Studia Gilsoniana

A JOURNAL IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY

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RENEWING THE WEST BY RENEWING COMMON SENSE

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THE NATURE OF COMMON SENSE AND HOW WE CAN USE COMMON SENSE TO RENEW THE WEST

Before I start the subject of this paper, I want to thank all the participants and co-sponsors who had helped organize the historic event at which I delivered it.[1] In referring to this as a "historic event," I employ a phrase I have used several times related to conferences in which the Gilson Society in the United States and its offspring, the International Étienne Gilson Society, have been involved for several decades. Bear with me as I explain to you why this event was historic, for it is directly related to why I had encouraged all the attendees to participate in this international congress.

Catholics and Christians as well as most people who claim to know about philosophy and its history know how, historically, philosophers and, especially Catholics and other Christians, have depended upon the power of signs to confirm the providential nature of their work and its nature as philosophical.

Consider, for example, the Herculean Labour upon which the Oracle at Delphi had sent Socrates millennia ago.[2] Think about, as he reported in his famous *Consolation of Philosophy*, Lady Philosophy's coming to Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius to console him in as he sought to as-

[1] The historic event to which I refer is the *Inaugural International Congress, Renewing the West by Renewing Common Sense*, 17 to 20 July 2014, at Immaculate Conception Seminary, Huntington, Long Island, NY, USA. The original talk was given on 17 July 2014 in Plenary Session 3.
[2] Plato, *Apology*.

suage his grief by ruining his soul through reading poetry. Consider the "Father of Modern Philosophy" René Descartes's three famous dreams coming, in part, from the Spirit of Truth, in which, among other things, Descartes found himself struggling violently against a whirlwind as he was trying to reach a Church at his Jesuit College of La Flèche; turning to show a courtesy to a man he had neglected to greet; hearing a report in the courtyard that someone had a melon to give him; hearing a crack of lightning that terrified him as he saw thousands of sparks in his room; noticing a dictionary and book of poetry; opening a passage that read "What path shall I follow in life?," by an unknown man giving him a bit of verse with the Latin words *Est et non* included in it.[3]

Who can forget the famous inspiration that came to Jean-Jacques Rousseau on a hot summer day in 1749 when, as he walked alone along a hot, dusty road, he read about a philosophical essay contest sponsored by the Academy of Dijon and said he suddenly saw another world and became a new man? So overcome was he by this clearly inspirational event that he felt his spirit dazzled by a thousand lights. He reports that crowds of vivid ideas so overwhelmed and confused him with an irrepressible tumult that his brain started to turn as if in a state of drunkenness. His heart started violently to palpitate, causing his chest to heave. Not being able to breathe, to regain composure, he threw himself under a tree, where he remained in a state of agitation for a half an hour. Upon rising, even though he had been totally unaware he had been weeping, he found his waistcoat wet with tears.[4]

Or think about the spiritual significance that Sir Isaac Newton had given to the fact that he had been born on Christmas Day, confirming for him that he was a prophet and historical descendant of the ancient Magi.[5]

I am no different than these other men whose life's quest has been repeatedly confirmed by signs and oracles of different sorts. Like Newton, consider the date of my birth, 16 August 1945, under the Zodiac sign of Leo (clearly indicating a life of leadership), the day after the feast of the Assumption, on which I was expected to be born, on the very day that peo-

[3] Jacques Maritain, *The Dream of Descartes*.

[4] Jules Le Maître, "Discours sur Les Sciences et Les Arts—The Moral Reform of Rousseau," in Jules Le Maître, *Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, trans. Jeanne Mairet (Madame Charles Bigot) (London: William Heinemann, 1908), 80–81.

[5] Richard S. Westfall, "Newton and Christianity," in *Newton*, ed. I. Bernard Cohen and Richard S. Westfall (New York and London: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1995), 356–370.

ple in the United States had received reports of the surrender of Japan to the United States ending World War II and the day on which, decades later, Elvis Presley, the King of Rock and Roll, would die.

Consider how, like Socrates, I have virtually nothing I can claim to know unaided by inspiration. Ask anyone who has known me for any extent of time or any student I have ever had in class. He or she will verify this.

Also consider, how, like Socrates, Descartes, and Rousseau, the start of my philosophical quest was heralded by several oracular signs, on the feast of All Souls, 02 November 1996, approximately ten years after, having asked myself what course I should steer for the rest of my academic life. Through what then appeared to be a chance event, I had arbitrarily opened a page in a work written by Fr. Armand A. Maurer to recall the astounding claim that, according to St. Thomas Aquinas, philosophy is chiefly an intellectual operation, a habit of mind, not a body of knowledge, which caused me to remember a puzzling claim I had come across in an annotated footnote in the same work by Fr. Maurer: that the genus (that is, the subject) the philosopher studies is not the genus (the subject) the logician studies.[6]

Ruminating on these events for about a decade, on that holy feast day, I delivered a paper entitled, "Why Descartes is not a Philosopher," at an International Conference of the American Maritain Association, held at Arizona State University, in Tempe.[7] My faithful sidekick in this decades-long quest, Curtis Hancock, was there on that historic day and witnessed 3 miraculous events that happened to me (a number that many of you will recognize for its special spiritual significance, for Christians in general, Georg Hegel, and me), Curtis is still alive and can verify for you the report of what happened to me actually did happen.

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[6] Armand A. Maurer, "Introduction," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences, Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the* de Trinitate *of Boethius*, trans. with an intro. and notes Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 3rd rev. ed., 1963), XVI and 75, fn. 15. Regarding this issue of the nature and unity of a science for St. Thomas, see Maurer, "The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974, Commemorative Studies*, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 269–291. In works of St. Thomas, see also *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, lect. 12, nn. 2142–2144; and *Summa theologiae*, I, 66, 2, ad 2 and 88, 2, ad 4.

[7] Peter A. Redpath, "Why Descartes is not a Philosopher," International Conference, American Maritain Association, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 2 November 1996.

On that day, after hearing my argument, John Knasas, from the University of St. Thomas in Houston, Texas, was so moved by an evidently malicious spirit that, against every natural inclination of his being, he told the audience he felt compelled to take sides against my claim that, strictly speaking, Descartes was no philosopher, and that, strictly speaking, he was a sophist, or, as I called him that day, a "transcendental sophist." Anyone who knows John Knasas can attest that nothing short of some sort of evil genie could have caused him to turn from his connatural inclination to dislike everything Cartesian and come to a defense of Descartes against a fellow student of St. Thomas.

What happened next, however, was so miraculous that, were not Curtis Hancock still alive to verify the events, I would not have the courage to report them, lest you might think me a bit mentally unstable. No sooner had my session ended at this conference than that a short rain immediately occurred, followed by the most glorious rainbow I had ever seen. Following the rainbow, Curtis and I took refuge under a tree when, suddenly, a crack, like a burst of lightning broke a limb of the tree under which I was standing when, coming from out of nowhere, one of our colleagues pushed me out of the way, saving me from death or serious injury.

Recognizing the significance of this event, as Curtis can attest, I immediately collected parts of that sacred bough and have kept them to this day, above a William Schickel portrait of Jacques Maritain with flames radiating from his head that hangs in my office, at my home in Cave Creek, Arizona, located in North Phoenix. Again note how the reference to a cave, a phoenix, and the last three years of my life being spent, like St. Anthony, in a desert preparing for this meeting are all signs of this conference's inspirational and historical philosophical significance.

So, too, was the event that happened on the evening of 02 November 1996. For what is occurring today is the historical descendant with modification of a series of developments essentially connected to what happened that evening. In a sense, all of us were there then because of what happened that night in a hot tub in Tempe, Arizona, when, reflecting on the series of miraculous events that had transpired that day, a long-time friend of Curtis Hancock and me, Tom Michaud, asked me what was my long-term goal related to the research I had been doing. In the matter of fact and typically humble manner that have come to be my trademark, I answered that my chief goal was to change the popular understanding of philosophy and higher education globally.

To my surprise, Tom Michaud could not help break out in howling guffaws, after which he decided to join Curtis Hancock and me to start a renaissance in learning that would eventually reunite philosophy and science and science and wisdom.

Along the way, through providential intervention, we were joined in this quest by our colleagues Pat Carmack and Steve Bertucci, who, with the help of Mortimer J. Adler and his partner in crime at the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas, Max Weismann, helped us build an international Great Books home school program called the Great Books Academy and the Angelicum Academy. With the help of Fr. Joseph Fessio, publisher of Ignatius Press, we recently formed what we have conceived to be a kind of combination of an online monastery and renaissance academy to preserve the best of works of classical Western cultural heritage for future generations: the Adler-Aquinas Institute.

So now you know why we were in Huntington, Long Island that day. That day was the day that, with the help of our co-sponsors, especially Holy Apostles College and Seminary, we begin in earnest to take this decades-long counter-revolution to reunite philosophy and science and science and wisdom to the next level by turning our attention to a cultural crisis of monumental proportions that only a reunification of philosophy and science and science and wisdom can remedy.

That the world suffers from a leadership deficit today is evident to any psychologically healthy human adult aware of contemporary cultural events locally, nationally, or internationally. In all human industries and organizations, increasingly, on a global scale, people called "leaders" today appear no longer to understand how to lead and inmates appear to be running the cultural asylums. Just as, several decades ago, the French existentialist thinker Gabriel Marcel described his contemporary world, on all cultural levels, the current world appears to be "broken," like a watch that no longer works.[8]

While, throughout human history, human cultures have always been somewhat pathological, today the pathology has grown to epic proportions that threaten the future of global, including Western, civilization. A proper and swift diagnosis of the chief causes of this civilizational disorder is

[8] Gabriel Marcel, *The Broken World*, in *Gabriel Marcel's Perspectives on The Broken World*: *The Broken World, a Four-Act Play, Followed by Concrete Approaches to Investigating the Ontological Mystery*, trans. Katharine Rose Hanley (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998).

crucial so that proper remedies can be administered as swiftly as possible to help restore the world to global, cultural health.

As Mortimer J. Adler observed in his 1940 article presented in New York City at a conference on science, philosophy, and religion, entitled "God and the Professors," like the health and disease of the body, cultural health consists in organizational health, the harmonious functioning of its parts, and cultures die from lack of harmonious functioning of these same parts. He added that

> science, philosophy, and religion are certainly major parts of European culture; their distinction from one another as quite separate parts is certainly the most characteristic cultural achievement of modern times. But if they have not been properly distinguished, they cannot be properly related; and unless they are properly related, properly ordered to one another, cultural disorder, such as that of modern times, inevitably results.[9]

In short, Adler was maintaining that, if we do not properly understand the natures of things, especially of culturally-related organizations like religion, science, philosophy, we cannot properly relate and unite them as complementary parts of a coherent cultural whole, or healthy cultural organization. This, however, is precisely the problem we have with solving the decline of Western culture and global civilization in our time. We do not properly understand the natures of things, and especially of the natures of philosophy, science, and religion; the way common sense essentially relates to all these, and how, through this relation, the natural human desire to have common sense regulate all aspects of human life uses the natures of things, arts, philosophy, science, and religion to generate cultures and civilizations as parts of organizational wholes.

During the early part of the twentieth century, this lack of common sense was so bad that it prompted Adler to write his scathing 1940 *Harper's Magazine* article "This Prewar Generation" in which, among other things, he accused post-World War I American young people of having a mindset largely similar to that of Hitler's youth. "Our college students today, like Thrasymachus of old," Adler said, "regard justice as the will of

[9] Mortimer J. Adler, "God and the Professors," *Philosophy is Everybody's Business* 9:3 (Winter 2003): 7–24. I thank my friend Max Weismann, director of the Center for the Study of The Great Ideas, for providing me with a copy of this article.

will of the stronger; but unlike the ancient sophist they cannot make the point as clearly or defend it as well."[10]

Immediately Adler went on to add that, while American students might not have read *Mein Kampf* and might not have been inoculated with nihilism's revolutionary spirit, they have become the same sort of realists, "believing only in the same sort of success—money, fame, and power." While their understanding of "success" was not identical with that of the Hitler youth, while, by "success," they understood personal advancement (*individual* power, money, fame; not mystical identification of the individual with success of Germany, working for the Fatherland), post-World War I and pre-World War II American youth did not think that democracy was intrinsically superior to fascism. Hence, Adler claimed that American youth would continue to work for democracy only so long as democracy continued to work for them: only so long as it continued to serve their sense of pragmatic liberalism.[11]

Adler did not think that post-World War I American culture alone had initially generated this post-World War I mindset. He maintained that centuries of Western cultural change had prepared the minds of American youth to become sophists. He argued that this situation was "the last fruition of modern man's exclusive trust in science and his gradual disavowal of whatever lies beyond the field of science as irrational prejudice, an opinion emotionally held."[12]

While Adler considered "the doctrine of scientism" to be "the dominant dogma of American philosophy," during the early part of the twentieth century, he maintained that this last fruition of modern thought had received its finishing touches in university philosophy courses, reaching "its culmination in American pragmatism and all its sequelae—the numerous varieties of positivism." Adler added that all these varieties agreed about one the same reductionistic point: "only science gives us valid knowledge of reality."

Such being the case, Adler maintained that, at its best, philosophy "can be nothing more than a kind of commentary on the findings of science; and at its worst, when it refuses to acknowledge the exclusive right

[10] Mortimer J. Adler, "This Prewar Generation," in Mortimer J. Adler, *Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind,* ed. Geraldine van Doren (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company and London, England: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 7–9.
[11] Id.
[12] Id., 9.

of scientific method to marshal evidence and draw conclusions therefrom, philosophy is either mere opinion or nonsensical verbiage."[13]

In the above claim, Adler does not explicitly state another, more important, role that, at best, philosophy could become in the modern world: the sophistic source of metaphysical fables about the origins of human consciousness to justify the claim that the whole of truth is to be found in modern physical science. Nonetheless, Adler implicitly well understood this other role. Hence, in philosophy courses, Adler continued, "the student really learns how to argue like a sophist against all 'values' as subjective and relative." Instead of being the last bulwark against the scientism that every other part of the curriculum, especially social science, professes or insinuates, he said, "philosophy courses reinforce the *negativism* of this doctrine by inspiring disrespect for any philosophy which claims to be independent knowledge."

To finish their job, Adler asserted that Philosophy departments used semanticism to implement the ancient sophistries they had revived.

> The student learns to suspect all words, especially abstract words. Statements which cannot be scientifically verified are meaningless. The abstract words which enter into moral judgments—such words as 'justice' and 'right' or even 'liberty' and 'happiness'—have only rhetorical meaning. Denuded of all deceptive verbiage, such judgments can be reduced to statements of what I like or what displeases me. There is no 'should' or 'ought.'[14]

While Adler rightly understood the sophistic nature of most twentieth-century American Philosophy Departments, I am puzzled that he would call such departments "philosophical." Most twentieth-century U.S. college and university Philosophy Departments were not examples of "the degenerative tendency of modern philosophy." They were, and still are, prime examples of the modern lack of philosophy, of the degenerative cultural effects of neo-sophistry fulfilling its nature in modern culture under the rubric of "philosophy."

As that great master of common sense, Gilbert Keith Chesterton once observed:

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[13] Id., 9–11.
[14] Id., 12.

> Since the modern world began in the sixteenth century, nobody's system of philosophy has really corresponded to everybody's sense of reality: to what if left to themselves common men would call common sense. Each started with a paradox: a peculiar point of view demanding the sacrifice of what they would call a sane point of view. That is one thing common to Hobbes and Hegel, to Kant and Bergson, to Berkeley and William James. A man had to believe something that no normal man would believe if it were suddenly propounded to his simplicity; as that law is above right, or right is outside reason, or things are only as we think them, or everything is relative to a reality that is not there. The modern philosopher claims, like a sort of a confidence man, that if once we will grant him this, the rest will be easy; he will straighten out the world if once he is allowed to give this one twist to the mind.[15]

One of the many twists in which modern "scientists," "philosophers," falsely-so-called tend to glory is that things have no natures, or, if they do, that only physical scientists can know what these are and tell us about the way they relate and act. Indeed, according to many of these thinkers, those of us that maintain otherwise must be intellectually backward, intolerant, bigoted, *medieval*, and must be forced to become scientifically enlightened and made scientifically free through educational and political re-education programs and a series of social experiments and acts of intimidation to recognize our intellectual and cultural backwardness so as to embrace true, scientific freedom, which only thinking in such a modern way can bring us.

To an ancient Greek philosopher, like Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, such claims defy common sense. These men considered the universe to be one, large, everlasting nature or operational organization, a giant composite whole, in which smaller natures, or operational organizations, smaller wholes, exist.

As another master of common sense, our friend Fr. James V. Schall, has observed:

> 'There are things and we can know them' is how the French philosopher Étienne Gilson once put the first intellectual affirmation

[15] Gilbert Keith Chesterton, *St. Thomas Aquinas*: *The Dumb Ox*, in *The Collected Works of G.K. Chesterton*, vol. 2, ed. George Marlin, Richard P. Rabatin, and John L. Swan (San Frnacisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 514.

> that we must implicitly make before we can state anything else. If we doubt either of these, either that there are things or that we can know them, we cannot get out of ourselves. Nothing is clearer than these statements and what they stand for. They are 'first principles,' evident. Nothing can be and not be at the same time. A thing cannot be true and false at the same time and in the same manner. We must distinguish. This distinguishing is why we have minds.
>
> Nothing can 'prove' such immediate principles because nothing in clearer. To deny them is to affirm them. Their denial, at one point or another, leads to the construction of alternate worlds from the one *that is*. Whatever first principles we select, we seek to explain everything else in their light.[16]

What Schall makes evident to us in what he says is that explicit awareness of the common sense principle of non-contradiction is not the first of first principles of common sense. As Schall knows, even implicit awareness of this first principle of knowing and intelligible and meaningful speech occurs vaguely, implicitly, and simultaneously with, and naturally depends upon, a more explicit, natural conviction that a human being possesses a human soul with reliable knowing faculties. For this reason, among others, explicit conviction about the reliability of the senses and sense knowing powers preceded among ancient philosophers like Thales and the early physicists the *explicit* discovery of the metaphysical and logical principle of non-contradiction through the paradoxes first raised by Parmenides's student Zeno of Elea and the early ancient Greek acceptance of the reality of a human soul.[17]

As any educated adult should know from human experience, precisely to acquire any art or science, a person must first to be able to establish an intellectual relationship with an imperfectly developed whole (like an incompletely healthy body, and incompletely perfected business, a somewhat impoverished person, dangers in voyages that only the skill of a pilot can remedy, or a block of marble that can become the *Pietà* or *David* at the hands of a master like a Michelangelo Buonarotti). *An art or science grows out of a human habit to which a subject known relates, that the subject known helps generate and activate within a natural human*

[16] James V. Schall, *Reasonable Pleasures*: *The Strange Coherences of Catholicism* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2013), 12.
[17] Peter A. Redpath, *Wisdom's Odyssey from Philosophy to Transcendental Sophistry* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, B.V., 1997), 1–29.

knowing faculty. For example, even before it is a finished whole, the genius of a Michelangelo can imagine the way the parts of his statue exist within a suitable piece of marble just as a good medical doctor can imagine the way the parts of a diseased organ are unharmoniously related so as to generate the illness whose symptoms the physician has observed and seeks to correct.

Every art, science, or philosophical activity grows out of the experiential relationship between the specific habit of an artist, scientist, or philosopher and a known material or subject that activates the habit. Eliminate one of the essential parts of this relationship, and the activity can no longer exist. No such subject (such as somewhat sickly bodies) known, or no habit of medicine in a physician, no art of medicine. The relation between the artist or scientist and the artistic or scientific subject known generates the habit and act of art and science. The two are essentially connected. Eliminate one or the other extreme of the relationship and the artistic, scientific, or philosophical activity becomes destroyed.

The above claim is universally true everywhere, for all time, for everyone. On an implicit level, most human beings know this. Wishing or hoping that it will not be true will not make it not true. No real enemies known to exist and no real military habits, and no military science, can exist for anyone.

Many self-professed modern philosophers generally deny the existence of human habits existing in a human subject. They also generally deny the existence of real natures, composite wholes, and real aims in things that human subjects can know. Many, even some contemporary physicists, deny the reality of principles like potency and privation, upon which the qualities of resistance and receptivity in matter, upon which Galileo Galilei's new theory of motion and Albert Einstein's teaching about general and special relativity essentially depend, in addition to the existence of real qualities, contraries, relations, and organizations.

Even professed students of St. Thomas and other self-proclaimed sense realists, who admit the existence of human habits and real natures existing within facultatively independent beings, tend to have no awareness of the essential connection that St. Thomas, Aristotle, and even Plato made between human habits and the subject known as constituting the essence of philosophy, or science, rightly understood. Instead, they tend to think of St. Thomas's teaching, and classical sense realism in general, as a logical system and of philosophical principles chiefly as logical premises. As

a result, pretty much no contemporary intellectual is able rationally to explain the nature of philosophy, art, or science as a humanly-produced act.

Nonetheless, when we praise someone for being scientific or artistic, we are not chiefly praising the fact that a person has scientific or artistic knowledge. We are chiefly praising the fact that this person has a personal quality capable of producing, causing, such exceptional knowledge, not the fact that the person, in some way, possesses it. If the knowledge is simply something someone has copied or stolen from someone else, or a bunch of purported "facts" that a person has memorized, that knowledge is not the product of art or science or chiefly worthy of praise. What makes it a product of art or science and chiefly worthy of praise is that an exceptional quality of soul has produced it.

Many years ago, if my memory serves me correctly, the satirist Ambrose Bierce wrote with some truth that a philosopher is someone who tells a person what he or she already knows in a language he or she does not understand. Part of the truth contained in that statement resides in something that people who want to think philosophically or scientifically often fail to realize, but which was evident to ancient Greek philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle: that philosophy is chiefly and directly an intellectual awareness generated by a prior knowledge a person has had of things, not a direct knowledge of the things considered simply in themselves.

Decades ago, such a realization struck me when I came to recognize that none of my colleagues in any of the university disciplines where I had ever worked or studied, nor I, could make intelligible to me precisely what was the nature of our profession, where we got our principles, how we got these principles, or why they worked. Decades before me, Mortimer Adler had a similar, but more narrow experience, giving up the practice of psychology after having received a Ph. D. in it because he had become aware of his inability to explain to himself or to anyone else what was his subject and its principles.

Sometime thereafter, before I had delivered my 02 November 1996 talk in Tempe, I came across a statement by one of the leading Catholic intellectuals of the twentieth century, Jacques Maritain, claiming that modern philosophy was not philosophy.[18]

[18] Jacques Maritain, *The Peasant of the Garonne*: *An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time* ((New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968), 100–102.

As a result chiefly of those 2 events, plus the events of 02 November 1996 and the claim Fr. Maurer had made about St. Thomas maintaining that philosophy is chiefly a habit of mind and not a body of knowledge and that the subject the philosopher studies is not the subject the logician studies, I started an intense examination of Western intellectual history to determine whether Maritain was right and to discover precisely what this subject called "philosophy" might be.

Somewhat like Odysseus, returning from Troy, I spent about 10 years doing this. At the end, I decided Maritain was right. Most contemporary philosophers are not philosophers. I even went beyond Maritain, concluding that, strictly speaking, most people in the so-called history of philosophy were not philosophers, that philosophy more or less ended with the ancient Greeks and that, strictly speaking, even what we call "science" today cannot be science.

Today, as far as I can tell, most professional practitioners of what people call "philosophy," including most students of St. Thomas, tend to think that philosophy is a body of knowledge or a logical system of ideas and science is a body of empirically demonstrable facts. Often, many people who claim to be philosophers today will maintain that philosophy differs from other subjects because philosophers ask the question why, not the question how; or they will make some other vague generalization, such as that philosophers ask meaningful questions.

Through this research, I came to realize that ancient Greeks chiefly studied their knowledge of things, not ideas. More precisely, they studied their knowledge of the actions of things inasmuch as they found this knowledge to be presenting them with paradoxes, or what, in Book 7 of his famous *Republic*, Plato calls "provocative thought," or apparent contradictions, about which they decided to wonder.[19]

Their chief concern was to understand what precisely existed within some multitude of things and human knowing faculties that enabled that multitude to act the way it did and present the human senses and intellect with apparently contradictory communications, or reports. Their chief interest was to understand causes of organizational unity and action and apparent contradictions these actions present to human knowers. Their chief interest was not to understand abstract numerical relations.

They recognized that organizational unity accounts for organizational action; that, in a way, organizational action results from harmonizing

[19] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. 7, 521B–524B.

opposition between and among organizational parts, much like an orchestra leader does. They (Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, especially) generally agreed that partial, not total, organizational opposition causes action and apparent contradictions because total opposition within a multitude causes total chaos, anarchy, and immobility, while partial, not total, opposition allows one principle of organization to dominate the others, rule the multitude, as a common source of unity, leadership, and cause order and uniform direction within it.

They generally agreed that opposition between two things within an organizational whole could not be so great that the existence of one part of an organization would totally annihilate the existence of another. The parts of organizations must include opposites, but these opposites must not be so greatly opposed that they cannot simultaneously co-exist and complement one another. Hence, they concluded that the existence of action generated by organizational wholes, or natures, could not be generated by contradictory opposition because the existence of one contradictory opposite precludes the existence of any other opposite. Total opposites in a contradictory sense can never be united, in short, because, in the case of total opposites, only one of them can exist at any one moment.

If the only sort of opposition that existed in the universe were contradictory opposition, as Aristotle more than anyone else among the ancient Greeks finally came to realize, no organizational unity could exist and no organizational action could be. But organizational action does exist. So, wherever action exists in the physical universe, Aristotle recognized that human beings could discover parts existing within an organization, or substance, harmonizing opposing actions (like giving and taking, delivering and receiving, commanding and being commanded), through the influence of a leading part communicating a general rule of action to other parts of the organization.

Hence, Aristotle concluded, another kind of opposition must exist that enables multitudes to be partially united through relationships of sameness, equality, and similarity, which can generate principles of sense wonder and philosophy, or science, and can lead to theoretical scientific divisions like metaphysics (based upon the relation of substantial sameness), mathematics (based upon the relation of quantitative equality), and physics based upon the relation of qualitative similarity, all of which, in a way express a qualitative unity among beings that are not totally one.

Aristotle called this kind of opposition "contrariety."[20] He considered it to be the foundation of all reality-based paradoxes, including that of sense wonder, which, for all the ancient Greeks, had been a the first principle of philosophy, and, as Gilson recognized centuries later, for every human being for all time.

Aristotle also realized ancient Greeks had recognized that organizational unity was more or less strong depending upon the parts being united and the way they are united. He came to understand that thinkers who had preceded him had conceived of unity chiefly as a qualitative cause, a principle of indivision, indivisibility, and indestructibility, not as a principle of number. For this reason, Aristotle said that the unity which is the principle of being (that is, the principle of being an organizational whole) is not identical with unity that is the principle of number (that is, the principle of quantity, which is the subject of study of mathematics).[21] As Aristotle realized, the unity of a nation, military unit, or a healthy person is not the same as the unity of a numerical multitude or magnitude.

Different multitudes have different principles of unity. Know what they are and you know how to build and destroy organizations, perfect or debilitate their actions. This is chiefly what the genius of the ancient Greeks recognized that philosophical/scientific study could identify. Hence, their chief interest in, and their development of, this subject. Little wonder should exist, then, that the greatest of the ancient Greek philosophers would have been the tutor of the military genius Alexander the Great.

This philosophical understanding of the ancient Greeks is something that, at least implicitly, Gilson realized when he wrote his classic historical-philosophical thriller, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*, about what happens to purportedly philosophical teachings once they leave the abstract thought of so-called "philosophers" and these thinkers and their students, or disciples, try to put them into practice in the real world. Gilson tells this tale by chiefly weaving together two principles that he takes from history and philosophy, especially from ancient Greek common sense.

While Gilson does not say so explicitly, from ancient Greek common sense, he takes the classical philosophical principle (expressed later on through the medieval Latin maxim *agere sequitur esse*) that things tend

[20] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 10, ch. 1, 1052a1–1053b; ch. 4, 105514–1055a32; Bk 14, ch. 1, 1087b29–1087b42; St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. 5, l. 2 and l. 3; Bk. 10, l. 2, nn. 1920–1960 and l. 5, nn. 2024–2026.
[21] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 1, ch. 9, 991b9–993a10.

to act according to their natures, or according to the organizational unity they have. Before anything can act in this world of ours, it must first be a unity, or composite, organizational, whole. Hence, when an organizational whole that is a dog or cat acts, a dog will tend to act like a dog, a cat like a cat, and so on.

Gilson extends and transposes this principle to human behavior and comes up with a more specific common sense principle regarding human psychology: We human beings think and act the way we can, according to our natural and acquired facultative abilities, not the way we wish. The way we act tends to reflect our natural and acquired organizational abilities, the principles we apply, not our wishes.

From this extension and transposition, Gilson makes a further extension and transposition to history, and derives the historical principle that, once we accept a specific teaching as a chief principle to guide our actions, and then attempt to apply it to reality, that teaching takes on a life of its own, leading, perhaps, to consequences that its author never envisioned and with which its author might vehemently disagree.

From history alone, Gilson makes the observation that, often, people called "philosophers" tend not to learn from philosophical experience. Once we find that our principles do not work when we try to apply them with logical consistency to the real world, instead of rejecting our principles as real philosophers and people of common sense would do, we often try to dodge the consequences of our foolishness by rejecting the ways of the world, not the ways of our false principles.

In short, Gilson recognized that we choose philosophical, scientific, principles the way we can, not the way we wish. Hence, even if the wishing is done by sincere, enlightened intellectuals, wishing them to be so *will never* make non-philosophical, non-scientific principles, philosophical or scientific.

Nonetheless, on some occasions, the philosopher-falsely-so-called tends to evince a kind of behavior the opposite of St. Augustine's faith seeking understanding: what I call "a refusal to understand in order to be able to continue to believe." As Chesterton observes, such behavior often exhibits the quality of a confidence man coming to realize his confidence is without foundation, or of being what Plato calls a "philosophical bastard," not a true philosopher.[22]

[22] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. 7, 535C–538A.

Failing to understand the natures of things, we cannot properly understand the nature of religion and unite philosophy and science to religion to produce a healthy culture and civilization. Worse, our actions will be totally incapable of reflecting prudential judgment. For this reason, in his *Politics*, Aristotle chiefly defined a "barbarian" as someone who, having a slave-like nature, cannot think prudentially because he denies the existence of natures in things, because such a person has an essentially anarchic mind.[23] The reason for this is that, by being incapable of recognizing principles (*archai*) in things, a person can never understand their natures, the organizational unity of their parts, their essential internal relationships, and can never anticipate beforehand how they will act in the future.

Following the lead of the ancient Greeks and St. Thomas, Gilson and Fr. Schall, by "common sense," I mean chiefly principles rooted in sensation that make all human experience, sense wonder, and philosophy/science possible. Reflecting upon the common sense realism of the ancient Greeks and St. Thomas, unlike some of our contemporaries who would diagnose the chief cause our contemporary problems to be a loss of faith, or adhering to the wrong politics, I see the chief cause of most of our current cultural problems to reside chiefly, in a sense, in having lost our minds, not our faith, in a moral refusal, intellectual *hubris*, to admit we understand that our minds can know the natures of things so that we might continue falsely to believe this refusal is a sign of some kind of higher, gnostic truth, or "belief system," by which we are elevated to a kind of enlightened understanding that transcends the rubes with whom we often have to associate on a daily basis.

Because, in a sense, we have lost our minds, not our faith, I maintain that we can only culturally renew the West by reuniting philosophy and science and science and common sense. And we can only reunite philosophy and science and science and common sense by reuniting human reason with sense reality. As Gilson tells us, since our chief problem is that we have lost reason, to recover the health of our minds, we must turn our minds again to the world, to have them measured by the being of things, not by our unbridled and unmoored poetic imaginations.[24]

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[23] Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. 1, 1252a32–1252b8.

[24] Étienne Gilson, *The Terrors of the Year 2000* (Toronto: St. Michael's College, 1949), 5. I thank my former colleague at St. John's University, Richard Ingardia, for, many years ago, first informing me about the existence of this work by Étienne Gilson.

To Gilson, this means that we must attempt once again to inhabit the universe of St. Thomas in which the service of God and reason are compatible and produce in us order, beauty, and joy—not nausea—because, in this world, unlike the contemporary world, the necessary condition for the existence of one does not entail the necessary destruction of the other. For, sharing the same cause as part of the same creation, or organization, the order of our freedom, thoughts and, reality are complementary parts, contraries of the same organizational whole, not contradictory opposites whose co-existence is impossible because the existence of one being destroys the existence of the other.[25]

In this return to common sense realism, a main thrust of my argument in this article is that, when most people use the phrase "common sense," we tend to use the term somewhat ambiguously, in somewhat the same and somewhat different senses; and that, in its chief sense, we tend to recognize that the chief principle of common sense is not common experience or practical knowledge (as many people often appear to think). Instead, it is an evident conviction that precedes common experience and practical knowledge comprised of essentially four unshakable convictions, the evident existence of: (1) substantial wholes composed of essentially relatable organizational parts (an organizational unity within a thing that constitutes a "truth in things"); (2) reliable human knowing faculties of sense and intellect that can adequately apprehend the truth in things; (3) the analogous unity of truth existing among things and the human knowing faculties; (4) the way things act reflect, are signs of, a relationship of organizational wholeness existing among parts of a multitude, which possess this wholeness through unequal relation to each other through unequal relation to a leading part through which a common organizational aim is chiefly communicated to all the parts.

As Adler keenly observed decades ago, which I have already mentioned in this paper, the chief cause of our cultural disorders today arise from common sense defects of our intellectual leaders, teachers, savants. "The disorder of modern culture," Adler told us, "is a disorder in their minds, a disorder which manifests itself in the universities they have built, in the educational system they have devised, in the teaching they do, and which, through that teaching, perpetuates itself and spreads out in ever widening circles from generation to generation."

[25] Id., 29–31.

I maintain that this defect is chiefly due to a denial on their part of one or more of the above common sense principles I have just identified, which are the remote first principles of all other common sense principles, including those involved in sense wonder, upon which any sound philosophy, science, essentially depends.

Such being the case, if we want to stop the decline of Western culture and global civilization, we need to do a "Hail Mary" pass over the skeptical, sophistic, and essentially anarchic mindset that tends to dominate in modern Western political and educational institutions so that we can learn once again how to communicate with each other in properly scientific, philosophical, and religious ways.

This is something that I think Gilson was concluding just after World War II as he was musing about how some Westerners tend to be slow learners, have needed some time to grasp the full implications of the late modern project. At the close of World War II, Gilson claimed we in the West had made our most astounding, involuntary, discovery: late modern science had become essentially Nietzschean. "The great secret that science has just wrested from matter," Gilson observed, "is the secret of its destruction. To know today is synonymous with to destroy."[26]

Gilson considered Nietzsche's declaration of God's death to be "the capital discovery of modern times," bigger than the explosion at Hiroshima. Compared to Nietzsche's discovery, Gilson maintained that, no matter how far back we trace human history, we "will find no upheaval to compare with this in the extent or in the depth of its cause." While his friend and fellow Frenchman Jacques Maritain was musing about how to use recognition of natural law to form common practical agreements among the world's people to generate future world peace, Gilson thought that Nietzsche's declaration of God's death signaled a metaphysical revolution of the highest, widest, and deepest order. Nietzsche is metaphysical dynamite. He knew it, readily admitted it. "This is not just our imagination," Gilson stated. All we have to do is read Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo* to find proof that what Gilson said is true. As Nietzsche said:

> I know my fate. A day will come when the remembrance of a fearful event will be fixed to my name, the remembrance of a unique crisis in the history of the earth, of the most profound clash of consciences, of a decree enacted against all that had been believed, ex-

[26] Id., 7–9.

> acted and sanctified right down to our days. I am not a man, I am dynamite.[27]

Clearly, to Gilson, the chief terrors of the contemporary age are, in root cause, metaphysical. The chief clash of cultures and civilizations we face today is not between the politics of West and East, between traditional political liberals and conservatives, or the West and other political orders. It is a metaphysical clash between the ancient and modern West.

Gilson maintained that, from time immemorial, we in the West have based our cultural first principles, our cultural Western creed and scientific inspiration upon the conviction that gods, or a God, existed. All of our Western intellectual and cultural institutions have presupposed the existence of a God or gods. No longer. All of a sudden, God no longer exists. Worse, He never existed! The implication is clear: "We shall have to change completely our every thought, word and deed. The entire human order totters on its base."

If our entire cultural history depended upon the unswerving conviction that God exists, "the totality of the future must needs depend on the contrary certitude, that God does not exist." The metaphysical terror now becomes evident in its depths. Nietzsche's message is a metaphysical bomb more powerful than the atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima: "Everything that was true from the beginning of the human race will suddenly become false." Moreover, mankind alone must create for itself a new self-definition, which will become human destiny, the human project.

