The ideas proposed by the aforementioned pragmatists are also used to compare and define their relationship in order to create a new philosophy (theory) of democratic education. Based on the assumptions of pragmatism to show democracy in education, the paper explains the application of pragmatism to educational reform in Vietnam today. Pragmatism, then, is to be what unites education. For development means more activities, more new tasks, more new solutions, all with the aim of creating a network of social relations.

At the same time, the paper uses the comparative method to juxtapose the arguments of pragmatists on educational philosophies to determine the tendency and degree of difference between them. Accordingly, the paper pays attention to the general characteristics and different educational concepts of pragmatists, and, based on the evaluation of differences, seeks the optimal solution for specific cases of the Vietnamese educational system.

Conceptual Famework

Since the philosophy of education is focused on answering the nature of education to formulate its goals, educational programs and

methods intend to help teachers know how students perceive their actions. What is needed to help students?[1]

Around 1870 in the United States, the educational philosophy of pragmatism became a third alternative to both the tradition of analytical philosophy and the "Continent" philosophy worldwide. Pragmatism was founded by Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), developed and popularized by William James (1842–1910), and redirected to politics and education by John Dewey (1859–1952). It was adopted by Willard Van Orman Quine, Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam, Robert Brandom in the late 20th century,[2] and neo-pragmatists following the direction of linguistic philosophy.[3]

First, pragmatism is the practice of democracy in education. Students are free to make and appreciate creative achievements and personalities, so pragmatism promotes agility, flexibility and understanding in adapting to reality in any situation. In education, students have the conditions to live and appreciate the effectiveness and usefulness of activities for their work. Therefore, democracy in education is the value of teachers' trust in students' capacity of experiencing real life for themselves. The teacher is one who makes the student's learning purposeful and conveys a sense of reality in education.[4] Dewey viewed democracy as an ideal of life associated with a standard that reconciles individual

[1] R. A. Buchanan, D. J. Forster, S. Douglas, S. Nakar, H. J. Boon, T. Heath, P. Heyward, L. D'Olimpio, J. Ailwood, and S. Eacott, "Philosophy of Education in a New Key: Exploring New Ways of Teaching and Doing Ethics in Education in the 21st Century," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2021): 1–26.

[2] H. S. Thayer, *Pragmatism, the Classic Writings*: *Charles Sanders Peirce*, *William James*, *Clarence Irving Lewis*, *John Dewey*, *George Herbert Mead* (Hackett Publishing, 1982).

[3] R. J. Bernstein, *The pragmatic turn* (Polity, 2010).

[4] H. Putnam, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and the Justification of Democracy," in *Campus Wars* (Routledge, 2021), 264–273.

and collective interests.[5] The presence of democracy in education is a way to realize social democracy. Social democracy is a society with a strict, humane legal system. Only a democratic society can meet the needs of every human being. Especially in education, democracy is the highest expression of respect for human beings. Democracy in education is a promotion of respect for people, a contribution to the common life, an independence in all their activities. Therefore, the quality of education is the quality of human life that meets the needs of every individual in society.[6]

Second, based on the presence of democracy in education, pragmatism assumes that each individual in the education system is a practical experience. Pragmatism expresses the value of education for students through the teacher's knowledge and work to direct their lives and development. Education is aimed to teach students practical things for life and encourage them to advance and thus be better people. Therefore, it is considered as the theory and tool of modern life.[7]

Pragmatist idea of democracy in education explains the social function of education. It indicates the purpose, program and method of forming students into spiritually free people, that is, capable of developing their own personality. Only democracy helps teachers to promote creativity. Only it helps to find and appoint creative teachers.[8]

[5] J. Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*: *Pragmatism*, *Education*, *Democracy*, vol. 1 (Indiana University Press, 1998).

[6] R. B. Westbrook, *Democratic Hope* (Cornell University Press, 2015).

[7] S. Fesmire, *John Dewey and Moral Imagination*: *Pragmatism in Ethics* (Indiana University Press, 2003).

[8] Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*.

Results and Discussion

Democracy in Education Is a Social Function

Pragmatism holds that the function of education is to prepare people to bring democracy into future society. Schools are representatives of a larger society. They are small societies. Therefore, the school must provide all the activities that make up the expected life of the society. The school provides social activities. These activities provide students with beneficial citizenship training.[9] Dewey argued that in American democracy government is "for people" and not just for the people. Because, according to Dewey, the most important thing in a democracy is what happens before the voting: thinking, discussing, and debating. He believed that democracy is both a political system and a moral ideal with the active participation of people. Therefore, in practical education, students must work together: they must undertake tasks related to real-world problems and learn to work as a team.[10] Cooperative activities instill in students the beneficial qualities of social life (compassion, ability to give and receive, being humane, spirit of sacrifice and tolerance) and are invaluable moral training.[11]

Democracy in education is an opportunity for the student, it is the right to learn and develop personal competencies. Teachers have autonomy, they choose their own materials for an appropriate program, they are responsible for their teaching methods to fit each student. Teachers must be able to explain to their students why they think their way of

[9] K. T. Pham, "The Concept of Pragmatism and Its Impact on Education in the Vietnamese Context," *Review of International Geographical Education Online* 11, no. 4 (2021): 1453–1466.

[10] R. Herheim, T. Werler & K. H. Hauge, *Lived Democracy in Education: Young Citizens' Democratic Lives in Kindergarten, School and Higher Education* (Routledge, 2021).

[11] J. Dewey, "The Challenge of Democracy to Education," in *America's Public Philosopher* (Columbia University Press, 2021), 30–39.

teaching is appropriate. The school administration system is aware that they are there to support and help the best teachers and the best students. Teachers cannot impose their beliefs on students. Democracy in school is in the form of conversation, exchange of ideas, discussion and coming to an independent decision. Before citizens implement democracy in society, they will learn it in school. Democracy is about expanding voting rights and equipping citizens with the ability to take responsibility for making informed and voluntary decisions that lead to the common good.[12] If democracy requires informed, educated, and wise citizens, then education must have a moral purpose.

Democracy in education has been a focus of Vietnamese education in recent years. The Ministry of Education of Vietnam has issued regulations for implementing democracy in schools and public educational institutions under the national education system.[13]

The pragmatist idea of democracy in education shapes the current implementation of democracy in education worldwide.[14] Education in any country depends on the quality of political institutions and the level of economic development of that country. Democracy in education is the goal, the way and the result of innovation, and progress. In Vietnam, the process of comprehensive renovation of the country and democratization of social life has made social democracy in general and democracy in education in particular the target and driving force of new changes. The social function of education is to improve the quality of education and help students build Vietnam's future creative and proac-

[12] C. Hookway, "Pragmatism: Commonsense and the Limits of Science," in *Proper Ambition of Science* (London–New York: Routledge, 2000), 103–121.

[13] M. o. E. a. T. Vietnam, *Decision No. 04/2000/QD-BGD-DT, Regulation on Implementation of Democracy in School Operations* (2000).

[14] J. Dewey, "Pragmatic America," in *America's Public Philosopher* (Columbia University Press, 2021), 49–54.

tive culture. This is the very inner core of education and its innovation in Vietnam.

Educational Objectives Are in Line with Learners' Psychology and Living Conditions

Pragmatism seeks the harmonious development of education, whether physical, intellectual, social, or artistic.[15] Pragmatism assumes an active life that is constantly changing, so the purpose of education must be dynamic. Education is related to human life: it must help students meet their biological and social needs. Pragmatism in education is about enabling the student to create value in their lives. Therefore, the purpose of education is to direct the student's drives, interests, desires, and abilities to satisfy them so that the student feel comfortable in their environment.[16] At the same time, pragmatism argues that human beings are biological and social organisms, so education goes in the direction of developing social skills in students. Every student should be an influential member of society. Education must then meet his own needs as well as the needs of the society. Therefore, education aims to train students to solve current problems and adapt effectively to the social environment. The student's perspective must be dynamic so that the student can change according to the changing situation. Society is constantly in motion and evolving, so education must be a place to cultivate an active, adaptable, resourceful, and entrepreneurial culture under all conditions. The mind of an educated student will have the power to create values in an unknown future. Education must therefore empower students to solve the problems of their future lives.[17]

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[15] N. Uralova, "World Experience in the Historical Dynamics of Continuous Education," *Pindus Journal of Culture, Literature, and ELT* 6 (2021): 70–74.

[16] M. E. Jonas, "Dewey's Conception of Interest and Its Significance for Teacher Education," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 43, no. 2 (2011): 112–129.

[17] N. Gross, "A Pragmatist Theory of Social Mechanisms," *American Sociological Review* 74, no. 3 (2009): 358–379.

Education must inspire confidence and excitement in learners. It must also adapt to social conditions. Therefore, pragmatism believes that school is a social environment for learners, not a place that prepares them for a future life in heaven. With this approach, pragmatism fosters the construction of an education in which learning goes hand in hand with practice and action, and reasoning is closely related to reality.[18]

Since education is life itself, schools are inseparable from the actual activities of society. Therefore, when imparting knowledge, teachers should not impose it on students and force them to memorize it. In relation to education, pragmatism also cannot accept the concept of "one size fits all." Teachers must be aware of and respect the differences among students. Education must be a process that belongs to the student, not the teacher. Education is a process in which the student is at the center. In other words, education must be a deeply democratic process.[19]

In Vietnam, the educational goal is the comprehensive development of students' abilities and qualities. Meeting the requirements of social development is the philosophy of innovation, education and teaching in Vietnam today. The whole and comprehensive renewal of education must aim at the comprehensive development of learners' abilities and qualities, especially the ability to build a society of "rich people, strong country, democracy, justice, civilization." This is the highest goal governing the whole process of innovation and development of education in Vietnam today.