What is that destiny, project? "To destroy," Gilson said. Nietzsche knows that, as long as we believe that what is dead is alive, we can never use our creative liberty. Nietzsche knows and readily admits his mission is to destroy. Hence, he says:

> When truth opens war on the age-old falsehood, we shall witness upheavals unheard of in the history of the world, earthquakes will twist the earth, the mountains and the valleys will be displaced, and everything hitherto imaginable will be surpassed. Politics will then be completely absorbed by the war of ideas and all the combinations of powers of the old society will be shattered since they are all built

[27] Id., 14–16. While Gilson gives no specific reference to the location of this and the ones that follow passages in Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo*, this one starts the section "Why I am a Fatality." See "*Ecce Homo*," in *The Philosophy of Nietzsche*, no editor or translator listed (New York: Random House, Modern Library, 1954), 923–933.

> on falsehood: there will be wars such as the earth will never have seen before. It is only with me that great politics begin on the globe. . . . I know the intoxicating pleasure of destroying to a degree proportionate to my power of destruction.[28]

If Nietsche was speaking the truth about his project, which Gilson thought he was, Gilson maintained that he was announcing the dawn of a new age in which the aim of contemporary culture, its metaphysical project, was to make war upon, to overthrow, traditional truths and values. To build our brave new world order, we have to overthrow the metaphysical foundations of Western culture. "Before stating what will be true, we will have to say that everything by which man has thus far lived, everything by which he still lives, is deception and trickery." As Nietzsche says, "He who would be a creator, both in good and evil, must first of all know how to destroy and to wreck values."

In fact, Gilson maintained, our traditional Western values are being wrecked all around us, everywhere, under our feet. He said he had stopped counting "the unheard of theories thrown at us under names as various as their methods of thought, each the harbinger of a new truth which promises to create shortly, joyously busy preparing the brave new world of tomorrow by first of all annihilating the world of today."[29]

What, then, are we who oppose Nietzsche's project to do in the face of such a cataclysm? Nietzsche's plan, his mission, is to destroy "today to create tomorrow." Gilson considered forgivable that we should not have anticipated Nietzsche's advent. "But," he says, "that we should not understand what he is doing while he is doing it right under our eyes, just as we were told he would do it—that bears witness to a stranger blindness. Can it really be that the herd of human being that is led to the slaughter has eyes and yet does not see?" Gilson's explanation for such a depth of blindness was that announcement of a catastrophe of such an order usually leaves us "but a single escape: to disbelieve it and, in order not to believe, to refuse to understand."[30]

Those who reject the escape of sticking our heads in the sand while we are sheepishly led to the slaughterhouse have another, more common sense, choice: to recognize the reality of the enemy we face and the nature of his project and reasonably to oppose it. Contemporary man tends to be

[28] Gilson, *The Terrors of the Year 2000*, 16–17.
[29] Id., 17–18.
[30] Id., 17.

essentially Nietzschean. And his "mad ambition" is impossible to achieve. We choose the way we can, not the way we wish. We might wish to become absolutely free creators, creators *ex nihilo*, but, at best, our wish is an impossible dream.

True creation, Gilson rightly recognized, is not fashioning material like a demiurge. It is a totally self-authoring gratuitous act, "the only act which is truly creative because it alone is truly free." As much as we might wish to become free in this strict sense, our *esse* (act of existence) is always *co-esse* (co-existence), not *esse subsistens* (subsistent existence).

The nature of the material world confronts us, limits us, and determines the extent to which we can fashion and remodel it. "We shall perhaps be great manufacturers," Gilson maintained. "[B]ut creators—never. To create in his turn *ex nihilo*, man must first of all reestablish everywhere the void."[31]

This, then, has become contemporary man's project: mad ambition, everywhere to reestablish the void. On all sides, postmodern man falsely-so-called feels Nietzsche's intoxicating joy, his mad delight, in the power of destruction. When Gilson said Nietzsche is the Antichrist, he was speaking of Nietzsche metaphorically, much like Socrates says the Delphic oracle singled him out as an exemplar of wisdom in her cryptic message to his friend Chairephon that "no one is wiser than Socrates."[32] The Antichrist is postmodern man falsely-so-called drunk

> with the supremely lucid madness of a creature who would annihilate the obstacle which *being* places in the way of his creative ambitions. Such is the profound sense of our solemn and tragic adventure. Antichrist is not among us, he is in us. It is man himself, usurping unlimited creative power and proceeding to the certain annihilation of that which is, in order to clear the way for the problematic creation of all that will be.[33]

While Gilson did not say so specifically, the Antichrist as Gilson described him as embodied metaphorically in Nietzsche is the secularized ghost of Renaissance humanism haunting the Earth, the contemporary attempt *to supplant creation with metaphysical epic poetry effected through the unbridled free spirit of artistic destruction*. No wonder, then,

[31] Id., 18–20.
[32] Plato, *Apology*, 23B.
[33] Gilson, *The Terrors of the Year 2000*, 20–21.

that Gilson would turn to a critic of Stéphane Mallarmé's poetic project to find just the right phraseology to describe "precisely the sacrilegious effort whose meaning" he sought to unravel: "to construct a poetry which would have the value of preternatural creation and which would be able to enter into rivalry with the world of created things to the point of supplanting it totally."[34]

Contemporary man's project is universal surrealism, total release of human reason, of creative free spirit, from all metaphysical, moral, and aesthetic, and common sense controls; the poetic spirit, the spirit of the artist gone totally mad with the intoxicating, surrealistic power of destruction. Once we destroy everything, nothing can stop us. Since the beginning of recorded time, God has gotten in the way of the artistic human spirit, has been the "eternal obstructor" to us being total self-creators. Now the tables are turned. With the advent of a new age announced by Nietzsche, we have entered "the decisive moment of a cosmic drama."[35] Protagoras and Musaios have become Dionysus.

"Everything is possible," Gilson admonished us, "provided only that this creative spark which surrealism seeks to disclose deep in our being be preceded by a devastating flame." Since "the massacre of values is necessary to create values that are really new," André Breton's description of "the most simple surrealist act" becomes perfectly intelligible and throws dramatic light upon the increasingly cavalier destruction of innocent life we witness in our own day: "The most simple surrealist act consists in this: to go down into the streets, pistol in hand, and shoot at random for all you are worth, into the crowd."[36]

As he was writing in 1948, Gilson understood that many intellectuals in the early post-World War II era had not fully comprehended the metaphysical drama unfolding before them. As a result, while they had gotten out of the habit of talking about things like "divine law," some, like Maritain, apparently still held onto its vestige in enlightened, secularized appeals to "the voice of conscience" to solve the world's problems. But what will happen to us, Gilson asked, when more of us start to realize that the modern voice of conscience (and, presumably, its principle: the modern understanding of natural law) is the reflection of nothing, a convenient

[34] Id., 21–22.
[35] Id., 21–25.
[36] Id., 26–27.

illusion we have created to maintain the intoxicating joy of our own poetic and sophistic project?[37]

Gilson clearly appeared to be saying that, if a natural law truly exists, looking today to international law for evidence of its existence and the notion of the dignity of the person that supports it historically in order to overcome contemporary intellectual incoherence cannot work. The chief reason that our falsely-so-called "postmodern" world is essentially hostile to such notions is rooted in the late modern world's essential moral, metaphysical, and political rejection of the first extrinsic principle of natural law: the existence of a creator-God.

Instead of presuming a common agreement about the existence of a natural law upon which to build a common consensus about human nature, like his friend Jacques Maritain had done, Gilson appears to have been saying Maritain would have been better off facing the reality of the world around him, in recognizing that the modern project is essentially rooted in a rejection of natures, or forms, in things and that incoherence in modern thought cannot be overcome unless and until, like an alcoholic incapable of self-recovery, modernity first hits bottom and accepts a common sense understanding that forms exist in facultatively-independent realities that we today commonly call "organizations."

If modernism and false postmodernism are built upon a rejection of the existence of forms in things, or the existence of real organizations, and of gods, or a creator-God, upon which the classical understanding of natural law depends, how can we make appeals to that law to give us a true postmodernism based upon the common understanding of the human person that will allow for communication between substances?

To Gilson's ears, the explosion of Hiroshima resounded a solemn metaphysical assertion of post-Nietzshean, late modern, man's statement that, while we no longer want to be God's image, we can still be God's caricature. While we cannot create anything, we now possess the intoxicating power to destroy everything. As a result, feeling totally empty and alone, late modern man offers, to anyone willing to take it, the futile freedom he does not know how to use. "He is ready for all the dictators, leaders of these human herds who follow them as guides and who are all finally conducted by them to the same place—the abbatoir" (the slaughterhouse). Having freed ourselves from divine rule, the necessary political consequence for "postmodern man" falsely so-called is political enslavement by

[37] Id., 26–28.

a totalitarian State. Having refused to serve God, we have no one left to judge the state, no arbiter between us and the state.[38]

As Gilson saw it, just after World War II, appeals to conscience helped some of us in the West, apparently Maritain included, to pretend not to understand the catastrophic consequences for the West and the world of the grandiose sophistry of the post-Nietzschean project: Our destiny has become "the absurd" and "truly exhausting task" of perpetual self-invention without model, purpose, or rule. Having turned ourselves into gods, Gilson maintained, we do not know what to do with our divinity.[39]

Finding ourselves totally free to engage in the perpetual, Sisyphean task of endless self-creation, Gilson said, we resemble a soldier on a twenty-four hour leave with nothing to do: totally bored in the tragic loneliness of an idle freedom we cannot productively use.[40]

Clearly, for Gilson in this work, the terrors of the late modern world are, in root cause, "modern," as well as moral and metaphysical; but, as I have said, for Gilson, the chief clash of civilizations we face today is not between the politics of West and East, or the West and other political orders, between the Western tradition and other metaphysical and religious traditions. It is a metaphysical and moral clash between the ancient and modern West.

No wonder exists why this current metaphysical and moral clash exists. Having essentially divorced itself from all moral and intellectual virtue, from wisdom and happiness, and classical common sense realism, having reduced all these to its all-consuming method, like modern economics and politics, modern "science" has essentially divorced itself from all real human good, and the chief end of human life: the creator-God. As a contrary of real science, modern "science" has embraced as its natural end real science's opposite natural end: moral and intellectual vice (including foolishness and the chief natural end of foolishness: human misery).

Since the time of Descartes, "science" falsely-so-called has divorced itself from any essential connection to wisdom, virtue, and human happiness, a human soul, human habits, and a creator-God (from all human good), and classical common sense. In place of these, it has gradually identified itself with an intellectually-blind urge (misnamed "will") to power, to torture the physical universe to reveal its secrets. Such being the case, hav-

[38] Id., 28–31.
[39] Id., 21–23.
[40] Id., 24.

ing embraced a kind of intellectual Machiavellianism as its nature, why should anyone be surprised to discover such a blind urge eventually to reveal itself as the neo-sophistic inclination to dominate: naked violence, universal despotism? No knowledge that knowingly separates itself from wisdom and happiness can legitimately claim to be science. It is foolishness.

In his now famous and historic 12 September 2006 address at the University of Regensburg entitled, "Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections," Pope Benedict XVI offered to the world community a positive critique to help modernity expand its intellectual horizons to avoid real dangers that arise from the incoherence of modern thought that Benedict called a "self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically falsifiable."[41] Devoid of such a broadening of the notion of reason, Benedict maintained that the Western world is incapable of entering into "that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today."[42]

He claimed that, while the West widely holds "that positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid," it largely cannot recognize the universal validity of forms of religious reason.[43] This puts the West in diametric opposition to "the world's profoundly religious cultures" which "see the exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions." He said, "A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures."[44]

Put slightly differently, the Pope was saying that people cannot enter into genuine dialogue with other people, *cannot genuinely communicate between substances*, unless we enter into rational dialogue with them. Such dialogue must have at least two characteristics; it must: (1) be in touch with reality and (2) assume the rationality of the interlocutors. Unhappily, the

[41] Pope Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections," Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Benedict XVI to München, Altötting, and Regensburg (09–14 September 2006), Meeting with the Representatives of Science, Lecture of the Holy Father, *Aula magna* of the University of Regensburg. [www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg_en.html], Tuesday, 12 September 2006.
[42] Id.
[43] Id.
[44] Id.

modern Western notion of reason arbitrarily tends to limit rational discussion, *communication between substances*, to talk about mathematical being and sense experimentation, tends to view all other talks as essentially non-rational. Hence, strictly speaking, people who hold this narrow, fundamentalistic, notion of reason cannot enter into rational debate with other people about moral and religious issues because their narrow understanding of reason cuts them off from such debate about these issues.

More or less, the Pope was saying that, in relation to religious and moral issues, the modern West's narrow understanding of Cartesian and Enlightenment human reason places it in the same situation as many Muslim fundamentalistic extremists. Modern Western reason tends to be arbitrarily narrow because it tends to be essentially fundamentalistic, but in a secular way. It cannot rationally dialogue with people about moral and religious issues because it has relegated religious and moral being and talk to the sphere of the essentially non-rational, capricious, arbitrary.

The Pope emeritus well recognized, and recognizes, that this places the West in an extremely precarious position relative to religious cultures, especially to extremist elements of Islamic culture. How are enlightened Western intellectuals supposed to dialogue with Muslims who think that God is an arbitrary Will, not subject to behaving according to mind-independent standards of rationality, like non-contradiction, when the Western intellectuals have a view of moral, political, and religious reason as essentially irrational (but at the secular extreme) as their extremist Muslim counterparts?

The West's view of moral, political, and religious reason tends to be a secularized reformulation of a popular Reformation notion of the essential depravity of reason (religious reason, in the contemporary West's case), just as narrowly fundamentalistic as that of Muslim extremists. Hence, strictly speaking, modern Western intellectuals cannot enter the debate because, by their own admission, because of their arrogant and unjustified presumption of their own rational superiority, they are totally incapable of conducting rational dialogue in the areas of religion, politics, and morality. Clearly, if such dialogue is to take place, it will have to occur between individuals in the West and East who do not share such hubristic and narrow understandings of rationality.

While modern "scientific" reason has to accept and base its methodology upon matter's rational structure "and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as given," Benedict claimed the real question remains why it has to do so? Moreover, he

asserted that the natural sciences have to remand this question to philosophy and theology to answer because the natural sciences are incapable of addressing the question. Benedict maintained that philosophy and theology are sources of knowledge derived from human experience, much of which in the West comes from religious traditions and Christian faith.

He made special reference to Socrates' observation in the *Phaedo* that extended philosophical argumentation involving "talk about being" might incline a person to mock all such talk, and, in so doing, "be deprived of the truth of existence" and "suffer a great loss."[45] In a similar fashion, Benedict claimed that "the West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer harm thereby."[46]

He argued that to ignore theological and philosophical sources of knowledge is "an unacceptable restriction of our listening and responding" to reason, and is something we do at our peril. Hence, he concluded by asserting that "a theology grounded in biblical faith enters into the debates of our time" with a program that involves "the courage to embrace the whole breadth of reason," not to deny its greatness. "It is to this great *logos*, to this breadth of reason," he said, "that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university."[47]

During the twentieth century, emeritus Pope Benedict XVI's predecessor, Saint John Paul II (b. 1920; d. 2005) was able to help colleagues introduce this *logos* to the Philosophy Department at The Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), now The Pope John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. As a result, with the help of Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (b. 1921; d. 2008), and other members of this Philosophy Department at KUL, the Pope was able to cause the personalist metaphysical principles of the Lublin School of Thomism to radiate from this Department throughout Eastern Europe and severely weaken the disordered notion of science that held these people for decades under the yoke of the Babelism of "scientific socialism." No reason exists why a similar revival of Christian metaphysics throughout the West cannot do the same for the entire West in our day.

It is to this same great *logos* that this conference is dedicated. In his Regensburg address, His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI attributed the at-

[45] Id. See Plato, *Phaedo*, 89A–91C.
[46] Pope Benedict XVI, "Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections."
[47] Id.

tenuation of modern reason largely to a concerted effort that started in the West several centuries ago to remove the influence of classical reason, especially Greek philosophical reason, from the modern notion of science and higher education. Devoid of proper self-understanding, we in the West cannot enter into rational dialogue with other cultures.

If we do not know who we are, how we came to be the way we are and think the way we do, if we do not precisely grasp our situation and its history, we cannot possibly expect rationally to listen to and understand other cultures. More than anything else today, we in the West need a *renaissance of philosophical and scientific reason*, a recovery of the understanding that a reason that is out of touch with reality, which refuses to have its judgments measured by mind-independent reality, has lost its common sense and is no reason at all, much less a scientific or philosophical reason.

If the chief cause of our contemporary, attenuated notion of reason is a loss of classical reason, its philosophical realism and common sense, and the essential connection of science and virtue to wisdom and human happiness, then nothing short of a new *Renaissance of Common Sense Philosophical and Theological Reason*, what my friend Bill McVey has dubbed a "born-again Thomism," can restore *logos* to its proper place within contemporary world cultures. It is to this great *logos*, to this breadth of reason, that, in the spirit of emeritus Pope Benedict, are dedicated this conference, a new Adler-Aquinas Institute/Holy Apostles College and Seminar graduate Thomistic Studies concentration in Christian wisdom that started in the fall of 2014, a recently-established Aquinas School of Leadership, and formation of an "Aquinas Leadership International" association are dedicated. I welcome those reading this slightly revised 17 July 2014 inaugural conference lecture to join us in promoting these efforts. Thank you.

THE NATURE OF COMMON SENSE AND HOW WE CAN USE COMMON SENSE TO RENEW THE WEST

SUMMARY

Since most pressing today on a global scale is to be able to unite religion, philosophy, and science into parts of a coherent civilizational whole, and since the ability to unite a multitude into parts of a coherent whole essentially requires understanding the natures of the things and

the way they can or cannot be essentially related, this paper chiefly considers precisely why the modern world has been unable to effect this union. In so doing, it argues that the chief cause of this inability to unite these cultural natures has been because the contemporary world, and the West especially, has lost its understanding of philosophy and science and has intentionally divorced from essential connection to wisdom. Finally, it proposes a common sense way properly to understand these natures, reunite them to wisdom, and revive Western and global civilization.

KEYWORDS: aim, analogy, anarchy, art, body of knowledge, cause, common sense, communication, comprehensive understanding, concept, contemporary, contrary, contrariety, culture, demonstration, demonstrative, disorder, education, equality, emotion, end, enlightened, enlightenment, excellence, existence, explanation, fear, fundamentalistic, genus, God, habit, happiness, harmony, hierarchically ordered, history, hope, human, humanist, inequality, inspiration, inspired, judgment, justice, knowledge, language, leadership, logic, mathematics, memory, metaphysics, modern, multitude, nature, Nietzschean, operational, opposite, order, part, person, philosophy, physical, poetry, power, principle, provocative thought, quality, reality, reason, receptivity, relationship, renaissance, resistance, rhetoric, science, scientism, skeptic, sophist, soul, species, strength, success, system, truth, utopian, West, Western civilization, unity, universe, values, virtue, whole, will, wisdom, wonder, World War.

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THE CULTURAL DANGERS OF SCIENTISM AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS

Who can deny the extraordinary achievements of science? The technology that we rely on everyday and the life-saving medical procedures that were unavailable to previous times are all the fruit of scientific research. Whether it is intellectually, in universities, where science receives great attention and funding, or more generally, in the culture, where the fruits of science are often revered and consumed en masse, science exerts tremendous influence over our lives. It is so easy to be proud of our scientific achievements that many have come to view science as the pinnacle of human knowledge. In fact, some scientists (and even some philosophers) hold that science is the only way to knowledge.[1] This view is usually called 'scientism' and, as I will argue, it is a serious obstacle to renewing the Western culture.

Although there is much that is good in modern science, misunderstanding its proper role in our intellectual and everyday lives is a serious danger, and the cause of much decline and confusion in the West. Unfortunately, some famous scientists have misused discoveries in science to promote the reductionism, materialism, and secularism we find today in the West. For example, scientists such as Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris have targeted general audiences with the message that we should look to modern science to treat questions about ethics and the existence of God.[2] In

[1] Jaegwon Kim notes that naturalism is at the heart of much of contemporary analytic philosophy and that the core of naturalism "seems to be something like this: [the] scientific method is the only method for acquiring knowledge or reliable information in all spheres including philosophy." Jaegwon Kim, "The American Origins of Philosophical Naturalism," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 28:supplement (2003): 87.

this way, for many, scientists have become the new high priests of our age—replacing the theologians, philosophers, and poets of prior ages. As I will explain later, such a situation is dire and calls for cultural renewal.

I will begin, first, by defining what is meant by 'science' and 'scientism.' Second, I will discuss some of the cultural dangers of scientism. Third, I will give several arguments why scientism should be rejected and why science needs metaphysics. Fourth, and finally, I conclude by noting how some of the questions and arguments I raised in the previous sections can be appropriated to help the general public understand the limits of science and the dangers of scientism.

Science vs. Scientism

Unfortunately, philosophers of science have struggled to reach consensus on an acceptable definition of science. In fact, some philosophers of science, such as Larry Laudan, have argued that all known attempts to distinguish science from non-science have failed.[3] Nevertheless, I think the key to understanding the difference between modern sciences, such as biology and physics, and other disciplines, such as philosophy and theology, lies in both its object of study and in its methodology. Modern science uses hypothetico-deductive reasoning and the experimental method pioneered by Galileo in order to study different kinds of changes that occur in the natural world. Although some experimentation occurred in ancient Greece and during the Middle Ages, it did not become a central feature of science until the Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century.

Generally speaking, the scientific method is as follows. First, one forms a hypothesis about how things work in the world. Second, one deduces a prediction (or predictions) from the hypothesis. Third, tests are performed to determine whether or not these predictions are confirmed by experiment or observation. Scientists prefer hypotheses and theories that are well confirmed and tend to abandon those that are not. However, strictly speaking, as Karl Popper has argued, the hypothetico-deductive reasoning cannot be used to prove a hypothesis or theory true in a defini-

[2] See Richard Dawkins, *The God Delusion* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), and Sam Harris, *The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values*, (New York: Free Press, 2010).

[3] Larry Laudan, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem," in *But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy* (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1996), 337–350.

tive sense.[4] While the scientific method does not allow for proof, Popper argued that it does allow for falsification. For example, Newtonian physics was very well confirmed for three centuries, but it eventually was falsified by Einstein's relativity. Still, much in Newtonian physics was able to be incorporated in Einstein's physics, and so philosophers of science who describe themselves as realists hold that very well-confirmed theories approximate the truth, if falling short of total truth.

The above discussion enumerates some of the limitations of the scientific method and therefore of the modern sciences. Another important limitation argued by Popper was that if a hypothesis or theory is not empirically testable, then it is not a scientific hypothesis. This will be an important point in our discussion of scientism below. For if something is claimed in the name of science that is not testable by the methods of science, what is put forth is no longer science. As we shall see, metaphysical materialism disguised as science is one of the cultural dangers of scientism.

Turning to scientism, Mikael Stenmark has identified many different kinds of scientism, including epistemic scientism, ontological scientism, axiological scientism, and existential scientism.[5] To discuss all of these in the depth that they deserve would require more space than I have here. Therefore, I will focus mainly on the first two because they are, arguably, the most important and common kinds of scientism. However, I will briefly comment on the others as well.

Let us begin with *epistemic scientism*, which is the view that "the only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has access to."[6] This kind of scientism tries to reduce all knowledge to scientific knowledge. Under this view, other disciplines, such as philosophy and theology, must either be absorbed into science, and thereby undergo significant changes, or be denied the status of knowledge. The biologist Edward O. Wilson, for example, espouses this view in his book *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge*.[7]

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[4] Popper argues that "[A] statement can never be finally established by establishing some of its consequences." Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper, 1959), 259. See also, Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper, 1963).

[5] Mikael Stenmark, *Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion* (Aldershort: Ashgate, 2001), 1–17.

[6] Id., 4.

[7] Edward O. Wilson, *Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge* (New York: Vintage, 1999). In chapter two of his book, Wilson explicitly pleads guilty to the charge of scientism and says one of his goals is to turn "as much philosophy as possible into science." Id., 11–12.

Although epistemic scientism puts limits on human knowledge, it at least leaves open the possibility that some realities exist that science cannot discover, such as God. In contrast, *ontological scientism* puts limits on what exists objectively because it holds that "the only reality that exists is the one science has access to."[8] As Stenmark notes, Carl Sagan's famous remark that "the Cosmos is all that is or ever was or ever will be" is an example of ontological scientism. The reason is that in order to make such a claim, a scientist like Sagan must hold that science gives us complete knowledge of reality. If science does not give us complete knowledge of reality, or if we are unsure that it does, then we are not warranted in drawing a conclusion like that of Sagan's above. I will return to this point later.

The next kind of scientism that Stenmark discusses he calls *axiological scientism*, and he defines it as the view that "science alone can explain morality and replace traditional ethics."[9] Finally, there is *existential scientism*. According to Mary Midgley, this is "the idea of *salvation through science alone*," though Stenmark defines it as the view that "science alone can explain and replace religion."[10]

Cultural Dangers of Scientism

It should not be difficult to see the cultural dangers of scientism. First, let us consider the dangers of ontological scientism. History shows that some scientists, who have ascribed to ontological scientism, whether consciously or not, have claimed that scientific discoveries imply metaphysical materialism. That is, the view that only matter and energy exist. This, of course, leads to several serious problems. First, it leads to the loss of God and with that the loss of hope for an afterlife, ultimate justice, and ultimate meaning. Second, materialism leads to an understanding of human nature bereft of freedom and dignity. Consider the comments made by William B. Provine, a biologist and historian of science, about a quarter of a century ago:

> Modern science directly implies that the world is organized strictly in accordance with deterministic principles or chance. There are no purposeful principles whatsoever in nature. There are no gods and

[8] Stenmark, *Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion*, 8.
[9] Id., 12.
[10] Mary Midgley, *Science as Salvation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 37; Stenmark, *Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion*, 14.

> no designing forces that are rationally detectable . . . Second, modern science directly implies that there are no inherent moral or ethical laws . . . Third, human beings are marvelously complex machines . . . we must conclude that when we die, we die and that is the end of us . . . There is no hope of life everlasting . . . The universe cares nothing for us . . . There is no ultimate meaning for humans.[11]

In a similar vein, consider the comments made two years ago by Jerry Coyne, a professor of biology, in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*:

> [F]ree will is ruled out, simply and decisively, by the laws of physics . . . Your decisions result from molecular-based electrical impulses and chemical substances transmitted from one brain cell to another. These molecules must obey the laws of physics, so the outputs of our brain—our "choices"—are dictated by those laws . . . So what are the consequences of realizing that physical determinism negates our ability to choose freely? . . . What is seriously affected is our idea of moral responsibility, which should be discarded along with the idea of free will.[12]

Finally, consider the comments of Steven Pinker, a professor of psychology, who, last year, espoused axiological scientism, while flirting with existential scientism:

> [T]he worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is the worldview given to us by science . . . The facts of science, by exposing the absence of purpose in the laws governing the universe, force us to take responsibility for the welfare of ourselves, our species, and our planet. For the same reason, they undercut any moral or political system based on mystical forces, quests, destinies, dialectics, struggles, or messianic ages. And in combination with a few unexceptionable convictions—that all of us value our own welfare and that we are social beings who impinge on each other and can negotiate codes of conduct—the scientific facts militate toward a defensible morality, namely adhering

[11] William B. Provine, "Progress in Evolution and Meaning in Life" in *Evolutionary Progress*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 64–66; 70.
[12] Jerry A. Coyne, "You Don't Have Free Will," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, March 18, 2012 [http://chronicle.com/article/Jerry–A–Coyne/131165/, accessed on 18.08.2014].

> to principles that maximize the flourishing of humans and other sentient beings. This humanism, which is inextricable from a scientific understanding of the world, is becoming the de facto morality of modern democracies, international organizations, and liberalizing religions, and its unfulfilled promises define the moral imperatives we face today.[13]

Of course, it is possible to espouse epistemic scientism alone, and reject the other kinds of scientism mentioned above. However, the cultural dangers of espousing epistemic scientism alone are not much better. As I mentioned above, under epistemic scientism other disciplines, such as philosophy and theology, must either be absorbed into science, and thereby undergo significant changes, or be denied the status of knowledge. The effect of this is to disorder the hierarchy of disciplines of knowledge. For example, metaphysics is either eliminated or reduced to something else. As a case in point, consider the position of James Ladyman and Don Ross, both proud defenders of scientism. They argue that metaphysics should be the hand-maiden of the modern sciences, defining metaphysics as "the enterprise of critically elucidating consilience networks across the sciences."[14]

Unfortunately, the elimination or reduction of different disciplines to science prevents a proper understanding of reality and precludes the attainment of wisdom. As Mortimer J. Adler argued, if science, philosophy, and religion are not "properly distinguished, they cannot be properly related . . . [and if they are not properly related] cultural disorder, such as that of modern times, inevitably results."[15] Of course, defenders of scientism do not see it this way. They see scientism as "the true foundation for an enlightened understanding of the world," to borrow a phrase from Pope Benedict XVI.[16] But is scientism the true foundation for an enlightened

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[13] Steven Pinker, "Science is not Your Enemy" *New Republic*, August 6, 2013 [http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114127/science–not–enemy–humanities, accessed on 18.08.2014].

[14] James Ladyman and Don Ross, with David Spurrett and John Collier, *Everything Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28. Chapter one of this book is titled "In Defence of Scientism."

[15] Mortimer J. Adler, "God and the Professors," *Philosophy is Everybody's Business* 9:3 (2003): 8.

[16] This was delivered in 1999 at a lecture at the Sorbonne in Paris, and was later published in the book *Truth and Tolerance: Christian Belief And World Religions* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 178.

understanding of the world? I shall argue it is not, demonstrating that both epistemic scientism and ontological scientism are intellectually indefensible.

Scientism and Its Problems

Let us begin with ontological scientism, which is the view that "the only reality that exists is the one science has access to." Recall that earlier, I made the point that if science does not give us complete knowledge of reality, or if we are unsure that it does, then ontological scientism is unwarranted. So let me raise the following questions. Do we know for certain, that science does or can give us complete knowledge of reality? Or is this merely an assumption? If it is an assumption then, obviously, there is no guarantee that it is true. And if it is claimed that it is not an assumption, then it must be knowable by scientific means since ontological scientism entails epistemic scientism. Unfortunately, for proponents of ontological scientism, it does not seem possible to determine through scientific experiment that the scientific method can give us complete knowledge of reality. Stenmark discusses the problem in detail:

> [H]ow do you set up a scientific experiment to demonstrate that science or a particular scientific method gives an exhaustive account of reality? I cannot see how this could be done in a non-question begging way. What we want to know is whether science sets the limits for reality. The problem is that since we can only obtain knowledge about reality by means of scientific methods . . . we must use those methods whose scope is in question to determine the scope of these very same methods. If we used *non*-scientific methods we could never come to *know* the answer to our question . . . We are therefore forced to admit either that we cannot avoid arguing in a circle or that the acceptance of [ontological scientism] . . . is a matter of superstition or blind faith.[17]

This is a serious problem for ontological scientism. Ironically, ontological scientism itself has turned out not to be a scientific view. And views that assume ontological scientism, such as Sagan's view of reality, are also not scientific views. Instead, they are metaphysical views that may or may not be true. Since the scientific method cannot be used to determine

[17] Stenmark, *Scientism: Science, Ethics and Religion*, 22–23.

whether or not such views are true, another non-scientific discipline, namely metaphysics, would have to make the attempt. But this is only possible if one chooses to reject both ontological and epistemic scientism. Epistemic scientism must be rejected since it denies that status of knowledge to metaphysics.

However, there is another option. Scientists can reject both ontological scientism and metaphysics, while continuing to accept epistemic scientism. Of course, scientists who take this option must refrain, unlike Sagan, from taking any metaphysical positions. But this raises another question, namely, is the retreat into epistemic scientism defensible? Stenmark gives two reasons why the answer is "no."

First, he argues that epistemic scientism is self-refuting.[18] This is because, once again, we cannot use scientific experimentation to know that "the only reality that we can know anything about is the one science has access to." As such, epistemic scientism collapses under its own weight. Second, Stenmark notes that if we are able to know some things independently of science then epistemic scientism is falsified. He gives detailed arguments, which I cannot reproduce here, that there are indeed things we know apart from science. These include memory, observational knowledge, introspective knowledge, linguistic knowledge, and intentional knowledge.[19] Moreover, he argues that the activity of science itself presupposes these more basic kinds of knowledge.[20]

While Stenmark's arguments above are enough to undermine epistemic scientism, I want to make the additional argument that science needs metaphysics. The key to such argumentation can be found in the fact that science itself presupposes metaphysical knowledge and metaphysical views that are not reducible to science. Let us examine some of these presuppositions.

The Necessity of Metaphysics

One reason why scientists cannot escape metaphysics is because the activity of science itself presupposes some metaphysical notions and principles. As the philosopher of science Del Ratzsch explains:

[18] Id., 32.
[19] Id., 26–31.
[20] Id., 18–33.

> One simply cannot do significant science without presuppositions concerning, for example, what types of concepts are rationally legitimate, what evaluative criteria theories must answer to, and what resolution procedures are justifiable when those criteria conflict, as well as answers to deeper questions concerning aspects of the character of reality itself, concerning the nature and earmarks of truth and of knowledge, concerning what science is about and what it is for, concerning human sensory and cognitive and reasoning capabilities, and other matters . . . Science cannot be done without a substantial fund of nonempirical principles and presuppositions.[21]

Ratzsch argues that some of the metaphysical principles that scientists adopt are empirically at risk, and therefore they can be rejected given certain discoveries. For example, he discusses how the philosophical principle that natural explanations must be deterministic was ultimately rejected due to the discovery of quantum physics.[22] I agree with Ratzsch on this point. However, I would add that there are at least some metaphysical principles and notions that are necessary presuppositions of science and therefore they cannot be rejected unless one is willing to reject science itself.

In making this claim, I should note that I am presupposing a realist conception of science, namely, the view that the aim of science is to discover objective truths about reality, at least approximately, where reality is understood as that which exists independently of our minds.[23] As examples of such necessary presuppositions of science, I would offer the principle of non-contradiction and the notion of truth, which we shall examine next.

For Aristotle, the principle of non-contradiction is ultimately a metaphysical principle, which he formulates as follows: "[I]t is impossible for anything at the same time to be and not to be."[24] If scientists hold that the metaphysical principle of non-contradiction is false, then we are led to absurdity. This is because a denial of non-contradiction means that it is

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[21] Del Ratzsch, *Nature, Design, and Science: The Status of Design in Natural Science* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 82.
[22] Id., 110.
[23] Realism in one form or another has been the dominant view of science for most of history and it is currently the dominant view among philosophers of science. See Frederick Suppe, *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2nd ed., 1977), 652, 716–728.
[24] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1006a2–3, trans. W. D. Ross, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 737.

possible for anything at the same time to be and not to be. So, for example, the planet earth can be both 10,000 years old and 4.5 billion years old at the same time for the same observer. Under these conditions, reality itself is so bizarre that I would argue it is no longer capable of being investigated scientifically.

To demonstrate this, consider another metaphysical notion that is presupposed by science, namely, truth. If truth is the conformity of a proposition with reality and reality itself exists in a contradictory way then there will be double truths. For example, if the planet earth can be both 10,000 years old and 4.5 billion years old at the same time then it will be true that the planet earth is 10,000 years old and it will *also* be true that the earth is 4.5 billion years old. Of course, we could deny that truth is the conformity of a proposition with reality but that, it seems, would lead us to some kind of relativism.

As the above makes clear, the activity of science, at least when it is understood in a realist way, presupposes a specific kind of philosophical foundation. And elements of this foundation such as the principle of non-contradiction and the notion of truth cannot be investigated or justified through the scientific method. As such, they will have to be treated in another discipline, namely philosophy, and, more specifically, metaphysics. This treatment is necessary to the extent that scientists want to hold that their theories are true, or at least approximately true, and in order to respond to the postmodernist attacks on science that have challenged its status as knowledge.

Modern science needs metaphysics, then, because a realist conception of science requires a philosophical foundation, part of which must be metaphysical. Because metaphysics is inescapable, scientists and metaphysicians should engage in interdisciplinary work. But in order for that to happen the current climate must change. Elsewhere, I have argued for a neutral metaphysical framework for scientists and members of other disciplines to conduct their investigations.[25] The goals of this framework are to clarify the connections between different disciplines, preserve the autonomy of each discipline, prevent disciplines from overstepping their bounds, and facilitate interdisciplinary work among disciplines. An important part of my framework is called the principle of methodological neu-

[25] Robert A. Delfino, "Scientific Naturalism and the Need for a Neutral Metaphysical Framework," in *Science and Faith within Reason: Reality, Creation, Life and Design*, ed. Jaume Navarro (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2011), 43–59.

tralism. One aspect of the principle of methodological neutralism is the following. If the methods of science, for example, cannot handle a particular issue then scientists must remain neutral on that issue and hand it over to a discipline (or disciplines) that can handle it. Similarly, other disciplines must also turn over questions that they cannot handle.

This methodological principle, along with the method, subject, perspective, and aim of the various disciplines, helps to clarify the boundary lines between disciplines. And clarifying the boundary lines should help to reduce some of the tension between science and other disciplines since much of this tension arises when disciplines overstep their bounds. Accordingly, my framework helps to prevent scientism and it also helps to distinguish and relate the various disciplines of knowledge, all of which is necessary to bring about cultural renewal.

Common Sense Solutions

Let me end, then, by summarizing some common sense questions and arguments that can be addressed to the general public in order to combat scientism. After explaining the general outlines of the scientific method to the general public, the following seven points should be raised.

1. Is it not absurd to say that only modern science gives us knowledge? Modern science only came into existence in the seventeenth century or, perhaps, a little earlier. Did human beings really have no knowledge prior to that?

2. Is it not true that human beings had and still have various kinds of knowledge independently from modern science? Consider, as examples, your own observational knowledge, introspective knowledge, linguistic knowledge, and intentional knowledge.

3. Is it not true that for modern science to be possible requires that we possess different kinds of non-scientific knowledge, some of which are listed above?

4. Is it not also impossible to do science without some metaphysical knowledge such as the principle of non-contradiction and the notion of truth?

5. Is it not absurd to hold that if science cannot detect something then it does not exist? Science would have to give us total knowledge of reality for that inference to be valid.

6. But you cannot set up a scientific experiment to prove that science gives total knowledge of reality or that only science gives us knowl-

edge. Because scientism, as a view, is not testable by the methods of science it is not a scientific view and therefore is self-refuting.

7. Therefore, we encourage you to think carefully about what is claimed in the name of science. Sometimes what is claimed goes beyond what the methods of science can determine.[26]

THE CULTURAL DANGERS OF SCIENTISM AND COMMON SENSE SOLUTIONS

SUMMARY

In his article the author begins by defining what is meant by 'science' and 'scientism.' Second, he discusses some of the cultural dangers of scientism. Third, he gives several arguments why scientism should be rejected and why science needs metaphysics. Fourth, and finally, he concludes by noting how some of the questions and arguments raised in the article can be appropriated to help the general public understand the limits of science and the dangers of scientism.

KEYWORDS: scientism, science, religion, philosophy, metaphysics, culture, common sense.

[26] I would like to thank Peter A. Redpath for his comments on an earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank Anthony J. Delfino, for all of his help and encouragement. *Et Deo Gratias.*

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A POLISH POPE AND AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT: 1979–1989

> General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!
>
> —Ronald Reagan[1]

At the twentieth anniversary celebration of the fall of the Berlin Wall, an observer in Berlin described the attempts by some in the West to rewrite the history of the collapse of communism. During the four-day celebration of that anniversary, speeches contained no mention of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, communism, who built the Wall (and why); no historical context; and only a few mentions of Pope John Paul II. But Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader who desperately tried to hold the Soviet system together, and who initially feared and opposed German reunification and the removal of the Berlin Wall, was mentioned repeatedly.[2] Re-

[1] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin, June 12, 1987" [http://www.reaganfoundation.org/tgcdetail.aspx?session_args=28B48886-035B-4CF5-AB71-4B32170BAB55&p=TG0923RRS&h1=0&h2=0&sw=&lm=Reagan&args_a=cms&args_b=1&argsb=N&tx=1748, accessed on 15.02.2015].

[2] Michael Reagan with Jim Denney, *The New Reagan Revolution: How Ronald Reagan's Principles Can Restore America's Greatness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2011), 166–168. After Reagan left office and before the publication of his writings, the Russians expressed astonishment at the refusal of American political, academic, and media elites to give Reagan any credit for his achievements. For a recent example, see Will Bunch, *Tear Down This Myth: How the Reagan Legacy Has Distorted Our Politics and Haunts Our Future* (New York: Free Press, 2009). Praise for Reagan contradicts what Jean-Francois Revel formulated as the first rule of the academy: "The Left may sometimes be wrong, but the Right can never be right" (John O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minis-*

cent scholarship has revealed a better understanding of the cast of characters in the gripping drama of the collapse of communism in Poland, especially the vital role Pope John Paul II and the indispensable contribution of President Reagan.[3]

This article examines similarities between John Paul II and President Reagan; their approaches to confronting communism; their meetings beginning in 1982; and the impact these two strategic leaders had on Poland during the decade 1979–1989.

Similarities

At first glance, Pope John Paul II and President Reagan appear to be an unlikely pair: the mystical, philosophical, poetically inclined Polish Pope and the American movie actor, television and radio personality, and conservative politician. And yet, born nine years apart on different sides of the Atlantic, Reagan in 1911 in Illinois, and the Pope in 1920 in Wadowice, these two men were well matched to change history.

Both men were popular, athletic, and loved the outdoors. As men of the theater, both knew the power of words to change minds and hearts. As

ter: Three Who Changed the World (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2006), 326–327). See also Cal Thomas, "Liberals Can't Give Right Credit," *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* (January 6, 2000): 14A [http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat=20000106&id=E7UaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=HjoEAAAAIBAJ&pg=5421,710415, accessed on 02.06.2014]. While "American audiences tend to be quite interested in the religious causes of the end of the Cold War—how John Paul's visit to Poland began the erosion of communist control of Eastern Europe, etc. . . . Western Europeans . . . are intellectually resistant to any mention of God in this kind of context . . . European attitudes to Reagan have altered dramatically in the last twenty years. He's now seen across the political spectrum as a formidable statesman whose contribution to the defeat of communism was massive and indispensable. The Left's attempt in the 1990s to give Gorbachev rather than Reagan the principal credit for ending the Cold War has really evaporated. Gorbachev is still respected for his refusal to send in the tanks to preserve the Soviet empire. But he is no longer seen as a motor force of history. His reforms were the Soviet Union's response to the pressures exerted on it . . . Gorbachev was an effect more than a cause: Without Reagan, no Gorbachev" (Kathryn Jean Lopez, "The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister for All Seasons," *National Review* (December 23, 2010) [http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/255910/president-pope-and-prime-minister-all-seasons-kathryn-jean-lopez, accessed on 13.03.2014].

[3] While the Catholic Church's role in Poland's emergence from Communist domination is clear, the pattern in other parts of the Soviet empire was much different, especially in countries like Romania and Bulgaria, where Eastern Orthodoxy is the predominant faith, and where the church hierarchy had often compiled a record of collaboration with Communist authorities and played little or no role in the actions which led to the collapse of the old order.

a young man, Reagan wrote short stories and drew pictures; the Pope wrote poetry and plays. As artists they paid close attention to script, character, and the shape of a story or play. They tried to see the thing whole, to get the big shape of things.[4] Both could creatively, and intuitively, quickly discern opportunities for bold action and had the firm resolve to pursue them. As charismatic leaders, both connected naturally with people. Optimism, serenity, and a disarming sense of humor characterized both men. Both staunchly supported the sanctity of human life and both have been called "great" because of the principles they lived by and their contribution to mankind.[5] Three areas, in particular, gave the Pope and the President an extraordinary amount of common ground: religious beliefs, views of communism, and assassination attempts made against them.

Religious Beliefs

Faith was the center of Karol Wojtyla's life. As priest, bishop, archbishop, cardinal, pope, and now saint, he dedicated his life to Christ. Wojtyla's autobiographical reflections reveal significant aspects of his religious life. But a full and more profound understanding of the man is prevented by his sense of personal privacy and, above all, by his mysticism which made it impossible for him to describe his innermost religious experiences and for us to understand them.[6]

Also private about his faith, religious remarks can be found throughout Reagan's papers and letters, so much so that spiritual convictions seem to have motivated every aspect of his life and career.[7] Reagan's

[4] Peggy Noonan, "Russia, the Big Picture," *The Wall Street Journal* (April 2, 2014) [http://blogs.wsj.com/peggynoonan/2014/04/02/russia-the-big-picture/, accessed on 02.04. 2014].

[5] Ronald Reagan, *Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation* (Nashville: T. Nelson, 1984), the first book ever written by a sitting President and the first U.S. President who was unashamedly pro-life. Reagan and Pope John Paul II embodied the political greatness that Aristotle summed up in Book Six of his *Nicomachean Ethics* as the ability to translate wisdom into action on behalf of the public good which requires a combination of moral virtue, practical wisdom, and public spiritedness. See Steven F. Hayward, *Greatness: Reagan, Churchill & the Making of Extraordinary Leaders* (New York: Crown Forum, 2005), 17.

[6] The controversial decision to publish Pope John Paul II's personal notes despite his explicit instructions to burn them was based on the belief that "they are the key to interpreting his spirituality" ("Cardinal Stanisław Dziwisz on Publication of Blessed John Paul II's Personal Notes" [http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/cardinal-stanislaw-dziwisz-on-publication-of-blessed-john-paul-ii-s-personal-notes, accessed on 24.02.2014]).

[7] James Mann, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (New York: Viking, 2009), 89–90 and Paul Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004), x, 175. "[I]t's impossible to understand Ronald Reagan fully—and especially

father, an apathetic Roman Catholic, left the religious upbringing of their children to his wife, a deeply evangelical Christian woman.[8] Even though raised as a Protestant, the very spiritual, God-fearing Reagan displayed an affinity for Catholics. As President, when fighting atheistic communism, he surrounded himself with decidedly, serious Catholics: CIA director William Casey, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, U.N. Ambassador Vernon Walters and, most importantly, Reagan's first two national security advisers, Richard Allen and William Clark.[9] Clark, closer to Reagan than anyone who knew the man with the exception of Mrs. Reagan, became Reagan's closest spiritual partner and the two men frequently prayed together.[10]

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his Cold War actions—without grasping the influence of religion on his thought . . . From all evidence it appears that Ronald Reagan's faith peaked in intensity at the bookends of his life—during his youth in Dixon, and again in his mature years as president and former president of the United States" (Id., xiii, 3). "Yes, I do have a deeply felt relationship with Christ . . . I have come to realize that whatever I do has meaning only if I ask that it serve his purpose . . . I have long believed there was a divine plan that placed this land here to be found by people of a special kind and that we have a rendezvous with destiny" (Letter circa 1976 to Dorothy D. Conaghan, in Ronald Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, eds. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Free Press, 2003), 256).

[8] Ronald Reagan, *An American Life: Ronald Reagan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 32. As a Protestant who married a Catholic, Reagan's mother, Nelle, was supposed to promise to raise her children Catholic, but her husband knowing her temperament conveniently forgot to secure her agreement. She reluctantly agreed to have Reagan's older brother Neil baptized in the Catholic Church, but by the time Ronald was born Nelle stiffened her religious spine and decided he would be brought up to make his own decisions regarding religion. See Ron Reagan, *My Father at 100: A Memoir* (New York: Viking, 2011), 50–51. Neil claimed his father was so lacking in outward faith that he didn't know his father was Catholic until he was almost 18 years old. See Anne Edwards, *Early Reagan: The Rise to Power* (New York: Morrow, 1987), 33–39, 58. Reagan's daughter, Patti, made the point that Reagan's father, Jack, an unsuccessful salesman with a serious drinking problem, did not provide the unwavering stability his son Ronald needed: "He couldn't really rely on his father" (Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 8). Reagan found in God a reliable, paternal figure.

[9] O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 176. O'Sullivan considered Reagan "culturally a Catholic" (Id.). Reagan's belief system was distinctively Christian and more particularly a general Protestantism, but one that was very open to consultation with Catholics. "You realize of course that you'll be reading the lines of a Protestant even though the son of a Catholic father. But I assure you that latter point means that I haven't even a tinge of religious prejudice" (Letter of March 5, 1987 to William A. Wilson, in Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 120). Jane Wyman, Ronald Reagan's first wife, converted to Catholicism in 1953. She and their two children were baptized into the Catholic faith. See Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 50.

Communism

Karol Wojtyla experienced the nightmare of living under repressive regimes—the Nazis and the Communists. His philosophical, theological, and papal writings, and two of the most important documents he secured passage of at the Second Vatican Council, *Gaudium et Spes* (*Joy and Hope*) and a new Declaration on Religious Freedom known as *Dignitatis Humanae*, reflected Wojtyla's deepest beliefs and urged the church to make its arguments through "the power of arguments" rather than by "moralization or exhortation." *Gaudium et Spes* affirmed that nothing that is genuinely human fails to find an echo in Christian hearts. In *Dignitatis Humanae*, the council declared that "the right to religious freedom has its very foundation in the dignity of the human person, as this dignity is known through the revealed word of God and by reason itself."[11] Throughout his papacy Pope John Paul II stressed the basic tenets of Catholic social thought: the limited role of the state; the principle of subsidiarity; the obligations to the common good as tempered by recognition of the transcendence of the individual; and, above all, the importance of religious liberty which denies the state the right to direct hearts and minds in having the freedom to respond to dictates of religious truth.

Modern Polish history provided Wojtyla an extremely important lesson regarding totalitarianism: it was through its culture—language, literature, religion—that Poland survived despite having been erased for 123 years (1795–1918) from the political map of Europe. Wojtyla learned that

[10] Paul Kengor, "Ronald Reagan and the Cold War: Catholic Ties Helped Reagan Triumph Over USSR," *National Catholic Reporter* (July 2, 2004): 22. According to Nancy Reagan, her husband "prayed a great deal," "wherever" he was and "whatever" he was doing (Peggy Noonan, *When Character Was King: A Story of Ronald Reagan* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002), 98). William Clark, so devout in his faith that he built a chapel on his property in California, has been characterized as "the most impressive advisor within the White House inner circle," "the only person in the entire two terms who had any kind of spiritual intimacy with the President," and the one "who did more than any other individual to help the President change the course of history and put an end to an empire that was, indeed, 'the embodiment of evil'" (Paul Kengor and Patricia Doerner, *The Judge: William P, Clark, Ronald Reagan's Top Hand* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2007), 10, 17, 71–74, 84–85; for Clark's chapel, see 14–15, 329–334). Due to Clark's close relationship with Reagan ("Judge Clark was Ronald Reagan's only real friend and soul-mate . . . These two men operated on the same wavelength for thirty years."), T.C. Reed maintained that "Clark's biographers have given us the only correct history of Reagan's SDI decision, of covert actions that worked and of Reagan's unique determination to end—and win—the Cold War" (Id., dust jacket).

[11] As quoted by Joseph Shattan, *Architects of Victory: Six Heroes of the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 1999), 193.

overwhelming material force could be resisted successfully through the human spirit—through culture—and that culture remains the most enduring factor in human affairs throughout history. Against the Nazis, Wojtyla participated in a host of cultural resistance groups and, as a priest and bishop in Krakow, he employed a similar "culture-first" strategy to resist the Communist effort to rewrite Poland's history and redefine and control Poland's culture.[12]

As for Ronald Reagan, when World War II ended, and after serving four years in the U.S. Army, he returned to civilian life as an actor. He began taking a closer look at some of the liberal film and arts organizations he had joined. One of these groups, the Hollywood Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, and Professions, was being taken over by Communists as part of a Soviet-led effort to gain control of Hollywood's film industry.[13] Reagan supported Congressional investigations of Hollywood Communists during the 1950's. And a U.S. Government decision to interfere in the Hollywood studio system led him to understand that, nearly always, big government also was part of the problem. This was true even in the United States—not because the government brutally oppressed the very people it claimed to be serving as in Central and Eastern Europe, but because the U.S. federal bureaucracy, Reagan maintained, "was becoming so powerful [that] it was able to set policy and thwart the desires . . . of ordinary citizens." The federal bureaucracy began leading America down the path to a silent form of socialism.[14] Reagan studied communism, read Marx, read the American Founders and conservative philosophers from Edmund Burke to James Burnham.[15] As a result, Reagan abandoned his

[12] George Weigel, *Witness to Hope: The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999) and *The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II: The Victory for Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy* (New York: Random House, 2010).

[13] Reagan, *An American Life*, 111–114. While president of the Screen Actors Guild in Hollywood, Reagan faced physical intimidation, including threats he would be splashed with acid to ruin his Hollywood career. He began carrying a gun and wearing it until he went to bed. See Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 54.

[14] Reagan, *An American Life*, 119–120, 129.

[15] Peggy Noonan "Thanks From a Grateful Country," June 7, 2004 [http://reagan2020.us/tributes/noonan_1.asp, accessed on 09.06.2014]. Reagan "did not dislike intellectuals—his heroes often were intellectuals, from the Founders straight through Milton Friedman and Hayek and Solzhenitsyn. But he did not favor the intellectuals of his own day, because he thought they were in general thick-headed. He thought that many of the 20th century's intellectuals were high-IQ dimwits. He had an instinctive agreement with Orwell's putdown that a particular idea was so stupid that only an intellectual would believe it" (Id.).

liberalism and became a conservative. He extolled the virtues of limited government and the benefits of private enterprise.[15]

In Hollywood, and afterwards as governor of California, Reagan narrated several radio broadcasts on Poland's persecution by the Soviets and the Katyn Massacre.[17] He (along with Karol Wojtyla) viewed the 1945 Yalta Agreement as unjust. He saw no reason why America should not seek to free Poland—a nation of brave, religious people—from totalitarianism. In a July 1961 speech, Reagan contended that the "ideological struggle with Russia" was "the number one problem in the world." He criticized those who maintained that the U.S. is at peace and should make no overt move to endanger that peace. He declared that "[w]e are at war and we are losing that war simply because we don't, or won't, realize that we are in it."[18] Four years before becoming president, Reagan told his future National Security Advisor, Richard Allen: "Dick, my idea of American policy toward the Soviet Union is simple, and some would say simplistic. It is this: We win and they lose. What do you think of that?"[19]

Assassination Attempts

In only the third month of his presidency, on March 30, 1981, President Reagan was shot while leaving a Washington hotel. At the hospital, doctors determined that a bullet had pierced one of his lungs. It just missed his heart. Known for his sense of humor, Reagan told one of the surgeons who was about to operate on him, "I hope you're a Republican."[20]

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[16] Reagan's letter of July 4, 1969 to Hugh Hefner, in Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 146–149. Hollywood films may have influenced Reagan's sense of what it is to be an American and an American president. See Peggy Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution: A Political Life in the Reagan Era* (New York: Random House, 1990), 156–159.

[17] Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 294 and "Katyn Massacre," Global Museum of Communism [http://www.globalmuseumonCommunism.org/videos/452, accessed on 26.02.2014]. See also Ronald Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan that Reveal His Revolutionary Vision for America*, ed. with an introduction and commentary by Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, Martin Anderson (New York: The Free Press, 2001), 31–33.

[18] Ronald Reagan, "Encroaching Government Controls," *Human Events* (July 21, 1961): 457.

[19] Shattan, *Architects of Victory*, 245.

[20] Reagan, *An American Life*, 261; Ronald Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 12. Reagan's daughter Patti in describing her visit to the hospital immediately after the shooting wrote that her father saw something—God or an angel. Reagan saw figures in white standing around him at the same time that he asked his wife whether he was alive, despite the fact that all the doctors and nurses were wearing green

Just six weeks later, on May 13, 1981, a trained assassin shot Pope John Paul II in Saint Peter's Square in Rome. Although the two bullets narrowly missed his abdominal aorta, spinal column, and every major nerve cluster, he lost nearly three-fourths of his blood. The Pope survived, but underwent five hours of surgery to treat his wounds.[21] That same day the Pope received a cable from Reagan in which the U.S. President expressed his shock and prayers.

Did the attempted assassinations change history? Although John Paul II believed Our Lady of Fatima helped save his life, this most likely did not affect his policies or Vatican diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. His call for religious freedom and human rights in the Eastern bloc and his support for Solidarity in Poland were in place two years before the attempted assassination, and did not change significantly thereafter.[22]

On the other hand, Reagan was changed within moments of his shooting. While in the hospital, he told his daughter, Maureen, that God

scrubs. See Nancy Reagan, *My Turn: The Memoirs of Nancy Reagan* (New York: Random House, 1989), 90.

[21] When he briefly gained consciousness before being operated on, Pope John Paul II instructed the doctors not to remove his brown scapular during the operation. The Pope maintained that Our Lady of Fatima helped keep him alive throughout his ordeal. A young pilgrim in St. Peter's Square held up an image of the Virgin Mary, and the Pope, by leaning forward to see it better at just the moment Mehmet Ali Agca fired, may have ensured that the bullet missed the point on his body where it was aimed. "Could I forget that the event in St. Peter's Square took place on the day and at the hour when the first appearance of the Mother of Christ to the poor little peasants has been remembered for over sixty years at Fatima, Portugal? For in everything that happened to me on that very day, I felt that extraordinary motherly protection and care, which turned out to be stronger than the deadly bullet" (Pope John Paul II, *Memory & Identity* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 184). See also "The Pope of Our Lady of Fatima" [http://www.michaeljournal.org/popefatima.htm, accessed on 24.02.2014]. A second assassination attempt took place on May 12, 1982, just a day before the anniversary of the first attempt on his life, in Fatima, Portugal, when a man tried to stab John Paul II with a bayonet. The Pope suffered a non-life threatening wound. "Pope John Paul Stabbed by Priest," *The Telegraph* (October 15, 2008) [http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/3203594/Pope-John-Paul-stabbed-by-priest.html, accessed on 26.02.2014].

[22] John O'Sullivan, "Of Providence and Policy: Three Assassination Attempts Failed, and an Evil Empire Fell," *National Review* 58:22 (December 4, 2006): 41. Margaret Thatcher, who was closely aligned with the Cold War policies of President Reagan based on a strong distrust of communism, also narrowly escaped injury in an Irish Republican Army assassination attempt at a Brighton hotel early in the morning on October 12, 1984 that killed five people. BBC News, On This Day 12 October, "1984: Tory Cabinet in Brighton Bomb Blast" [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/12/newsid_2531000/2531583.stm, accessed on 21.02.2014].

had spared his life for a purpose. Two weeks later, he wrote in his journal: "Whatever happens now I owe my life to God and will try to serve Him in every way I can."[23] In terms of policy, that did not mean any great change of direction. Reagan had just arrived at the White House and few policies had been established. But Reagan's being shot did strengthen his determination to pursue policies that he favored despite opposition from the Democrats, the government bureaucracy, and even some within his own political party. Ultimately, Reagan would conclude that the great purpose for which God had spared him was to hasten the collapse of communism.[24]

Reagan's sense of purpose was reaffirmed in June 1981. He, his wife, and a few guests had a private meal with Mother Teresa who said to the President: "Mr. President Reagan, do you know that we stayed up for two straight nights praying for you after you were shot? We prayed very hard for you to live." Then during the meal, she looked at Reagan and said: "You have suffered the passion of the cross and have received grace. There is a purpose to this . . . This has happened to you at this time because your country and the world need you." Reagan was practically speechless and Mrs. Reagan dissolved into tears.[25]

Approaches to Communism

Papal Soft Power

Poland's Communist authorities, their masters in Moscow, and their allies throughout the Soviet bloc long had regarded Karol Wojtyla as a deadly enemy. After his election as Pope in 1978, they saw him as a mor-

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[23] Reagan, *An American Life*, 263. Four days later, on Good Friday, Reagan met with Terence Cardinal Cooke in the White House where the cardinal told him, "The hand of God was upon you." Reagan grew very serious and replied: "I know. I have decided that whatever time I have left is left for Him" (Id.).

[24] O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 87 and note 68 below. Reagan told Michael Deaver, his White House Deputy Chief of Staff, "You know, since I've been shot, I think I'm going to rely more on my own instincts that other people's. There's a reason I've been saved" (Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 200).

[25] Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 208–209. In a June 4, 1981, entry in his diary, Reagan wrote that Mother Teresa "radiates joy because God, as she says, has given her the opportunity to serve the lepers, the poverty stricken & the hopeless." On June 13, 1986, Reagan wrote, "Mother Teresa dropped by for a brief visit & to tell me she prayed for me every day. She's a most remarkable little woman" (Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 23, 419). Reagan "was raised to believe that God has a plan for everyone and that seemingly random twists of fate are all a part of His plan" (Reagan, *An American Life*, 20). Likewise, Karol Wojtyla was

tal threat not only to communism in Central and Eastern Europe but also to the very survival of communism itself.[26] John Paul II's papacy would prove to justify most of those fears. His pilgrimage to Poland beginning on June 2, 1979, is regarded as the beginning of the spiritual and psychological earthquake that provoked the fall of Eastern European communism.[27] In Warsaw's Victory Square, Pope John Paul II gave what some consider the greatest sermon of his life.[28] He did not directly challenge the government.

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convinced that there are no mere coincidences in the world just aspects of God's providence we do not yet grasp. Weigel, *The End and the Beginning*, 33.

[26] Since 1971, the KGB had targeted Wojtyla for surveillance as one suspected of subversion. The Communists knew that Christian religious belief and practice were on a permanent collision course with totalitarianism, which is why they persecuted it everywhere they could. They understood, in short, that the chief enemies of the state were those who did not believe the state had the authority to make the ultimate moral and political decisions. It is a remarkable and enduring and deplorable irony that over twenty years after the end of the Cold War itself, many Western intellectuals and pundits and other designated authorities still did not understand or acknowledge any of this.

[27] Local witnesses stressed this point: "[W]hen I first began to research this question in 1990, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks, religious and secular alike, were unanimous in their testimony about the crucial impact of June 1979. That, they insisted, was when '1989' started" (George Weigel's 2000 Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs, "Pope John Paul II and the Dynamics of History," *Watch on the West: A Newsletter of Foreign Policy Research Institute's Center for the Study of America and the West* 1:6 (April 2000) [http://www.fpri.org/ww/0106.200004.weigel.popehistory.html, accessed on 27.02.2014]. Jerzy Turowicz knew Karol Wojtyla when they were young men together; he later became a supporter of Solidarity and member of Poland's first post-communist government. "Mr. Turowicz, remembering Blonie Field and the Pope's visit, told Ray Flynn, at the time U.S. ambassador to the Vatican, 'Historians say World War II ended in 1945. Maybe in the rest of the world, but not in Poland. They say communism fell in 1989. Not in Poland. World War II and communism both ended in Poland at the same time—in 1979, when John Paul II came home'" (Peggy Noonan, *John Paul the Great: Remembering a Spiritual Father* (New York: Viking Penguin, 2005), 34). The West largely missed the significance of the event as evidenced by the *New York Times*: "As much as the visit of Pope John Paul II to Poland must reinvigorate and reinspire the Roman Catholic Church in Poland, it does not threaten the political order of the nation or of Eastern Europe" (*New York Times* editorial of June 5, 1979). But two other Slavic observers of the times were not at all confused: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Yuri Andropov both knew that the rise of John Paul II and the deployment of his "culture-first" strategy of social change was a profound threat to the Soviet order. See Weigel, "Pope John Paul II and the Dynamics of History." After Wojtyla was elected Pope, an Italian journalist commented that Moscow "would prefer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as Secretary General of the United Nations than a Pole as pope" (Weigel, *The End and the Beginning*, 100).

[28] Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 293. The Communists did understand the threat that John Paul II's pilgrimage posed: "Two months before the Pope's arrival, the Polish Communist apparatus took steps to restrain the enthusiasm of the people. They sent a secret directive to schoolteachers explaining how they should understand and explain the Pope's visit. 'The Pope is

He did not call for an uprising or tell the Poles to push back against their atheist masters. He did not speak of what governments want, what a freedom movement wants, or what the Polish workers' unions wanted. He spoke of what God wants. He declared that "Christ will never agree to man being viewed only as a means of production;" he urged Poles to follow an "inner truth" and avoid conformity; he spoke of the right to self-determination and integrity; and he called for Slavic solidarity in the face of an unnamed, common enemy. His message "Be not afraid!" transmitted to his countrymen, would resonate throughout the world.[29]

A week later on June 10, 1979, in Krakow's Blonie Field, one of the greatest spiritual moments of the 20th century occurred. The Pope continued the theme of his pilgrimage that without Christ it is impossible to understand the history of Poland. "Those who oppose Christ," he said, "still live within the Christian context of history." Christ, the Pope declared, was not only the past of Poland—he was "the future . . . our Polish future." The crowd thundered its response: "We want God!" The millions of Poles at Blonie Field went home transformed. They compared the reality they witnessed with their own eyes and ears with the propaganda their media reported, with television broadcasts carefully not showing the huge crowds. The people of Poland could definitively say: "It's all lies. Everything this government says is a lie. Everything the government is is a lie."[30]

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our enemy,' it said. 'Due to his uncommon skills and great sense of humor he is dangerous, because he charms everyone, especially journalists. Besides, he goes for cheap gestures in his relations with the crowd, for instance, puts on a highlander's hat, shakes all hands, kisses children . . . It is modeled on American presidential campaigns . . . Because of the activation of the church in Poland our activities designed to atheize the youth not only cannot diminish but must intensely develop . . . In this respect all means are allowed and we cannot afford any sentiments.' The government also issued instructions to Polish media to censor and limit the Pope's comments and appearances" (Noonan, *John Paul the Great*, 25–26).

[29] Pope John Paul II, "Homily of His Holiness John Paul II, Victory Square, Warsaw, 2 June 1979," John Paul II Foundation [http://www.fjp2.com/us/multimedia/60-apostolic-journey-to-the-poland-1979/16074-homily-in-warsaw-june-2-1979, accessed on 21.02.2014]. For an account of the Pope's entire pilgrimage, see Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 305–323. When Cap Weinberger, Reagan's Secretary of Defense was on his deathbed, Bill Clark phoned to say goodbye; he shared with Weinberger the famous words of Christ that Pope John Paul II echoed in 1979, "Be not afraid," before telling Weinberger that he was going to a better place. See Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 352.

[30] "[W]hen 10 million Poles said it was over in Poland, it was over in Eastern Europe. And when it was over in Eastern Europe, it was over in the Soviet Union. And when it was over in the Soviet Union, well, it was over" (Noonan, *John Paul the Great*, 34). The Pope's 1987 pilgrimage to Chile in 1987 and to Cuba in 1998 deployed similar strategies: a reconstituting of those civil societies through reclamation of their Christian culture.

The Pope's nine-day visit to Poland reinvigorated the Catholic faith of his countrymen. It repeatedly reminded them of their true identity and began to shift the boundaries of the world. The Pope's approach pointed out the obvious: We are Christians, we are here, and we are united, no matter what the Communists and their map-makers say.[31]

After the Pope's visit, Poland's domestic opposition, traditionally divided, emerged relatively united. Even the intellectual dissidents suspicious of the church's role acknowledged the power of the Pope's themes.[32] One year later in 1980, intellectuals, workers, and believers came together in a series of mass strikes. This led to the formation of Solidarity, the first overtly anti-communist institution established in a Communist country.

Hard Power

Reagan paid careful attention to the extraordinary effect of the Pope's 1979 trip to Poland. In one of his radio broadcasts, prior to announcing his candidacy for the Republican nomination for president, Reagan blasted the "'Communistic atheism' that had preyed on Poland." Reagan asked, "Will the Kremlin ever be the same again? Will any of us for that matter? Perhaps that one man—the son of simple farm folk has made us aware that the world is crying out for a spiritual revival and for leadership."[33]

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[31] "[W]e human beings, we Poles, each of whom was born as a human being of the flesh (cf. Jn 3:6) and blood of his parents, have been conceived and born of the Spirit (cf. Jn 3:5) . . . So, before going away, I beg you once again to accept the whole of the spiritual legacy which goes by the name of 'Poland,' with the faith, hope and charity that Christ poured into us at our holy Baptism" (Pope John Paul II, "Homily of His Holiness John Paul II, Krakow, 10 June 1979" [http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/homilies/1979/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_19790610_polonia-cracovia-blonia-k_en.html, accessed on 27.02.2014].

[32] Shattan, *Architects of Victory*, 193. Before World War II, the Catholic Church insisted that all true Poles had to be Catholic. This disenfranchised many and generated little support among Polish intellectuals. By 1970 the church refused to confine its demands to strictly "Catholic" issues. Instead it became the leading advocate of the rights of all Poles and the most outspoken champion of this new approach was Cardinal Karol Wojtyla. In 1976, he preached: "We are all Poland, all of us believers and unbelievers . . . There is only one road to peace and national unity, and that is through unfettered respect for the rights of man, for the rights of citizens and Poles" (Id., 194–195). See Damon Linker, "John Paul II, Intellectual," *Policy Review* 103 (October 1, 2000) [http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6912, accessed on 24.02.2014] and Chantal Delsol, *The Unlearned Lessons of the Twentieth Century*, trans. Robin Dick (Delaware: ISI Books, 2006), 98–102, 193–195.

[33] Ronald Reagan's June 29, 1979 broadcasts, "The Pope in Poland," and "A Tale of Two Countries," in Reagan, *Reagan, In His Own Hand*, 174–177.

After the Pope's visit to Poland, Reagan was never the same. It is possible that, at the same time, both these men, who had never met but whose lives and leadership would soon be entwined, came to the same strategic conclusion: the Communist emperor had far fewer clothes than previously imagined. A few months after Reagan came to the White House in 1981, he wrote: "I have had a feeling, particularly in view of the Pope's visit to Poland, that religion might very well turn out to be the Soviets' Achilles' heel."[34] From the beginning of his presidency, Reagan understood that the rise of Solidarity represented a major threat to Moscow and a major opportunity for the West. "This was what we had been waiting for since World War II," Reagan wrote in his autobiography. "What was happening in Poland might spread like a contagion throughout Eastern Europe."[35]

We tend to forget that during his presidency, Reagan's assessments of communism resonated with Pope John Paul II's teachings. Reagan quoted the Pope when speaking at a Polish festival in Pennsylvania and later at a White House luncheon marking the fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising: "Freedom is given to man by God as a measure of his dignity . . . As children of God, we cannot be slaves."[36] In an earlier speech, Reagan elaborated on this point:

> That's why the Marxist vision of man without God must eventually be seen as an empty and a false faith—the second oldest in the world—first proclaimed in the Garden of Eden with whispered words of temptation: 'Ye shall be as gods.' The crisis of the Western world . . . exists to the degree in which it is indifferent to God. The Western world does not know it but it already possesses the answer to this problem—but only provided that its faith in God and the

[34] Letter of July 9, 1981, to John O. Koehler, in Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 375. See Weigel, "The President and The Pope," *National Review Online* (April 2, 2005) [http://m.nationalreview.com/articles/214067/president-and-pope/george-weigel, accessed on 02.04.2014].

[35] Reagan, *An American Life*, 301. Both Reagan and Clark believed that Poland was the key to breaking the Soviet grip on Eastern and Central Europe. See Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 170.

[36] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at a White House Luncheon Marking the 40th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising," August 17, 1984 [http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/81784b.htm, accessed on 02.01.2014], and Reagan, "Remarks at a Polish Festival," Doylestown, Pennsylvania, September 9, 1984 [http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1984/90984a.htm, accessed on 02.01.2014].

> freedom He enjoins is as great as communism's faith in man. This is the real task before us: to reassert our commitment as a nation to a law higher than our own, to renew our spiritual strength. Only by building a wall of such spiritual resolve can we, as a free people, hope to protect our own heritage and make it someday the birthright of all men.[37]

Shortly after becoming President, Reagan wrote Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev asking him to join in shaping a lasting peace for people on both sides of the Iron Curtain. After Brezhnev's polemical response blaming the United States for the Cold War, Reagan understood that the Communists would have to be brought to the point of defeat before they would consider compromise. From then on, Reagan remained open to dialogue but developed and executed a strategy of economic and military competition intended to compete the Soviets into bankruptcy. Only then would they be ready to make the compromises that signaled a genuine peace.[38]

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[37] Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference, Washington, D.C., March 20, 1981," in *Speaking My Mind: Selected Speeches* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 99.

[38] "I really don't trust the Soviets, and I don't really believe that they will join us in a legitimate limitation of arms agreement" (Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 399). On March 26, 1982, President Ronald Reagan made the following entry in his diary: "Briefing on Soviet economy. They are in very bad shape and if we can cut off their credit they'll have to yell 'Uncle' or starve" (Reagan, *An American Life*, 316). In the first months of his presidency, Reagan was convinced that "[t]he great dynamic success of capitalism had given us a powerful weapon in our battle against communism—money. The Russians could never win the arms race; we could outspend them forever. Moreover, incentives inherent in the capitalist system had given us an industrial base that meant we had the capacity to maintain a technological edge over them forever" (Id., 267). Reagan pursued his strategy without much concern for politics: "If this is what the Lord would have me do, then we will find that out, and maybe it should be someone who has no political ambition, who is at an age where he can do what he thinks should be done without worrying about the votes in the next election" (Letter of June 19, 1979 to Ed Langley, in Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 229). Peter Schweizer was the first scholar to demonstrate that Ronald Reagan deliberately set out to win the Cold War. In two books—*Victory: The Reagan Administration's Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1994) and *Reagan's War: The Epic Story of His Forty-Year Struggle and Final Triumph Over Communism* (New York: Doubleday, 2002)—"Schweizer cited interviews with some of Reagan's national security and foreign policy staffers, national security directives, Reagan's speeches and private correspondence, and documents from several foreign countries, to argue that Reagan intentionally abandoned detente, moved beyond a passive containment policy, and pursued a strategy of victory" (Francis P. Sempa, "Ronald Reagan and the End of the Cold War,"

On May 17, 1981, Reagan gave the first public hint of his new strategy in a speech at the University of Notre Dame. He said: "The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism. It will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history whose last pages are even now being written."[39] Two years later, Reagan described the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" and went on to say: "I've always maintained that the struggle now going on for the world will never be decided by bombs or rockets, by armies or military might. The real crisis we face today is a spiritual one."[40] Reagan hated communism not only because it oppressed people economically and politically, but also because it oppressed people spiritually.[41] Despite criticism from experts and advisors, Reagan ploughed on with his defiant truth-telling. He believed that the great purpose for which he had been spared by God did not include sugarcoating the reality of totalitarianism.[42]

American Diplomacy (March 13, 2007) [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2007/0103/book/book_sempa03.html, accessed on 26.02.2014]).