In the process of achieving educational goals, Vietnam absorbs democratic ideas in education in the following points:

[18] Dewey, *The Essential Dewey*.
[19] *Ibid.*

1. *Democracy in teaching and learning*: students are actively involved in their learning process. Students are central figures and play an active and proactive role in the learning process.

2. *Democracy in the socialization of education*: creating favorable conditions for people to have the opportunity to learn throughout life. At the same time, democracy in education also shows that the whole society joins together to participate in the education of students to form a social person.

3. *Democracy in education with school management*: to promote democracy in teaching and learning, and at the same time the need to fight against radical democracy, that is, democracy that does not conform to the principles of schooling. In teaching, all different opinions must be discussed democratically, frankly, and teachers must run the school so that democracy be used to disclose both financial information and the quality of education in teaching.

The Educational Program Must Be Associated with the Student's Life

The purpose of education was to be reflected in the curriculum. Pragmatist goals can be found in a pragmatic curriculum. The curriculum framework is based on certain fundamentals. These are utility, interest, experience and integration. Practical utility is the slogan of pragmatism.[20]

Democracy in the curriculum is an inevitable need. Therefore, subjects useful to students should be included in the curriculum. The subjects of vocational usefulness should find a place in the curriculum.[21]

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[20] S. Gerber, "Developmental-Pragmatic Approaches/Strategies," in *Encyclopedia of Autism Spectrum Disorders* (Springer, 2021), 1384–1394.

[21] A. Lever and D. Gerber, "Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy," *Raisons politiques* 81, no. 1 (2021): 5–10.

The curriculum for young students must be different from the existing educational program to include many activities applicable to social life. Topics such as psychology and sociology related to human behavior should be included in the curriculum. Pragmatists argue that subjects that help solve practical life problems should be included in the curriculum, especially at the elementary stage.[22]

William James dealt with the individual, both a teacher and a student, rather than with abstractions. He learned much from his own stance as an individual. James believed that teachers who guide students through moving objects (*e.g.*, events and occurrences) possess a wonderful level of quality that the student discovers, learns, and attempts to achieve.[23]

Dewey's educational goal is to help students realize how the dynamics of knowledge and learning are rooted in the learner's experience.[24] Dewey proposed a three-tiered general education program. The first for elementary school students who focus on doing and making activities, such as starting a garden in the schoolyard, drawing banners, etc. By learning and acting in this way, students must solve problems in the process: hypothesis, plan, implementation and verification. The second stage is learning history and geography through activities and projects, helping students develop perception and master concepts of time (past, present, future) and space. Human experience does not happen in space, but in the flow of time and space. The third stage is learning. Science, according to Dewey, consists not only of the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, etc.), but also of the humanities. Science gives us

[22] J. R. Batista de Souza, P. L. d. O. Borba, L. C. Pan & R. E. Lopes, "'Inclusion' and 'Democracy' in Education: An Exploration of Concepts and Ideas for Occupational Therapists," *World Federation of Occupational Therapists Bulletin* (2021): 101–113.

[23] W. James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals*, vol. 10 (Harvard University Press, 1983).

[24] J. Dewey, "Democracy in Education," *The Elementary School Teacher* 4, no. 4 (1903): 193–204.

generally reliable results, not absolute truths, because it must constantly test them.[25]

Dewey believed that individual subjects should not be taught separately, without regard to each other, but should be taught in such a way that students realize that they are interrelated. For example, mathematics should not focus only on solving equations or calculating the derivative of a function, as is often done in traditional teaching, but rather on relating derivatives (rates of change) to practical issues, such as the world population explosion (World History).[26]

The idea of practical learning is that education should be applied to the real world. For example, if teachers teach students to live in an urban area, there may not be much practical application to agricultural science. Or, if they teach at a school for farmers' children, they probably will not need to teach art history.

Dewey rejected the idea that elementary school teachers should teach all subjects. Dewey particularly emphasized that the teaching profession requires that teachers have life experience, experience that relates to the subject matter of the lesson and the life of the school. At the same time, to impart their experience, teachers must use a variety of methods that are rare in public schools. In a Dewey school, each teacher specializes in a particular area and works with other teachers to plan activities and projects. Students participate in shopping and art projects, field trips, science lab experiments, games, stories, and discussions; they may cook lunches for French classes; teachers may take on the role of classroom assistants or instructors. But they are still in charge and decide what and how students will learn. Every experience, no matter how simple it may seem at first, can contain an infinite amount of meaning by adding connections to things and other experiences in the

[25] Lever and Gerber, "Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy."

[26] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (Project Gutenberg, 2020 [1916]).

mind. One of the simplest and most effective ways to add meaning to an experience is through regular communication with others, that is, contact in which both parties share a common interest or concern that gets each party excited about an activity. Excitement in action creates a feeling of excitement in learners and effectively replaces one-way communication in which while one party speaks another listens and follows instructions. In education, geography and history are two disciplines that lend themselves very well to expanding the meaning of direct personal experience. Geography does this by explaining the relationship between experience and nature, and history does this by explaining the relationship with people. Both, however, relate to the same life as a whole, because human social life is always closely connected to nature.[27]

Democracy in education is expressed in the content of education when delivering knowledge to learners. Therefore, capabilities should be understood here as meanings that make up the content of the social life taking place, many of which are derived from the experiences of previous generations. Knowledge rapidly increases in scope and meaning according to the development of the complexity of social life. That is why knowledge must be selected, shaped and reorganized so that it can be passed on to the next generation. However, this process tends to make knowledge something valuable in itself, rather than a tool to help students realize the hidden meanings of social life and solve problems. To avoid this, learners need to start with real activities with social origins and applications, and then with a scientific understanding of the relevant things and laws by incorporating into their experience the ideas and knowledge of those who are more competent. The teacher, on the other hand, tends to think that his job is to make the learner acquire

[27] C. Subramaniam, "Play and Education: Some Points to Ponder," *Learning Curve* 10 (2021): 3–7.

such knowledge and respond to it with predefined words, without paying attention to the level of social acceptance and connection of this knowledge to the learner's intelligence.[28]

Vietnamese education faces limitations such as outdated content and curriculum, many places of education pay attention to quantity more than quality, resulting in program overload. Therefore, fundamental and comprehensive innovation in education must lead to the following goal: to educate Vietnamese people so that each individual comprehensively develop and promote their best potential and creativity; love family, country and people; live well and work effectively.[29]

The educational idea of pragmatism seems to be suitable to renew Vietnam's educational program by promoting students' capabilities. Classifying education according to age and region brings a content for students that helps them master different kinds of knowledge, different kinds of skills, and enter into natural and social relationships in different fields of life. In this way, students are self-confident and independent, work more creatively and efficiently, and have more knowledge and life skills to live better. The abilities and qualities of citizens required in a modern, civilized and democratic society are skills for every person and citizen to live and work according to the Constitution and the law. Education is the development of learners' operational capabilities. Along with democratic values, attitudes and skills, they must be taught, learned, practiced in schools, educational and training institutions.

Democracy in education in the sphere of education management in Vietnam must be realized through organization, research and evalua-

[28] L. J. Waks, "John Dewey's Philosophy of Democratic Education," in *A History of Western Philosophy of Education in the Modern Era* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2021), 25–52.

[29] Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, *Resolution No. 29-NQ/TW*: "*Transforming a new and comprehensive version of education and training, responding to public requests modernization in the context of the market economy*" (Hanoi 2013).

tion. Schools and teachers participate in students' educational activities together with organizations, families and communities. In this way, students are free, autonomous and can comprehensively promote their creative abilities to develop. Democracy in education is that students can educate themselves to live according to their conditions, needs and abilities; they can learn to be human, to work, to have, to live together. This is the value of democracy in educating and training future citizens for the country.

Current educational innovations in Vietnam should aim to develop students' competencies and qualities. Examinations and assessments must be first of all a comprehensive assessment of students' competencies, not just an assessment of students' ability to memorize knowledge. Reviewing, testing and evaluating educational results gradually follow advanced criteria trusted and recognized by the global society and educational community. These criteria include: coordinating assessment during the educational process with final and summative assessments of the school year; coordinating teacher assessment with student self-assessment; coordinating school assessment with assessments by families and society; making periodic assessments of the quality of educational institutions, educational programs and in-service training; and making accreditation results public.

Democracy in education means autonomy in school management, social responsibility and commitment to the quality of education, proper implementation of legal mechanisms and equality in education; schools must use information technology in education. Democracy in education proactively prevents negative developments in education by boldly dismissing low-quality teachers and outdated managers. Democracy in education is transparent in testing and evaluating students' abilities.

Educational Methods Following Specific Conditions of Society and Level of Awareness of Learners

The efficiency argument about benefits is deeply rooted in the concept of truth. Each practical person explains their method in different ways. However, their basic views are the same and boil down to finding efficiency in what is less labor intensive, less time consuming, and what pragmatists call a cost saving method.