[39] Ronald Reagan, "Address at University of Notre Dame," May 17, 1981 [http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-5854, accessed on 26.07.2014]. See also Ronald Reagan, "Remarks at the Annual Convention of the National Association of Evangelicals," Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983, in Reagan, *Speaking My Mind*, 180.

[40] Ronald Reagan, "Evil Empire Speech," March 8, 1983 [http://www.nationalcenter.org/ReaganEvilEmpire1983.html, accessed on 24.02.2014]. "I had always believed that, as an economic system, communism was doomed. Not only was it lacking in the free market incentives that motivated people to work hard and excel—the economic propulsion that had brought such prosperity to America—but history was full of examples showing that any totalitarian state that deprived its people of liberty and freedom of choice was ultimately doomed. The Bolshevik revolution had simply replaced an inherited aristocracy with a self-appointed one, the Soviet leadership, and it, like its predecessor, could not survive against the inherent drive of all men and women to be free" (Reagan, *An American Life*, 237).

[41] Michael Reagan, *The New Reagan Revolution*, 194–195.

[42] "At the time, however, Reagan seemed intellectually isolated. Henry Steele Commager, a distinguished presidential historian who claimed to have read every presidential address, called the 'evil empire' speech the worst in history. The Soviets called it 'lunatic anti-communism.' Allies were either silent or condemned Reagan's 'megaphone diplomacy'" (O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 89). Even Nancy Reagan and her friend Stuart Spencer, a Reagan campaign advisor, objected to the evil empire speech. See Paul Kengor, *The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism* (HarperCollins, 2006), 175. But Reagan understood the Soviet Union far better than the so-called experts who denounced him for refusing to buy the liberal dogma of a nuclear freeze, unilateral disarmament, and accommodation with the Soviets. See Andrew Nagorski, "Reagan Had It Right," *Newsweek International* (Oct. 21, 2002): 68 [http://www.newsweek.com/reagan-had-it-right-146237, accessed on 27.05.2014]. Reagan's reading of Whittaker Cham-

When Poland's Communist government arrested Solidarity's leaders and imposed martial law on December 13, 1981, Reagan was furious. Just one day later, he called the Pope to discuss the situation and said he looked forward to a time when the two could meet. "We can't let this revolution against communism fail without our offering a hand," Reagan wrote in his diary. "We may never have an opportunity like this in our lifetime."[43] In the first hours of the crisis, Reagan ordered that the Pope receive up-to-date and relevant American intelligence, including reports and analysis from Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a senior member of the Polish general staff and a CIA informant who courageously warned the U.S. that the Soviets were prepared to invade if the Polish government did not impose martial law.[44]

To express his anger over human rights violations in Poland, Reagan imposed a host of sanctions against both Poland and the Soviet Union. His strategy to squeeze the "evil empire" consisted of five pillars: 1) financial—providing covert financial (and intelligence support) to Solidarity and other forces opposing communist regimes; 2) political/economic—cooperating with Saudi Arabia to drive down the price of oil to reduce Soviet hard currency earnings, among many other forms of economic warfare intended to cripple the Soviet economy; 3) military— initiating a massive U.S. defense buildup aimed at outspending Moscow and bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table, including via the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); 4) ideological—advocating free market incentives as motivating people to work hard and excel, or as Reagan quipped: "Socialism only works in two places: Heaven where they don't need it and hell where they already have it;"[45] and, 5) moral—proclaiming that atheistic

bers' book *Witness* (New York: Random House, 1952) most likely contributed to his characterization of communism as concentrated evil. See Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 75–88.

[43] Reagan, *An American Life*, 301, 304; Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 55.

[44] Communist spies did manage to infiltrate the Pope's inner circle and Kuklinski may have been betrayed by a Soviet bloc spy inside the Vatican. See Francis Rooney, *The Global Vatican: An Inside Look at the Catholic Church, World Politics, and the Extraordinary Relationship between the United States and the Holy See* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 140–141. Reagan entertained the notion of using military force if Russia invaded Poland. See Kengor, *The Crusader*, 93–97.

[45] Steve Frank, "200 Ronald Reagan Quotations," Steve Frank's California Political News and Views [http://capoliticalnews.com/2013/04/09/200-ronald-reagan-quotations/, accessed on 26.02.2014]. Reagan had a great sense of humor: "How do you tell a communist? Well, it's someone who reads Marx and Lenin. And how do you tell an anti-communist? It's someone who understands Marx and Lenin" (Id.).

communism is living a lie that, when fully understood must ultimately fail.[46] As former Soviet officials later admitted, the Kremlin suddenly realized it was beyond their power to compete with Reagan.[47]

The full story has yet to be told, but it has been estimated that the U.S. alone covertly spent millions of dollars to keep Solidarity alive.[48] A successful revolution requires communication, so tons of equipment—fax machines, printing presses, transmitters, telephones, shortwave radios, video cameras, photocopiers, telex machines, computers, word processors—were smuggled into Poland via channels established by Catholic priests, American intelligence agents, and American and European labor movements. The U.S. embassy in Warsaw became the pivotal and most effective CIA station in the Communist world. Reagan discussed Poland with only his closest advisers; larger meetings were not considered leak proof. All of the major decisions on funneling aid to Solidarity and responding to the Polish and Soviet governments were made by Reagan, Casey, and Clark, often in consultation with John Paul II or (more specifically) his aides and liaisons, particularly Cardinal Pio Laghi, apostolic delegate to the United States.[48]

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[46] Norman A. Bailey, *The Strategic Plan that Won the Cold War* (McLean, VA: The Potomac Foundation, 1998). Reagan's initiatives also were linked to his courageous and, at the time, stunning vision of a nuclear free world. He was, in fact, a nuclear abolitionist. No one seemed to encourage him except Pope John Paul II. Because of his large defense buildup, Reagan's critics considered him a warmonger and influenced the May 3, 1983 National Conference of Catholic Bishops' peace pastoral, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response, A Pastoral Letter on War and Peace* (Washington, D.C, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops Inc., 1983). They failed to see that Reagan was a true radical who wanted to eliminate nuclear arms. Likewise, the Soviets never bought the idea that Reagan was increasing America's nuclear arsenal only to reduce nuclear weapons. They thought the U.S. was preparing its own "first-strike" capability. Reagan feared war with the Soviets intensely, but remained convinced that a "peace through strength" approach was the best strategy for dealing with them. He believed building up the military and even talking tough would avoid confrontation and the need for war.

[47] Nagorski, "Reagan Had It Right." Bill Clark was Reagan's point man for the "economic dimension" of the strategy. See Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 165. France strongly resisted Reagan's efforts to undermine the Soviet economy and concluded that Poland was doomed to continued communist rule. French President François Mitterrand vigorously stated, "[N]othing can happen in Poland. The very nature of the Communist movement will not allow anything to happen. If necessary, they will act brutally but it is impossible for them to allow the society to become liberal" (Id., 176–180).

[48] Fifty million dollars is a figure frequently cited, but it remains difficult to evaluate the precise nature and extent of financial aid provided to Solidarity which stems from "secret," "confidential," and "private" source material.

Just ten days after martial law was imposed, Reagan asked Americans during that Christmas season to light a candle in support of freedom in Poland. Two days earlier, the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Romuald Spasowski, and his wife met in private with the President. The Ambassador asked the President if he would light a candle and put it in the window for the people of Poland. Reagan immediately got up, lit a candle, and put it in the window of the White House dining room. Later, he escorted his guests in the rain to their car holding an umbrella over Mrs. Spasowska, as she wept on his shoulder.[50]

Meetings

Face to Face Encounters

President Reagan's first meeting with Pope John Paul II took place in the Vatican on June 7, 1982. Reagan's Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, prepared a report on topics on which the Vatican and U.S. might cooperate, including Poland. The report described the Pope as an admirer

[49] Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," *Time* (February 24, 1992): 28–35 [http://www.carlbernstein.com/magazine_holy_alliance.php, accessed on 25.05.2014]. "We were most active in Poland. We slowly increased our clandestine support of Solidarity, mainly by providing printing equipment and other means of communication to the underground. They were not told that C.I.A. was the source of the assistance, although there must have been suspicions . . . We provided a good deal of money and equipment for the Polish underground for this . . . I know that there was considerable sharing of information about developments in Poland with the Vatican . . . there were discussions at the highest level about the need to assist Solidarity" (Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 450).

[50] "Let those candles remind us that these blessings [of freedom and abundance] bring with them a solid obligation, an obligation to the God who guides us, an obligation to the heritage of liberty and dignity handed down to us by our forefathers and an obligation to the children of the world whose future will be shaped by the way we live our lives today" (Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation About Christmas and the Situation in Poland," December 23, 1981 [http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/122381e.htm, accessed on 15.02.2014]. A Marxist and patriotic Pole, Spasowski's faith in the Polish Communist regime wavered over time. The ascension of a Pole to the papacy served as the impetus for Spasowski's break with communism. See Romuald Spasowski, *The Liberation of One* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). A day or two after the crackdown when Alexander Haig notified Reagan that Ambassador Spasowski wanted to defect immediately, Reagan forthwith "welcomed Spasowski and his family to America as genuine Polish patriots. Subsequently, Reagan learned that the generals who ruled Poland had sentenced Ambassador Spasowski to death." See Kengor, *The Crusader*, 100–101, and Reagan, *An American Life*, 303.

of American generosity, distrustful of the Soviets, and critical of America's wastefulness and materialism. Declassified sections of this report show close agreement between the Pope and Reagan on Poland, and their movement toward agreeing on Central America, and arms control. The two leaders remained alone for fifty minutes in the Vatican Library to pray together and talk about life.[51]

We have no record of their private discussion. According to Reagan's National Security Adviser, William Clark, the Pope and the President referred to the "miraculous" fact that they had survived assassination attempts and shared a spiritual view and vision of the Soviet empire, namely, "that right or correctness would ultimately prevail in the divine plan." Atheistic communism lived a lie that when fully understood would cause its own demise.[52] Reagan convinced the Pope he was sincerely committed to peace and disarmament and that these commitments, which were compatible with both Catholic values and Vatican interests, would shape his U.S. policy. A cardinal, who was one of the Pope's closest aides, elaborated:

> Nobody believed the collapse of communism would happen this fast or on this timetable. But in their first meeting, the Holy Father and the President committed themselves and the institutions of the church and America to such a goal. And from that day, the focus was to bring it about in Poland.[53]

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[51] Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 87; O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 179–183.

[52] Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 210–211; Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 172–173.

[53] Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance." According to William Clark, "Reagan had an insatiable appetite for information on Poland . . . Often Reagan's first question at the daily briefing would be, 'What's happening in Poland'?" (Kengor, *The Crusader*, 134–135). Clark and William Casey frequently met secretly with Archbishop Pio Laghi, the apostolic delegate to Washington to share intelligence and brief him on the Reagan administration's positions. The existing records of these meetings remain classified. See Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 172–174. Neither Reagan nor John Paul II, each convinced that communism could be defeated, came to high office with a detailed plan for victory. Both expected, in the late 1970s, that the struggle would continue beyond their lifetimes. See Weigel, "The President and The Pope." "I don't claim the vision to have foreseen in 1984 all the dramatic changes that came later to the Communist world. But the events in China and Poland made me feel optimistic; they were an exciting glimmer on the horizon, the first public admission in the Communist world that communism wasn't working . . . a harbinger of its collapse" (Reagan, *An American Life*, 372). Indeed "even as late as 1984, the Pope did not believe the Communist Polish government could be changed" (Mark Riebling, "Freedom's Men: The Cold War

Reagan met with the Pope three more times: briefly in Fairbanks, Alaska in May 1984, where each had a stopover while traveling and Reagan briefed the Pope on his recent trip to China;[54] at the Vatican in June 1987, where the President held an hour-long, one-on-one meeting with the Pope who was preparing an upcoming visit to Poland and where Reagan offered the Pope his impressions of Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations;[55] and in September 1987, in Miami during the Pope's visit to the U.S. and Canada.[56]

Eventually, Reagan engaged in summit meetings and arms control negotiations with a reform-oriented Mikhail Gorbachev to manage the Cold War (and its end) peacefully.[57] Reagan's relationship with Gorbachev helped ensure the liberation of the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe from Soviet control during President George H.W. Bush's administration without violence, "without a shot being fired."[58] In February 1987, after

team of Pope John Paul II and Ronald Reagan," *National Review* (April 4, 2005) [http://old.nationalreview.com/comment/riebling200504040753.asp, accessed on 27.02.2014]).

[54] Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 237. Reagan told the Alaskans that when in China he spoke of American exceptionalism. He "tried to explain what America is and who we are—to explain to them our faith in God and our love, our true love, for freedom." John Paul II was pleased when he learned of Reagan's spiritual message to the Chinese. Reagan publicly stated that "America was founded by people who sought freedom to worship God and to trust in Him to guide them in their daily lives" (Reagan, "Remarks to Chinese Community Leaders," Beijing, China, April 27, 1984 as cited by Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 281–282). For an account of this "big speech" by the speechwriter, see Noonan, *What I Saw at the Revolution*, 79–83.

[55] Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 504.

[56] Id., 529.

[57] Unlike Reagan and the Pope who had a destination in mind, Gorbachev had no such map—even at the end in 1991, he still hung on to the possibility of reform communism, a hybrid that Reagan and John Paul II deemed impossible. Weigel, *The End and the Beginning*, 185. Gaddis, the influential Cold War historian, carefully concluded that Reagan ended the Cold War by "changing rather than containing" the Soviet Union: "What one can say now is that Reagan saw Soviet weaknesses sooner than most of his contemporaries did; that he understood the extent to which detente was perpetuating the Cold War rather than hastening its end; that his hard line strained the Soviet system at the moment of its maximum weakness; that his shift toward conciliation preceded Gorbachev; that he combined reassurance, persuasion, and pressure in dealing with the new Soviet leader; and that he maintained the support of the American people and of American allies . . . Reagan's role here was critical" (John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 375).

[58] Prime Minister Thatcher, the Iron Lady, always gave the credit to Reagan. As she said in her eulogy to him in 2004, Reagan "had a higher claim than any other leader to have won the

the Polish government pledged to open a dialogue with the Catholic Church, Reagan lifted U.S. sanctions against Poland. Though not entirely democratic, the victory of anti-communist candidates in the election held in June 1989 paved the way for the creation of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's cabinet and a peaceful transition to democracy both in Poland and elsewhere.[59] Poland's first postwar democratic government came into being on September 12, 1989—exactly ten years and three months after Pope John Paul II landed in Warsaw and appealed to God: "Let Your Spirit come down and renew the face of the land—this land."[60]

A Holy Alliance?

Some have maintained that following their first meeting in June 1982 Reagan and the Pope, acting on their compatible visions of global issues in the 1980s, shared intelligence and struck a deal, a "holy alliance," or clandestine campaign, in which the Pope promised silence on the installation of U.S. missiles in Europe or U.S. policy in Central America in return for Reagan's support in liberating Poland.[61]

We do know that secret U.S. assistance played an important role in Solidarity's survival and eventual triumph which was one of the turning

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Cold War for liberty—and he did it without a shot being fired" [http://reagan2020.us/eulogies/thatcher.asp, accessed on 05.06.2014]. Communism ended in 1991: in July, the Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved; on December 25, U.S. President George H. W. Bush, after receiving a phone call from Mikhail Gorbachev, delivered a Christmas Day speech acknowledging the end of the Cold War; on December 25, Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR; on December 26, The Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognized the dissolution of the Soviet Union and decided to dissolve itself, and on December 31, all Soviet institutions ceased official operations.

[59] A few weeks before the elections, Reagan received a visit from two Solidarity members and two Polish Americans hosting the men. Chris Zawitkowski, one of the hosts, asked Reagan if he had any words of wisdom or encouragement for the two Solidarity members and was taken aback when Reagan said: "Listen to your conscience because that is where the Holy Spirit speaks to you" (Kengor, *The Crusader*, 286–287).

[60] After the elections in Poland in 1989, where not a single Communist won, the demand for freedom spread to Czechoslovakia, then to Hungary, Bulgaria, and East Germany. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall was dismantled and on Christmas Day Romania rid itself of its dictator Nicolai Ceausescu. Two years later, Gorbachev resigned as leader of the Soviet Union. Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 334.

[61] The hypothesis of a "secret alliance" between John Paul II and Ronald Reagan was proposed by Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," and Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, *His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Times* (New York: Doubleday, 1996). Kengor (*The Crusader*, 139, and *God and Ronald Reagan*, 212) also thinks that the mutual effort of Reagan and the Pope was "a 'conspiracy' of sorts."

points in the history of the Cold War. And we know that the establishment of martial law in Poland led to a close collaboration, with the United States and the Holy See exchanging information and that President Reagan asked the Pope and Curia officials for guidance and support for policies such as economic sanctions against Poland.[62]

But the hypothesis of a "holy alliance" has been over-dramatized and overstated. First of all, sharing intelligence does not constitute an "alliance." Secondly, the hypothesis is chronologically deficient: John Paul II did his maximum damage to the Communist enterprise during his first pilgrimage to Poland in June 1979, 19 months before Ronald Reagan became president.[63] The availability of archival materials (i.e., the Reagan administration papers and those of William Wilson, the first U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See) and a closer look at the nature of the relationship indicate that, although U.S. and Vatican interests converged, they were not identical, and the Holy See did not back all American initiatives.[64] At times, the United States had to lobby intensively on numerous issues to convince the Vatican to back its policies—e.g., the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and Reagan's policy in Nicaragua. This seems to indicate that Vatican support for U.S. foreign policy was not always forthcoming.[65]

The Pope himself dismissed the "holy alliance" as an after the fact deduction:

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[62] Marie Gayte, "The Vatican and the Reagan Administration: A Cold War Alliance?" *The Catholic Historical Review* 97:4 (October 2011): 720. See also Reagan's entry for February 19, 1987 in Reagan, *The Reagan Diaries*, 476.

[63] Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 441–442. See O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 181–182. Tad Szulc, author of *Pope John Paul II: The Biography* (New York: Scribner, 1995), rejected the idea of such an alliance as a "myth . . . spawned in Washington" (John W. Carlson, "Seeking the Measure of John Paul II," *Kripke Center Newsletter* 8:2 (Spring 1997) [http://moses.creighton.edu/csrs/news/S97-2.html, accessed on 25.05. 2014]). "Marian Subocz, a spokesman for Poland's Catholic Bishops Conference, described the claim [of a holy alliance] as 'laughable.' Jan Litynski, a former spokesman for Solidarity, which played a leading role in overthrowing Poland's Communist government, described the book's allegations as 'total rubbish.' Of course, U.S. policy and the Pope's influence contributed to the collapse of communism. But far from being conspiratorial, the resistance struggle drew its power precisely from openness and transparency" (E.N.I., "Polish Church Denies Pope-CIA alliance," *Christian Century* 113:30 (October 23, 1996): 1007).

[64] Gayte, "The Vatican and the Reagan Administration," 720. Wilson, a businessman, fellow horseman, and old friend of Reagan's from California was a Catholic convert. See Rooney, *The Global Vatican*, 145.

[65] Gayte, "The Vatican and the Reagan Administration," 720.

> One cannot construct a case from the consequences. Everybody knows the positions of President Reagan as a great policy leader in world politics. My position was that of a pastor, the Bishop of Rome, of one with responsibility for the Gospel, which certainly contains principles of the moral and social order and those regarding human rights . . . The Holy See's position, even in regard to my homeland, was guided by moral principle.[66]

The Pope and Reagan had no plan or plot. They did have a strong psychological and emotional tie that started with their meeting on June 7, 1982, the likes of which have rarely been seen in modern politics.[67] Based on shared religious and intellectual convictions and an abhorrence, firmly anchored in their experience, of all attempts to deform the structures of society and, above all, of attempts to deform the nature of the human being—a being created and redeemed by God, a being who is free—they were going in the same direction and, under Reagan's direction, successfully collaborated to undermine communism. Richard Allen described the information sharing and a modicum of coordination between the CIA and the Vatican as a "silent alliance." This reinforces the point that "each of these institutions, for important reasons of its own, maintained a clear separation from the other in its activities." The Vatican did not want to abridge its neutral and independent status by entering into clandestine activity with the U.S. or any other country and evidence that the CIA was colluding with Solidarity would have undermined its antigovernment efforts.[68]

Conclusion

Various answers have been proposed to the question of who was most responsible for the fall of communism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War. Based on available evidence to date, a strong case can be made that the Pope and Reagan jointly did more than

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[66] Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 905, n. 13; Rooney, *The Global Vatican*, 141–144.

[67] Kengor, *The Crusader*, 139. In 1989, Reagan referred to the Pope as his "best friend" and continued, "Yes, you know I'm Protestant, but he's still my best friend" (Id, 287). Nancy Reagan also said that "John Paul II was Reagan's closest friend" (Mary Claire Kendall, "Reagan Revisited," *The Wanderer* 32 (August 6, 2009): 1). "Let me assure you the Pope is still Catholic and let me add, still a truly great human being" (Letter of June 25, 1987 to Phil Regan, in Reagan, *Reagan: A Life in Letters*, 735).

[68] Rooney, *The Global Vatican*, 143.

any others to bring about these astonishing events, even though neither one of these men ever claimed such credit for himself.[69]

John Paul II's soft power revolution that began with his visit to Poland in 1979 filled the spiritual void brought about by atheistic communism. He ignited the religious fervor and national spirit of the Polish people. He gave them a sense of self-confidence and hope that sustained them in the difficult decade that followed.[70] But a campaign just by Solidarity, even aided by the Pope, may have gotten no further than the Hungarians in

[69] Reagan did not see himself as specifically chosen by God to defeat the Soviet Empire, but he did believe that America and his White House team fulfilled God's will. Reagan was too humble to credit anyone except his overall team. He saw himself as an instrument of God, and one of many who contributed. See Kengor, *God and Ronald Reagan*, 213–216. John Paul II's analysis of the fall of communism in his 1991 encyclical *Centesimus Annus* nevertheless was a reminder of what he had accomplished. Citing the "violation of the rights of workers" and the "inefficiency of the economic system" as causes of what happened, he added: "The true cause of the new developments was the spiritual void brought about by atheism, which deprived the younger generations of a sense of direction and in many cases led them, in the irrepressible search for personal identity and for the meaning of life, to rediscover the religious roots of their national cultures, and to rediscover the person of Christ himself as the existentially adequate response to the desire in every human heart for goodness, truth and life" (John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*, 24). Similarly, "Bill Clark, the key player, nearly the whole show regarding the Soviet takedown . . . gave everyone else the credit . . . He wanted no credit for himself" (Kengor and Doerner, *The Judge*, 349). On Reagan's desk in the Oval Office was a sign that read: "There's no limit to what a man can do or where he can go if he doesn't care who gets the credit" (Lee Edwards, "Ronald Reagan's 'Secret' Crusade" [http://www.firstprinciplesjournal.com/articles.aspx?article=1381, accessed on 05.06.2014]).

[70] "To be sure, there were other factors in creating the Revolution of 1989: the policies of Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Helmut Kohl; Mikhail Gorbachev, a Soviet leader not formed in the brutalities of Stalin's purge trials; the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and their effects throughout Europe, and in linking human rights activists in the captive nations and the old democracies. But if we ask why communism collapsed *when* it did—in 1989 rather than 1999 or 2009 or 2019—and *how* it did—without mass violence (with the sole exception of Romania)—then sufficient account has to be taken of June 1979 and the revolution of conscience it ignited. This was a different kind of revolution, because the revolutionaries were a different sort of people—people who understood, as Adam Michnik aptly put it, that 'those who begin by tearing down Bastilles end up building their own'" (George Weigel, "And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: A Lecture Given at Grove City College" [http://www.eppc.org/publications/and-the-wall-came-tumbling-down, accessed on 24.02.2014]). Weigel argued in his *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (Oxford, 1992) that the current Pope played a greater role in defeating communism in Central and Eastern Europe than any figure besides, perhaps, Ronald Reagan. Dinesh D'Souza maintained that Reagan "was the decisive agent of change" (*Ronald Reagan: How an Ordinary Man Became an Extraordinary Leader* (New York: Free Press, 1997), 28).

1956 or the Czechs in 1968 without the hard power assistance which unfolded throughout the 1980s, namely, the rearmament of the West on which Reagan insisted in tandem with the robust ideological challenge that he mounted. Neither the Pope's soft power revolution nor Reagan's hard power challenge could have sufficed by itself. Each needed the other. Together soft power and hard power led to victory. Without formal coordination—even without much discussion between the principals—Reagan and John Paul II pursued, with astonishing success, parallel courses toward the same objective: the defeat of communism and the restoration of freedom in Eastern and Central Europe.[71]

Ronald Reagan died on June 5, 2004, just one day after President George W. Bush bestowed the Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor, on Pope John Paul II for his heroic efforts to topple communism. The Pope sent Mrs. Reagan his condolences recalling "with deep gratitude the late president's unwavering commitment to the service of the nation and to the cause of freedom as well as his abiding faith in the human and spiritual values which ensure a future of solidarity, justice, and peace in our world." The Pope morally endorsed Reagan's policies. He identified them with "service," "freedom," "solidarity," "justice," and "peace." Clearly, in the Pope's eyes, Reagan's policies not only had beneficial results but also were driven by good intentions—positive proof that their first meeting in 1982 at the Vatican where they discussed Reagan's foreign and defense policies, was a hinge of history.[72]

Less than a year later, on April 2, 2005, John Paul II died. Like the crowds that passed before Reagan's catafalque, the people in Rome were not grieving in the usual sense of the term, but rather giving thanks for the Pope's life.[73] Today, statues, monuments, streets, and squares throughout

[71] Rooney, *The Global Vatican*, 142.

[72] John Paul II further indicated his regard for Reagan by sending Cardinal Angelo Sodano, the secretary of state of the Holy See, to President Reagan's funeral. O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 328; Weigel, *The End and The Beginning*, 361. In 2007, Polish President Lech Kaczyński posthumously conferred on Reagan the highest Polish distinction, the Order of the White Eagle, stating that Reagan had inspired the Polish people to work for change and helped unseat the repressive communist regime—this "would not have been possible if it was not for the tough-mindedness, determination, and feeling of mission of President Ronald Reagan" ("President Kaczynski Presents Order of the White Eagle to Late President Ronald Reagan" [https://web.archive.org/web/20090305223044/http://poland.usembassy.gov/events_2007/president-kaczynski-presents-order-of-the-white-eagle-to-late-president-ronald-reagan--18-july-2007.html, accessed on 05.06.2014]).

[73] O'Sullivan, *The President, the Pope, and the Prime Minister*, 328–329.

Poland honor John Paul II and Ronald Reagan so that their contributions in bringing down the evil empire in that country remain alive in the minds and hearts not only of the Polish people but also of those everywhere who love freedom.

A POLISH POPE AND AN AMERICAN PRESIDENT: 1979–1989

SUMMARY

The author examines the shared religious and intellectual conviction, toughness, and an abhorrence of communism of Pope John Paul II and President Reagan that contributed to the demise of that system in Poland. The author discusses similarities between these two men; their approaches to communism; their meetings beginning in 1982; the hypothesis of a "holy alliance," and concludes that based on available evidence to date, a strong case can be made that the Pope and Reagan jointly did more than any others to bring about the fall of communism, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War.

KEYWORDS: Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, Poland, Communism.

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IMAGE AND *IMAGO*: A RATIONAL DEFENSE OF A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF GENDER

In the May 2014 issue of *Harper's Bazaar*, there was an interview with actress Kirsten Dunst. In the course of the interview, she talked about relationships and offered this statement:

> I feel like the feminine has been a little undervalued. We all have to get our own jobs and make our own money, but staying at home, nurturing, being the mother, cooking—it's a valuable thing my mom created. And sometimes, you need your knight in shining armor. I'm sorry. You need a man to be a man and a woman to be a woman. That's how relationships work.[1]

Depending on one's perspective, this is either a thoroughly commonsensical statement or else a betrayal of the struggle of being a woman in the 21st century. Trying to ascertain which way one should view this statement (and one cannot have it both ways in this specific instance) strikes at the heart of issues of gender identity, gender meaning, and gender confusion today. Modern and Post-Modern discourse espouses an increasingly plastic or subjective understanding on gender. As a result, confusions run rampant throughout discussions on subjects as practical as marriage and as theoretical as questions of human meaning and purpose.

Catholic theology provides a response to this problem with a consistent account of gender that is also compatible with the best evidence available in support of a purely rational approach. A better understanding of the true meaning and purpose of gender, especially in regard to relationships,

[1] *Harper's Bazaar* (May, 2014).

will lead to a better understanding of ourselves and all of our relationships, and ultimately to the betterment of culture as a whole. This can be demonstrated through a reflection on the core of the Church's teaching on gender as first revealed in Scripture, and then developed through the personalistic approach espoused by Pope Saint John Paul II, specifically in his Theology of the Body.

The specific element of Dunst's statement mentioned previously that caused such consternation was likely its implied commentary on contemporary feminism,[2] which is not necessarily the same thing as the contemporary crisis regarding gender. Feminism, after all, strives for the best realization of the unique gifts that women bring to culture, and in its broadest form is a noble and worthy enterprise.[3] But Dunst also stated that a man needs to be a man and a woman needs to be a woman. That is not something that can be taken for granted any longer.

Modern and Post-Modern thought on gender has reduced it from an element of being human that is readily recognizable and acknowledged as a given to a yet another characteristic of the person subject to radical self-definition. Along with these varying approaches in self-definition comes a dizzying multiplication of new vocabulary to define one's specific niche, often further distinguishing one's gender identity (or lack thereof) with one's predilections in regard to sexual pleasure. Thus, man and woman is first distinguished from male and female and then one can identify as being a trans-male or a trans-female, who in turn may identify as heterosexual or homosexual (which is very confusing to cisgendered men and women—the term for someone who identifies with one's biological sex characteristics). Beyond this, one may identify themselves as asexual or genderless. These different terms can be given further shades of meaning to produce an even greater variety of results.[4] In April, 2014, Facebook made the news when it

[2] For example, see http://uproxx.com/up/2014/04/shut-kirsten-dunst-kirsten-dunst-thinks-women-know-place-home/, accessed on 02.07.2014, and http://jezebel.com/kirsten-dunst-thinks-ladies-in-relationships-should-wif-1557845533, accessed on 02.07.2014.

[3] Cornelius Murphy defines feminism as "a struggle to correct laws and practices that prevent women from achieving full equality with men in all aspects of domestic and public life." See Cornelius F. Murphy, Jr., *Beyond Feminism: Toward a Dialogue on Difference* (Washington: Catholic University of America, 1995), 16. "In the most basic sense, feminism is exactly what the dictionary says it is: the movement for social, political, and economic equality of men and women," in Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards, *Manifesta: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future*, 10th Anniversary edition (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), 56.

announced that one could choose from one of 50 preset gender options for one's profile.[5]

New ways to understand gender identification have led to new questions about rights and roles in society. This inevitably leads to legal questions, and in the United States, for example, legal questions regarding gender identification have often been considered to be a part of the same conversation regarding rights for persons with same-sex attraction. The fact that these two phenomena are only tangentially related to one another has largely been lost in the discourse, as both parties benefit from the greater exposure that their political alliance offers.[6]

To what end all this specification? This depends on with whom you are speaking. Those in favor of subjective understandings of gender see the idea as necessary for true autonomy and self-understanding. They assert that the human experience is far more complicated than a mere binary distinction and, as its proponents purport to be happier as a result of a more nuanced understanding of gender, this is necessary for truly human rights.[7]

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[4] For more on this, see the American Psychological Association, *Answers to Your Questions About Transgender People, Gender Identity, and Gender Expression* [http://www.apa.org/topics/lgbt/transgender.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2014]. Also see *GLAAD Media Reference Guide—Transgender Issues* [http://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender, accessed on 28.08.2014]. According to GLAAD, one is not "born a man or a woman," but rather one is "assigned" at birth, thus describing the perceived lack of agency in one's subjective understanding.

[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/fashion/facebook-customizes-gender-with-50-different-choices.html?_r=0, accessed on 05.06.2014.

[6] The two related but distinct issues are how one identifies oneself according to the concept of sex and/or gender, and who one finds sexually attractive. Combining them, as is almost always done under the "LBTQ" moniker (and new letters are often added to this to account for new subjective variations), seems inaccurate from a legal point of view.

[7] A few examples that demonstrate this perspective: Arn Thornben Sauer and Aranka Podhora, "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Human Rights Impact Assessment," *United Nations Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal* 31:2 (2013): 135–145; Shannon L. Sennott, "Gender Disorder as Gender Oppression: A Transfeminist Approach to Rethinking the Pathologization of Gender Non-Conformity," *Women and Therapy* 34:1 (Jan–June 2011): 93–113; Trevor A. Corneil, Justus H. Eisfeld, and Marsha Botzer, "Proposed Changes to Diagnoses Related to Gender Identity in the DSM: A World Professional Association for Transgender Health Consensus Paper Regarding the Potential Impact on Access to Health Care for Transgender Persons," *International Journal of Transgenderism* 12:2 (Apr–June 2010): 107–114; Maya Sabatello, "Advancing Transgender Family Rights Through Science: A Proposal for an Alternative Framework," *Human Rights Quarterly* 33:1 (February, 2011): 43–75.

The counterpoint to this suggests that this is merely emotive rhetoric. Ignoring the binary distinctions of man and woman, male and female, creates challenges for anyone in any way responsible for helping others to understand the value and meaning of being human. This includes parents, educators, health care professionals, and law makers, to name just a few. While hard data is a little difficult to come by, a 2011 report released by the Williams Institute stated that 3 in 1000 Americans identified as transgendered, though much of this data was obtained from studies conducted in California and Massachusetts, in which more progressive ideas about being human might find greater support.[8] Yet, language is important here, because other studies report as much as two to five percent of the population exhibits some form of gender dysphoria, though this is more broadly classified to include any discomfort with one's biological identity, without necessarily including identification with the opposite sex.[9]

These numbers, while not miniscule, reveal that anywhere from 95 to 99.7% percent of the population identify with their biological sex. Yet a disproportionate amount of energy is placed on changing cultural perspectives on subjective gender as well as the laws to protect gender identification as a category.[10] This does not include the additional challenges discovered in the mental health community, when trying to determine whether the increased prevalence of depression and other emotional disorders among those who identify with a subjective view of their own gender is a result of cultural pressure that does not accept their self-understanding, or whether gender dysphoria is not one aspect of more comprehensive difficulties in one's mental health.[11]

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[8] *How many people are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender?* (The Williams Institute, April, 2011) [http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf, accessed on 26.07.2014].

[9] See "Gender Identity Disorder: An Emerging Problem for Pediatricians," *Pediatrics* (February 20, 2012) [http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/129/3/571.long, accessed on 28.08.2014], and *Transgender Issues: A Fact Sheet*, [http://www.transgenderlaw.org/resources/transfactsheet.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2014].

[10] In the state of Massachusetts, the Department of Education issued a formal set of guidelines for dealing with the miniscule minority of persons identifying themselves as transgender, including allowing students access to changing rooms based solely on gender identity, as long as that identity is "sincerely held." *Guidance for Massachusetts Public Schools Creating a Safe and Supportive School Environment—Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Gender Identity* (Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education) [http://www.doe.mass.edu/ssce/genderidentity.pdf, accessed on 01.08.2014].

[11] For some examples of the complexity of this question, see James D. Weinrich and J. Hampton Atkinson, Jr., "Is Gender Dysphoria Dysphoric?" *Archives of Sexual Behavior*

Overall, we have great confusion about questions of gender in the west and we have adopted varying views in an attempt to answer these questions. As a generalization of the secular world, there is a movement towards the normalization of the subjective definition of gender: a recognition that, while most people will simply identify with one's biological constitution, if one does not, then that should be recognized, accepted, and legally supported as simply an alternative but equally valid way of being human.

In order to better understand what the Catholic tradition might bring to this situation, a better understanding of the concepts of gender and image are necessary. Theories of gender can be broadly distinguished between essential understandings of gender and constructionist understandings of gender.[12] In the not so distant past, essentialism was understood as normative, but now constructionism is widely accepted, especially in the halls of academia.[13]

24:1 (February, 1995): 55–71; Emma Dargie, Karen L. Blair, Caroline F. Pukall, and Shannon M. Coyle, "Somewhere Under the Rainbow: Exploring the Identities and Experiences of Trans Persons," *Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality* 23:2 (2014): 60–74; Walter O. Bockting, Michael H. Miner, Rebecca E. Romine, Autumn Hamilton, and Eli Coleman, "Stigma, Mental Health, and Resilience in an Online Sample of the US Transgender Population," *American Journal of Public Health* 103:5 (May, 2013): 943–951; Walter Bockting, "Are Gender Identity Disorders Mental Disorders? Recommendations for Revision of the World Professional Association for Transgender Health's Standards of Care," *International Journal of Transgenderism* 11:1 (2009): 53–62; Randall D. Ehrbar, "Consensus from Difference: Lack of Professional Consensus on the Retention of the Gender Identity Disorder Diagnosis," *International Journal of Transgenderism* 12:2 (Apr–June, 2010): 60–74; Colin A. Ross, "Ethics of Gender Identity Disorder," *Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry* 11:3 (2009): 165–170. While some of these authors present arguments regarding *why* transgenderism may be a disorder, the overwhelming majority do not consider it a disorder.

[12] On essentialism, for example, see Yves Christen, *Sex Differences: Modern Biology and the Unisex* Fallacy, trans. Nicholas Davidson (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991). On constructionism, for example, see Rosalyn Diprose, *The Bodies of Women: Ethics, Embodiment and Sexual Difference* (London: Routledge, 1994), esp. 18–37. See also Christopher P. Klofft, *Living the Love Story: Catholic Morality in the Modern World* (Staten Island: St. Paul's, 2008), 61–64. Susan Parsons uses slightly different language in distinguishing between a "naturalist" view (rather than essentialist) and two different ways of looking at the constructionist position. She makes a distinction between "liberal" and "social constructionist," based on differing paradigms of equality and justice. See *Feminism and Christian Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996).

[13] It is difficult to cite specific examples to demonstrate this in a comprehensive fashion. However, any search of either the "gender studies" program in any college or university, or a search for "gender" in an academic database, reveals an overwhelming number of

Essentialism asserts that a person's biological makeup is also in some way constitutive of one's personhood. In other words, it simply matters if one is born a man or a woman. The biological and hormonal differences between men and women are not accidents, but rather elements that enable us to understand what it means to be human in both our similarities and our differences. Our body types, the ways in which hormones affect our bodies and our neurochemistry, even certain culturally consistent predilections about the meaning of man and woman, all work together to define two different but complementary kinds of persons in the human community.

In its most extreme form, essentialism could go so far as to suggest that men and women are different creatures in their essence—two different species capable of interbreeding. This is a theologically untenable position. In the Incarnation, God became man—literally—and, paraphrasing Gregory Nazianzus, "that which is not assumed is not saved."[14] Therefore, a radical essentialist account of gender would deny salvation to women, which is simply not true.

The counterpoint to gender essentialism is constructionism. Constructionism denies the value of any sort of biological determinism when it comes to gender. Constructionism distinguishes between sex, one's biological identity as revealed through one's primary and secondary sex characteristics, and gender, which is a social construct formed by attitudes and ideas coming from one's self-understanding and/or the culture around the person. There can be little doubt that culture does have an effect on gender understanding. One of the challenges of discussing gender today is working through disagreements about what might actually constitute a real distinction between men and women and what might be merely a social attitude that could be changed. Constructionism sees one's identity as biological man or woman equally or perhaps less important than one's understanding of oneself as male or female, which may or may not have any relation to one's biology.

In its radical form, more manifest now than in any time in the past, constructionism becomes the situation described earlier: one's understanding of oneself is not bound by biology, nor even necessarily guided by the

examples of gender constructionism, broadly understood. By contrast, gender essentialism remains either a minority view, highly specialized in a biological context, or presented merely for critique.

[14] "To gar aproslepton, atherapeuton ho de henotai to theu, touto kai sozetai" (Gregory Nazianzus, *Letter*, 101.5).

larger culture, but rather solely defined by one's self. Functionally speaking, there are as many genders as there are persons, with classifying vocabulary merely being used as a convenient shorthand for generalization, but which is not ultimately accurate. One of the strongest arguments against radical constructionism is simply common sense, as defined by Aquinas.[15] There is a reason why the overwhelming majority of people throughout recorded human history have divided people as men and women: because it is simply true.

What is at stake for many people struggling with the question of gender is the matter of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is certainly important for one's psychological and spiritual well-being, for the quality of one's relationships, for some degree of success in one's professional life, and most especially in one's quest for Truth and growth in holiness. Proponents of a subjective definition of gender assert that the ability to define one's gender as one understands oneself is a necessary part of understanding—even defining—one's self-image.

There seems to be a critical difference between the idea of understanding one's self-image and defining one's self-image. Certainly, there are elements to one's self-image that are chosen and that are personal or even unique to each individual: one's taste in music, the style of one's hair, one's preference for flavor when eating ice cream. But while these can be important characteristics in a person's sense of self, they have little or no effect on the level of the very personhood of the individual in question.

Gender, however, is a characteristic that *does* go to the core of what it means to be a human person. As such, can it be something that is defined by one's own perceptions and subsequently thrust upon those with whom one is in relationship? Are one's personal perceptions automatically to be taken as accurate for that person because they come from within? Or rather, is it possible that this aspect of one's image, one's gender, is something that can only be *discovered* rather than defined by oneself?

The revelation of God about the meaning of the human person as taught by the Catholic Church reveals that we are creatures, lovingly fashioned by a Craftsman Who is Himself personal and relationship. Therefore, even with all the delight we human beings can experience in a journey of

[15] *ST* I, 78, 4 ad 2. Part of the role of the common sense is to distinguish between the real and fantasy, to utilize the data provided by the senses and arrive at a conclusion as to what is really real.

self-discovery throughout our corporeal lives,[16] there are elements of ourselves that are simply defined from the moment of our conception.[17]

There is a benefit to acknowledging and accepting one's gender based on one's biology. It is easier and convenient. It simplifies relationships with others, especially people who we may not know as well. It promotes good physical health. It leads to psychological wholeness and easier spiritual growth. And perhaps most importantly, it is better for a person to live in conformity with the Truth that has been revealed by God and in nature than to try to establish one's own personal world amidst worlds of different persons. To put it more simply, the Catholic tradition is grounded in revelation, but also common sense.

The teaching of the Church has always espoused a moderate essentialist account of gender, as revealed through the first witness of Scripture. The creation accounts in Genesis describe the explicit creation of human persons as man and woman. "Then God said: Let us make human beings in our image, after our likeness . . . God created mankind in his image; in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them" (Gn 1:26–27). Two things are important in this passage. First and foremost, all human beings are created in the image of God, the *imago Dei*. God is the author of the human person and we are all created in His image, not in an image of our choosing. Second, being made in the image of God means being made specifically as male or female. Not only is this a defense of a binary account of gender, but the very idea that we are God-like is specifically revealed through our maleness and femaleness, not through any other characteristic that might have been described.

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[16] The first chapter of *Gaudium et spes* begins by defining the human person as being made in the image of God (*GS* 12), and notes that: "When he is drawn to think about his real self he turns to those deep recesses of his being where God who probes the heart awaits him, and where he himself decides his own destiny in the sight of God. So when he recognizes in himself a spiritual and immortal soul, he is not being led astray by false imaginings that are due to merely physical or social causes. On the contrary, he grasps what is profoundly true in this matter" (*GS* 14).

[17] To avoid additional complexity, I am avoiding consideration of the phenomenon of intersex human beings, in which even the biological fact of the person as male or female is not necessarily clear. For more information on intersex persons in general, see *What is Intersex?* (Intersex Society of North America) [http://www.isna.org/faq/what_is_intersex], accessed on 21.08.2014]. For some thoughts on one possible approach to this issue from a theological context, see the work of Susannah Cornwall, especially "Recognizing the Full Spectrum of Gender? Transgender, Intersex and the Futures of Feminist Theology," *Feminist Theology* 20 (May, 2012): 236–241. Her approach is illustrative of a subjective understanding of gender.

The creation account in Genesis 2 specifically describes the relationship between men and women.[18] In the familiar story of the Garden of Eden, we read of our creation and also of our first disobedience against our Creator; in a sense, our first attempt to define our own image apart from the *Imago* in which we were created.[19] While the details of this story are straightforward, there is a greater depth about the meaning of man and woman that can be uncovered here. And there is no better teacher in the modern world in this regard than Pope Saint John Paul II.[20]

John Paul II's Theology of the Body, his weekly catecheses from 1979 to 1984, present a comprehensive "body" of thought on the relationship between God, our bodily nature, and personhood. The first part of the catecheses present a thorough explication of Genesis 1–3, especially Genesis 2, that reveals a deep understanding of the meaning of man and woman in the context of our creation in the *Imago Dei*.

Focusing on his presentation of Genesis 2, John Paul II begins by describing the creation of the creature in the garden. This creature, not defined as man or woman, but merely as *adam*, human being, is made of the muck of the earth: it is a corporeal creature.[21] Yet, God breathes into it and makes it a living being. This breath establishes the creature's personhood, as it now possesses God's spirit dwelling within it.[22]

This leads to the first of three Original Experiences described by John Paul. These Original Experiences of Genesis 2 are contrasted with the experience of Original Sin in Genesis 3. The first Original Experience is Original Solitude. The creature, made in the *imago Dei*, recognizes that is a subject amidst a world of objects, and in this recognition, also comes to realize that it is alone.[23] God creates more creatures, but none of these are

[18] Genesis 2 is actually the first account of creation, the Yahwist account, written c. 10th c. BC, while the Priestly account in Genesis 1 dates to c. 6th c. BC.

[19] Specifically, the serpent says to the woman, "God knows that when you eat of it your eyes will be opened and you will be like gods, who know good and evil" (Gn 3:4). What the serpent is suggesting is that the woman will be able to know for herself and be able to choose for herself. Her personal subjectivity could be in contrast with the objective design of the Creator in Genesis 2.

[20] For additional theological reflection on gender complementarity, see also Prudence Allen, "Man–Woman Complementarity: The Catholic Inspiration," *Logos* 9:3 (2006): 87–108; "Integral Sex Complementarity and the Theology of Communion," *Communio* 17 (Winter, 1990): 523–544, and "Self-Creation and Loss of Self: Mary Daly and St. Teresa of Avila," *Studies in Religion* 6:1 (1976–1977): 67–72.

[21] Pope John Paul II, General audience of October 10, 1979.

[22] Pope John Paul II, General audience of October 31, 1979.

a fit companion for the creature, as none of them are made in the Image as it is.

Thus, God, in His recognition that it is not good for the creature to be alone (Gn 2:18), puts it into a deep sleep and constructs a new creature out of the muck of the earth and the rib of the first creature. John Paul II describes the mystical significance of this sleep in two ways. The first is that the creature has fallen asleep and, in a sense, has dreamed up his fit companion. In another way, sleep is likened to annihilation; in this way, God, through his creative initiative, remakes His creature who then e-merges from sleep as male and female.[24]

This leads to the second experience, the experience of the Original Unity of Man and Woman. The man, who we can now call a man instead of a mere creature,[25] sees the answer to his longing in the presence of the woman, contained in his exclamation: "This one at last is bone of my bones, flesh of my flesh!" The original creation, the creature made in the *Imago*, is now fully revealed: two different ways of being a body, two different ways of being made in the Image of God.[26] These two different bodies also have the capacity to unite, to form one body, in the experience of marriage, which John Paul II describes as "the primordial sacrament."[27] This union is also described using one of his favorite phrases throughout the catecheses as a *communio personarum*, a "communion of persons."[28] The answer to the longing of the solitude of the individual is to enter into relationship, and this is especially realized in the marital relationship of a man and a woman. Manhood and womanhood are corporeal realities that are discovered, not chosen, and they would make no sense otherwise, because bodily man and woman were literally made for each other.

The final Original Experience in Genesis 2 is the Original Nakedness: "The man and his wife were both naked, yet they felt no shame" (Gn 2:25). The full meaning of this experience is less relevant to the present discussion, but it does indicate that in their bodily awareness from the first moment of creation, the man and the woman did not fear one another, physically, emotionally, or spiritually.[29] It is not beyond the

[23] Pope John Paul II, General audience of October 24, 1979.
[24] Pope John Paul II, General audience of November 7, 1979.
[25] Id.
[26] Pope John Paul II, General audience of November 14, 1979.
[27] Pope John Paul II, General audience of February 20, 1980.
[28] Pope John Paul II, General audience of November 14, 1979. In his use of the phrase, John Paul II is recalling *Gaudium et spes* 12, referenced above (n. 16)

intention of the Theology of the Body to also suggest that the man and the woman did not feel shame at their own corporeality, their own recognition of themselves as man and woman.[30] This is not just about their bodies; their very personhood was constituted as man and woman. Our bodies reveal our personhood. The way that we are made is a cause for joy and wonder at the mystery of God's love; when it becomes a matter of psychological discomfort or shame, perhaps a prayerful return to the design of the Creator might yield better results than trying to re-define reality according to one's own perceptions, as if one's personhood could differ from the reality of one's body.

This brief exposition of the first part of Pope Saint John Paul II's Theology of the Body only begins to plumb the depths of human experience uncovered by the Holy Father's reflections. Much more is said about the meaning of marriage, parenthood, the family, celibacy, and the way that bodies influence and contribute to our growth in holiness, our greater conformity to the *imago Dei*. All of this makes sense because it takes seriously the first fact that human beings are deliberately fashioned as man and woman and for a purpose.

Despite the philosophical language of John Paul II and his obvious foundation in Sacred Scripture, it is important to note that many of his conclusions about the nature of man and woman are not explicitly sectarian; one does not need to accept the fundamental premises of Christianity in order to see the wisdom in his teaching. Human persons come into being and come to identify themselves through the medium of their bodies.[31] This discovery fundamentally reveals the person as either

[29] See Pope John Paul II, General audiences of December 12 and December 19, 1979.

[30] "[T]he words 'they were not ashamed' can mean *in sensu obliquo* only an original depth in affirming what is inherent in the person, what is 'visibly' female and male, through which the personal intimacy of mutual communication in all its radical simplicity and purity is constituted. To this fullness of exterior perception, expressed by means of physical nakedness, there corresponds the interior fullness of man's vision in God, that is, according to the measure of the 'image of God.'" Pope John Paul II, General audience of December 19, 1979.

[31] See the recent article by Helen Alvare, "Reflecting on Complementarity" (Pontifical Council for the Laity) [http://www.laici.va/content/laici/en/sezioni/donna/tema-del-mese/Complementarita.html, accessed on 14.08.2014]. Also see Madhura Ingalhalikar, Alex Smith, Drew Parker, Theodore D. Satterthwaite, Mark A. Elliott, Kosha Ruparel, Hakon Hakonarson, Raquel E. Gur, Ruben C. Gur, and Ragini Verma, "Sex differences in the structural connectome of the human brain," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 111:2 (2014): 823–828. This is a recent article noting the "hard-wired" differences between men and women, immediately challenged by those who prefer a subjective account

male or female. Knowledge of the self, and the peace and wholeness that that brings, includes the simple acceptance of this observation. While some people may experience a disconnect on this level of self-understanding, the reasonable conclusion would be to counsel such persons towards a greater integration of their corporeal reality with their troubled subjective identification.

Gender has become yet another locus of cultural crisis in the 21st century west. The problems associated with gender are hardly new: reflections on the specific roles and recognition of the particular contributions of women has been around since the beginning of the modern era. Related to this discussion are equally important conversations about the meaning of parenthood and family and the definition of marriage. But these conversations have made possible new conversations—ones that strike at the very fundamental meaning of the human person: our identity as men and women. Looking back at the history of the west over the past 75 years, it is fairly obvious to see that the problem brought about by a subjective understanding of the concept of gender stemmed from the core conceits of modernity itself: the turn to the subject ultimately suggested that everything about ourselves is up for grabs, subject not only to exploration, but also manipulation. The sin of our first parents remains: we desire to be the selfish gods of our own private universes in which we engage with the Truth only when it is convenient.

The results of this have been significant and far-reaching. Important public discussions on the nature and meaning of the family, marriage, and parenting have all been complicated by confusion about gender. Legislation now serves to protect each individual's self-identity rather than work towards the common good of our shared humanity. Mental health professionals have accepted a curious inversion in which each person can establish their own definition of mental health, while criticizing as neurotic anyone who holds to an objective view of reality, especially in matters of human sexuality. In short, we have an ever expanding multiplicity of images of the human person, while neglecting the good that comes from conforming ourselves to the Image of our Creator.

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of gender. See, for example, "The Most Neurosexist Study of the Year?" *Slate* (December 4, 2013) [http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/science/2013/12/hard_wired_brain_differences_critique_of_male_female_neuroscience_imaging.html, accessed on 21.08. 2014].

The work ahead of us is daunting, but the end result is sure. For the immediate future, there will continue to be curious laws, broken relationships, dangerous misunderstandings of human sexuality, depression, suicide, and one or more generations of children growing up confused about what it means to be a human person. The Catholic tradition offers an alternative to this, one which is founded in God's revelation, but because of that, it is also accessible to human reason and common sense. For those who are a part of this tradition, our role for now is to educate when possible, demonstrate by the example of our own lives, and pray continuously as St. Paul exhorts us (1 Thes 5:17). The simple truth remains this: human persons all share happiness as their final end and nothing can ultimately satisfy that longing except for relationship with the Creator in Whose image we are made. Being witness to this truth in a world full of confused images can lead to nothing less than the transformation of culture.

IMAGE AND *IMAGO*: A RATIONAL DEFENSE OF A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY OF GENDER

SUMMARY

Modern and Post-Modern discourse espouses a subjective understanding of gender. As a result, confusing new problems erupt in discussions as practical as marriage and as theoretical as questions of human meaning and purpose. Catholic theology, drawing primarily from the personalistic approach to gender contained in Pope John Paul II's Theology of the Body, provides a consistent account of gender that is also compatible with the best evidence available in support of a purely rational approach. A defense of this approach could lead to a better understanding of ourselves and our relationships, to the betterment of culture as a whole.

KEYWORDS: gender, anthropology, John Paul II, theology of the body, sexuality, common sense.

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COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE RESTORATION OF SACRED ART

Is art really meant as something that simply pleases, attracts the emotions when seen, simply relegated to the pleasurable? During a walk through the busy Metropolitan Museum of Art, on a weekday with tour groups of secondary school students who have come face to face with John Henry Sargent's *Madame X*, would inevitably hear the outcry, "Oh, that's cool." News headlines about art auctions of Ming vases to Old Masters do not emphasize the beauty of a masterpiece but its monetary price, as if it were merely a capital investment. Is beautiful art something then so perfunctory that one can actually dismiss a masterpiece as "cool?" or seek to appellate the masterpiece as a product to be bought and sold, an investment? What can religious art tell us about the experience of beauty, and if we have lost a sense of beauty in our churches? May *common sense* see, argue towards, and apprehend the *totum bonum* through simple manifestations of "Cool" and "Mine," where even the religious can fall within the range solely of the subjective and individual?

It has often been said by Pope Benedict XVI,[1] and it was a crisis which Josef Pieper[2] examined, that modernity has lost the sense of the sacred. It can be seen, especially in the design and decoration of churches, from suburban America to Padre Pio's new shrine in San Giovanni Rotondo, that there has been a rupture between this period's artistic/liturgical style and that of the Baroque, Classical or Gothic eras. La Madeleine in Paris as well as St. Peter's Basilica in Rome have a common, otherworldly

[1] Cf. Benedict XVI, *Ubicumque et Semper*, Apostolic Letter as "Motu Proprio" (September 21, 2010).
[2] Cf. Josef Pieper, *In Search of the Sacred: Contributions to an answer* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991).

trajectory, a ship on pilgrimage heading Eastwards, towards the Rising Sun representing the Risen Christ, and the beginning of the Eternal Day of the New Creation. The sacred is manifested in these buildings through Classical design. They have a cosmological *telos* to a glorious reality that is tasted here within this sacred building but not yet, of the transcendent kingdom represented by the height of the statues and of the immense dimensions of the interior space.

Religious imagery encompasses the *sacred* and the *devotional*. The definition of the *sacred* must first be established in order to have a renewal of liturgical art and architecture. The term *Sacred* comes from the Latin, *Sacer*, which translates the biblical usage of *qadosh* or *hagios*. It represents a liturgical purpose: separated or consecrated for the service of God; *Devotional Art* whose ambient is secular or *profano* can be found in the great halls of Palazzo Spada, that is in the home, or even in a bureau. In the island yonder called Manhattan, Bellini's *St. Francis in the Desert* is at home in Henry Clay Frick's living room. However, S*acred art* has a milieu that is *liturgical* in dimension, and thus is considered dedicated to God's ritual service. Some of the greatest masterpieces such as Michelangelo's *Sistine Chapel* and Raphael's *Transfiguration* are considered sacred art. Thus, in viewing them, one sees that they are at home amidst Gregorian chant, polyphony, incense, lit candles and vested ministers facing East standing before an altar, offering prayers to the direction of the rising sun. Whether the purpose is liturgical or devotional, religious art is often used for the edification of the individuals who see them in a church or a home. Though we are thankful for the Metropolitan Museum of Art, the milieu of *sacred works of art* is not in a museum, and *devotional art* should be seen within the context of a sanctification of the secular. In both instances, Religious Imagery, bears within it the imprint of the numinous *mysterion* in tangible form, whether that be a symbol, a vestment, architecture or painting; truths of God that are mysteries and known through Faith; revealed by the God-Man, which for eons was hidden amongst angels but now symbolically visible in created beauty.

Religious Imagery in general, comprises of the union of Divine Revelation and the artistically beautiful. By its beauty, it attracts man to love a transcendent theme. Being attracted is very important. In his famous work, *Six Great Ideas*, Mortimer Adler bases beauty on Thomas Aquinas'

own definition of beauty, "*Pulchrum est id quod visum placet*."[3] However, Adler rightly points out that *videre* and *placere* do not mean the same things in our day as in Aquinas' day; *Videre* used here is a contemplative way of seeing, especially with regard to understanding the Truth; this is like the biblical term, *theorein*, "to see and to contemplate" especially when it concerns seeing a divine act such as miracles[4] and angels.[5] Thus those things *visum* are given a wider definition especially when it comes to the object of the sight, one can contemplate the ineffable form through the material; *placere* is released from the narrow mindedness of only a delight in the emotions to carnal things, but finds fulfillment in finding joy in possessing a vision of the spiritual *cognoscitive*.

The content of the religious image—that which is seen—is based upon imitation of usually, an historical scene, from the Scriptures or the Lives of the Saints. The word *imitation* is of great importance here when discussing the arts. Aristotle describes at least poetic imitation as the activity that differentiates man from the animals. What Aristotle says about *Poetry* can be said analogically about *religious art*: "Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is natural for all to delight in works of imitations."[6] However, artistry is no photographic imitation of nature, narration or history; it is rather an *elaboration* on how the artist has first seen the model or prototype, how he has contemplated it and thus expressed it by his *ars*.[7] A great amount of contemplative interpretation is necessary to portray the interior meaning of the object imitated. Aristotle says,

> The objects the imitator represents are actions, with agents who are necessarily either good men or bad—the diversities of human character being nearly always derivative from this primary distinction, since it is by badness and excellence men differ in character. It follows, therefore, that the agents represented, must be either above our

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 5, 4 ad primum, BAC, Salamanca 1965: "*pulchra enim dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis virtus cognoscitiva*."
[4] Cf. Jn 2:23; 6:19.
[5] Cf. Jn 20:12.
[6] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 4, 5–8, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941).
[7] *Ars* can be translated as "skill."

> own level of goodness, or beneath it, or just such as we are; in the same way as, with the painters, the personages of Polygnotus are better than we are, those of Pauson worse, and those of Dionysius just like ourselves.[8]

For Aristotle especially, artists portray a moral lesson, elaborating the individual or scene portrayed in terms of the good or the evil. There is moral value behind physical depiction. The sacred artist can easily analogize this experience by portraying the sacred vs. the profane, graceful vs. sinful. Portraying moral/spiritual values is the language of the artist. In this way, the scenery can be portrayed, and the entire ambient of the painting can seek to portray this end. The contrast between darkness and light, a technique called *chiaroscuro*, can be used as a metaphor symbolizing the light of Christ's grace dispelling the darkness of sin and ignorance.

The Council of Trent emphasized that sacred art in order to be beautiful has to reflect with accuracy and be proportionate to sacred history comprising of the lives of the Saints, excerpts from the Bible, historical events in Church history, or Divine or saintly persons.[9] The Tridentine perspective wished to portray to the individual his or her *telos* mediated through created/artistic beauty by using a nuanced meaning of sacred history. This was all termed in the 16th and 17th centuries, where a great amount of sacred art was being produced based on *Historia*. *Historia* did not mean a simplification of historical events simply according to time period and succession. Rather, *Historia* for the entire tradition of sacred art meant historical reality yes, but through artistic composition, drew the mind of the viewer into knowing and desiring the painting. Thus *historia* has more than a physical or empirical component, but one where the historical was united to the realization of an intellectual, emotional and even spiritual history that would attract the beholder.[11] With regard to uniting Faith and *historia*, a historical event in the life of Christ or a Saint would encompass the invisible moral and divine meaning present in the Judeo-Christian view of history, where the transcendent God *acts* intimately in

[8] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 2, 1–6.

[9] Cf. Council of Trent, *De Invocatione, veneration et reliquiis sanctorum, et de sacris imaginibus*, Session 25, December 3–4, 1563, in *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, vol. 2, ed. Norman P. Tanner (Georgetown, Washington DC 1990): "Bishops should teach with care that the faithful are instructed and strengthened by commemorating and frequently recalling the articles of our faith through the expression in pictures or other likenesses of the [histories] of the mysteries of our redemption (***per historias mysteriorum nostrae redemptionis***) . . ."

the midst of men's history, giving a providential dimension according to the *oikonomia* of salvation. The vision of history, not just seeing a chronology of events, was thus symbolic and worthy of contemplation, especially when the hand of Providence was involved in the minute matters of men. It really was an allegorical interpretation of not only the Bible, but of the ancients as well.

This accurate *imitation of historia*[11] is what St. Gregory the Great emphasized that religious art was *biblia pauperum*[12] or books for the unlearned. Artistic design and the harmony of colour was then, a poetry of the natural and divine significations of *historia* as Truth. In Byzantium, it was the face of Christ that settled the imitation of *historia* within the iconoclast debates of the 8th century.[13] The question of whether He was circumscribable or not allowed for a greater nuance into the portrayal of the divine united to the human. It was St. Theodore the Studite who emphasized that the circumscription was possible based on the Council of Chalcedon's affirmation of a theological definition, that Christ's Human Nature was united to His Divine Nature under the person of the *Logos* of God. Therefore as the Son of God is truly God and truly man, like any other man, he can be portrayed.[14] For John Damascene, this portrayal was

[10] Cf. Leon Battista Alberti, *De Pictura*, II. In this book, the term *historia* is examined in its various meanings with regard to portraying events seeking an intellectual and affective response and relation from the viewer.

[11] Gregory the Great, *To Serenus, Bishop of Massilia*, Lib. XI, Ep. XIII, in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Second Series* (Peabody MA: Hendrickson, 1994): "And, seeing that antiquity has not without reason admitted the histories of the saints to be painted in venerable places . . . let thy Fraternity carefully admonish them that from the sight of the event portrayed they should catch the ardour of compunction, and bow themselves down in adoration of the One Almighty Holy Trinity."

[12] Id., 53: "For what writing presents to readers, this a picture presents to the unlearned who behold, since in it even the ignorant see what they ought to follow; in it the illiterate read. Hence, and chiefly to the nations, a picture is instead of reading."

[13] Cf. Leonid Ouspensky, *Theology of the Icon*, 2 vols. (Crestwood: St. Valdimir's Seminary, 1992); Christoph von Schönborn, *God's Human Face: the Christ-Icon*, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994).

[14] Theodore the Studite, *On the Holy Icons*, III, 13, trans. Catharine P. Roth (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1981): "There are many kinds of circumscription—inclusion, quantity, quality, position places, times shapes, bodies—all of which are denied in the case of God, for divinity has none of these. But Christ incarnate is revealed within these limitations. For He who is uncontainable was contained in the Virgin's womb; He who is measureless became three cubits tall; He who has no quality was formed in a certain quality; He who has no position stood, sat, and lay down; He who is beyond all measure of space, is placed in a manger; He who is more ancient than all time, grew to twelve years old; and He who is

not simply a photograph, but was the very likeness and *mimesis* of a *Person*, and thus venerable if He Who is portrayed is Divine; Divine Personhood is known through the created beauty of human likeness imitated.[15]

Eastern Iconography's reliance of the *objective* of Divine Revelation is reflected in the way icons are painted based upon the histories of the saints with very specific symbolism representing their heroic attributes. Thus, St. Lucy is identified by a silver plate of eyes, St. Anthony is often accompanied by a pig or is in a wilderness, St. John the Baptist in fur with a staff, Mary of Egypt emaciated. Specific and objective symbolism assist the viewer in identifying the person they encounter through image. The iconography is not created by the artist, and neither is the artistic style, but the iconographer literally *iconographein*, *writes* about Divine *historia* through the art of fashioning images. His art is a language of beauty that is proportionate to, integral in form, and radiating in its clarity a divine *historia* encompassing both physical and spiritual figures. The iconographer's art even bears semblance to Faith insomuch that the Truths of Faith are handed down from God, while the iconographer's design and colour scheme is received from the Church as a tradition. Like Revelation, *religious imagery* speaks of God in man's own terms as Federico Borromeo says,

> Colors are like words; once the eyes see them they sink into the mind just as do words heard by the ears. Correspondingly, making an initial sketch of a subject to be painted is like formulating the preliminary thoughts and arguments in a speech. This explains why the common, uneducated multitude can comprehend the language and discourse of painting. It has just as much influence among wise men, too. As Gregory of Nyssa rightly put it, painting speaks silently and with its aid the walls of a church becoming blooming meadows (St. Gregory of Nyssa, *Oratio laudatoria sancti ac magni martyris Theodori*).[16]

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without figure, is seen in the figure of men; and He who is incorporeal, assumed a body and said to his disciples, 'Take, eat, this is my body.' Therefore the same one is circumscribed and uncircumscribable, the latter in His divinity and the former in His humanity—even if the impious iconoclasts do not like it."

[15] Cf. John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, IV, 16.

[16] Federico Borromeo, *Sacred Painting*, I, 2, in *Sacred Painting* and *Museum*, trans. and ed. Kenneth S. Rothwell, Jr., I Tatti Renaissance Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010).

For the Western Church, religious imagery has always taken into consideration the artistic time period. Many of the finest artists have given their talents to the service of the altar. One can only imagine Michelangelo's *Cristo Risorto* right beside the high altar of Santa Maria sopra Minerva, Raphael's *St. Cecilia in ecstasy*, and a rather unknown piece, Guido Reni's *Most Holy Trinity* still in its original position used for the ancient roman rite. Romanesque, Renaissance or Baroque lent their respective artistic *ingenuity* for the portrayal of *Sacra Historia*.

There was a revelatory dimension to religious imagery, eyes were opened to the expanse of Faith; it allowed the worshipper a visual world that was divinely sacred and en-graced, not common or secular. It portrayed beauty perfected in redeemed saints, where stains of sin and distortion of passions were not present in their state of heavenly glory; a purity in the virgin's face unmatched in its porcelain skin tone. It was the Truth of Revelation allegorized through art. Thus, the Council of Trent wanted *religious imagery* to edify the layman unto greater devotion. Thus, the *cosa sacra* also pleased beyond the mere beauty of form, design, and the harmonious variation of colours. One's eyes of contemplation possessed a taste of that final *good* of union with the eternal, through the intimacy of the visible and understandable. It is sacramental. Truly contemplating a beautiful work of religious art was a foretaste of contemplating God Who is Beauty Itself.

Aquinas' own definition of the components of the beautiful, that for something to be beautiful it must have proportion, integrity and clarity reflect something in Trinitarian Life, thus raising the dignity of human discourse on artistic beauty, especially if the subject is sacred. Even in God there is *historia* as Eternal. In Trinitarian life there is a *narration*, or the procession from origin/mind to word, *logos*, Who is the *eikon tou Theou aoratou, image of the invisible God*.[17] The Logos differs from artistic imitation because it *is* God: *Quia Filius procedit ut Verbum, de cuius ratione est similitude speciei ad id quo procedit* (*For the Son proceeds as Word, whose ratio is to be a similitude of the features of that from which he proceeds*);[18] the eternal word is a *mimesis* that radiates perfectly and simply the divine mind. Aquinas further says that unlike man who is made *ad imaginem Dei*, denoting an imperfect image, Christ on the other hand is the *perfecta Patris imago*, so much so is he in similitude from which he pro-

[17] Col 1:15.
[18] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 36, 1.

ceeds, that with the Father He is consubstantial. It is for this reason that John Damascene describes him as the primordial sacred image. Between the relation of Father to the Son, Origin to Image, there lies a relationship as a model to our own experience of a contemplative *visio*. In the Trinity, the *Logos* is *Deus*, who is not only known but also loved in the Spirit—that is, affection, divine desire proceeding forth from the Father by the will as the exhalation of love upon seeing the Son who is Divine Beauty. In God there is truly relational contemplation of Beauty: *Hic est Filius Meus dilectus in quo mihi complacui* (*This is my beloved, or dear, Son in whom I am very pleased*).[19]

A beautiful *mimesis* of the Christ's *historia* has to portray that natural accuracy of the model, and its spiritual/moral importance and meaning, even down to the nails of the Crucifixion. A painting of a crucifixion is understandable and thus, can be seen through contemplation, because it portrays the Truth in the portrayal of great suffering, and the mystery of redemption through the poetry of colour. It is this proportion to naturalism and divine meaning, established through written Scriptural word, that fosters enjoyment; and in a truly Damascenian sense where the image is an imitation of the Person, the contemplative/aesthetic experience is transformed into the ecstatic/unitive at finding a taste of the One Who is Truth, Goodness, and Beauty itself—there is joy at having finally apprehended Divine Personhood!

One of the greatest problems of modern religious imagery is the spirit of icononclasm, an indifference to religious images. A contrast between a New York City parish church one hundred years ago, built by immigrants from Europe and the modern day suburban Catholic Church is striking. A church of St. Rita would have had a statue of the saint as the centerpiece to a *reredos*, today, it might be on the side—a white expanse of dry wall replaces gothic minutiae, the focus is a simple table facing the congregation, or even, the congregation itself. Is the whitewashed expanse of wall supposed to describe the sacred and heavenward orientation of the building? Is it really just that, a "gathering space" as it is so described in parish announcements? Where have all the images gone, is the crucifix supposed to be annihilated of its dark gravity when it is portrayed that Christ rises from within it? Is this proportionate to *historia*?

If there is a poverty of *religious imagery*, then there is no *biblia pauperum*, and thus no sacred beauty being an experience for all, no for-

[19] Matt 3:17.

mation of man's common sense through the beauty of the sacred. Human senses are not asked to encounter the sacred: the way in which the medieval man of common sense interacted with the objective Revelation portrayed in something like stained glass, or the baroque's man of common sense, the *l'honnête homme*, being surrounded by masterful and complex altarpieces is lost in rational awe at a mystery beyond apprehension apprehended. The formation of what one prays by seeing/contemplation, and rejoicing in the vision, do not become the nourishment of belief for modern day Hooper if there are no images he can contemplate, thus, he could not imagine Brideshead Castle in its magnificence—there is no joy in iconoclasm. He is trapped. It is by sight man is asked to know and to love what in the end is divine, ineffable, "other"-worldly and which is seen through the glass, but darkly. Blue–Divinity, Red–Flesh, Gold–Sanctity, Wide eyes on visages–contemplation: this is the Logos of *religious imagery*, it is of a *rationabilitas* which can be argued and moreover, contemplated, lauded, and tasted with the senses.

COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO THE RESTORATION OF SACRED ART

SUMMARY

In this paper, Sacred Art is examined as an imitation of *historia*. *Historia* interprets historical human events as empirical, material and real while seeking to understand their moral and spiritual significance. It is from *historia* that sacred art can be understood, where Christ and the saints are portrayed in the integrity of their human natures united to symbols representing Divinity or grace in order to present a visual/contemplative narrative. Mortimer Adler rightly sees that the vision of the beautiful is inherently *contemplative*, thus sacred iconography provides a language that can form the common sense of men and women.

KEYWORDS: *historia*, imitation, sacred art, contemplation, common sense.

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COMMON SENSE BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS

The chief aim, the final cause, of this study is to foster a better understanding of how noetic, metaphysical, and semiotic preconditions rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas contribute to a common sense biblical hermeneutic. The efficient cause is wonder over the divergent opinions of the meaning and significance of one perfect revelatory unit and the possibility of discovering how many revelatory acts constitute one unified revelatory act. The material cause is composed of (a) the noetic aspects of moderate realism; (b) the actions of sign relations in communication and interpretation; (c) the problem of the one and the many; and (d) God's revealed word. The formal cause is movement from a nominalistic method of biblical interpretation toward a method that finds truth as revealed in God's Word, the proper object of Christian faith, and becomes, in fact, the object of our faith. This study finds a metaphysical justification for a theologically derived principle of scriptural unity; thus showing how reason serves faith. The interpretive principles of nominalism are the interpreter's ideas that the interpreter combines and divides at will and which terminate in the interpreter's mind. The interpretive principles identified in this paper are: (a) the noetics of moderate realism ground the hope of successfully discerning the meaning of Scripture; (b) the nature and activity of sign relations ground the hope of successfully discovering and communicating the significance of Scripture, beyond its meaning; (c) sign relations also make possible error and deceit; and (d) respect for the metaphysics of the relationship between and among a multitude and to a chief aim encourages correct interpretation by minimizing errors in discerning meaning and significance. Before exploring this further, an explanation of the compound term 'common sense hermeneutics' is appropriate, but first a brief note on nominalism and principles.