Peirce's educational approach is a guiding principle and correct way of thinking that helps us "make our ideas clear."[30] Peirce is a mathematician who reduces our actions to our basic beliefs or hypotheses. By experiencing new things and creating new ideas based on our knowledge, we can improve our thinking and action.[31] This is a complicated process, but in essence, as Peirce argues, pragmatism is about reality. It values ideas that are rational and usable in real (*i.e.*, practical) life. It is not interested in abstract concepts, but only in things that are relevant and valuable to human life.[32]

Pragmatism holds that education is not about teaching a student what he should know, but about encouraging them to learn through experimentation and creativity. Education through learning and doing makes a person creative, self-confident and cooperative. These methods of learning by doing are the goal of education. The student is given a set of notes to solve problems and develop his knowledge relevant to his life now and in the future.[33] Dewey believes that people learn through a "realistic" approach and experience of reality. This means

[30] D. Özden, "Does the Pragmatist Theory of Truth 'Work'?," *Aporia* 31, no. 1 (2021): 63–72.

[31] C. S. Peirce, *Charles S. Peirce, Selected Writings* (Courier Corporation, 2012).

[32] D. G. Campos, "Peirce's Philosophy of Mathematical Education: Fostering Reasoning Abilities for Mathematical Inquiry," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29, no. 5 (2010): 421–439.

[33] T. Fadel, *Use What We Have: Ways to Contextualize and Improvise in the Classroom* (M.A. Thesis, Western Oregon University, 2021).

that pragmatism encourages students to interact with their environment in order to adapt and learn. The continuity principle asserts that people's experiences in the past will influence their future. In contrast, the emphasis on interaction assumes that exchanging experiences with the present situation will create new experiences, experiences in the present.

According to Dewey, education is an activity, not a preparation for future life. Dewey's theory is that the teacher cannot be concerned with the learner's past experiences and that these experiences need not be negative or positive for the learning process. The teacher cannot control the learners' past, but he can arrange the appropriate learning context to give students a present experience through the interaction between the learning context and their experience.

Like all human knowledge, any specific subject is a product of human efforts to solve problems encountered in practice. However, treating this subject as a standard subject of expertise separates and abstracts it from complex situations. Traditional educators argue that it is possible to impose this knowledge through successive steps based on the logic of this abstracted subject. However, such a presentation is less interesting to the subject.[34] Dewey set the teacher the challenging task of "bringing the subject matter of the curriculum into practical experience."

Moreover, it does not allow students to discover knowledge on their own through activities that require them to apply specific knowledge. According to this model, students are given a way to do something rather than directly discovering it. As a result, teachers must rely on other things, such as fear of pain or insult, and knowledge transfer is challenged by imposing knowledge on students or allowing them to

[34] J. Dewey, *Experience and Education*: *In the Educational Forum* (Taylor & Francis Group, 1986).

deal with abstract knowledge on their own. Dewey thus calls on teachers to a "psychology" of the curriculum. It is necessary to create an operational environment with challenging situations to apply their knowledge and skills, experience and culture when dealing with science, history and art in the learning process. Knowledge at its most basic level is the understanding of directly performing certain activities. Therefore, one of the most effective educational methods is to use simple activities that capture students' interest and simulate relatively accurate social actions. Students will then acquire skills and information about materials, tools, and rules to engage in these activities because of their appeal, not to learn. The fact that these activities stimulate social life also facilitates the transfer of the school content to out-of-school situations. In this way, they serve an educational purpose. This principle eliminates the practice of imitating or reproducing patterns without the freedom to change and make informed judgments, while also eliminating the use of materials that are too perfectly processed instead of raw, as in the real environment. In addition, activities must include opportunities for learners to make mistakes and some level of challenge. The teacher is there to help and make the learner aware of their mistakes and weaknesses. Creating and maintaining a creative and constructive attitude in these activities is more important than perfection.[35]

In Vietnam, education faces limitations in educational methods. Teachers mainly teach more theory than practice, which causes students to be limited in practical skills and creative thinking. Therefore, the innovation in education strives to renew the educational method. Teachers must use such techniques to require students to discover the truth for themselves. Through educational methods, students' experiential activities should be planned to arouse their curiosity in acquiring knowl-

[35] M. K. Williams, "John Dewey in the 21st Century," *Journal of Inquiry and Action in Education* 9, no. 1 (2017): 91–102.

edge. In pragmatist education, the position of teachers is secondary in the teaching-learning process. The teacher suggests a problem, points out solution lines, and then lets the student experiment on his own. The student realizes the idea of self-education.

Therefore, the pragmatist philosophy of education is the basis for Vietnamese education to innovate teaching methods and teach teachers to be autonomous in teaching activities based on creativity and interest. The teaching method teaches students to do rather than to know, to discover independently rather than to gather dry information. The process of arousing the students' "interest" is the teachers' task. Student interest is the keynote of pragmatist education. Democracy in education establishes a new way of looking at communication and equality between teachers and students. Equality here means an equitable, positive exchange of ideas. Equality is understood as the student's right to ask questions, the right to acquire new information, the right to participate in solving tasks. It is necessary to eliminate teaching according to the old method: teachers read and students take notes. Since teaching is an interactive process between teachers and students, teachers must lead students to discover new knowledge that they do not know. This method of education develops the habit of independent and creative thinking; at the same time, students will develop life skills and moral qualities by following social norms. Student-centered education methods are based on the principle of suggesting and guiding students rather than imparting knowledge to them. The perspective of learner-centered teaching does not diminish the role of the teacher; on the contrary, it requires the teacher to be much more qualified in professional qualities and competencies. The learner is the focus of the educational process, not the teacher as before. Education is to help learners have interest, passion for learning, be active in learning activities and be able to learn how to acquire new knowledge.

Conclusion

In short, the educational ideas of pragmatism aim to help students learn how to live and adapt to real life. Democracy in education stems from the effort to discover and present the concepts associated with a democratic society and apply them to the problems of educational activity. Pragmatism holds that an educational program must promote democracy and be related to the learner's experience, nurture the learner's imagination, curiosity, and creativity, and express the learner's ideas.

The pragmatist idea of democracy in education had a fundamental impact not only on American education but also on modern education in the 20th century. The pragmatist philosophy of education is about equipping learners with useful knowledge and helping learners acquire practical skills that they can develop and use in their lives. The pragmatist philosophy of education is aimed to promote each student's strengths and teach them in the context of their individual characteristics. Using the experience of pragmatist philosophy of education, Vietnamese education aims to implement fundamental and comprehensive educational innovations to meet human demands globally. And this article is an expression of that.

Pragmatist Idea of Democracy in Education and Its Meaning for Educational Innovation in Vietnam Today

SUMMARY

This paper uses the philosophical methods employed by Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey to formulate pragmatism's basic ideas about education. The ideas proposed by the pragmatists are also used to compare and define their relationship between each other in order to create a new philosophy (theory) of democratic

education. Based on the assumptions of pragmatism to show democracy in education, the paper explains the application of pragmatism to educational reform in Vietnam today. For pragmatism is to be what unites education.

KEYWORDS

Vietnam, democracy, education, philosophy, pragmatism.

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Peter A. Redpath

With a Diamond in His Shoe: Reflections on Jorge J. E. Gracia's Quest for Self-Perfection

Jorge J. E. Gracia was born in Cuba in 1942. At age 19, he escaped Cuba by dressing as a Catholic seminarian. He arrived in the United States with some spare belongings, $5.00; a golden watch with a leather band; his mother's diamond ring secured in a hole in a shoe; and virtually no knowledge of English. In 2019, 58 years later, in a nation which, prior to his arrival in North America, had no major Latino cultural presence in higher education and philosophy, Gracia rose to hold the Samuel P. Capen Chair and State University of New York at Buffalo Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature. In this position, he became the leading figure to institutionalize Latin American philosophy in the U.S. academy and an internationally-renowned scholar in medieval philosophy.[1]

I have known Jorge J. E. Gracia for close to 50 years. Mine was the first doctoral thesis he directed. In no publication of his have I ever seen him ever mention the little-known, but highly-influential, psychological/metaphysical principle of virtual, or intensive, quantity (*quanti-*

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[1] Jorge J. E. Gracia, *With a Diamond in My Shoe*: *A Philosopher's Search for Identity in America* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2019).

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tatis virtutis, or *intensiva* [spiritual greatness]).[2] Nonetheless, I am convinced that, more than any other, this principle underlies Gracia's incredible career. Implicitly present in Plato's teaching, and explicitly mentioned by Aristotle, Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, and Sts. Aurelius Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, in 1997, Fran O'Rourke resurrected this principle in his brilliant, groundbreaking, work *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas*. On the back cover of its next printing, Alasdair MacIntyre calls this monograph, "One of the two or three most important books on Aquinas published in the last fifty years."[3]

More than any other classical philosopher, Aristotle has influenced Jorge Gracia's philosophical work. Chiefly through Francisco Suárez's writings, Aquinas has, also, heavily influenced him. Despite the fact that contemporary philosophers, including most *Thomists,* are unfamiliar with this metaphysical principle, it is one of, if not, the most influential metaphysical principles in Aristotle's and Aquinas's teachings.

As O'Rourke says in reference to Aquinas, "It is only *en passant* that Aquinas makes explicit the identity between 'virtual' and 'intensive' quantity."[4] Nonetheless, O'Rourke claims a "wealth of texts exist by Aquinas on virtual quantity," as do said texts showing "the connection between *virtus*" (virtue/spiritual greatness) "and intensity."[5]

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[2] For a detailed discussion of this principle, see Peter A. Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics: Written Hope of Ending the Centuries-Old Separation of Science between Philosophy and Science and Science and Wisdom*, vol. 2: *An Introduction to Ragamuffin Thomism* (St. Louis, Mo.: En Route Books & Media, 2016), 3, 30–34, 45, 56, 61, 66, 70, 99–101, 104–105, 108, 112–114, 118, 127–130, 135, 140, 152, 172–173, 181–183, 189–190, 194.

[3] Fran O'Rourke, *Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010).

[4] *Ibid*., 166.

[5] *Ibid.*

About *virtual quantity*, O'Rourke states, "One is tempted to speak" of it "as a qualitative quantity."[6] He adds that everyday language tends to confirm existence of this causal principle: extending something internally in qualitative greatness in being perfect.[7]

For example, "We commonly speak of intense heat or cold, we use the language of intensity to convey depths and degrees of light and colour"; analogously, we transfer the idea of intensity to emotions like pleasure and pain, and, while inner emotional and spiritual states like love and joy might not be "susceptible to numerical qualification," they "lend themselves to being described in terms of qualitative intensity."[8] Hence, he says, "Running through such usage is the connotation of an increase or decrease in quantity, distinct from the dimensive aspect of a physical kind."[9]

To O'Rourke, such linguistic usage: 1) "signifies an escalation of inner attainment, as distinct from outward extension or expansion" and 2) "indicates a heightening or gathering of concentration rather than a loss of external dissipation or dispersion. An individual increases in respect to a particular perfection or determination not by extending outwards but through an increase of inner achievement; not by expanding its power to more and more objects, but through an enrichment of its own actuality: it *is* more."[10]

As I will try to show in this paper, more than anything else, this principle of virtual quantity explains the philosophical and adult-personal life of Gracia as a philosophical quest driven by a highest desire: As intensely and perfectly as possible to understand and become Jorge J. E. Gracia!

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[6] *Ibid.*, 167.
[7] *Ibid.*, 166 and 186–187.
[8] *Ibid.*, 186.
[9] *Ibid.*, 186–187.
[10] *Ibid.*, 187.

The Crucial Role that Tradition Plays in Gracia's Quest for Personal and Philosophical Greatness

To make more intelligible the nature of the principles Gracia has applied to perfect his personal and philosophical life, need exists for me to provide an outline of, and brief commentary on, Gracia's summary discussion of the nature of tradition as he presents this in the last three chapters of his masterful, 2005 Marquette University "Aquinas Lecture," *Old Wine in New Wine Skins*: *The Role of Tradition in Communication, Knowledge, and Group Identity.*[11]

Therein, Gracia employs the metaphor he uses in the book's title (taken from verses of Luke 5:37, Matthew 9:17, and Mark 2:22) to explain that he understands this title "to mean that the present can incorporate the past and the future can incorporate both past and present without implying radical changes in either the present or the past."[12]

Despite repeated claims to the contrary, Gracia maintains that, in and of itself, writing cannot establish tradition because writing depends upon interpretation, and "interpretation is a function of culture" (of the way interpreters live). Without interpreters, communication agents trained in the liberal arts-Renaissance-humanist sort of educational skill /act of linguistic translation, who understand a tradition as a social re-enactment actively engaged in repeating some human action from one generation to the next, no human activity can be established, or endure, as a tradition. Tradition, in short, is always part of a trans-generational cultural relation and re-enactment of some activity: a social, cultural relation and activity that, for a culture to become established and survive,

[11] Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Old Wine in New Wine Skins*: *The Role of Tradition in Communication, Knowledge, and Group Identity* (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 2005).

[12] *Ibid.*, 122–123.

must be intentionally, historically, transmitted through social-cultural, trans-generational re-enactment.[13]

Considered as such, while Gracia does not put what he means in these terms, tradition is an essential part of a real, oral, trans-generational, educational-genus (a public philosophy of sorts, similar to that possessed by the ancient Greek theological poets) without which a culture cannot be established, much less endure. Hence, the import of how Gracia precisely defines tradition is nothing short of enormous: Destroy a culture's symbols and you destroy its traditions and history. Destroy its traditions and history, and you destroy the culture!

For the reasons immediately given in the preceding two paragraphs, Gracia contends:

> The significance of the re-enactment for the identity of the group and the awareness of it are also essential for tradition . . . Social groups . . . are tied through complex social relations that help unite them and establish their identity. Eliminate these relations and the group loses its unity as a group. This explains the significance of traditions and the importance of the awareness of such significance on the part of the members of the group.[14]

According to Gracia, behavioral actions, not written words, texts, are the chief cause of significance, meaning. Traditions are behavioral re-enactments that connect symbols and signs (communications media) to what they signify, communicate, mean.[15] Precisely considered as such, Gracia says traditional actions convey to us the meaning of signs, which we conventionally associate with the actions.[16] Hence:

> Traditions are not semantic phenomena as are signs and symbols; they are not entities selected and organized to convey meaning. The flag is a symbol, whereas the action of saluting the flag on a

[13] *Ibid.*, 123.
[14] *Ibid.*, 84.
[15] *Ibid.*, 114.
[16] *Ibid.*, 112.

> certain occasion is a tradition. The flag functions semantically, but the tradition does not. Rather, the tradition is the action that ties us (i.e., those who salute) with the symbol (i.e., the flag) in a certain context (e.g., such as a date that commemorates a particular occasion) and as a result with each other (i.e., the nation).[17]

Considered as signs we use in a specifically complex way (order), in specific contexts, words (texts) are the means through which we convey knowledge. When we socially, culturally, and historically unite these words (texts) as signs to a complex order of actions tied together in a particular context and way of living (a tradition), we give that tradition linguistic significance, meaning.[18] Nonetheless, traditions are not essentially (or first and foremost) linguistic acts. Linguistic acts are essentially (and first and foremost) traditional acts; and, as traditional acts, they are essentially social, cultural acts.[19]

Considered as such, language is a form of cultural life; cultural life is not a form of language. In time and nature, culture precedes, and proximately causes, language to exist. Once a language exists, and a tradition of linguistic usage is historically established, we can linguistically associate a complex order of words (textual formulas) with part of a cultural way of life (a traditional way of acting, expected behavior).[20]

Citing Norman Malcolm, Gracia rightly claims that only within the context of a cultural way of life, one in which we understand the cultural actions as a historical enterprise (a real cultural genus, or living tradition) do we "ask questions, carry out investigations and make judgments."[21]

"I have to learn the way of life before I can understand the word," he says. "Only someone acquainted with two ways of living (a human-

[17] *Ibid.*, 86.
[18] *Ibid.*, 109.
[19] *Ibid.*
[20] *Ibid.*, 109–113.
[21] *Ibid.*, 114.

istically, culturally-educated person!; someone who grasps a group's public philosophy, organizational psychology) can attempt to translate from one language to another, for learning a foreign language involves a perspective on one's previous worldview. Learning a language is nothing but learning a way of living (a culture's pre-professional, public philosophy [organizational psychology]: the way the parts of that cultural, organizational-whole incline to think, their organizational psychology)."[22]

> To know the meaning of "eating" is precisely to be able to use the word appropriately in a community of English speakers. This is the force of the much discussed Wittgensteinian view that meaning is use.
>
> In short, questions about what people mean and understand make sense only within a linguistic framework [real linguistic genus] that reflects a way of life [public philosophy/organizational psychology] and in the context of which such words are used. To take words out of that context creates an artificial situation which leads to unresolvable paradoxes . . . The reason is obvious: Outside the way of life [public philosophy/organizational psychology, the way groups incline to organize parts into wholes] within which these words are used effectively there are no criteria or rules that can be applied to them. The way of life, then, establishes the boundaries of human action and thus of speech.[23]

While Gracia maintains: 1) he intends his definition of *tradition* to be real, not nominal, and 2) understanding the truth about the way in which language, tradition, culture, and history essentially relate and function is not easy, this relation and function is essential to comprehend to make intelligible the nature of language and culture and Jorge Gracia's personal and professional autobiography—which comprises parts of this paper to which I will now turn my attention.[24]

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[22] *Ibid.*, 114–116. My parenthetical addition.

[23] *Ibid.*, 115–116. My parenthetical addition.

[24] *Ibid.*, 90 and 123.

The Start of Gracia's Adult Personal and Philosophical Quest as a Refugee in America

Even before I had read his intellectual and personal biography, I had understood that, by the term "Diamond" in his monograph's title, Gracia chiefly meant *philosophy* understood in the ancient Greek sense of pursuit of wisdom (not a precious gem).