For the nominalist a sign relation is a mind-dependent being of pure objectivity with no actual counterpart in what is signified.[1] One who engages in a nominalistic reading of the Bible expressly or implicitly tends to take liberties with the text by associating the wrong signified being with a sign vehicle. Respecting the sign relation's grounding in mind-independent reality will tend to inhibit the personal musings of the interpreter. A principle is a point of beginning of being, change, or knowledge.[2]

Hermeneutics[3] is the speculative science[4] of biblical interpretation, the chief aim of which is to know how to interpret God's word. Its subject-matter[5] is composed of three species: (1) Scripture; (2) the art[6] of interpretation; and (3) human cognition. The three species are inextricably related, but they can stand on their own, so it is reasonable to view each of them as a distinct genus composed of species ordered to a chief aim and chief act,[7] but within the genus of hermeneutics they are species ordered to a chief aim. Scripture as a revelatory species is the proximate principle of the science, and the science is the proximate principle of the art. The species of human cognition, comprising the active and passive powers of the human soul that unequally contribute to the chief aim of knowing God's word, enables human beings to study the Bible and study *how* we study the Bible. The speculative genus studies how the cognitive species unites with the

[1] John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 389.

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. V, 1012b34–1013a23, in Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's* "*Metaphysics*," trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1995), 276; Peter A. Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Manitou Springs: Adler–Aquinas Institute, Socratic Press, 2012), 138; Bernard Wuellner, *Summary of Scholastic Principles* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1956), 1–9.

[3] See D.G. Burke, "Interpret; Interpretation," in *The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia*, vol. 2, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmanns Publishing Company, 1982), 863. But there is also a practical aspect that falls into the category of art. Milton S. Terry, *Biblical Hermeneutics* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 20.

[4] Wuellner defines science in its strict philosophical sense as "certain intellectual knowledge of something in its causes" under "Science" in Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 112.

[5] "Subject-matter" refers to what a science studies or considers. Redpath, 137–138.

[6] Wuellner primarily defines art as "correct knowledge joined to skill in making things" under "Art" in Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 9.

[7] The analogical predication of genus and species to the same unit is dependent on the unit's relations to other units. Scripture *in se* is a genus, but as a subject of study it is a species of the science or art.

revelatory species in the interpretive species. The speculative genus is where the reflexive aspect of the cognitive species considers the relation of the revelatory, interpretive, and cognitive species. Stated another way, the art of interpretation is the activity that joins the knower to the known through sign relations, and the science is the study of the activity's causes so that the knower and known truly unite. Hermeneutics is necessary, because one cannot interpret well absent the knowledge of the conditions necessary for correct interpretation.

Common sense is more difficult to define. Étienne Gilson observes that the ambiguity of the term 'common sense' has caused grievous philosophical harm. Cicero used the term to refer to the sensibilities of an audience of which an orator must be aware in order to move the audience. It may refer to human moral intuition. One may attribute the sanctity of his pet postulate to common sense to defend against further inquiry.[8]

According to Thomas, the common sense, one of the interior senses, is the common root or principle of the five exterior, proper senses.[9] Each of the five exterior senses has an object proper to it. Sight senses white, taste senses sweetness, but neither sight nor taste can distinguish white from sweet. The common sense perceives the intentions of the proper senses and judges them.[10] The common sense can know all sensations and distinguish them.[11] The common sense is reflexive; it permits one to perceive that he is using his external senses. It is aware of the external sense impressions themselves and of the differences between the objects of each proper sense. "It is by the common sense that we are aware of our own life, and that we can distinguish between the objects of different senses, e.g., the white and the sweet."[12] The external senses feed the internal senses (common sense, imagination, and memory), which cooperate to unify, preserve, and recall the image of the object of sense experience. The three acts of the intellect (apprehension, judgment, and reason)[13] work with these images to give us knowledge. The common sense is a necessary condition precedent to apprehension, judging, and reasoning, without which we would not have

[8] This treatment of common sense relies on the first chapter of Étienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism And The Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 27–53.
[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 78, 4, ad. 1.
[10] Id., ad. 2.
[11] Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 2 (426b8–427a15).
[12] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's "De Anima,"* II, lect. 13, para. 390; III, lect. 2, para. 584.
[13] Peter Kreeft, *Socratic Logic* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2004), 28.

concepts, judgments, and arguments.[14] Even so, the common sense does not assure that human beings will (1) rightly understand what they receive through the external senses; (2) correctly judge what they do understand; and (3) build sound arguments with their correct judgments. The common sense merely makes good hermeneutics and revealed knowledge possible.

In this paper the denotation of common sense is synecdochic; the internal common sense, a part of the noetic process, represents the whole noetic process, which begins in the external sense impressions and ends in the conclusions of arguments. It should also connote the commonality of specific noetic potential among human beings as well as self-evident propositions that proceed from the right use of human noetic powers (the denial of which would result in self-refutation). Into this category of propositions I put the law of con-contradiction and its corollaries; fundamental statements about the organizational structure of composed being; and averments concerning the action of signs as the foundation of communication and error. Common sense hermeneutics respects the primacy of being and the inter-subjective and supra-subjective relations among beings that permit communication.

The noetics of moderate realism provide a firm foundation upon which to build a hermeneutic of common sense, so in the first part of this paper I shall adopt Thomas Howe's argument that the noetical aspect of moderate realism is a necessary condition for correct, universally valid biblical interpretation, but I will add, "insofar as it gives us hope in discovering the true *meaning* of a given passage." In the second part, I'll rely on John Deely's work to show how semiotics may help interpreters go beyond meaning and seek the significance of the persons, places, events, ideas, etc. of which the meaning of the text has presented as objects to be interpreted. It is in significance that the unity of Scripture is found. The chief aim is what every passage of the Bible signifies. Considered as a genus, Scripture is composed of many parts/species that are ordered to a chief aim. This is the structure of common sense hermeneutics; therefore in the third part I shall restate Peter Redpath's exposition of Aristotle and St. Thomas's ontology of the one and the many and analogously apply it to the question of how an exegete can discern the proper significance and faithfully interpret the word of God.

[14] Id.

Meaning and the Noetics of Moderate Realism

There are many good expositions of moderate realism and its noetic aspects,[15] but the value of Thomas Howe's work is that it expressly gives a moderate realist's answer to the question of whether or not a universally valid interpretation of the Bible is possible.[16] According to Howe, the debate among Christian scholars over the possibility of an 'objective'[17] biblical interpretation—one that is universally valid and free from the influence of cultural and historical presuppositions—is fundamentally a difference of opinion between epistemological representationalists (nominalists) and noetic moderate realists.[18] Interpreters who view ideas and concepts as mentally created copies with no essential relation to the real things known will naturally overemphasize the influence of cultural and historical presuppositions on hermeneutics and deny the possibility of objective biblical interpretation. Interpreters who consider ideas and concepts as formal signs, the forms of the known real things abstracted from their material conditions and existing intentionally in the interpreter, will accept the relation between the knower and the known and affirm the possibility of objective biblical interpretation. Interpreters in the former class doubt their ability to know the truth of God's revelation, but interpreters of the latter class have hope of success, to change from ignorance to knowledge. Thus, the moderate realist can resist the temptation to eisegete the text and avoid, or at least mitigate, the perils of hermeneutical nominalism. A brief restatement of moderate realism may make this evident.

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[15] E.g., Étienne Gilson, *Methodical Realism*, trans. Philip Trower (Front Royal, VA: Christendom Press: 1990), Étienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism And The Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986); Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Gerald B. Phelan (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Joseph Owens, *An Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 2008); Hermann Reith, *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958); Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality: An Introduction to Thomistic Epistemology* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1956).

[16] See Thomas Howe, *Objectivity in Biblical Interpretation* (Kindle Electronic Edition 2012).

[17] The reader should note that Howe uses the word 'objective' to signify the concept of "some kind of neutrality or of some universally applicable perspective" (Id., Chapter 6, 4781–4790.) In this paper I equivocate in the meaning of 'objective' and its various forms, because Howe and Deely use them differently. For Deely, an object is that which is known. An object may be a real, mind-independent thing, a subject, or it may be a mind-dependent being of reason, which is not a subject, but is objective.

[18] Id., Chapter 3, 2135–2137, 2331–2332; Chapter 5, 3680–3685; Chapter 6, 5058–5065, 5086–5087.

According to Gilson, as a result of Immanuel Kant's modification of René Descartes's improper application of the mathematical method to metaphysics most modern thinkers begin with the "idea that philosophical reflection ought necessarily to go from thought to things."[19] Methodical realists accept that philosophical reflection necessarily remotely begins in the senses and terminates in the intellect, neither in the senses nor imagination.[20] The material of our thought comes from outside in; therefore, absent sense data we have nothing to think about.[21] We apprehend reality when we receive the form of a thing, abstracted from its material conditions, through the senses and the intellect forms an image (phantasm). Human beings use images of material things to think about abstract, immaterial things.

In the first intellectual act of apprehension,[22] we produce images as we encounter a real object, when our memories recall a previously produced image stored in the memory, and as we study and come to know something through reading and hearing. The image may be from a previous encounter with a sensate object. The image may be a non-sensate complex of judgments.[23]

The second act of the intellect is judgment, which produces true or false propositions. In every proposition, which is the product of judgment and which is either true or false, the intellect "either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate . . ."[24] Truth is relational; it is found in the real relations that really exist between real things in extra-mental, metaphysical structure of reality. The judgment, and our appreciation of its significance, is enriched as we increase our knowledge of each concept and how they relate to one another in reality. Methodical realism "is emphatically not an abstract philosophy of possible beings."[25] The realist's goal is not to cleverly devise amalgams of images and concepts (fables), "for the ultimate end of the intellect is to conceive reality as it is, and reality simply is not a mosaic of essences."[26]

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[19] Gilson, *Methodical Realism*, 17–18.
[20] Redpath, 162
[21] Id.,73.
[22] Also called 'understanding'. Kreeft, 28.
[23] Wilhelmsen, 109–117.
[24] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 16, 2.
[25] Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, 233.
[26] Id., 229.

The third act of the intellect is reason. Reason extends our knowledge beyond what we immediately apprehend. The act of reasoning synthesizes judgments, knowledge about what we have sensed, to reach a conclusion, knowledge of what is beyond our sense experience.[27]

Howe summarizes the act of knowing:

> The Moderate Realist view of knowledge as presented began with sense cognition which issued in the formation of the phantasm, the form of the thing in reality, separated from its matter but not from its concrete material conditions. The agent intellect illuminates the intelligible aspect of the phantasm that is the common nature or essence of the thing. It abstracts this essence from the phantasm forming an intelligible species that is impressed upon the possible intellect. The possible intellect, in an act of understanding, expresses this intelligible species in the form of an idea or concept. The intellect, by means of the expressed intelligible species, also called the idea or concept, knows the thing in reality. The knowable thing has become the known object of the intellect, and knowledge is the result.[28]

Howe also recognizes the distinction between meaning and significance and quotes E.D. Hirsch:

> The important feature of meaning as distinct from significance is that meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an interpreter. An interpreted text is always taken to represent something, but that something can always be related to something else. Significance is meaning-as-related-to-something-else.[29]

Howe further warns against confusing the two.[30] Meaning is the foundation of significance, but significance or interpretation is legitimate as long as it does not distort the meaning of the text.[31]

For reasons that should become apparent, Howe's explication of the distinction between meaning and significance is particularly salient. A word is a conventional sign that conveys meaning, and meaning is the concept (or idea) that one associates with the word. The concept is the

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[27] Kreeft, 28.
[28] Howe, Chapter 8, 7357–7363.
[29] Id., Chapter 10, 8578–8582, quoting E.D. Hirsch, *The Aims of Interpretation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 79–80.
[30] Howe, Chapter 10, 8657–8660.
[31] Id., 8676–8684.

formal sign, that is a composed being's form existing immaterially in the intellect of the knower, which points to the being as composed of matter and form. Form determines matter as act determines potency. Just as the form of a being determines its matter and moves the being from potency to act, so the abstracted form of the being informs the matter of the word and gives it meaning. The complex of letters becomes a meaningful word, but the same word may signify many concepts, so the interpreter has the task of discerning from the context precisely what concept, meaning, the author intended to convey.[32] The reader learns what the author intended to communicate about the persons, places, things, ideas, actions, relationships, substances and accidents about which the author wrote. One can, however, rightly understand the meaning of a text while missing its significance, because the meaning of the words is not the same as the significance of the events. Even so, knowing the correct meaning of the words is a necessary condition for discerning the significance of that which the text describes. Linguistic communication is just one kind of semiotic communication.[33]

Significance and Semiosis

All human organizations require communication, and all communication requires sign relations and networks of sign relations. Moderate realism provides a firm noetic foundation for understanding the ubiquitous communicative networks that we observe throughout the created order, including special revelation, that transfer meaning as well as significance. Thought and communication rely on signs; correspondence between thought and real things is possible only because sign relations are indifferent to the orders of real being and thought being.[34] The formal sign is the sign vehicle that points to another being that is either a substantial, existent thing composed of matter and form, a mind-independent real being (*ens reale*), or a being of reason alone (*ens rationis*). The word, the instrumental sign vehicle, points to the formal sign. The author of a text combines words into sentences, paragraphs, books, etc., that convey meaning through complexes of formal sign vehicles, but once an interpreter discovers the

[32] Lack of precision leads the interpreter into the error of 'illegitimate totality transfer' or 'unwarranted adoption of an expanded semantic field,' in which the interpreter imposes the full range of possible meanings. D.A. Carson, *Exegetical Fallacies* (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1996), 60–61.
[33] Deely, 155–156.
[34] Id., 51.

meaning he can then go on to discover the significance of the whole text and its parts. The complexes of persons, places, events, ideas, relations, etc., that the meaning derived through the formal signs reveals are further sign vehicles that point to something else. Although meaning is discoverable within the immediate context, the interpreter discovers significance by relating the part to a whole ordered to a chief aim. Semiosis, the action and nature of signs, accounts for the discovery of the one proper significate related to meaning and significance as well as the many possible interpretive errors.

A sign is an irreducibly triadic, suprasubjective relation[35] that, by virtue of its being a relation, is indifferent to the orders of rational being and real being, mind-dependence and mind-independence.[36] Signs are irreducibly triadic in that they necessarily are composed of (1) an interpreter, (2) a sign vehicle, and (3) a significate (that which is signified).[37] They are suprasubjective in that they do not rely on any relation between real, subjective beings to exist. Signs may be intersubjective, but they are not necessarily so; they extend beyond mere subjectivity. A relation may exist between real or imagined subjectivities,[38] and a relation judged to be fictional could be real or *vice versa*.[39] Signs are indifferent to the orders of rational, objective being (*ens rationis*) and real, subjective being (*ens reale*) in that they do not rely on real beings to exist. The orders of subjectivity and objectivity are not opposites.

Deely eschews the modern opposition of subjectivity and objectivity[40] and returns to the scholastic usage. Objective means whatever exists as known; subjective means whatever exists independently of being known.[41] Subjectivity refers to what exists independently of human thought, belief, feeling, or desire.[42] Intersubjectivity names a dyadic relation that has both a basis and a terminus in subjectivity.[43] Subjectivity and intersubjectivity constitute mind-independent reality that exists even when no one is aware of it.[44] Objectivity exists in awareness as cognized. Purely

[35] Id., 87.
[36] Id., 93.
[37] Id., 16.
[38] Id., 27.
[39] Id., 93.
[40] Id., 116–117, 123–124.
[41] Id., 84.
[42] Id., 34.
[43] Id., 28, 152.

objective being has no being other than as known; it has no subjectivity, no being apart from awareness. An object may also exist as a subject but it is not necessary for it to do so.[45] When a previously unknown subject becomes known, objectivity is added to its subjectivity, and the orders overlap.[46] To further complicate matters: (1) an objective subjectivity may cease to exist as a subject and continue to exist only as an object; (2) a pure object may come to exist subjectively and become an objective subjectivity; or (3) an objective subjectivity may be forgotten and lose its status as object but remain a subject. In every case where there is objectivity or objectivity plus subjectivity there is a triadic sign relation, and the relation is suprasubjective, beyond the limits of intersubjectivity.

While subjectivity and intersubjectivity may exist apart from sign relations, objectivity requires triadic sign relations. Thought, knowledge, communication, response, truth and error, and agreement and disagreement all depend on triadic sign relations. Suprasubjective, triadic sign relations make truth possible, but they also make deceit possible.[47] The nature of signs permits human beings to build relations and webs of relations without limit.[48] It also permits the interpreter to associate the wrong significate with the vehicle or mistake one for the other. There seems to be no limit to the potential mischief.

The reader should underscore two points in this part. First, words and formal signs are sign vehicles that point to persons, places, events, ideas, relations, and other subjects and objects that are also sign vehicles that point to something else. Words and formal signs point to meaning; the referents point to significance. So there are at least two layers of sign relations in Scripture. Second, the suprasubjective nature of sign relations permits thought and communication as well as truth and deceit, agreement and disagreement, and there is no apparent curb within the nature of sign relations to limit the potential to misread, create, or ignore sign relations. There seems to be no limit on the ways biblical interpreters risk taking the Lord's name in vain; yet, there must be something available to keep the intellect's attention within the range of the proper significates of the words, concepts, and the narratives, poetry, wisdom, epistles, etc., of Scripture.

[44] Id., 35.
[45] Id., 45.
[46] Id., 123.
[47] Id., 142.
[48] Id., 44.

The Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the problem of the one and the many offers such a curb.

Revelatory Genus: Genesis to Revelation

The individual words of Scripture deliver meaning to the interpreter, but the complex of meanings that the words signify, passages, for example, are themselves sign vehicles that point to something else. Often when an interpreter asks, "What does this passage mean?" he is properly asking after the significance of the passage, that is, what does God intend to signify by conveying information about this particular event? There is a necessary interpretive step beyond receiving the bare meaning through the words. The chief aim of Scripture determines the significance of the passages, each of which is one part among many that when ordered to the chief aim of Scripture relates to other parts and is seen as a part of the whole. Thus, to understand the significance of any passage the interpreter must know the chief aim of Scripture and avoid taking the passage as a self-standing unit to which the interpreter is free to relate his own ideas or construct his own purely objective sign relations. The interpreter prescribes neither the chief aim nor the significance; the author does. The Pharisee Saul knew the meaning of the *tanakh*, but not until Christ revealed the chief aim of Scripture to him did St. Paul see in the Old Testament its true significance. The balance of this section will describe the Aristotelian-Thomistic account of the problem of the one and many, and analogously predicate it to Scripture.

All philosophy/science studies the multifarious ways many beings relate to one proximate subject and unequally participate in the unity of the subject.[49] All philosophy and every science seek knowledge of how many beings become one being.[50] Philosophers and scientists seek to discover order in multitude by identifying how many parts cooperate to achieve a common chief end and thereby constitute one whole subject. As Redpath writes, "Every science investigates a genus, a multitude of species, with respect to a chief aim."[51] The two-fold order of things is evident: parts relate to parts to form a whole, and all the parts relate to a chief aim, end, or purpose. The latter order holds the whole together; the chief aim is the

[49] Redpath, 144, citing Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 12, Ch. 1 (1069a18–1069b32) and *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. 2, Ch. 2 (90b14–16).
[50] Redpath, 145.
[51] Id., 168, n. 61, citing Aquinas, *Commentary on the "De Trinitate of Boethius,"* 5, 1, reply.

principle of unity.[52] Without a chief aim there is nothing to unify individuals into parts of a whole.[53] If the chief aim changes, then the relations among the parts change and the nature of the whole changes and becomes something different. The proximate aims and acts of the parts must likewise change so that they are ordered to the new chief aim. If the chief aim is lost, then the relations among the parts are lost and the whole ceases to exist. The related individuals that formerly were parts become unrelated individuals.[54] So the first task of any philosophy/science is to identify its chief aim as well as the chief aim of the genus (or genera) the science studies, but the science must also understand the limits of potentiality of the species and how they unequally contribute to the chief aim.[55]

Every part has its own internal and external limitations, its own qualities.[56] The matter of a being, its innate potentiality, imposes internal limits on how the being can act. The substance and accidents of external beings further determine the range of acts within a given potency. So to truly understand a generic subject one must not only describe how a species contributes to the chief aim, but also must know to what extent it can and cannot contribute according to its qualities. The highest species has the greatest potential to be activated by the chief aim; its possession of the chief aim and contribution to it is greater than all other species of the hierarchy; and the highest species is the measure of all subordinate species.[57] The chief aim is chiefly communicated through the chief possessor to the lesser possessors as proper to their range of potential, *according to their qualities*. If this were not the case, there would be no activity. Knowing the aims and the qualities of the species equips the observer to recognize the nature of the generic and specific acts.

The acts serve the chief aim, even as the chief aim determines the acts. The acts move the genus from a state of privation of the chief aim to a greater state of possession.[58] The chief aim informs the specific matter, activates its potential to achieve the chief aim. The informed matter, the multiple species acting cooperatively to achieve the chief aim is the es-

[52] Id., 173, n. 70, citing Aquinas, *Commentary on the* "*De Trinitate of Boethius*," 6, 4, reply.
[53] Id., 176.
[54] Id., 177.
[55] Id., 191.
[56] Id., 197–201.
[57] Id., 178.
[58] Id., 197.

sence of the genus. To complete one's grasp of a genus, one should inquire into the origin of the genus, its point of beginning, its source.

Anyone familiar with Aristotle's four causes will recognize them in the preceding paragraphs. The aim is the final cause; the species are the material cause; the acts are the formal cause; and the origin is the efficient cause. Philosophical/scientific knowledge is the knowledge of a subject by its four causes.[59]

Finally, the notion of contrary opposition adds much to scientific and philosophical study. Contrary opposition describes the degree of privation and possession within a genus.[60] Think of it as a continuum in which the limits of privation and possession are contrary opposites. Degrees of possession and privation fall in the continuum between contrary opposites.[61] Contradictory opposites are beyond the continuum; there is complete possession and complete privation and no potential for movement between the two. Contrary, not contradictory, opposition permits qualitative, specific differences that are required to achieve the chief aim. We measure species by the degree of their possession and privation of the chief aim and the degree to which they contribute to the chief aim. But the qualitative differences among the species, the degrees of privation and possession, do not mean that the species are not part of and contributing to the genus. Every species unequally possesses and contributes to the chief aim.

Every science understands its subject-matter, and each part of its subject-matter, according to its four causes and according to how its parts relate to each other as each part unequally and analogously relates to the chief aim, thus forging one whole unity.

Scripture is a revelatory genus comprising many parts/species that are ordered to a chief aim. God intended every full passage of Scripture to contribute to the chief aim of His word. This is one reason that context is so important, because every word, sentence, paragraph, book, and testament is a part of a whole insofar as it contributes to the chief aim. Analogously, a human being is a cognitive genus comprising bodily and intellectual powers, the species/parts, all ordered to a chief aim. Rightly identifying the chief aims of the genera/species supports the endeavor of seeking the proper significate.

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[59] Id., 156.
[60] Id., 203, quoting Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Bk. 10, Ch. 4 (1055a33–1055b3).
[61] Id., 153.

Conclusion

Biblical hermeneutics requires understanding of the powers and activities of the human soul as they relate to cognition; this is foundation of common-sense hermeneutics. The hermeneutist must also understand the art of biblical interpretation according to its four causes and chief aim, because the interpretive art relies on the conclusions of the science. The hermeneutist must also know Scripture according to its four causes and chief aim. Without such knowledge there is no unified subject, no science, and only some loose confederation of conjectures and opinions. Only after knowing the genera as genera can the hermeneutist appreciate them as species of the generic science. Within the genus of hermeneutics, Scripture is the highest species, because it determines the activities of the other species, that is, the intrinsically limited cognitive powers are extrinsically determined by the mode and message of Scripture. The Bible determines meaning and significance, not the interpreter, and in order to respect this authoritative function the hermeneutist must order all the parts, passages, to the chief aim, which determines each interpretive act. An interpreter who identifies the chief aim as M will interpret differently from an interpreter who identifies C as the chief aim. The significates of their triadic sign relations will probably differ. Both may agree on the meaning of the text, but they will probably disagree about its significance. If an interpreter's identification of the chief aim differs from time to time, he will interpret inconsistently and fail to appreciate the coherence of Scripture. What, then, is the chief aim?

The chief aim of Scripture is to reveal *something*.[62] The chief act is the revealing of *something*. Scripture is revelatory; it communicates something that was unknown. Considered as a genus, each part unequally contributes to the chief aim of revealing something. Each part has a proximate aim of contributing to revealing the remote aim, which is to reveal *something*. In order to understand the proximate aim of a given part, one must know the chief aim of the genus. Thus to rightly interpret Scripture one must rightly identify the *something* that God reveals in Scripture.

Scripture, the word of God (2 Timothy 3:14–17), reveals its own chief aim: to reveal the sinfulness of human beings so that we can repent and accept the forgiveness that Christ gives us in his crucifixion. God revealed his love for his creation in the crucifixion of his Son (John 3:16; cf.

[62] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 1, 1.

Hebrews 9:22). John's baptism was of repentance (Mark 1:4; Acts 13:24; 19:4), a necessary condition for forgiveness through baptism in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (1 John 1:8–10; 2:12). Jesus shed his blood for the forgiveness of sin (Matthew 26:28) and commissioned his Apostles to preach repentance and forgiveness of sin to the ends of the earth (Luke 24:44–48; Acts 2:36–41; 5:27–33; 10:34–44; 13:15, 38–39). The Father gave the words to the Son, and the Son gave the words to the Apostles (John 17:1–23), and the Apostles have given the word to us in the inspired Scripture as preached and taught correctly (Ephesians 4:11ff).

The passages that reveal the incarnate, crucified, and risen Christ, who is the sign vehicle that points to the Father (John 14:8–9; Colossians 1:15; Ephesians 1:7–10), are the highest revelatory species that perfectly communicate the chief aim of Scripture, so all other passages are ordered to the chief aim through these. Jesus says, "You search the Scriptures because you think that in them you have eternal life; and it is they that bear witness about me, yet you refuse to come to me that you may have life" (John 5:39–40; cf. Luke 24:13–28; Acts 8:26–36; Ephesians 1:7; Colossians 1:14). So, biblical passages are networks of sign relations, the vehicles of which are words (instrumental signs) and concepts (formal signs) that point to historical people, events, etc. The proper significance of biblical passages is discovered by reading them: (1) with due respect for their meaning; (2) as sign vehicles grounded in mind-independent reality to which we can attach the proper or improper significates; and (3) as they relate to one another as ordered to the chief aim revealed in the highest species, the incarnate and risen Son of God who allowed himself to be crucified for the forgiveness of our sin.

COMMON SENSE BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS

SUMMARY

Since the noetics of moderate realism provide a firm foundation upon which to build a hermeneutic of common sense, in the first part of his paper the author adopts Thomas Howe's argument that the noetical aspect of moderate realism is a necessary condition for correct, universally valid biblical interpretation, but he adds, "insofar as it gives us hope in discovering the true *meaning* of a given passage." In the second part, the author relies on John Deely's work to show how semiotics may help interpreters go beyond meaning and seek the significance of the persons, places, events, ideas, etc., of which the meaning of the text has

presented as objects to be interpreted. It is in significance that the unity of Scripture is found. The chief aim is what every passage of the Bible signifies. Considered as a genus, Scripture is composed of many parts/species that are ordered to a chief aim. This is the structure of common sense hermeneutics; therefore in the third part the author restates Peter Redpath's exposition of Aristotle and St. Thomas's ontology of the one and the many and analogously applies it to the question of how an exegete can discern the proper significance and faithfully interpret the word of God.

KEYWORDS: common sense, hermeneutics, Bible, language, interpretation, realism, nominalism, semiotics, Thomas Howe, John Deely, Peter Redpath.

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PHILOSOPHICAL TENSIONS AMONG LEADERSHIP, EFFICIENCY, COMMUNITY— AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE ACADEMY

> I have three precious things which I hold fast and prize. The first is gentleness; the second frugality; the third is humility, which keeps me from putting myself before others. Be gentle and you can be bold; be frugal and you can be liberal; avoid putting yourself before others and you can become a leader among men.
>
> —Lao-Tse

"Effective immediately, your job with our institution is terminated." On a day of spring 2014 these words were uttered to a person I know. A person holding a Philosophy Ph.D. Someone who had gotten along with fellow coworkers, supervisors, and students alike. Someone who had not been guilty of a crime, nor even of failure to perform teaching or administrative duties as requested. This was a person who had repeatedly stood up for the boss, in fact had tried to make him look good, and who often worked overtime. Someone who had made a point of not disrespecting colleagues, or students, behind their backs. The starkness of the words spoken, beyond even what they entailed, was perhaps what most stood out to this person. Words spoken as if to an enemy, rather that to a loyal coworker. The only reason offered for this dismissal was one of "organizational restructuring." And this happened at an institution of higher education which prides itself on its Catholic spiritual identity. How to account for this?

The Spread of the "Toxic Leader"

Harvard University's Dr. Daniel Goleman, popularizer of the term "emotional intelligence," has written recently of leaders who deploy what

he terms a "super-focused" management style. Goleman refers to such a leader as a "pacesetter." Goleman claims that, "Pacesetters tend to rely on a 'command and coerce' leadership strategy," "where they simply give orders and expect obedience." According to Goleman—and here I'm going to cite him at some length—leaders sporting a pacesetting management style:

> create a *toxic* climate, one that dispirits those they lead. Such leaders may get short-term results through personal heroics . . . but do so at the expense of building their organizations . . . Such leaders don't listen, let alone make decisions by consensus. They don't spend time getting to know the people they work with day in and day out, but relate to them in one-dimensional roles. They don't help people develop new strengths or refine their abilities, but dismiss their need to learn as a failing. They come off as arrogant and impatient. [emphases added]

Goleman continues, adding ominously:

> *And they are spreading* [emphasis added] . . . the number of people in organizations of *all* kinds who are overachievers [in the sense Goleman just described] *has been climbing steadily among those in leadership positions* since the 1990's . . . During the financial crisis of 2008 and onward, [and here Goleman quotes business consultant Georg Vielmetter], 'many companies promoted . . . top-down leaders . . . good for handling emergencies . . . But it changes the heart of an organization. Two years later those same leaders created a climate where trust and loyalty evaporate' . . .[1]
>
> The just-get-it-done mode runs roughshod over human concerns . . . Ambitious revenue targets or growth goals are not the only gauge of an organization's health—and if they are achieved at a cost to other basics, the long-term downsides, like losing star employees, can outweigh short-term successes as those costs lead to later failures

[1] Daniel Goleman, *Focus: The Hidden Driver of Excellence* (A&C Black, 2013). Goleman here goes on to add of the period in time he is describing: "That was a period when economic growth created an atmosphere where raise-the-bar-at-any-cost heroics was lionized. The downsides of this style—for example, lapses in ethics, cutting corners, and running roughshod over people—were too often winked at. Then came a series of flameouts and burst bubbles . . . [which] put a spotlight on the underside of pacesetters' single-minded focus on fiscal results at the expense of other leadership basics."

> . . . Single-pointed fixation on a goal morphs into *over* achievement when the category of 'distractions' [from the leader's perspective] expands to include other people's valid concerns . . . ideas, and their crucial information. Not to mention their morale, loyalty, and motivation.[2]

Goleman's comments here dovetail with the judgment of several respected experts in the for-profit sector going back decades.[3] According to W. Stephen Brown of the Fortune Group, leadership is defined as one's ability to motivate others to follow willingly. Going back to 1978 a distinction was made between "transactional" leadership versus "transforma-

[2] Business not being Goleman's field, some might be tempted to write him off, saying: "He's basically saying to be nice to people—and I usually am. But that's just not how the game of business is played nowadays—and you can ask anyone at the country club, the yacht club, or the golf course. You cover your own behind first, and you fire who you fire to boost stock prices a few cents every other year. Because if you can't keep up with the status of your peers—you're not a real man. What's more: both your friends—and your spouse—may remind you of how far behind you've fallen in the race for more." (The reader can fill in whatever "more" is supposed to consist of here.)

[3] E.g., the late great Dr. Stephen R. Covey, who raised these identical issues twenty-five years ago; W. Steven Brown, President of the Fortune Group, who did so even earlier; Dr. James C. Collins who taught at the Stanford University Graduate School of Business, basing his judgments on over two decades' worth of empirical data and CEO interviews; CEO John Mackey, founder of the Whole Foods chain of stores, and coauthor with R. Sisodia of the incomparable synthesis of historical analysis and success story found in his book *Conscious Capitalism: Liberating the Heroic Spirit of Business* (Harvard Business Review, 2013); CEO Vincent Higgins and C. Dan McArthur in their book *Social Influence and Genius, a Leadership Journey* (Tanglewood Publishing, 2011); and Robert K. Greenleaf, in his seminal essay "The Servant as Leader" (1970). This is to name just a few. Greenleaf, for example, writes the following: "The servant-leader is servant *first* . . . That person is sharply different from one who is leader first, perhaps because of the need to assuage an unusual power drive . . . The difference manifests itself in the care taken by the servant-first to make sure that *other* people's *highest* priority needs are being served. The best test, and difficult to administer, is: Do those served grow *as* persons? Do they . . . become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society?" [emphases added]. In his later book *Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness*, Greenleaf writes: "A new moral principle is emerging, which holds that the *only* authority deserving of one's allegiance is that which is freely and knowingly granted by the *led* to the leader in *response* to, and in *proportion* to, the *clearly* evident servant stature of the leader . . . [T]hey will freely respond only to individuals who are chosen as leaders because they are proven and trusted as servants [first]. To the extent that this principle prevails in the future, the only truly viable institutions will be those that are predominantly servant led" [emphases added]. R. K. Greenleaf, *Servant Leadership: A Journey into the Nature of Legitimate Power and Greatness* (New York: Paulist Press, 2002), 24.

tional" leadership, the latter being characterized by a leader's interpersonal relationships combined with the active promotion of worker creativity. Transformational leaders stress communication within the group, show trust in group members, and celebrate tasks accomplished.

Yet according to Goleman, today we are increasingly confronted with the workplace narcissism of what others have called the "toxic leader." The U.S. Army defines toxic leaders as those who put their own needs first, micromanage subordinates, and periodically behave in a mean-spirited manner, and display poor decision-making.[4]

Now it is true we must walk very delicately when presuming to evaluate the motives and mental states of other people, such as coworkers; and, for academics at least, that includes evaluating the motives and mental states of certain academic administrators perhaps.[5]

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[4] "Army worries about 'toxic leaders' in ranks," *The Washington Post* (June 25, 2011). "Why do we allow Toxic Leadership to occur?" Combined Arms Center Blog. The Center for Army Leadership found toxic leaders promote themselves at the expense of subordinates, without considering long-term consequences to either their subordinate or their unit. (Here one might think back to the film *A Few Good Men*—which I've seriously viewed roughly 22 times now—starring Jack Nichols, Tom Cruise, and Demi Moore, to get an idea). According to Professor Jean Lipman-Blumen "toxic leadership" is not about mismanagement in general. Rather it refers to leaders who due to "dysfunctional personal characteristics" and "destructive behaviours" leave their subordinates and organization worse off than they found them, either personally or professionally. See too J. Lipman-Blumen, *The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians—and How We Can Survive Them* (Oxford University Press, 2006).

[5] For we all may very well get along with colleagues and students. But not all of us may have subordinates, or people reporting to us directly, while we ourselves, simultaneously, are burdened with institutional financial pressures. As Abraham Lincoln once said, if you wish to test someone, don't just let him suffer; give him power. Then watch what he does with it. How many of us can say we have wielded power of any kind? As Augustine famously claimed the root of most institution building historically is the lust to 'prevail,' either over, or at least in the full view of, others (what he famously called in *Civitas dei* the *libido dominandi*). Both Alasdair MacIntyre—who labels himself an "Augustinian" Thomist for this reason, and René Girard, respectively, have had interesting things to say about this. It should first be noted, if we are all honest with ourselves—and own up to the psychological analyses of Augustine or Paul—the fact is we are, at root, all of us, narcissists. According to Paul in his Epistle to the Romans (7.14ff)—and Aquinas will gloss this passage with his own commentary of course—we do the evil we would not do; and we fail to do the good we would do. What am I about to describe therefore manifests itself along a kind of spectrum of individuals, intersecting the leader's individual maturity and the nature and number of external pressures bearing down upon the leader in question. Professor Terry L. Price offers a cognitive account for ethical failures in toxic leadership, claiming leaders can be aware of what normative ethical behavior should consist of generally; but can then go on to err as to

Yet it is no dishonesty to recognize when the egocentric behaviors of those accountable for the common good of teams or institutions become toxic to that team or to that institution. Nor is it necessarily wrong to hold them publicly—perhaps even prophetically—accountable for such, as this may be both for their own individual good, as well as for the good of those whose fates partially depend upon them.[6]

One of the first things one notices about a toxic leader is how he or she may feel subjectively that everything is "on" him or her to perform; and thus he or she may feel a crushing sense of responsibility to something—or, more to the point, to someone. Yet what is noteworthy is that this sense of *all-encompassing* responsibility—and that *distrust* of subordinate collaborators that so often accompanies this sense of responsibility—is itself a manifestation of egocentricity; of a kind of self-imposed isolation from subordinates, professional peers, or external advisors; and of a failure to trust deeply or perseveringly in any higher power for real assistance.