That this is so is evident from what Gracia says about this ring toward the start of his monograph: "It became a talisman that I always kept near as a source of strength in moments of doubts and fear. It was always there, quietly speaking to me about my past. And it is an object of beauty, something I needed after all the ugliness that the prior three years in Cuba had meant."[25]

By "all the ugliness that the past three years in Cuba had meant," he says he was referring, among other things, to: 1) the death at the age of twenty-two of his older brother Ignacio, who had been crushed and killed by a heavy weight at his family's sugarcane plantation; 2) confiscation of his family's plantation and wealth by the Castro regime; 3) financial and other hardships that had beset them because of loss of their prior fortune and social status; 4) and the sadness, danger, of his present situation: looking at his relatives "perched on" a pier at the entrance to Havana Harbor, trying to get a glimpse of him as his ferry departed at dusk: past the "forbidding, imposing" El Morro fortress (then serving as a prison), toward West Palm Beach, Florida—and a new, and uncertain, life awaiting him.[26]

"At this moment," Gracia "remembered the diamond. With its beauty, light, and strength. Yes, this could be a light to guide me, the link between the old me and the new me. The diamond was a symbol of

[25] Gracia, *With a Diamond in My Shoe*, 9.
[26] *Ibid.*, 13.

what I brought with me and what the revolutionary government could not take away—memories of the past, what I had learned from my family, the values that I carried with me everywhere, and a love of justice, beauty, and rationality."[27]

Recalling the diamond and its *virtual quantity* (qualitative) properties (of spiritual greatness) as a symbol, Gracia describes slowly caressing the shoe where he had hidden the ring, apparently to reassure himself that he had not lost it: "Yes, it was there, and the hard consistency associated with diamonds suddenly seemed to give me strength. Yes, I would do the best I could to succeed, in spite of the many obstacles that I would surely face."[28]

Gracia remarks that, before he had landed in Florida, he did so conscious he would be entering a circumstance he would never repeat, one that no traditional cultural supports could make precisely familiar to him.[29] His exit from Cuba had been prompted by his conviction that "we are social beings who prize and value company and fellowship," a situation which, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Cuba's totalitarian government had made impossible, especially for economically- and socially-privileged elites, like Jorge (for whom they had coined the term "worms" [*gusanos*]).[30] Right then, he encountered a situation that would forever alter his life as he had traditionally, culturally, and historically known and lived it; redefine his existence, life, identity, in a radically new way: about which he knew nothing. In a sense, he was conscious of entering an entirely new, real, social, cultural, and personal genus (a whole new set of traditions) as a refugee in America:

> Until that moment I had lived in my native land, but soon I would arrive at a country that would consider me a refugee, the

[27] *Ibid.*, 13–14.
[28] *Ibid.*, 14.
[29] *Ibid.*, 11.
[30] *Ibid.*, 11–12.

> lowest legal status in the country. Refugees have limited rights; they can be deported or confined to areas or camps. They are not citizens or legal immigrants; they are accepted under strict conditions. Often they are accepted but not sought. And in many cases, they are hated. Being a refugee is a temporary status granted as an act of kindness. But refugees not only feel, but are, at a disadvantage in the societies in which they live.[31]

Happily for him, after exiting and accompanying some seminarians from the ferry to a seminary in Miami, Gracia was able to contact a former classmate of his from the St. Thomas Military Academy in Cuba. He then traveled to a family farm belonging to his friend's parents in the countryside close to Jacksonville.

After living comfortably with this family for several weeks, Gracia decided that, to become self-reliant in his new situation, he should set out in his own. To do so, he contacted a woman named Kathleen (Karlin) in charge of a Cuban refugee center in Miami. She had been a missionary and pastor at an evangelical church in Cuba where his mother had been a parishioner. To his future good fortune, Karlin had two other qualifications that would prove quite helpful to him later; she was a: 1) Wheaton College alumna and, 2) longtime friend of its president.[32]

While Karlin could provide him no food, lodging, or money, not wanting to be financially dependent, Gracia was "grateful for her conditional help."[33] Moreover, while difficult, the time he spent in Miami, taught him "self-reliance, independence, and the value of economy and hard work," qualities that, previously, had not been expected of him as a youthful member of the Cuban upper class![34]

Just how far his situation had fallen from its prior qualitative (virtual quantum) greatness most of his life in Cuba, Gracia quickly

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[31] *Ibid.*, 11.
[32] *Ibid.*, 20.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*

realized once he secured residence in a Miami "rooming house that catered to starved-for-cash Cuban refugees."[35] Often more than starved for cash, he was often starving for food. In this sense (as a virtual qualitative privation of qualitative strength), he remarks, "Hunger is a terrible thing . . . To say that feeling hungry is not a good feeling is a major understatement. It is characterized by an emptiness that weakens you. Walking streets filled with restaurants, take-out eateries, bakeries, and the scents that envelop the passerby are torture if you are hungry."[36]

At such, alone and hungry, times, "I would take—as he thinks back—the ring with the diamond out and play with it in my hands. It was like having a talisman that could bring me luck. Its power and beauty mesmerized me and I remembered happy times."[37]

However, Gracia was not always alone at the house. For example, one night a thief with a loaded gun had made the terrible mistake of entering it and running into its Cuban landlady Felina, a woman of "indomitable spirit, and uncompromising courage," who, hearing the intruder, "got up from bed, yelled at him, and followed him out of the house beating him with a broom."[38]

Gracia considered this kind of spiritual greatness to exemplify the character of Cuban professionals who had emigrated from Cuba during the 1960s. Since, at times, for one reason or another, they could not practice their traditional professions in America, "Physicians became employed as floor cleaners, lawyers washed dishes, dentists drove taxis, businessmen turned into bartenders or waiters, and so on with the rest of them," including Gracia.

To have enough money to survive in Miami (until, in January 1962, his mother's friend Karlin helped him enroll in Wheaton College

[35] *Ibid.*, 23.
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, 27.
[38] *Ibid.*, 26.

on a work-study program), he worked many odd jobs, including restaurant busboy, an ice cream salesman, and even gambling with other rooming house residents.

Wheaton College as Gracia's Gateway to, and Confrontation with, Real, Isolationistic America: Catholic Refugee in a Foreign Nation and Culture

Until he had reached Wheaton College, Gracia says he "had not really been confronted with the real America."[39] On the ferry from Cuba his thoughts had been about his life in Cuba and motives for leaving his homeland; in Miami, he says he lived in "a de facto Cuban ghetto": "Nice and comfortable, but culturally isolated from the American mainstream."[40]

While at university study in Cuba, Gracia had pursued architecture as a major. At Wheaton, Gracia chose mathematics as a major; and, because of the opportunity such a liberal arts college gives to students to sample different disciplines to determine whether they have a natural talent for this or that subject, he says, "The notion of a liberal arts education is perhaps the most important contribution of American education to world education."[41]

While in his third year at Wheaton, Gracia was fortunate to move off campus and room in the home of a lady opera fan. There he expanded his liberal education through immersion in fine arts. Through her encouragement, he subscribed to the Lyric Opera of Chicago; and, periodically, traveled to the Chicago Art Institute to enjoy concerts and other cultural events.[42]

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[39] *Ibid.*, 33.
[40] *Ibid.*
[41] *Ibid.*, 38.
[42] *Ibid.*, 41–42.

This served him as a good break from his: 1) sixteen hours of work during the fall and spring semesters when he "swept, mopped, threw out garbage, put classroom chairs in proper order, wipe black boards, made sure there was an ample supply of crayons in class, and did all the maintenance required"; and 2) the summers when he worked daily for about twelve hours.[43]

Gracia remarks that, perhaps, his greatest challenge about his Wheaton experience was the cultural, American-Midwestern provincialism. While he finds American provincialism not exclusively Midwestern, he says it is "particularly true of the Midwest."[44]

To help defend himself, and keep afloat, against a tide of cultural, American provincialism, at Wheaton College especially (where students and faculty knew little about essential parts of Gracia's identity: Spanish history, culture, Catholicism), he concentrated on: 1) learning English and adapting himself to American culture; 2) at least for a short time, distancing himself from every obstacle to his becoming culturally Americanized, including from becoming part of a ghetto of other Latin American students; 3) learning to answer the key question of his identity: "What defines me?"; 4) investigating and appreciating the great achievements his native culture had produced; and 5) avoiding what he calls the two, great, counterproductive "temptations" with which exiles, immigrants, and refugees have to reckon: *nostalgia* ("wrapping the country of origin in a veil of approval, reimagining it as a golden land where one had been happy but that, for economic or political reasons, had to be abandoned"; while considering the present land where they actually live to be full of faults and "an object of resentment") or *for-*

[43] *Ibid.*, 42.
[44] *Ibid.*, 43.

getfulness (forgetting all the actually good things about their native homelands).[45]

As a defense against: 1) the temptations of nostalgia and forgetfulness and 2) drowning from the overpowering impact of American culture, Gracia decided he needed to understand the "entire edifice of Hispanic and Latino history and culture." Gradually adapting to becoming culturally Americanized, he first had to transform himself "from Cuban into Hispanic and Latino."[46] He had to enter into a real, transitional cultural genus while moving from one national-cultural species (Cuban) into another national-cultural species (American): "Precisely the opposite of what those who succumb to the temptations of nostalgia or forgetfulness do."[47]

Before he could make this transition in self-understanding from a Cuban national to an American national, Gracia had to take seriously the admonition Socrates gave to philosophers that the most fundamental, and perhaps the most difficult, task of a philosopher is self-knowledge: "to discover who we are and how we fit into the world that surrounds us. Indeed, finding a path, career, profession, or vacation . . . is one of the most significant, difficult and agonizing decisions we are expected to make in our lives."[48]

Human beings always engage in conversation with ourselves and others only in relation to some, numerically-one, real genus (organizational whole) to which, as participants in the same conversation, we essentially belong. To converse intelligibly, productively, about anything, we must be chiefly talking about the numerically-one, same genus, species, or individual (and, if we are talking about a species or individual, we must be talking about some genus [organizational whole]), in more

[45] *Ibid.*, 45–52.
[46] *Ibid.*, 53.
[47] *Ibid.*
[48] *Ibid.*, 69.

or less the same way (be engaged, at least generically, in using the same human habit [your habit and mine must be, at least, generically identical]).

For example, if we converse about geometry, we have to talk about figured bodies using geometrical intellectual habits; and not talk about immigration issues using intellectual habits involving medical or political expertise. If we know nothing about that about which we are conversing, or the chief habit we are using to discuss it, we cannot belong to the same conversational genus; and our conversation cannot be, in the slightest degree, intelligible or productive!

Unhappily for Gracia at the time, the Cuban educational tradition from which he had come and his then-current one he had entered at Wheaton had not adequately prepared him to engage in this task of proper self-understanding as an American national. The Cuban educational program he had left was too narrowly focused to give students sufficient exposure to make intelligent choices about such crucial matters. There, and places with similar programs, Gracia says, are full of "disgruntled people," imprisoned in professions they hate—"a personal tragedy of enormous proportions that affects them and their families for life," in which "a small minority is satisfied with that choice" and the majority, undecided about who they are and what they should do," spend their lives in miserable desperation, "trying to escape it while they find passing relief in vacations, hobbies, and often alcohol or drugs."[49]

Before he could transition himself to become Jorge J. E. Gracia American national, as a wavering, or "roaming Catholic," as he sometimes refers to himself (and someone who was not, and had no inclination ever to be, an evangelical Christian), Gracia first had to have a

[49] *Ibid.*

wider and deeper understanding of himself as a refugee Spanish, "roaming Catholic" at evangelical Protestant, Christian, Wheaton College.[50]

According to Gracia, his entry into the genus of "roaming Catholic" had started before Wheaton (at age thirteen, during his first year at a Marist high school in Cuba). For different reasons, at the time, he reports he had considered being doctrinally religious to be rationally incoherent.

While he states that he has never been an atheist, he has certainly experienced periods in his life when he has "been an agnostic and other periods when" he has been "anti-Catholic, faithfully Catholic, and existentially Catholic. Even at times," he continues, "when I did not consider myself Catholic, I never adhered to other faiths. I have always thought that if one is going to be religious, being Catholic makes the most sense from a theological standpoint."[51]

While at Wheaton, while 1) reading Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky (authors who left a strong impression about religion on him), and 2) studying with his favorite teacher, Arthur Holmes, he says he had such an existential period. He goes so far as to state that Holmes: 1) appeared to have such an existential religious view and 2) was probably unknowingly responsible for enticing Gracia into adopting it, although Gracia admits he has "always had problems with (doctrinal) orthodoxy, of whatever kind."[52]

While he maintains that: 1) "The religious tenor of Wheaton enticed students to think seriously about religion"; 2) "serious discussions were everywhere—at the cafeteria, during work, and of course in the classroom"; 3) he "never felt unwelcome at Wheaton because of" his "religious opinions"; 4) he opposed the religious tenor of Wheaton not because he was Catholic, but because he found it rationally, behavior-

[50] *Ibid.*, 57.

[51] *Ibid.*

[52] *Ibid.*. My parenthetical addition.

ally, incoherent with its mission "to be perceived by the community of scientists as a place of rigorous scientific research, up-to-date in the latest scientific theories."[53]

Saying that he found this rational incoherence to have helped his intellectual development, he gives four examples of it: "the theory of evolution, the doctrine of the literal interpretation of the Bible, the doctrine of the inerrancy of biblical texts, and the view that races should not mix."[54]

Gracia reports, "The fundamentalism of the branch of Christianity advocated at Wheaton, with its anti-rationalist bias, eventually turned me off and made me appreciative of the Catholic tradition, in which, despite some unfortunate deviations, there has generally been a profound respect for reason. That tradition pointed me toward the scholastics, particularly Thomas Aquinas."[55]

Immediately, he adds, he has "never been a disciple of Aquinas or an apologist for his views." He "became interested in him at Wheaton because if one looks at the history of Christian thought there are very few authors who reach Aquinas's stature, his rationality, and his clear thinking."[56]

Nevertheless, Gracia admits that, as early as the fifth grade, "embracing Catholicism was not enough for" him.[57] He was becoming increasingly agnostic. By the time he was thirteen, partly because of clerical corruption and apparent doctrinally rational incoherence, Gracia had decided, "the Catholic Church was a sham."[58]

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[53] *Ibid.*, 57–59.
[54] *Ibid.*, 59.
[55] *Ibid.*, 62.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*
[58] *Ibid.*

At the same time, he admits to being psychologically conflicted, saying, "But would giving up belief in Catholic doctrine that appeared to me to be nonsense require I give up all sense of spirituality? The choice was difficult because when I went to church I was often deeply moved. Procession of the Host on Holy Thursday, the singing of Thomas Aquinas's magnificent hymn, the *Pange lingua*, together with the incense and the ritual, produced in me experiences that were deep and seemed genuine."[59]

And what was he to make of all the holy people he knew, "who had selflessly devoted their lives to Christ and to the welfare of others? Were they a complete farce too, or were they just stupid?"[60] How could he "reject the legitimacy of St. John of the Cross's *Spiritual Canticle* or Saint Augustine's *Confessions*,"[61] or the wisdom of the Eastern sages whom he had started to read which he had deeply felt and "further complicated his situation"?[62]

While cracks that had begun to exist in the edifice of his religious faith continued to grow, while he no longer could precisely identify, define, the real religious genus to which he psychologically belonged, Gracia had recognized he had entered into a new, transitional (crossover) genus. "Rationally," he "had become an agnostic."[63]

He reports, "I could not believe what the Catholic Church taught. Nor could I accept the views that my mother tried to press upon me, the evangelical version of Christianity she had adopted after the tragic death of my brother at twenty-two."[64]

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[59] *Ibid.*, 64–65.
[60] *Ibid.*, 65.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*
[63] *Ibid.*
[64] *Ibid.*

Gracia adds that, from this time onward, he has always experienced a conflict between a strong sense of spirituality "always followed by periods in which agnosticism fought for supremacy."[65]

He reports that, at Wheaton, he "had to take a stand," decide what he "did and did not believe" and unite this with his "professional and personal goals."[66] That is, he had to decide precisely who he was, define himself, determine the precise, psychological, religious, professional, and personal genus to which he then belonged![67]

Decisively helping him along with this intellectual struggle, then, giving him "the key to" his "predicament," were his reading of: 1) Protestant and Catholic existentialist theologians, and 2) Dostoyevsky's book, *The Brothers Karamazov*—"a story of conflict among three different views of life and faith. The hero is Alyosha, whose approach to faith is portrayed as authentic and non-doctrinaire. He is a symbol of the Christ that is revealed in the scriptures."[68]

Instead of "trying to justify the inconsistencies of Christian doctrine, whether in Protestantism or Catholicism," Gracia decided he "should embrace the actions and rituals of a traditional living faith, for faith was not about holding onto propositions, many of which made no rational sense, but about living a life based on the Christian commandment to love everyone."[69]

Gracia, then, reports, "years later," he "used these ideas in the short book" he "wrote about tradition, *How Can We Know What God Means*?," in which he argued "that tradition is not a matter of propositions but of actions."[70]

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[65] *Ibid.*, 66.
[66] *Ibid.*
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*
[69] *Ibid.*
[70] *Ibid.*

After Wheaton: Gracia's Implicit Quest to Become a Great Organizational Leader

Toward the end of his opuscule about tradition to which I referred toward the start of this paper, Gracia states he wanted to "make clear that his concern" in this work had "not been focused on the psychology of tradition, that is with the way tradition functions in, and affects, the human psyche, even if some things I have said have implications for this kind of investigation."[71] Nonetheless, I contend that the only way precisely to understand Gracia's personal and philosophical life is to grasp this life as one of an organizational psychologist pursuing perfect self-realization in action and understanding: someone chiefly interested in intellectually grasping precisely how organizational wholes (including his own psyche): 1) become united and divided; and 2) operate when so united and divided.

That what I am saying about Gracia is true is easy to prove. All someone needs to recognize about him is that, more than anything else in his personal and philosophical life, Gracia has always wanted to be a philosopher, who had been influenced by Aquinas, in the tradition of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: all four of whom identified philosophy with an intellectual virtue, a psychological habit, *virtus* (intensive quantity) of the human soul chiefly interested in wondering about, and finally understanding, the proximate causes of the existence, unity, and action of organizational wholes.

Each chiefly, really, not nominally, defined, understood, philosophy to be born of wonder (a habit of wondering) about the principles and causes of the behavior of composite-whole-organizations (*substances*, in the language of the medieval Scholastics). All agreed that the job of someone wise is to: 1) know and cause order;[72] and 2) under-

[71] Gracia, *Old Wine in New Wine Skins*, 123.

[72] Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, 144–145.

stand how the order of organizational wholes (organizationally-unified, acting things: substances and their essential properties), like language, traditions, culture affect the faculties of the human soul (human psychology) and how the organization of the operational faculties of the human soul (human psychology) affect the order of organizationally-unified, acting beings, natures, substances. In short, all were great organizational leaders who understood perfection in organizational leadership to consist in a form of organizational psychology.