Whereas so called "task-oriented" leaders are usually unconcerned with catering to group members, and more concerned with working out a particular solution to meeting a concrete goal, they can ensure certain deadlines are met, but their group members' well-being may suffer. Relationship-oriented leaders, by contrast, focus on updating their team members' skills, and enhancing the relationships within that team by soliciting honest feedback.

In the end—whether he is fully conscious of it or not—the health of an institution in a toxic leader's eyes is merely the health of the leader's own reputation, in his own eyes, and in the eyes of others, be they subordinates, peers, clients, or all three.[7] This in its turn leads to what are

whether a specific norm applies to them in a particular situation, or whether they can exempt themselves from it for the sake of their goal. Of course, fear of failure or humiliation, hyperfocus, and lack of compassion or intellectual humility can seriously warp their cognitive processes in deciding.

[6] This is true in institutes of religious life. It is true in families. It is true in business enterprises. It is true in academic departments; in academic administration; and on the boards of institutions of higher learning. In short, it is true wherever human beings—and thus authority figures—can be found.

[7] His sense of responsibility thus runs the risk of not being born out of a desire to please God, for example, for God's own sake, because God himself is good—in other words, the definition of charity as Augustine describes this. Nor is it even to seek the flourishing of individuals in community, as friends, or as "other selves"—as Aristotle's argued. Rather—whatever else the toxic leader may *tell himself*—he ultimately is motivated by terror.

called "CWB," or "counterproductive workplace behaviors," which result when toxic leaders feel pressured or threatened—which is fairly regularly. Management analyst Gillian Flynn has described a toxic leader as one who at least periodically "bullies, threatens, yells. Whose mood swings determine the climate of the office on any given workday. Who forces employees to whisper in sympathy in cubicles and hallways."

The traits of toxic leaders reveal themselves in, at least periodic or cyclical, flashes of the following:[8]

Namely, the terror of a humiliating failure in the eyes of his peers, or of his subordinates, or of a superior, or, in many cases, of all three.

[8] A much more comprehensive list of a toxic leader's qualities include the following, some of which are found on the "Hare Psychopathy Checklist," and which constitute so called "Aggressive Narcissism:" (1) Evaluating long-term institutional strategies in light of their potential to safeguard the manager's reputation—rather than the long-term good of the institution, or of individual members within it. (2) Carving out of "kingdom" within which subordinates' performance standards are picked not on the basis of their usefulness to their institution, but rather on the basis of subordinates' ability to satisfy a toxic leader personally. (3) A consequent expectation of loyalty from subordinates—combined with his paradoxical inability to reciprocate real loyalty of any kind, himself; especially should he be feeling "under the gun" to perform. (4) Authoritarian decision-making (accompanied by arrogance in executing key decisions), due either to an unwillingness or an inability to learn—even from consultants outside the institution. (5) Having subordinates sign "non-disclosure agreements" about operations, so that the leader may take credit for subordinates' work performed on his watch; and so subordinates may not defend themselves from the leader's public, or private, criticism of themselves. (6) Deep emotional insecurity in his own role—accompanied by a fear of how others will view him, and consequent hypersensitivity to even constructive critique which could help produce internal reform. (7) Fearfulness of change. (8) Hyper-competitive attitudes toward other individuals and institutions perceived as rivals; this partially is manifested by attempting to bond with associates over things which are predominantly "negative" (e.g., a common "enemy" or a common hassle), more so than over things to be positively celebrated or shared in common. (9) An inability to sympathize, either habitually or consistently, with the perspectives or circumstances of subordinates. (10) Inducing subordinates to "turn on" each other when feeling stressed himself; this, due to a fear subordinates may come to a collective consensus about the leadership's need to improve—though this is usually just the leader's own paranoia at work. (11) Mistrust of how subordinates use their time, viewing them as wayward children, rather than esteemed coworkers; the leader habitually mistrusts how others use *their* time, because he is painfully aware he chronically fails to maximize his own. (12) A growing (and often paralyzing) sense of self-imposed isolation from various subordinates—especially from those judged to have higher skill sets closer to his own. (13) Habitual (or else on-again, off-again) irritability with others—including impatience with their work performance. (14) Delegating work to subordinates, while micromanaging subordinates' performance—thus enabling the leader to take credit for *positive* results; and to shift blame for negative results onto subordinates (in this way a toxic leader displaces any personal accountability for failure on his part, but does not delegate to subordinates freedom to act in such a way as might lead to success).

a) What has been called an "addiction" to micro-managing the tasks of subordinates—rather than attending to one's own proper tasks—all the while expressing irritation if a subordinate make decisions without consulting him first—and this even if the decision falls within the scope of the subordinate's authority.[9]

b) Poor emotional regulation, resulting in "flailing about," such as shouting or using vulgar language—or even hotly expressing a desire to

(15) Blaming others for a failure to perform; when, paradoxically, it is the leader who happens to be underperforming in his own specific tasks—either due to a lack of training, or to procrastination due to self-doubt, or to both. (16) Playing the part of a perfectionist out of the anxiety that he must possess *total* control—or at least the *appearance* of such control. (17) Callous criticism of others in their absence; this, either for the purpose of dividing subordinates from each other; or else to select a *particular* subordinate for collective scapegoating, and consequent isolation by the group (heedless of the words of Thomas a'Kempis, who said that to be humble is "not to think highly of oneself, [and] always to think highly of others"). (18) *Public* criticism of others during meetings; both in order to elevate the leader's own status, by expressing dominance; or else to isolate that subordinate. (19) A chronic, habitual, inability to apologize, much less to admit mistakes. (20) A lack of trust in the competence, judgment, and/or the loyalty, of those the leader has hired—regardless of whatever qualifications, skills, or successes they may possess; this has the potential to promote a dysfunctional, hostile environment that kills trust both "vertically" between manager and subordinate, and "horizontally" with subordinates among one another, damaging their interpersonal relationships, and discouraging subordinates from engaging in teamwork and creative production. (21) A "behavioral dependence" on control over subordinates, both as a lifestyle of the toxic leader—and precisely in order to perpetuate that lifestyle. (22) Failure to tolerate mistakes of any kind by a subordinate as part of their learning process, abiding by what Stephen R. Covey calls the "law of the machine" rather than the "law of the farm." (23) Withholding information which a subordinate may require in order to succeed at their own tasks. (24) General cunning, duplicity, and a propensity for manipulation. (25) Shallow, fleeting empathy only, lacking any deep or lasting remorse for callous behavior toward those more vulnerable than themselves. (26) Regularly demanding unnecessary, hyper-detailed, reports (what's been called "reportomania"), due to terror of "losing control" over the workplace; as well as to reinforce the leader's own sense that his own position is secure, that his role is useful and needed—because his oversight is allegedly so critical; such reports seek low-level trivia which delay decision-making, obscure bottom-line objectives, and divert a project in different, or even opposite, directions; in other words, first he creates the chaos—then he proposes to impose some kind of external order on that chaos to show himself, and others, how much he is needed.

[9] In *Drive: The Surprising Truth About What Motivates Us* (Riverhead Books, 2011), Daniel H. Pink argues on the basis of empirical evidence that self-management/self-directed processes, and worker autonomy are more effective incentives than monetary compensation. The latter motive is extrinsic, the former intrinsic.

close down the institution—in the presence of subordinates (though not in the presence of others) when he feels stressed.[10]

c) Setting up a subordinate to fail, by overloading the subordinate with work on the one hand, while denying him or her the authority to handle this work appropriately; all the while intrusively micro-managing the subordinate's work.

d) Using the subordinate's consequent lack of success at his or her task as ammunition to discredit and blame the victim in the eyes of fellow coworkers.

This last point is supposedly a common workplace bullying tactic, in which the toxic leader displaces his own feelings of inadequacy onto a subordinate, so that the subordinate might act as a kind of copper wire of connectivity for the toxic leader's sense of feeling "trapped," vulnerable, and helpless in his own position. (Though this position of helplessness, ironically, is of the leader's own creation; due to a combination of procrastination, lack of transparency, and self-imposed isolation.)[11]

The ultimate consummation of "setting someone up to fail" is often job termination.[12]

The lack of trust displayed by a toxic leader toward subordinates undermines growth by channeling worker energy into gossip, second guessing, and anxiety-fueled distraction. When one considers that—by contrast—"A *high performance* workplace can expect to achieve a 20 per cent increase in productivity and profitability"—and that such an environment is partially defined by institutionalizing innovation, combined with

[10] Dr. H. Greibel cites Aquinas describing humility as "praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place . . . [since] humility is part of the cardinal virtue of temperance because it *restrains and moderates the* '*impetuosity of the emotions*'" [emphases added]. Unpublished paper "Humility and the Intellectual Life" [http://www.google.pl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcourseweb.stthomas.edu%2Frmlemmons%2Fqv%2520giebel%2520humility%2520intellectual%2520life.doc&ei=WRHSVJDEC8P2UrymhIgH&usg=AFQjCNEj7GxPqWN3LbFn4m3eBOdQvIC4iw&bvm=bv.85076809,d.d24&cad=rja, accessed on 10.07.2014].

[11] The subordinate is thus made to 'feel the superior's pain' and frustration in his own work situation, as a kind of 'enforced empathy' with the superior's situation so to speak. A more common manner of expressing this is to say that "misery loves company." In any case, this behavior constitutes a deeply anti-social, callous willingness to inflict psychological pain; an obvious manifestation of infantile sadism.

[12] This is something General Kitchener is alleged, at least, to have done to Winston Churchill by engineering the Allies' defeat at the Battle of Gallipoli, during the First World War.

freedom from fear of failing, then one begins to realize how damaging a toxic leader is to his own institution.[13]

Hence, the reason such leaders are called "toxic" is, quite simply, because they risk burning their institutions down. First, because a failure to prioritize their own affairs, and an addiction to micromanaging subordinates to compensate for this, take them off-point. Second, because their own emotional insecurity disables them from thinking clearly, or of being able to put others before themselves. Third, and lastly, because the tension and the "lifeboat" mentality of distrust toxic leaders generate among subordinates leads to endless waves of staff turnover (or "churn") within an institution. This pours down the drain boatloads of funding which had been invested in bringing a new hire up to speed on an institution's goals, history, internal logic, members, methodologies, and specific protocols, over what is often a year-long cycle.

The toxic leader likewise damages his institution's reputation with current and potential clientele—including potential students and financial donors, if we're talking about an institution of higher learning. Damage to an institution's reputation can further *increase* the felt insecurity of toxic leaders—perpetuating a negative feedback loop of *even further* micromanagement. Now, we can all agree this is awful. Here's the problem.

First, people who engage in these behaviors often are—at best—only semi-consciously aware of what they are doing, to others or to themselves.[14] What results from their hyper-focused approach, and the attendant lack of habitual empathy and perspective taking they need to lead, is a lethal lack of intellectual humility. Dr. Peter Graham, Professor of Philosophy at the University of California at Riverside, notes that intellectual humility is a positive social virtue which involves neither

[13] "High Performance Teams—the only way to sustained benefits," Chartered Institute of Personnel November 2003 [www.kinetik.uk.com/docs/High_Performing_Teams_IOM.pdf, accessed on 08.07.2014].

[14] Their capacity for habitual empathy and perspective-taking regularly "shut downs" due a closing of their attention horizon. The leader's "hyper-focus" on fiscal deficits—rather than on their own role in institutional growth (say, through sales, or if in a college setting, on the need for their own individual ongoing fundraising efforts), cause this to happen. To use Goleman's terminology, they lack an authentic leader's foundational quality: "self-awareness." Namely, an awareness of how they impact others emotionally; yet they are also, very simply, lacking in self-knowledge regarding their own deepest motives, though subordinates begin to discern them. They may even lack a basic ability to "label" their own complex emotions linguistically. They thus necessarily run the occupationally lethal risk of lacking authentic intellectual humility.

overestimating, nor underestimating, one's own knowledge.[15] To the extent a toxic leader regularly distrusts the judgment of coworkers or of outside consultants, he sins against the first point—through what Graham calls "hyper-autonomy."[16] To the extent he allows himself to be tortured by self-doubt, due to an egocentric, perpetually second-guessing insecurity, he sins against the latter point, resulting in periodic paralysis.

What is more—and here we come full circle—this very lack of self-awareness—of even having "time" to be aware of oneself—is undermined by the "pace-setting" management style Goleman describes as having taken off since the 1990's, and as increasing exponentially since 2008 in particular. For it has been claimed that "the temptation to micromanage intensifies mightily during times of financial or occupational instability."[17] It is when we most feel helpless and "out of control" that we may be most tempted to start controlling those around us.

As Simon Head recently pointed out in publication, the lengths to which not only computer business systems (CBS's), but actually physically worn devices, track and surveillance workers, are reaching apoplectic proportions, revealing a level of micromanagement which—by curtailing the human element—isolates individuals, and reveals a profoundly demoralizing distrust in human beings as agents.[18]

Due to the toxic leader's hyper-focus, a cognitive dissonance can arise in which he salutes certain principles that offer him an idealistic, prosocial identity; yet he lacks the self-awareness of his own deepest motives—these become apparent to coworkers and subordinates over time—for the actual decisions he makes; especially when these are know-

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[15] As Graham points out, intellectual humility involves self-knowledge; or again, what Goleman refers to as that key quality any leader requires: "self-awareness." Or, in the words of the Introduction to the "Dependence Thesis" articulated by St. Louis University's Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility Project, intellectual humility is "related to open-mindedness, a sense of one's own fallibility, and a healthy recognition of one's intellectual debts to others" [http://humility.slu.edu/team/guy-longworth, accessed on 17.07. 2014].

[16] Dr. Greibel cites St. John of the Cross as noting that "the humble soul has the 'virtue of self-knowledge, which is so excellent and necessary, considering itself now as nothing and experiencing no satisfaction in itself; for it sees that it does nothing of itself nor can do anything' . . ."

[17] Under such circumstances, even spouses may attempt to micromanage one another's productive occupations outside the home, with the danger of inducing domestic tension. (This, in spite of the fact that, as George Macdonald pointed out, people often would prefer to be trusted even than to be loved.)

[18] *Mindless: Why Smarter Machines are Making Dumber Humans* (Basic Books, 2014).

ingly damaging to others. It is in such a state that Augustine's *libido dominandi* may flourish unaware.

The Macro Level

At this point we are compelled to add that the spread of the toxic leader—as well as of levels of reported 70% worker disengagement in the U.S. which have accompanied his rise—follows upon something occurring at the macro level in our economy. Namely, the subordination of the needs of individual workers, of families, and of their local communities, to a particular unfettered vision of *finance* capitalism; something exquisitely described by the CEO of a $3 billion company. Namely, John Mackey of Whole Foods.

In making this claim, I am—in no way—advocating a redistribution of income through federal taxation (which I oppose); nor advocating increased oversight by a centralized state; nor am I critiquing the operation of free markets for goods and services, any more than Mackey is (and he doesn't). Nor am I Luddite. Rather, I'm talking about the tension that necessarily exists between (allegedly) more efficient short-terms means by which publicly traded companies attract investment today, as Mackey describes this dynamic, versus that sense of solidarity, of community, and of all those Aristotelian virtues so often shredded as a consequence of these pressures.[19] Because I suspect the increase in the numbers of toxic bosses results in part from a trickle-down effect—from publicly traded firms to

[19] Since at least the recession of 1992, reality is that the cultural Left has been handed a made-to-order weapon against its opponents. This weapon is a pointed finger—a sometimes gun-shaped finger—aimed at those deemed by the young to be the destroyers of their parents' trust in the traditional workplace. Its engines, and its results, include: mass layoffs of workers in the interests of boosting stock prices from one quarter to the next (and here the flawed yet evocative film *The Company Men* starring Tommy Lee Jones, Ben Affleck, and Kevin Costener, comes to mind); the overworking of those "left behind" expected to "do more" as a consequence (evocative of the workhorse "Boxer" in Orwell's novel *1984*, only to be carted out himself soon enough), resulting in social alienation and burnout; the cynicism and lack of loyalty to institutions displayed by so many millennials; the increasing fear of younger people to commit to one another in marriage, much less to bear children within wedlock; the willingness of the young to "punish" an alleged top 1% through heavier taxation—and to entrust their security and future to the State. Yet, paradoxically, while much of this can, at least in part, be laid at the feet of a current regime of financial capitalism, in its mania for mechanized, utilitarian conceptions of efficiency, it bizzarely coincides with current *socialist* or progressive visions of order. Either way, it is the individual, the family, and local communities which "lose."

privately held ones, and right down to nonprofit organizations—schools included. But if this analysis is correct—and Goleman seems to think it is—what are we to do about it?

One alternative, at least, is ready at hand. It can be found quite simply in having students—from grammar school up—trained in the "interdependent stakeholder" philosophies of CEO John Mackey and of the late great management expert Dr. Stephen R. Covey, respectively.

For the philosophical underpinnings of his own thought, Stephen R. Covey proposed a strongly classical facultative psychology, and openly either praised or quoted in his writings such figures as Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Martin Buber, and Kurt Lewin (the father of "force field theory" in human relations) as potentially contributing to a natural law-based dialogical personalism. Covey insisted it was *trust* among all stakeholders—namely among all those affected by an institution in any way—which fueled both healthy human and healthy financial growth in the workplace. In fact, Covey was ultimately persuaded to describe the application of this personalism of the workplace to educational institutions—an initiative which now involves 1,500 schools and which is expanding exponentially.

John Mackey, likewise a lifelong student of philosophy, openly uses such terms and categories as "virtue," "solidarity," "human flourishing," and an overt rejection of postmodern relativism in the defense of recognizing objective truth. Mackey himself cites as philosophical influences Dr. Viktor Frankl and the philosophy of the beautiful, the good, the true, and the heroic first proposed by Plato, while citing Jesus, St. Francis of Assisi, and Mother Teresa as potential role models for leaders. (Something many might not expect from the free-marketeering founder of a successful $3 billion dollar company.)

So impressive, in fact, is Mackey's 2013 book *Conscious Capitalism*, that it really should be developed into a comprehensive course in management philosophy. Offering as it does a brilliant, evenhanded, historically and philosophically-minded analysis of the sins of both Wall Street and of the "Occupy Wall Street" crowd alike,[20] Mackey's book

[20] Mackey lists as some of his own role leaderships models such figures as Vineet Nayar of HCL Technologies; JRD Tata, founder of the Tata group; Howard Schulz, chairman, president, and CEO of Starbucks; Herb Kelleher, former CEO and chairman of Southwest Airlines; Biz Stone, cofounder of Twitter; Terri Kelly, CEO of W.L. Gore & Associates. My own include a founder of the $100 million company WesTech Engineering, a Catholic permanent deacon who told me he started his company to be based on solid social principles

should be required reading for every MBA student in America. But: what does any of this have to do with the academy? Two things.

First: it just goes to demonstrate what philosophical training can do for our economy—a topic rarely far from our minds today; and a fact toward which neither an Aristotle nor an Aquinas would have been indifferent had they lived in our day.

Second: when we talk about toxic leaders, it becomes incumbent on institutions of higher learning to know *who it is that they are hiring* to run their schools.

This begins with the president—whose primary duty, following the 80/20 (or 90/10) rule formulated by Wilfredo Pareto—is, and ought to be, institutional advancement through donor fundraising.[21] If the president fails to do his own job in this respect, those he leads will be unable to do theirs; and thus begins the temptation to become a toxic leader, reactively seeking to scapegoat subordinates accordingly, and to rationalize his own inadequacies to the school's board.

Conversely, it is the institution's duty to duly train an incoming college president both in fundraising methodologies on the one hand, and in the soundest management philosophy on the other; so as not to set him or her up for failure, and to create that trust within the institution which it needs to thrive.

The institution which fails to do these two things—merely assuming an incoming president must already possesses these skills, or otherwise he or she would not have been selected for the position, does an injustice both to the incoming president, to faculty, staff, students, and donors alike.

(one of the stated values on their website remains "Value our people and their families"); James Dangermond, founder and president of the ESRI software company and an old mentor of mine in practical affairs; and Vince Higgins, author and CEO of the Texas-based Fitiri Energy corporation—and an old personal mentor of mine in practical affairs.

[21] Melissa Ezarik, "The President's Role in Fundraising," *University Business* (May 2012) [www.universitybusiness.com/article/presidents-role-fundraising, accessed on 17.07.2014]; "Overcoming the College President's Achilles' Heel: Fundraising," by Mel and Pearl Shaw [http://diverseeducation.com/article/11898, accessed on 17.07.2014]; Derek M. Wesley, "Catholic college and university presidents: Fundraising initiatives and identity maintenance" (January 2007), Dissertation & Theses Collection, Paper AAI3315136; Jennifer J. Raab, "For Public College Presidents, Fundraising Is Full-Time Job on Top of Their Full-Time Jobs," *The Huffington Post* (08.11.2013) [accessed on 17.07.2014]; Matthew W. Miller, "The Role of the Community College President in Fundraising: Perceptions of Selected Michigan Community College Presidents," DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska—Lincoln (April 2013), accessed on 17.07.2014.

In addition, however, and John Mackey points the way here, as he does in so many things: a school must choose wisely who its "investors" are. For, while long-term investors have rights that must be respected and actively consulted, they in turn must learn to respect the ethic of mutual trust owed employees and clients alike. For this reason, Mackey believes only those long-term investors should be accommodated who understand his organization's philosophy, first and last. Now, in an institution of higher learning, the "investors" in question are often board members, who are also financial contributors to the school; clients are the students; and employees remain the same.

If, as Goleman points out, the toxic leader is now everywhere—and his influence is growing—then he or she must not be invited onto your school's board, however much money he can contribute in the short-term. (Just ask him for that contribution to your capital campaign over five years instead, or something.) Because in the long-term, he may burn your institution to the ground. Since no matter what his good intentions may be, he is hyper-focused and, ultimately, short-sighted (though he himself is unaware of this fact—precisely because he is short-sighted). They will fire staff for short-term debt reduction, setting the deadly staff-turnover wheel in motion. They will automate and outsource, but without retraining those replaced for higher skill sets which can increase staff value to the institution. In short: they will fail to be smart.

If the person in question is already on your board, then a rightfully-trained and selected president must be able to gently educate this person on the school's philosophy regarding how it treats human beings, and why it does so; and to stand up to this person if need be—even if this person is the chairman of the board, for the sake of the institution. (Hopefully other rightfully-educated board members would have the fortitude to do the same.)

Final Thoughts

What we have just described has implications for the online education revolution—and again, here I insist I am no Luddite.

I have heard it alleged that what students most appreciate today is a "blended" course which incorporates online delivery combined with limited face-to-face interaction best pleases students, and that their test scores testify to the potential of these methods. Either way, we know the online revolution is here. We know declining enrollments due to population de-

cline in the U.S. mean students must be sought for abroad, even if it means they are acquired virtually. We know a great many instructors living abroad will not ask to be compensated at the rates homegrown American tenured instructors expect to be. We know U.S. students are crushed by a $1 trillion debt in outstanding financial aid, part of it consisting in residential cost-of-living expenses.

We know all this. And boards and academic administrators know it too. They would be irresponsible—and failing in their jobs—if they failed to know all this. It is part of their job description to do so.

What we must work toward is an ideal in which school presidents create a synergy of high trust among board members, academic administrators, instructors, and students alike, in which each individual's input is actively sought moving forward; and that the interests and desires of all stakeholders are genuinely respected.

And one last thing. Why is it that to locate a management philosophy as close to classical thought and preaching human solidarity in the workplace as I could find among CEO's and management consultants, I had to find it outside the fold of Thomism? I could be wrong, but I believe Vineet Nayar is Hindu. Stephen R. Covey was Mormon. John Mackey (very occasionally) sounds New Agey. These individuals are the best of the best. When I learned that something called the "Aquinas Leadership International" had been founded, I had one thought: where have *you* been all my life?

I am certain it is Thomistic personalists aware of the contributions of the hermeneutics of everyday life, and of all the human and social sciences, who are best positioned to offer larger metaphysical and epistemic groundings for the proposals of authors like Covey and Mackey. In sum: we have a lot of work to do.

PHILOSOPHICAL TENSIONS AMONG LEADERSHIP, EFFICIENCY, COMMUNITY—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE ACADEMY

SUMMARY

In any age, at any given time, there are leaders who fail to lead by example. The desires which motivate them, and the means they deploy to cover for this fact, can weave paths of destruction with social costs borne by those who can least afford them—including within the academy. Taking the right steps—both professionally and spiritually—at least theoretically make this avoidable. This article addresses select topics in light of ancient perspectives and

recent phenomena alike, including those of: the harmony of Thomistic personalism with stakeholder theory and transformational leadership, respectively; the relationship of Augustinian realism to cognitive dissonance theory and the composition of boards.

KEYWORDS: leadership, efficiency, community, Thomism, personalism, academy.

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THOMISTIC SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP AND COMMON SENSE TRIAD OF ORGANIZATIONAL HARMONY

Organizational Harmony of the One and the Many

I want to address initially the first topic of Thomistic organizational harmony with a little history about how I became a born again Thomist. I had originally been educated in Thomistic philosophy in a traditional Catholic seminary. It was taught primarily as a preparation for Catholic theology. For the greater part, it was a process of learning in a sequential and structured format the language and definitions of Thomistic philosophy, e.g., definitions of substance, prime matter, genus, species, etc. I cannot say that it was an introduction to the nature of wondering about the organization and aim of life; it was more than anything an elementary introduction into scholastic logic. After Vatican II and a few years of graduate studies in ethics at a secular university, I left any active pursuit of Thomistic study. I moved into the business world in marketing and sales positions, building a modest career. Eventually, I became the CEO of a small manufacturing engineering consulting firm. Although I was not an engineer, I was hired by the owners because of my business development skills.

I enjoyed the company because I was learning about manufacturing and product development. The company also had a quality management division, and it proved a promising profit center. I felt rather comfortable in the domain of statistical process control. Looking back, I believe it was the manufacturing environment that brought me back to my unconscious memories of Aristotle and Aquinas. Manufacturing is an extremely sensible place where one hears the sounds of machines, drills, the odors of fuels,

and the movement of parts. It is a place where one feels all the pieces fitting together. It is not a place of abstract ideas as much as a place where all pieces must fit together well.

It was the time of the late seventies and early eighties, when America was losing badly in the world of manufacturing. We were hit hard by Japan's sudden amazing mastery of total quality management, especially in the automotive industry. American quality control had become outmoded in light of Japanese competition, and panic had set in big time. Of course, it provided a promising opportunity for consulting firms such as Jensen Engineering. There were various schools of quality control, but our firm and engineers were disciples of W. Edwards Deming. It was Deming who had gone to Japan and introduced them to quality management. Basically, he introduced them to the work of Walter A. Shewart in statistical methods and quality control.[1] As a tribute to Deming, the Japanese to this day award the Deming Prize medal of quality to companies of excellence.

Consequently, I attended a course at NYU department of statistics given by Deming on Statistical Process Control. I went somewhat apprehensively because I was not a statistician, but to my surprise Deming spent much of the time lecturing on variation and a theory of knowledge. In one of the sessions, an associate gave a lecture on Deming and the rediscovery of Aristotelian causation. Immediately I sat up because there was something going on much more than just statistical methods of measurement. I was introduced to Deming's philosophy of management, and it was really a philosophy of practical knowledge based fundamentally on Aristotelian causation, i.e., material, formal, efficient and final causes.

Primarily, Deming called for a return to the Aristotelian principle of teleology in the management of any organization dedicated to the satisfaction of the end user of a product, good or service. The founder of the quality movement held emphatically to two Aristotelian principles. One, the relation of parts to whole in organizational structures is essentially teleological since an organization has machinery, manpower, material and methods in order to perform the functions for which they are designed (end user satisfaction). Two, mechanical efficiency and teleological purpose must be continuously reconciled throughout the organization. It is the task of management to optimize the organization by maintaining the mutual compatibility of these two forces.

[1] Walter A. Shewart, *Statistical Methods From The Viewpoint of Quality Control* (New York: Dover Publications 1939).

Based on the relation of part to whole and teleological purpose, Deming defines business from the perspective of an interactive and interdependent system, and it is here that he begins to sound like a Thomist.

> A system must create something of value, in other words, results, the intended results, along with consideration of recipients and of cost, mould the aim of the system. It is thus management's task to determine those aims, to manage the whole organization toward accomplishment of those aims. It is important that an aim never be defined in terms of a specific activity or method. It must always relate to a better life for everyone.[2]

Deming was a devout Anglican who enjoyed discussing philosophy. As a result, I entered into correspondence with him and discovered that he was a dedicated disciple of Clarence Irvine Lewis, a Conceptual Pragmatist. However, he often quoted St. Paul, 1 Corinthians 12: 14–21, as an example of a system, "A body is not one single organ, but many, etc." Deming unconsciously falls back to the Greek and Thomistic concern of the One and the Many.

Deming would get upset when he was referred to as the founder of Total Quality Management. Although he presented his famous 14 points of management, he rejected all attempts at constructing a system of management based on technique. The heart and mind of Deming's vision for transformation of an organization and American industry is in chapters three and four of *The new Economics for Industry, Government, Education, A System of Profound Knowledge*.

> What is a system? A system is a network of interdependent components that work together to accomplish the aim of the system. The system must have an aim. Without an aim there is no system. The aim of the system must be clear to everyone in the system. The aim must include plans for the future . . . a system must be managed. It will not manage itself. Left to themselves in the Western world, components become selfish, competitive, independent profit centers and thus destroy the system.[3]

[2] W. Edwards Deming, *The New Economics for Industry, Government, Education* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England: MIT Press, 1994), 52.
[3] Id.

Deming's Frustration and His Need for a Thomistic Metaphysics

Deming challenged Western business and industrial education as being overly dedicated to accounting, quantitative work measurement, cost/benefit analysis, administrative techniques and human resource policies. He was a mathematical physicist who suggested that a science or liberal arts education was the best preparation for the management of an organization. He became frustrated with business and government leadership inability to grasp the need for a new Western understanding of an organization.

I believe that he would have appreciated the thinking of Thomistic scholars like Charles Bonaventure Crowley, John Deely and especially Peter Redpath who writes,

> Like Aristotle, St. Thomas maintained that every division of science starts with the evident acceptance of the existence of what, today, we would call "operational organizations" or "operational systems." Unlike other sciences that study one species, or "system" of operational organization to understand its distinctive kind (genus) of organization and its specific principles of operation (species), metaphysics studies all genera and species of organizations in an attempt to discover what are the universal organizational and operational principles that exist in any and every genus or species of organization.[4]

I suggest that Deming was in need of a born again Thomistic philosophy of organizational leadership and harmony. I am using the terminology born again in order to clearly differentiate the efforts in Thomistic thinking regarding organizational harmony from neo-Thomism. Born again Thomism simply holds that Thomistic thinking is not about logic; rather, it is a philosophy about the habit of wonder. Thomas was not writing about a logic as much as he was wondering about the organizational harmony of God's universe and human interactive participation in the wholeness of a mind independent reality of organizational networks.

Having been guided for several months in Thomistic philosophy by Peter Redpath, I propose a born again Thomism where we look upon Thomas as an organizational genius. Furthermore, this organizational genius of

[4] Peter A. Redpath, *One and The Many* (Graduate Course Transcript 2014), 110.

Thomas is most timely to a postmodern culture where philosophical and management focus is driven by existing in a dynamic information field. Peter Redpath has suggested a Thomistic communication network of principles.

1) "Principles of instrumentalizing (effecting, communicating, establishing) a relation (enabling means, circumstances that include somewhat separately-existing beings, conditions, and opportunity) must precede principles of relation (communion) that generate an actual relation." I would apply this principle as meaning that an organization must have a leading team of experts possessing knowledge of the market and industry, with the necessary resources and strong vision. It is a matter of the right people, with the right idea, at the right time, with the right vision and the right resources, etc.

2) "Principles of relation having the right qualities in those separately existing beings, overcoming resistance and imparting receptivity (communication networks) must precede principles of unity that can actually establish unity." If the leaders of an organization do not have the ability to communicate and reach intellectual, emotional and operational harmony, the organization will not achieve a state of optimization. In order for an organization to have harmony, there is no place for self-serving prima donnas and organizational silos.

3) "Principles of instrumentalizing unity (having the right tools, enabling means, circumstances, conditions relating) must precede principles of unity (actually overcoming resistance and imparting receptivity to being related (communicating with each other as a unit), having the right tools to establish unity must precede principles that establish an actual relation of parts into a whole." Executives, managers and workers must be able to use operational tools such as flow charts, statistical process controls, financial instruments and marketing and sales forecasting, etc., to maintain optimal organizational harmony.

4) "Principles of establishing unity (a causal unit, genus, communication network, an existing thing) must precede principles of instrumentalizing operational relations (enabling means, circumstances for communicating action that include conditions and opportunity for action and a being capable of being qualified to act) must precede principles (quantities and qualities) of action (species, internal delivery system for communicating action: organizational departments or divisions, numerical divisions (to number is to divide and unify a smaller plurality from a larger one of an organization into departments, divisions)."

A communication network is far more than having a computer system, advanced operational processes, financial and metric software, inventory control, etc. It is the continual interpretation of information. "Information is not knowledge. To put it another way, information, no matter how complete and speedy, is not knowledge. Knowledge has a temporal spread. Knowledge comes from theory. Without theory, there is no way to use the information that comes to us on the instant."[5] There must be an executive level team that creates a knowledge based communication network.

5) "Principles of further instrumentalization of relation by an organizational leader through a strategic plan must precede principles of further qualification of an intrinsic, or departmental delivery system into a qualified internal delivery unit." A plan is a dynamic instrument that is comprised of feed forward knowledge, i.e., the organization measures where it is going over what period of time and feedback, i.e., what measurements report success or failure of hitting strategic goals and objectives. In this dynamic planning process there must be intense participation from a hierarchy of agents up to senior executive levels and directors.

6) "Principles of qualification of departmental, divisional units (cementing relations among departments through communication of unity, single mindedness of purpose) initiated by departmental heads through communication networks established by them within their divisions of proper tactics (through intrinsic accidents of quantity and quality) must precede transformation of departments, divisions, into an internal organizational delivery system."

7) "Principle of instrumentalization of tactical operations of an internal delivery system (through intrinsic and extrinsic accidents, like qualified departments and external enabling means existing between them like the existence of transportation and vocal communication network, must precede relations with tactical operations of external organizations to establish an external delivery system for cooperative generation of a product or service that effects an organizational chief aim."[6]

In a global information environment, organizations, especially business, exist in extremely challenging information fields that call for continuous adaptation. A metaphor about the nature of organizational leadership best serves to describe this contemporary reality.

[5] Deming, *The New Economics*, 106.
[6] Peter A. Redpath, *Missive*, 25.11.2014.

Let us take the example of the Oracle yacht in the American Cup. This competitive world cup yacht racing is comprised of a well-trained crew with a leader helmsman, and the use of a finely engineered catamaran and advanced competitive research using Oracle technology, such as radar tracking and laser range analysis of competitors. The catamaran has 300 built in sensors that allow for constant and rapid decision-making throughout the race. It is a sophisticated communication network with a skipper and crew who must exist, judge and move as a team driven by a clear common aim, to win. In the American Cup race the technology faces an "independent of mind" reality. It is the awareness that organization of the American team and the yacht must begin with a series of sequential organizational principles long before the race begins. It is Thomistic thinking, however, that clearly identifies the need for a common aim shared by all the team, the support engineering and the competitive research and the necessity of a communication network for the purpose of game strategy and real-time decision making. It is a communication system totally designed to support the team's commitment to an organizational philosophy of the one and the many and victory.

Organizational Harmony of Hope, Habit and a Psychology of Power

I am careful when I talk about organizational harmony and leadership not to present Thomistic philosophy as a system of organizational management. As much as Thomistic thinking is essential to management harmony, it is not a systems theory of management. Primarily, I am careful about not falling into this trap because organizational harmony is about the leadership of persons who must be motivated, educated and habituated to a common aim. Systems theory and various off springs such as management complexity and chaos theory, management by objectives, ISO 9000, six sigma are about defined ideas, procedures and processes. Besides these types of engineering systems there are human resource, accounting, financial, employee equity systems etc. All these systems are fundamentally based on ideas about measureable interactions of components, units and work force for optimal output. Much of this systems approach is essential to efficient management, but the Thomist is basically concerned about the nature and practice of the intellectual and moral nature of the leader and his team in an organization.