While, because of his natural tendency toward humility, I do not think Gracia has ever explicitly considered his life-pursuit to be chiefly one of becoming a great organizational leader and psychologist, to some extent, starting with the identity-crisis he experienced as a refugee in America at Wheaton College and the psychological self-examination he needed, as perfectly as possible, to understand himself as a philosopher (someone wise: the psychological quality of the greatest human leaders), implicitly, Gracia had started psychologically to experience a need to become as perfect as possible as an individual human being, scholar, and teacher. No wonder, then, that he entitles the chapter in his book that caused him, at Wheaton, to turn toward pursuit of philosophy "Knowing Myself."[73] Moreover, therein he explicitly states that one of the proximate causes, first principles, of his decision at Wheaton to pursue philosophy had been driven by a psychological need, and experiences, he had during one literature course and his general exposure to the teaching skill of Arthur Holmes.

Regarding the first he reports that he had never before appreciated poetry as much as he did after reading of John Milton's masterpiece, *Paradise Lost*. His "exposure to English" had already: 1) "sensitized him to the sounds of language," and Milton's "long poem satisfied in" him "a longing for a greater variety of sounds organized in magnifi-

[73] Gracia, *With a Diamond in My Shoe*, 69.

cent verses about a thrilling hero. This was psychology at its best; the psychology of good and evil." Gracia continues, "The epic character of Satan, who is without a doubt the tragic hero of the poem, is unequaled in the world of literature."[74]

After this, he immediately refers to Sophocles's great *Oedipus Rex*: "the tale of the magic life of a hero who paid a dear price for his inquisitiveness," immediately adding:

> I have always had a thirst for knowledge, and I found in Oedipus a kindred spirit and a warning of what could happen to me if I followed in his footsteps.
>
> Would my own search for knowledge and meaning end in tragedy as well? And what is the role that destiny plays in our lives? After all, I had already seen how a strange combination of will and chance had affected the course of my life in unexpected ways. The course became more than just an accumulation of literary facts; it turned into an odyssey of sorts in which I was the traveler and my destiny was a mystery known only to the gods.[75]

A major psychological impact this course had on Gracia was to call to his attention his need to master English as a means to becoming as perfect as he could be. To solve this problem, he: 1) "took every opportunity to talk with other students"; 2) "read every printed page" he could get; and 3) made "the dictionary" his "constant and faithful companion."[76] Within a short time his mastery of English became so proficient that he was able to take honors courses and seminars, and he decided to change his major from mathematics to mathematics and English literature.[77]

He followed this by taking another life-changing course, "in philosophy with the legendary Arthur Holmes," whom he describes thus:

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[74] *Ibid.*, 71.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*, 72.
[77] *Ibid.*, 73.

> He was a great actor in the classroom, teaching virtuoso, and the way he presented himself and the texts that we read were enticing. More significant perhaps was that he squeezed out of texts a content that should have been obvious but that students missed. He also related authors and texts in such a way that we could see the history of human thought developing in front of our eyes. The difference between what the instructors of literature courses did and what Holmes did was enormous, and I wanted more of what he did.[78]

In contrast to Holmes, Gracia reports that what literature teachers seem to do "is to function like bad philosophers."[79] They talk about texts, but cannot communicate precisely what causes the organization of a text to be a great piece of literature that could cause a *great* psychological affect on someone.[80]

According to Gracia (evidently following Aristotle), "Being oblivious to the general answers to these questions has to do in part with the form a work takes. It is the form, the sounds, the vocabulary and how these are woven into a tapestry (organizational unity/whole) that make a work unique and invite an audience to think in unique ways."[81]

While Gracia admits that a particular thought is part of what makes a literary work great, a literary work is not primarily great because of the particular thought it conveys. It is chiefly great because of: 1) the thought it conveys and 2) the organizational way of uniting some multitude of texts into a coherent whole in and through which a particular thought is conveyed: the literary work's form, qualitative unity as an organizational whole.[82]

Realization of this fact proved to be a *Eureka*! moment in Gracia's intellectual life: "When I took Holmes's course I realized that,

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[78] *Ibid.*

[79] *Ibid.*

[80] *Ibid.*

[81] *Ibid.*, 73–74.

[82] *Ibid.*

although I would continue to be interested in the form and hermeneutics of literary texts, a major part of what interested me was, paradoxically, the thought they conveyed, and yet in order to get at the thought, one needed a philosopher, not a literary critic. And that did it: this is why I dropped mathematics from my double major and instead became a philosophy and English literature major."[83]

In a sense, prior to this moment, at this fundamentalistic, Christian college, apparently, Gracia had not psychologically recognized the analogous similarity he now saw between most of the courses he had taken at Wheaton and Cuban higher education: In a way, both tended to be fundamentalistic, nominalistic! Moreover, this realization came to him mainly under the influence of a professor at an evangelical Christian college in the United States!

While "Cuba has produced some extraordinary poets and essayists," he remarks, it has produced "very few philosophers of note. Discussion and dialogue have clearly been essential to philosophy from the very beginning of the discipline. But if one is a philosopher, what can one do in a country (or college, university) where there are so few others with whom one can engage in a discussion of ideas?"[84] The United States, in contrast, "had what Cuba lacked, an abundance of well-trained philosophers who addressed the main problems that had been explored in the discipline throughout the ages—and it had a well-established community devoted to it."[85]

Knowingly or not, when he experienced this realization, the Cuban Jorge Gracia at an evangelical Christian college was describing the often, currently-maligned, American Great Books educational program chiefly started by Mortimer J. Adler at the University of Chicago and the Canadian, classically-oriented one initiated by the Frenchman É-

[83] *Ibid.*, 74.
[84] *Ibid.*
[85] *Ibid.*

tienne Gilson at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies (PIMS), University of Toronto: Two great universities at which he would eventually study and obtain advanced degrees, which treated philosophy chiefly as a social, historical, enterprise, not as a Cartesian form of solitary musings.

Paradoxically, a Cuban refugee coming out of a largely narrow, politically conservative educational tradition started to feel most at home and liberated as a human being and a philosopher in a tradition of philosophy and a contemporary educational movement (*Great Books*) that has often been criticized for building a canon based largely on white males and embraced by conservative political forces![86]

At this moment, Gracia became explicitly sure that: 1) he wanted to become a philosopher; 2) the means he sought to become a philosopher would essentially involve study at a university that would immerse him in the historical discussion of great ideas; and 3) his "prime motivating factor" in his doing so at the time "was the (psychological) impact that learning English was having on" him: he "wanted to know more about how language works and how we communicate effectively through the medium of language."[87]

Regarding his struggles with learning English and his dissatisfaction with the way literature was taught, he concludes his chapter about knowing himself with the following observation:

> This was one of the reasons why I became attracted to logic and eventually Wittgenstein and other philosophers who favored a linguistic approach, including an emphasis on ordinary language. Indeed, to this day, in my philosophical writing I avoid philosophical jargon as much as possible and try to philosophize using ordinary language and ordinary examples. At Wheaton, this interest was decisive and moving me in the direction of the history of philosophy in the Middle Ages. But to get there was not easy

[86] I thank Rod Nicholls for pointing out this incredible paradox to my attention.

[87] Gracia, *With a Diamond in My Shoe*, 74–75. My parenthetical addition.

by any means. First I had to go to graduate school, and that meant going to Chicago.[88]

Moving on to Chicago: All the Rest is History—and Philosophy!

Aside from going to Chicago because of the Great Ideas, discussion-type education the University could provide him, Gracia did so as a means to begin study of the Middle Ages; and he desired to study the Middle Ages because he "wanted to know more about how language works and how we communicate effectively through the medium of language."[89]

While such a move might sound strange to many people, it makes perfect sense considered in itself and in the way it appeared to Gracia at the time: "The Middle Ages was the period of history in the West when modern languages were formed, when the first treatises and discussions of how these fundamental concepts that relate to each other came into existence."[90]

Such being the case, Gracia became convinced that, to do what he had chiefly from-then-on wanted to do (philosophy) the way the ancient Greeks had done (as a historical, cultural, enterprise [living tradition] essentially involved in the love, pursuit, of wisdom, and as more than a historian), he would have to get there by going back through the Middle Ages "to discover the origin of the philosophical concepts we use today."[91]

As a fairly new refugee in America, going directly to Toronto to study was not readily available to him. Happily, he was accepted into the University of Chicago with a financial package enabling him to en-

[88] *Ibid.*, 76.
[89] *Ibid.*, 77.
[90] *Ibid.*, 76.
[91] *Ibid.*

ter their philosophy program in 1966. He was especially pleased by this event because a main reason he had wanted to go to Chicago, not some other American university, was the presence on the faculty there of the "the great (Richard) McKeon," the legendary mediaevalist who had studied for a while in Toronto with the celebrated Gilson.[92]

As a result of many difficulties, including personal and financial, Gracia only spent a year of study at the University of Chicago, moving on to Toronto by securing Canadian residency to enable him to go there in 1966.[93]

Since my focus in this chapter is chiefly on: 1) the life of Gracia the philosopher and 2) explicating the principles he uses, and has used for decades as part of his mature, intellectual development as an organizational psychologist pursuing psychological greatness, in what follows, I will omit the rest of his amazing personal life story and, instead, for the rest of this paper, concentrate on some things Gracia says about philosophy's nature considered in itself and in relation to history.

The first is that "philosophy is a vocation," a psychological calling for which a person has to have the proper psychological disposition. "The core of that vocation is not just passing down views one from another" (like rote memorization of what texts say, report); but exchanging ideas that will serve as a corrective to ideas developed in solitude. Consider," Gracia remarks, "how easily Descartes deviated from truth and common sense in his purposeful isolation."[94]

In the tradition of Adler, Gracia clearly understands philosophy to be part of a great historical-cultural conversation, enterprise, living tradition, in which historical awareness and dialogue are essential elements. Hence, he states:

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[92] *Ibid*., 79–80. My parenthetical addition.

[93] *Ibid*., 82–89.

[94] *Ibid*., 142. My parenthetical addition.

> Dialogue is essential in our discipline, and although this kind of exchange can exist and be profitable with others, it is more fruitful between teachers and students because of the mutual devotion to one another. The bond between student and teacher is one of the strongest that humans can experience.
>
> In part because of the strong belief that philosophy is to a great extent a discipline in which the role of students is as significant as that of the teachers, many philosophers have thought of philosophy as a vocation rather than a profession. Indeed Socrates's famous words, "Philosophy is the love of wisdom," is a calling to follow a master in the pursuit of wisdom, which in some ways is like art. Unfortunately, a lack of resources in our contemporary world in particular has forced us to act as if philosophy were a profession or a career rather than a vocation.
>
> There is an important difference between being a philosopher and practicing philosophy as a profession, that is, entering the community of philosophers who are living by teaching philosophy for a fee, which is approximately what the sophists did in ancient Greece and which Socrates criticized so sharply.[95]

As Gracia recognizes further, for philosophy to take root in individuals and a culture, more is needed than simply having the ability to mentor students in philosophy and having students capable of being philosophically mentored: Existence of 1) trans-generational "leaders who can serve as examples and mentors to younger generations"; 2) "the strong commitment and the existence of leaders (like Gracia and his undergraduate mentor Holmes) who will encourage and inspire new generations of . . . philosophers to continue the practice of the discipline" (a philosophical tradition). As a cultural enterprise, philosophy needs academic leaders: intellectuals who recognize that the activity of philosophy as a cultural habit cannot exist and survive without people who call themselves *philosophers* eventually realizing that 1) their activity is an essentially historical, cultural, trans-generational tradition, re-enactment, and 2) to be as effective as they can possibly be in what

[95] *Ibid.*

they do, in the well-known spirit and tradition of St. Bernard of Chartres, philosophers must stand on the shoulders of philosophical, psychological, giants![96]

No wonder should exist, then, that, in the latter part of his autobiography, we find Gracia telling us that, during the 1980s, he had started "to examine critically what I had been doing all along, for until then I had a question the validity of the *enterprise* in which I was engaged and its effectiveness."[97] As a result, he wrote a book entitled *Philosophy and Its History*: *Issues in Philosophical Historiography*.[98]

Gracia, however, would do more than this. He would go on to master an understanding of the essential connection between history and philosophy and recognize, because philosophy's short- and long-term survival depends upon the ability of students and teachers to work together generationally and trans-generationally, a chief reason philosophy must be done historically is essentially because (to accomplish this goal of generational and trans-generational survival) the students and their mentors involved in its practice must have, at least six essential psychological qualities enabling them effectively to co-operate, work as a trans-generational-team: wisdom, understanding, prudence, temperance, justice, courage, and love. And he would become one of, if not the, most successful student(s) that the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto ever produced; and one of the greatest Thomistic and Christian philosophers of the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries.

In making this last remark, I realize, at least in part, I am contradicting what, over the years, Gracia has consistently said about himself and his relation to the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas: that he does

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[96] *Ibid.*, 177.

[97] *Ibid.*, 201. Italics is my addition.

[98] See Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Historiography* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991).

not consider himself to be a disciple of St. Thomas and he is no "Thomist."[99] Plus, his humility would incline him to deny he is a Christian philosopher at all, and even if he were, he would certainly not be a good, or great, one.

Nonetheless, I stand firmly by this claim. Étienne Gilson, too, repeatedly asserted that he was not a disciple of Aquinas (maintaining, instead, he was a *student* of St. Thomas, and so should be his students). And, while our mutual friend John N. Deely repeatedly made the same claim about not being a Thomist, I disagree with him, too. One day, being puzzled by, and asking John about, his refusal to describe himself as a *Thomist*, he replied to me in a way that made perfect sense to me: "Because I am not good enough!"

John's response made so much sense to me that, from then on, I refused to apply that designation to myself (restricting myself to calling myself a *student* of St. Thomas, instead of a *Thomist*), until one day I learned Aquinas had maintained that the philosopher's genus is not the logician's genus and that, while logicians predicate terms chiefly univocally, according to equal definitional reference (Socrates and Plato are *equally* men), philosophers predicate terms chiefly analogously (Derek Jeter [life-time batting average: .310; home runs: 260; runs batted in: 1,311] and Bob Uecker [life-time batting average: .200; home runs: 14; runs batted in: 74] were *unequally* baseball players: Jeter was a qualitatively better baseball player than was Uecker).[100]

In my opinion, like Deely, Gracia is a qualitatively better, more perfect, student of St. Thomas and better Christian philosopher, than are ninety-nine percent of the students of Aquinas who call themselves *Thomists* or refer to themselves as *Christian philosophers*. According to Aquinas, following Aristotle, the maximum in a real genus is "the meas-

[99] See, for example, Gracia, *With a Diamond in My Shoe*, 62, 76, 149.
[100] Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, 30–57.

ure" of everything else (other species and individuals) in the genus.[101] If that is true (and I am sure that Gracia would agree with me it is), then he ranks among the best of Thomists and Christian philosophers because (to put my claim in a term he often used), Gracia "instantiates" with maximum qualitative perfection the definition (generic, specific, and individual nature) of being a Thomist and Christian philosopher, one of whom his teachers Holmes and Gilson would be most proud!

The chief reason Gracia has refused to call himself a *Thomist* has nothing to do with Gracia not comprehending Aquinas's philosophical principles and, for the most part, appropriately applying them to put wonder to rest when confronted by apparent contradictions. It is because so many people who call themselves *Thomists* tend to be fools, fundamentalistic systematic logicians, Jansenists, who incline to reduce the very complicated teachings of Aquinas to a nominalistic logic that students are taught passively, like infants or parrots, rotely to memorize. By nature and philosophical, cultural, and historical experience, Gracia recoils at becoming mis-identified as being a member of such a genus. I do, too!

For this reason, a few years ago, I started to call myself a *Ragamuffin Thomist*, a designation given to me by a student/colleague of mine (Arthur William ["Bill"] McVey). Definition: "The *outsider* from the main circles of much Thomistic philosophy. The Ragamuffin is somewhat of an academic misfit, a street-smart Thomist who does not long to wear the fine garments of the academic Thomists: a shabbily-clad, existential, metaphysical waif who wanders about looking for other ragamuffins to share in a common purpose—to develop and teach a

[101] *Ibid.*, 162–166.

personalist Thomism that has been largely lost since the death of St. Thomas."[102]

In closing this paper to my mentor and friend (one of the greatest goods that has befallen me in this life), I give a final reason I insist calling Gracia a *Ragamuffin Thomist* and, as such, a *Christian philosopher*, is because the principles I have used in this paper to analyze his philosophical nature I have taken from the teachings of St. Thomas about philosophy's nature as a *virtus*: virtual quantity. I leave it to the readers of this paper who have known Gracia for many years to judge whether he or I has better designated how, philosophically, most precisely to define him.

***With a Diamond in His Shoe*:**
Reflections on Jorge J. E. Gracia's Quest for Self-Perfection

SUMMARY

Jorge J. E. Gracia, was born in Cuba in 1942. At age 19, he escaped Cuba and arrived in the United States. In 2019, 58 years later, in a nation which, prior to his arrival in North America, had no major Latino cultural presence in higher education and philosophy, Gracia rose to hold the Samuel P. Capen Chair and State University of New York at Buffalo Distinguished Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature. In this position, he became the leading figure to institutionalize Latin American philosophy in the U.S. academy and an internationally-renowned scholar in medieval philosophy. Jorge J. E. Gracia died in the United States on July 13, 2021.

In this paper the author shows that what properly explains the philosophical and adult-personal life of Gracia is the Thomistic principle of virtual quantity. He contends that the only way to understand Gracia's personal and philosophical life is to grasp this life as one of an organizational psychologist pursuing perfect self-realization in action and understanding: someone chiefly interested in intellectually grasping precisely how

[102] Arthur W. McVey, "Foreword," in Peter A. Redpath, *The Moral Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas*: *An Introduction to Ragamuffin Ethics* (St. Louis, Mo.: En Route Books & Media, 2017), 3.

organizational wholes (including his own psyche) become united and divided, and operate when so united and divided.

KEYWORDS

Jorge J. E. Gracia, philosophy, comparative literature, Thomism, virtual quantity, self-perfection, tradition, identity, Catholicism, religious faith, organizational psychology, ragamuffin Thomist.

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Appendix

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