> St. Thomas's teaching is chiefly about existential judgments, not about ideas. The emotions are crucial in all forms of judging and reasoning, judging to forming every emotion. In fact, we can have no emotion without forming judgments related to ideas. St. Thomas considered business activity in the highest form to be a practical or productive science. He would view any kind of Modern Corporation in the same way. Like every practical activity, it starts in wonder. Wonder is an activity moving away from the emotion of fear through hope to escape from fear. Since all art, science, philosophy starts in wonder, it starts in total conviction, or hope of being able to satisfy a desire, ending the desire in intellectual, volitional and emotional satisfaction. A human aim, or end, is simply a hope or totally conviction-filled desire. The object of that hope or conviction is the final act that stops the movement of desire, puts it to rest, and satisfies it. Good leaders lead by instilling conviction filled, hope filled friendship, desire in a multitude: creating professional friendships.[7]

A great example of this style of leadership is Southwest Airlines grounded on the personalism of the founder Herb Kellerman as described in the book *Nuts! Southwest Airlines' Recipe for Business and Personal Success* by Kevin Freiburg and Jackie Freiburg, I suggest that this book is a must read on the nature of leadership and organizational harmony. Colleen Barrett, one the original founders, describes Southwest as an organization grounded on a philosophy of common sense:

> Let common sense prevail. Southwest employees know from history that when they use common sense to do what they think is right, the company will support them. "We never jump on employees for leaning too far in the direction of the customer. They have to know that we stand behind them, and we do. The only time we come down on them pretty hard is when they fail to use common sense. Common sense may sound easy enough, but it's a hard thing to define. When we say we are going to be an on-time airline and we are not holding planes for anybody, period, we have to use good judgment. We once had a situation where we slammed the door to a jet way because we wanted to push the plane on time. Fine. But when the passenger coming down the ramp is a paraplegic and can be seen by the opera-

[7] Peter A. Redpath, *Missive*, 12.11.2014.

> tions agent in the jet way and has to sit in a wheelchair for four and a half hours for the next flight—that's not common sense.[8]

From the earliest days, Southwest was founded as an organization where employees are seen as persons capable of intellectual wonder and a willingness to learn. Herb Kelleher and Colleen Barrett founders of Southwest were intensely inquisitive. Kelleher is a student of life and a voracious reader who digs into issues to understand them thoroughly. Southwest senior officers and all employees at all levels are seen as learners capable of developing the habit of wonder. The organization is known for its Southwest University for People; it is a multitiered learning facility staffed by the Employee Learning and Development Department. Its primary mission is to equip employees to practice the kind of leadership that Southwest Airlines expects.

A Thomist is driven by the importance of living and organizing life by means of intellectual and moral habits. An excellent and concise explanation of the Thomistic importance of intellectual and moral habit is in a small book by Curtis L. Hancock, *Recovering A Catholic Philosophy of Elementary Education*. He writes, "Good individual habits (virtues) are crucial to us because healthy human life is largely a matter of relating means and ends. Virtues are means toward perfecting our human nature and life." I should like to change this to a description of organizational habit, i.e., habits (virtues) are crucial to healthy and successful organizational life because they are necessary to the relationship of the means and end of the organization more so in the long run more than operational and administrative procedures.[9]

For example, Herb Kelleher has dedicated his leadership of Southwest as grounded on the greatest source of leadership and harmony, the virtuous habit of love. Kelleher's ethical leadership principle is

> if you are careful about the hiring loving people, it should come as no surprise that acts of love and generosity will naturally spill out of them. It should come as no surprise that when you get enough peo-

[8] Kevin Freiburg and Jackie Freiburg, *Nuts! Recipe for Business and Personal Success* (Austin Texas: Brad Press, 1996), 287–289.
[9] Curtis L. Hancock, *Recovering A Catholic Philosophy of Elementary Education* (Newman House Press, 2005).

> ple with these attributes in the same company, a corporate character is created that practices love as a way of doing business.[10]

At Southwest love is defined by example and education for the purpose of becoming an organizational habit. I use the concept of habit because it is not an organizational process. In the Thomistic sense, a habit is part of the organizational system, as Hancock defines the virtue and practice of habit,

> One scholar has called habits 'operational structures,' a phrase at once that expresses that habits exercise powers toward action and yet do so in a way that involves ease, constancy and purpose. As an acquired operational tendency, a habit is not identical with knowledge or appetite. For we can know things without needing skill to do so, and we can desire things in a random and unproductive way. Nor is a habit identical with the activity toward which it is directed, for we retain our acquired abilities even when we are not performing those actions at a given moment . . . Consequently, a habit is related to a power by giving it a limiting qualitative ability and aim (an operational, determinate structure, as it were) and is related to an activity by enabling it to occur quickly and with comparative ease and proficiency. In this light, we see that habit actuates (by giving structure or form) a power within definite limits, while an activity actuates a habit. Accordingly, a habit is related to a power as act to potency; a habit is related to an activity as potency to act.[11]

From the perspective of a Thomist, employees at any level of the organization are respected for their ability to achieve excellence in their organizational capacity because faculties of intellect and will are challenged, recognized, affirmed and contribute to the shared common aim. Workers are not programmable robotic automata, rather they are intellectual and moral persons who are capable of making wise existential judgments for the betterment of the customer, the organization and fellow employees.

Through Southwest Airlines, we learn that ethics is not an interesting component in leadership training. At a company like Southwest, motivational psychology, ethics and operational behavior are all one and the

[10] Freiburg, Freiburg, *Nuts*.
[11] Hancock, *Recovering A Catholic Philosophy of Elementary Education*, 82–83.

same. It is really an exercise in the rational psychology of Thomas that is best understood as a power psychology. Ethics and Organizational leadership are one and the same reality. Redpath's call to understand the treatment of moral wisdom in terms of a power psychology is truly one of the most critical Thomistic contributions to understanding of organizational leadership.

> To us the reality of ethics rests upon the reality of a power psychology. Ethics appears to us to be misunderstood today, not because there is anything unreal about ethics, but because we have been trying to observe this subject from the wrong perspective. In order for us to re-establish the worth of this subject, we think it is necessary for us to appreciate, once again, in the history of ethics the need for a power psychology . . . how can moral activity belong to human beings, unless it arises from a human power? Surely, it cannot. There simply seems to us to be no way to establish the existence of a reality like moral activity without a power psychology.[12]

In a sense for a Thomist, the concepts of organizational harmony, ethics and leadership are basically the same. Thomistic philosophy holds that it is by means of a power psychology (ethical leadership) that an organization empowers workers at all levels to move continuously towards a common aim.

Over the past several months as I have been reading Thomistic philosophy, especially Peter Redpath, I began to speak with some business executives and successful entrepreneurs about the nature of organizational leadership. I knew the individuals personally, and I respected them as successful business leaders and good people with deep ethical values. I simply asked them to take a little time and give me their three characteristics of a good leader.

One of the individuals is a Senior Vice President with a large hotel-resort corporation. He is the director of human resources and is responsible for the hiring and training of approximately 15,000 employees a year. He is one of the top human resource executives in the country. He is also a devout evangelical Christian with a dedicated life of biblical study, daily prayer, and worship and a focused family man. His three characteristics

[12] Peter A. Redpath, *The Moral Wisdom of St. Thomas* (University of America Press, 1983), An Introduction.

proved very helpful in combining the sense of the Thomistic principles of the one and the many, wonder and power psychology.

The characteristics of a good leader		
1. Create authentic connections with others:	2. Think ahead:	3. Develop self and others:
a) Inspire trust and manage expectations of stakeholders.	a) Anticipate changing dynamics which can happen at lightning speed.	a) Understand one's own strengths and weaknesses, constantly seeking to improve.
b) Listen to others and develop a shared understanding.	b) Synthesize and simplify complexity to solve for the essence.	b) Unlock potential in others and help them succeed according to their own strengths.
c) Recognize interdependence and connect the dots to ensure success.	c) Experiment, fail often and yet moving towards a goal and doing it quickly.	c) Be surrounded by others who are more talented to raise one's own game.

A Practical Organizational Harmony

Finally, I would like to conclude with a question that I gave Doctor Redpath some months ago that made my rediscovery of Thomism tremendously exciting. It was when I began to realize that Thomistic philosophy is about how human life fits together. As a result, I sent this question to Doctor Redpath.

I have a grandson Joshua who is now seven years old. Since he was a little child, he has always shown a mechanical interest, inclination and aptitude. He is extremely unlike his grandfather who is a mechanical cretin. Yet when he was about four years old, I would make an effort to build things with him with Lego blocks. I seem to have a suitable amount of mechanical dexterity for this technology.

Let's say, for example, that Joshua and I want to build a house together, and there are no Lego blocks available. Both Joshua and his grandfather have an idea of a house, i.e., we essentially agree on the essential nature of a house. Since we have to build the house, it needs some form, i.e., the size, walls, a roof, a door and a window. We will need material to build the house, so we decide to use paper, and we want thick paper. We

will need glue and scissors to cut the paper (machinery). We will conduct rounds of testing the material and methods of gluing. We will be attempting to compose an idea out of parts.

Soon, my grandson will say, "Grandpa, this is not working! Let's get the Lego blocks." It is here that I think my four year old grandson becomes an Organizational Thomist. He is discovering, as Redpath teaches, "parts that cannot be intelligibly united." The thin paper does not have the necessary viscosity; we have "parts that cannot coexist in a nature."

Therefore, we get the Lego blocks, and we go into action. These blocks (parts) work well together. There is no contradiction, and it becomes easy for Joshua and Grandpa to exchange design concepts, go into action, try this and that, and mutually build a house that is intelligibly united.

Consequently, it seems the Joshua and Grandpa have learned something about the principle of contradiction and organization. In the real world of construction and organization some courses of action are better than others. In other words, our successful organizational actions show that we have beliefs and habits that conform to the Principle of Non Contradiction (PNC Organizational Development).

My Question

> Peter, am I getting a proper understanding of your teaching on non-contradiction (PNC)? I would like to call it the basic principle of organizational development. It is important because all present academic approaches to organizational development is grounded on nominalism, information theory and Kantian business ethics.

The Answer

> Yes, you are getting a proper understanding of what I am saying. In recently reviewing St. Thomas and Aristotle's teaching about unity, from which they partly derive their teaching about non contradiction, they note that we do not arrive at our understanding of unity, or indivisibility, from quantity alone. They say we get it from awareness related to the qualitative indivisibility of a continuum body, to the difficulty we experience breaking some united whole. Like a piece of wood apart. Aristotle and the ancient Greeks, in general, identify unity as a cause existing within a multitude that made the unity unbreakable . . . Aristotle and St. Thomas add that contradiction is a kind of negation, and negation is a kind of privation. We get the idea of privation (resistance to receptivity within the subject)

> from an analogous extension of the idea of unity. They think of privation as a principle, a cause of resistance within a potency to the existence of some difference. Hence privation is a kind of unity working as a principle, a cause of opposition.
>
> Aristotle claims that 4 kinds of opposition exist: privation and possession, contradiction, contrariety, and relation. In a way, all 4 are species of privation and possession opposition. Contradictory opposites are the differences that totally resist co-existence, cannot be unities, and cannot enter into organization.
>
> Contrary opposites are extreme differences generated out of a common cause of unity, or principle consisting of opposite extremes of privation and possession of a generic (organizational unity). They divide an organizational unity into species, departments, and divisions, unequally possessing the organizational unity (like a 5-star general and a private).[13]

I have concluded with this dialogue with the Thomistic philosopher Peter Redpath because it speaks most directly to my years in leadership positions in business and the church, i.e., moving members of an organization with passion and dedication to a common aim. The main challenge in this unremitting attempt to achieve that goal is the blending together of opposing forces (personalities, personal agendas, talents, emotions, protection of turf, etc.) for the common aim.

Therefore, I will conclude with a risky over-exaggeration of what Thomistic organizational leadership is all about. It is a matter of constantly getting all the pieces to fit together in a very mind independent world where the leader must find the natural unity, the natural harmony, and intellectually, emotionally and morally blend the forces around for a common aim. This is a foundational principle of common sense philosophy and leadership. It is the "desire to overcome the apparent contradiction that arises from an unshakable conviction about (1) the reliability of our human knowing faculties and (2) the unity of truth (that some true part/whole organization exists in things and human beings can know this truth through an analogous operation, organization, of true judgment in and through the reliable human knowing faculties). This conviction is what Adler and most Thomists, Aristotelians, are groping after in their use of the phrase "common sense." It is the principle of common sense and first principle of all

[13] Peter A. Redpath, *Missive*, 2014.

philosophy for all time and an essential principle of European civilization!"[14]

THOMISTIC SCIENTIFIC LEADERSHIP AND COMMON SENSE TRIAD OF ORGANIZATIONAL HARMONY

SUMMARY

This paper examines the nature of organizational leadership from the perspective of common sense principles. The principles are established by means of a Thomistic metaphysics of the One and the Many, i.e., the Thomistic teaching of the opposition between Unity and Multiplicity. It is this Thomistic metaphysical philosophical science that studies the distinct kind (genus) of an organization and its specific common sense principles of organizational leadership. This common sense leadership is a harmonious blending of psychology, ethics and operational behavior.

KEYWORDS: one and the many, communication network, organization teleological purpose, psychology of power, virtuous habits, characteristics of a good leader, contrary opposites.

[14] Peter A. Redpath, *Missive*, Feb. 2004.

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TRANSFORMED IN CHRIST, THE MASTER OF UNCOMMON SENSE

"I am the way and the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father except through me." As a sixteen-year-old seminarian in Piedmont, Italy, James Alberione was seized by those words of Christ. He had read Leo XIII's encyclical for the dawn of the twentieth century, *Tametsi futura prospicientibus, On Jesus Christ the Redeemer*. He had absorbed the thinking of now-Blessed Giuseppe Toniolo, economist and leader of Christian social thought. Together, they launched Alberione on a unique, lifelong quest into the Person of Christ the Master, both rooted in Christian Tradition and responsive to society.

Exactly one hundred years ago, that response took the form of what gradually became the ten branches of the Pauline Family. Each branch, in its own way, bears witness to Christ the Master, Way, Truth, and Life. The theological-spiritual synthesis that undergirds this witness is the principal reason that at Alberione's beatification, John Paul II would call him "the first apostle of the new evangelization." What secret does this synthesis hold for us here as we attempt to renew the West?

The whole Christ

The title, 'Jesus Master, Way, Truth, and Life', is derived from both the Synoptics and John. The "master" of Jn. 13:13—"you call me master and Lord and you say rightly; so I am"—is not slaveholder, but teacher (in Greek, *didaskolos*, akin to our English word, 'didactic'). This translation is borne out by the text itself. Jesus has just washed the feet of his disciples as "an example. As I have done, so you must do" (13:15). This Master is not one who pontificates from on high, but who offers himself as a model, an exemplar. He is like the medieval master craftsman who takes the appren-

tice under his wing, into his family, or like the Oriental master who has walked the path of enlightenment and can then enlighten his disciple.

Matthew's Jesus is the Teacher, Instructor. In his Gospel, the Greek reads: *kathigités*, the teacher who announces the kingdom from the *cathedra* of the new Sinai—the Mount of the Beatitudes, and later, the cross—"Nor shall you be called teachers, for you have one teacher, the Messiah" (Mt. 23:10). This Master-Teacher does not equivocate when revealing the secrets of the kingdom: "You have heard it said . . . But I say to you . . ." He holds crowds spellbound precisely because he teaches "as one with authority" (Mt. 7:29).

But why Way, Truth, and Life? In the New Jerusalem Bible, the Johannine text reads: "I am the Way: I am Truth and Life." This construction is an interpretive reading of the passage. It emphasizes the Way, which is suggested by the context: "No one *comes* to the Father except *through* me," in response to Thomas who had just asked, "Master, we do not know where you are going; how can we know *the way*?" According to this reading, the reason that Jesus can be Way for human beings is because he is in himself Truth (the revelation of the Father) and Life (eternal co-existence with the Father).

But is there another way of reading this trinomial without contradicting this interpretation? The original Greek construction would suggest that there is: "I am the way and the truth and the life"—almost as three aspects of the same Person. In the words of Thomas à Kempis: "I am the Way you must follow, the Truth you must believe, the Life you must hope for."[1]

Fr. Alberione saw in Christ the perfect Master, with whom total configuration of will, mind, and heart is the only sure way to salvation, to sanctification: "Lord, to whom shall we *go*? You alone have *words* of eternal *life*" (Jn. 6:68). Uncommon sense, indeed.

In addition, although Paul never referred to Christ as Master or described him as Way, Truth, and Life, Paul, more than any other figure, represented for Alberione the human being's total response to the transforming call to apostolic discipleship: "It is no longer I who live; Christ lives in me" (Gal. 2:20). In other words, John offers us the image of the whole Christ; Paul offers us the image of the whole human person in relationship with Christ. In its totality, the Pauline mission meant bringing the

[1] Thomas à Kempis, *The Imitation of Christ*, Bk. III, ch. 56.

whole Christ to the whole person and the whole person to the whole Christ. It still does.

The whole human person

We read in the Gospel that one day a scribe asked Jesus which commandment was the greatest. Jesus answered, "The first commandment is this: 'Hear, O Israel! The Lord our God is Lord alone! You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength.'" (Mk 12:29–30).

Heart, mind, strength. From philosophy, we know that the powers of the soul are distinguished on the basis of their activities, and those activities on the basis of their ends. Thus, the mind recognizes the good perceived through the senses, the heart desires it, and the will, informed by the mind and spurred on by the heart, chooses it.

I do not mean to suggest that, holistic though it is, this is the only way to understand human nature or its integration. For instance, in its *therapeutic* capacity, psychology examines how a person's story interacts with his or her sentiments, beliefs, needs, and values and even shapes them. In its *formative* capacity within catechesis, as well as in religious and priestly formation, psychology attempts to integrate growth in faith and congregational charism with one's cognitive, volitional, and affective development. In either case, it is nevertheless valid to cast the aspects or powers of the human person in terms of mind, will, and heart. Let's look at these powers of the soul to see how discipleship configures the whole person to Christ.

In *Tametsi futura* Leo XIII wrote: "There are many who study humanity and the natural world; few who study the Son of God. The first step, then, is to substitute knowledge for ignorance, so that He may no longer be despised or rejected because He is unknown" (TF 13). Years later, in his book, *The Sanctification of the Mind*, Alberione repeats that it is the **mind**, with its convictions and power ideas, that governs the will. "The greatest battles are fought in the mind . . . If you save your mind you will save yourself." Paul, too, urges us to "have the mind of Christ" (1 Cor. 2:16), "bringing every thought captive in obedience to Christ" (2 Cor. 10:5).

As the **will** is conformed to Jesus, the Way to the Father, he frees it to choose what is eminently human. Everything that is of Jesus is ours, because we are grafted (to use Paul's expression), incorporated in Christ

Jesus, whom God made "our wisdom, our justice, our sanctification, and our redemption" (1 Cor. 1:30). Thus understood, faith is more than just the assent of the mind to a known truth. There is no dearth of people who recognize the truth without accepting it. What Paul called "the obedience of faith" (Rom. 1:5) is an act of the will, also, and life is brought into conformity with what is believed intellectually. Hence virtue; hence acceptance, hence the sanctification of the will.

In the Bible, the **heart**, in its broadest sense, denotes not only the physical organ as the source of life, but the whole personal composite of emotional, intellectual, and moral powers, to which God's grace imparts new life. St. Paul adds that the heart is the dwelling place for the Spirit, who purifies and strengthens the person in love.[2] As the seat of desires and sentiments, the heart is the power that animates us and urges us to choose. Grafted onto Christ-Life, the heart is freed from its corruption so as to sanctify the whole person in the life of grace, leading him or her to the life of glory (see TF 11).

"No disciple is above his teacher (*didaskolos*) . . . It is enough for the disciple that he become like his teacher" (Mt. 10:24, 25). As the powers of the soul, split from each other by sin, are brought into harmony with the truth, into right relationship with Jesus, the Master heals and integrates them, making them one. As *Gaudium et spes* phrases it, "Whoever follows Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more of a man" (GS 41).

'Tom' was a member of the Daughters of St. Paul young adult prayer group in Toronto about fifteen years ago. At a meeting one evening, we were talking about our vocation to be true human beings. Tom asked, "But how do we know what it means to be truly human?" I answered with two words: Jesus Christ. Within moments, he and the whole group were energized: the Gospel made *personal* sense. I learned the following week that Tom had brought a Muslim friend to the gathering. Afterward the friend told him, "Now I understand what Christianity is about."

Jesus did not come to call a select few to some esoteric *gnosis* or way of life that the 'great unwashed' have no access to. Jesus Christ preached the Gospel—better, as the Word of God, he *is* the Gospel—to show us how to be truly human and to enable us to reach our full human potential—life with God. In this sense, the Gospel is not 'uncommon'

[2] *The Collegeville Pastoral Dictionary of Biblical Theology*, ed. Carroll Stuhlmueller (Collegeville: The Liturgical Press, 1996), 422, 424.

sense at all, but is oriented toward everyone attaining the full stature of Christ (Eph. 4:13).

Unification of the sciences in Christ

An initiative dear to the hearts of Fr. Alberione and his spiritual director, Canon Francesco Chiesa, was an attempt at the unification of the sciences. He and Chiesa joined regularly in prayer "that God's Providence will raise up a new Aquinas who will assemble . . . the sciences . . . into a synthesis that is systematic and clear . . . and mold them into a sole body" so that "every science will beam its own ray of light through Philosophy toward Theology . . ."[3] They and a number of Pauline priests made several attempts to carry out this synthesis over the years, but never succeeded. I do not intend to analyze such a unification in general or their experience in particular, but to offer a brief reflection on how unification might serve us as we embark on the new evangelization.

Certainly a major difficulty was their approach to the sciences as "a sole body," rather than as habits of the intellect. Unification is not to be a common method, an attempt to unify branches of knowledge, or a common denominator identified with any one science. Philosophy, for example, cannot replace theology in explaining the ultimate purpose of life; theology cannot suffice to explain the workings of the universe; the natural sciences cannot answer the questions, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" or "How do we know anything?" much less, "What is the reason for it all?"

Despite its tendency to refer to philosophy as a system or body of knowledge, *Fides et ratio* also speaks of it as an "exercise," (FR 106) and a "habit of mind" (FR 15) and it emphasizes the "primacy of philosophical *enquiry*" that springs from wonder and from which all reasoning stems (FR 4).

Peter Redpath makes a compelling argument for situating philosophy within the philosopher rather than in the end product of philosophical reasoning: Only a person can possess wisdom, which guides the way in which that end is achieved and thus, defines the way, habitually exercised, as science. He further notes that this order is essential for the unification of the sciences and of the arts, because as an act of the intellect, "science

[3] James Alberione, *Abundantes divitiae gratiae suae: Charismatic History of the Pauline Family*, (Rome: Society of St. Paul Generalate, 1998), nos. 192, 193.

knowledge must do more than facilitate right judgment about its specific subject matter." To "contribute to the perfection of a human being as a whole," it must be capable of "co-existing with other forms of human science/philosophy."[4]

Fides et ratio phrases it this way: Understood as metaphysics in consonance with:

> the word of God, philosophy needs first of all to recover its *sapiential dimension* as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning of life . . . In doing so, it will . . . take its place as the ultimate framework of the unity of human knowledge and action, leading them to converge towards a final goal and meaning (FR 81).

If the first principle of the act of science is the scientist, then the unification of the sciences is, if I can say it like this, the unification of the scientist! That integration, as we have seen, is fully accomplished only in Jesus Christ, Way, Truth, and Life. Within their science, Christ gives believing scientists the answers they need to understand the ultimate causes of things.

How could he not? "In him all things hold together . . . God wanted all fullness to be found in him and through him to *reconcile all things to him[self]*, everything in heaven and everything on earth" (Col. 1:17, 19–20). The Constitutions of my congregation read: "Christ is the Master, the unifying center in whom every human being and the whole of history find complete fulfillment."[5]

Transformation of culture and society in Christ

In his latest book, Dr. Redpath maintains that the educational system in the West is founded more on rhetoric than on philosophy, with the result that opinion is often valued more than truth, dialectic, more than metaphysics, meaning conferred on reality, more than meaning discovered.[6] True. How often students are told, "It doesn't matter what conclusion you reach, as long as you can show how you got there." "You have your truth, I have my truth." That may be valid for subjective exercises, but not for science—

[4] Peter A. Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics* (Manitou Springs: Socratic Press, 2012), 26.
[5] *Constitutions* (Rome: Daughters of St. Paul, 1984), no. 7.
[6] Redpath, *A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics*, 104ff.

whether natural or supernatural. Two and two is four, not twenty-two, regardless of how I reach that conclusion.

Clearly, the morass we find ourselves in is sophistic. But this has been centuries in the making. What makes its deception so deadly now? Why is extrication so urgent? I submit that a culture generated and sustained by the explosion of the media of communication, in which ephemeral sensation rules, and a text is far less important than its context, a culture in which all interpretations are equally valid, and communication serves consumerism rather than communion or justice—such a culture is often hostile to objective and abiding truth, goodness, and beauty, even as it searches incessantly for them.

In the book, *Following Christ in a Consumer Society*, Jesuit John Kavanaugh writes that in this milieu, "cultural consciousness is saturated by mercantile media."[7] He amply demonstrates that the partnership between media and consumerism in forming or deforming our culture is fundamental. Nor is it limited to America. As Pope Francis wrote in his exhortation, *The Joy of the Gospel*:

> In the prevailing culture . . . What is real gives way to appearances. In many countries globalization has meant a hastened deterioration of their own cultural roots and the invasion of ways of thinking and acting proper to other cultures which are economically advanced but ethically debilitated (EG 62).

To us could be applied the words of the Master, pronounced in a different, though not unrelated context: "You have taken away the key of knowledge. You yourselves did not enter and you stopped those trying to enter" (Lk. 11:52).

Thus, the problem is not only the nature of media as such, but their partnership with the 'isms' of our society, a confluence of factors, that spawn a perfect storm. The media culture is not irredeemable. Nothing human is. God is there. It is challenging, but possible to unify the art of media literacy with the science of metaphysics and the relationship with God that is spirituality. Unified in Christ the Master, we *can* engage our media world and still maintain our integrity. Do you and I know how to analyze and evaluate media messages communicated through various media and construct wise messages ourselves? How can we help those

[7] John F. Kavanaugh, *Following Christ in a Consumer Society* (New York: Orbis Books, 2006), 59.

younger than we pursue wisdom in this culture if we do not show them how? New wine needs new wineskins. Hanging onto the old skins will keep us all media illiterate, regardless of our ability to navigate the Web or work devices, because in the final analysis, it is not a technological question, but a human one. Again I quote from *Fides et ratio*:

> This sapiential dimension [of philosophy] is all the more necessary today, because the immense expansion of humanity's technical capability demands a renewed and sharpened sense of ultimate values. If this technology is not ordered to something greater than a merely utilitarian end, then it could soon prove inhuman and even become a potential destroyer of the human race (FR 81).

Our culture will never be transformed from without, but only from within, from you and me choosing to put Christ at its center. Look at the alternative: the pseudo-Buddhism so popular in Hollywood that can only lead to pessimism, despite its being a mutation by an ever-optimistic America; an isolated existence revolving around media meant to connect; powerlessness before the highly addictive character of video gaming and social media. These can be harnessed only if we turn ourselves over to Christ, our highest Power, choosing his discipline, allowing ourselves to be 'discipled' by the Master. *Christification*, configuration with Jesus Christ, not only humanizes and unifies persons; it humanizes and unifies societies and cultures.

Is this all too little, too late? In *Navigating the New Evangelization*, Raniero Cantalamessa, preacher of the papal household, quotes Friedrich Nietzsche and Adolph von Harnack—not exactly bastions of orthodoxy—who attached the 'success' of Christianity in its first centuries to its inculturation within a milieu supposedly defined by philosophy.[8]

Cantalamessa takes exception to what he labels this "historical revisionism," by quoting two parables of Jesus. The first is the seed sown that grows without the sower knowing how. Our job is to sow well. After that, "the sower can even go to sleep, for the life of the seed no longer depends on him. When this seed is the seed that 'falls into the earth and dies,' that is, Jesus Christ, nothing can prevent it from bearing much fruit." The second parable concerns the mustard seed that grows far beyond the sower's expectations. "Here Jesus teaches us that his Gospel and his own person

[8] Raniero Cantalamessa, OFM Cap., *Navigating the New Evangelization* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2014), 5–6.

are the smallest things that exist . . . because nothing is smaller and weaker than a life that ends in death on a cross. Yet . . . all creation, absolutely all, will be able to find refuge there." He observes: "This is what we need most today: to awaken in Christians . . . the intimate certainty of the truth of what they proclaim . . . The success of the new evangelization will depend on the degree of faith that it successfully brings forth in the Church among the evangelizers themselves."[9]

Jesus Master teaches from the *cathedra* of the cross and the empty tomb. With confidence, then, we can forge ahead, taking heart from these words of Paul VI: "The road . . . is certainly difficult and laborious. But lift up your soul in hope, for the cause is not ours but that of Jesus Christ."[10]

TRANSFORMED IN CHRIST,
THE MASTER OF UNCOMMON SENSE

SUMMARY

Both definitive and enigmatic, the figure of Christ, the Master-Teacher emerges from the pages of the Gospel. What does he reveal? How does he reveal it? In an age that markets transformation as a commodity, what promise of rebirth does he offer us as persons and societies? What key implication does this hold for the unification of the sciences, as well as of art and science? The unique insight of Blessed James Alberione, SSP, sheds light on what has lain hidden in plain sight: what Jesus' personal profile, 'Way, Truth, and Life,' can mean for our cynical yet searching times and particularly for us, who now find ourselves immersed in the Church's new evangelization.

KEYWORDS: transformation, Way-Truth-Life, Christ the Master, unification of the sciences, media, new evangelization, Alberione, common sense.

[9] Id., 6–10.
[10] Paul VI, *Message to the General Chapters of Religious Orders and Congregations*, (May 23, 1964) [http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/speeches/1964/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19640523_capitolari_en.html, accessed on 14.07.2014].

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THE ESSENTIAL CONNECTION BETWEEN COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY AND LEADERSHIP EXCELLENCE

I take as my point of departure for this paper two claims I made in my opening talk at the 2014 July international congress on "Renewing the West by Renewing Common Sense" in Huntington, Long Island, NY, USA:

1) "An art or science grows out of a human habit to which a subject known relates, that the subject known helps generate and activate within a natural human knowing faculty."

2) "Every art, science, or philosophical activity grows out of the experiential relationship between the specific habit of an artist, scientist, or philosopher and a known material or subject that activates the habit."

"Eliminate one of the essential parts of this relationship," I said, "and the activity can no longer exist. No such subject (such as somewhat sickly bodies) known, or no habit of medicine in a physician, no art of medicine. The relation between the artist or scientist and the artistic or scientific subject known generates the habit and act of art and science. The two are essentially connected. Eliminate one or the other extreme of the relationship and the artistic, scientific, or philosophical activity becomes

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This paper somewhat amends and expands slightly on the talk entitled "The Essential Connection between Common Sense Philosophy and Leadership Excellence," which I presented at the *Inaugural International Congress*, *Renewing the West by Renewing Common Sense*, 17 to 20 July 2014, at Immaculate Conception Seminary, Huntington, Long Island, NY, USA. My talk was given in Plenary Session 7 on 18 July 2014.

destroyed."[1] We take the nature, divisions, and methods, of all experience, art, philosophy/science, and leadership, from an essential relationship between human habits existing within human faculties and a known material, or known subject, that activates these human abilities.

As I think most people familiar with any of the human qualities of experience, art, science/philosophy, or leadership implicitly, if not explicitly, realize (at least in our sane, common sense, moments), all these human principles chiefly grow out of an essential relationship among the human intellect, will, and emotions and an organizationally and operationally deprived body (an incompletely developed organizational and operational whole, one that can be receptive to or resist further organizational and operational development, or improvement) and a chief action that parts of that deprived body naturally and cooperatively incline to produce, or aim (end) they incline to realize.

The first beginnings of my explicit realization of this reality came to me decades ago while I was reading Book 1 of Plato's *Republic*, in which Socrates gives Polemarchos examples of people ancient Athenians reasonably considered to be artists: cooks, physicians, pilots of ships, money makers, traders, and so on. In each case, Socrates made evident to Polemarchos that, to be an artist, a person has to work with some kind of essentially improvable body; that an artistic subject, body, or organization that the artist, in some way, improves has to be essentially deprived, impoverished, but improvable.[2]

Subsequent reading of different works of Armand A. Maurer showing that St. Thomas understood (1) the genus, or subject, of the philosopher to be essentially different from the genus of the logician; (2) philosophy to be chiefly an intellectual habit, not a body of knowledge;[3] and (3) analogy

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[1] Peter A. Redpath, Plenary Session 3 Address (17 July 2014), "The Nature of Common Sense and How We use Common Sense to Renew the West," *Inaugural International Congress, Renewing the West by Renewing Common Sense*, 17 to 20 July 2014.

[2] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. 1, 331D–334B.

[3] Armand A. Maurer, "The Unity of a Science: St. Thomas and the Nominalists," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274–1974, Commemorative Studies*, vol. 2 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 269–291. See, also, Maurer, "Introduction," in *St. Thomas Aquinas, The Divisions and Methods of the Sciences, Questions V and VI of his Commentary on the* de Trinitate *of Boethius*, trans. with an intro. and notes Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 3rd rev. ed., 1963), 75, fn. 15. See. St. Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5, a. 2, ad 1; *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, lect. 12, nn. 2142–2144; and *Summa theologiae*, I: 66, 2, ad 2 and 88, 2, ad 4.

to be "above all . . . a doctrine of a *judgment* of analogy or proportion rather than an analogous *concept*" caused me to start to realize that none of the leading twentieth-century students of St. Thomas, including Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, had adequately understood his teaching about many of his most fundamental principles, including his understanding of philosophy and science.[4] At that point, I decided that I had better start to investigate these issues on my own.

Spending many years studying these matters, among other things, this is what I discovered. For St. Thomas Aquinas, philosophy, science, is, just as for Aristotle before him, chiefly an intellectually-virtuous, habitual knowledge born of sense wonder. This philosophical, scientific, wonder is essentially about a multitude of beings already known to be one or a whole and the memory of the way an individual has been able to acquire much memory of this multitude as one or a whole.

Just as a human being cannot become morally virtuous without practice, habitually choosing what is right in the right way, no human being can become intellectually virtuous (scientific, philosophical) without much practice, habitually judging about what he or she has already rightly conceived and judged, habitually engaging in right reasoning about already existing orders of truths, things known.

More precisely, according to St. Thomas, all philosophy, science, starts in sense wonder essentially involving a complicated psychological state of *fear*, intellectual confidence about the unity of truth and the essential reliability of our sense and intellectual faculties, personal *hope* to achieve intellectual, volitional, and emotional satisfaction though resolving the wonder and putting the fear to rest.

As St. Thomas recognized even before the historical birth of some later, mistaken notions of philosophy's first principle of generation, philosophy does not start in faith seeking understanding, absolute skepticism, universal method doubt, impossible dreams of pure reason, Absolute Spirit's urge to emerge, veils of ignorance, or any of the other starting points that Western intellectuals, mistaking themselves to be doing philosophy, have proposed over the centuries. It starts in an opposition between fear and hope in which the act of philosophizing, pursuing science, essentially constitutes an act of hope of success based upon an essential

[4] Armand A. Maurer, *The Philosophy of William of Ockham in Light of its Principles* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1999), 278.

conviction about the unity of truth and the essential reliability of our human sense and intellectual faculties.

St. Thomas maintained that wonder is a species of fear that results from ignorance of a cause.[5] Because the formal object of fear calls to mind a difficulty of some magnitude and a sense of dissatisfying personal weakness (an immediate sense of opposition, dependency, and privation), the desire to philosophize, engage in science, can only arise within a person who can experience a complicated psychological state involving a natural desire to escape from the fear we experience of the real difficulty, danger, and damage ignorance can cause us; *personal self-confidence* that our sense and intellectual faculties are reliable enough to help us put this fear to rest by knowing about the truth of things as expressed in the truth of our intellectual and sensory judgments, and some *hope* in our personal ability to use our intellectual and sense faculties to put this fear to rest by rationally resolving an apparently irreconcilable contradiction; and, by so doing, achieving a state of intellectual, volitional, and emotional satisfaction that we have done so.

St. Thomas explained that this initial sense of fear grips us in two stages: (1) recognition of our intellectual weakness and fear of failure causes us to refrain immediately from passing judgment; and (2) *hope* of possibility of understanding an effect's cause prompts us intellectually to seek the cause.[6]

Actually, this fear appears to include an intervening third stage between fear and hope in which we experience intellectual, volitional, and emotional dissatisfaction with being in a state of fear and a determination to eliminate it. Thomas added that, since philosophical investigation starts with wonder, it must end in the contrary of wonder (a species of fear), in some sort of satisfaction that puts fear to rest.

St. Thomas recognized that we do not, and cannot, wonder about the answer to questions we already know, about what is evident, or about what

[5] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I–II, 41, 4, ad 5.

[6] Id. And St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. 1, lect. 3 and *Summa theologiae*, qq. 40 and 41 dealing with hope and fear. My analysis of St. Thomas's teaching about the nature of philosophy and the relation of sense wonder to philosophy/science is based upon St. Thomas's explicit teaching about wonder and the emotions of fear and hope as contrary opposites. I have pieced it together from the teachings St. Thomas gives about the emotions of fear and hope and the nature of sense wonder.

we consider *impossible* to know; and, strictly speaking, when working as philosophers, scientists, we do not seek to remain in a state of wonder.[7]

We seek to put wonder to rest by discovering the causes that have generated the wonder. Since wonder is the first principle of all theoretical, practical, or productive philosophy, science, for everyone and all time, initially all philosophical first principles arise from our common sense pre-philosophical, pre-scientific knowledge, human senses, emotions, intellect, will, personal self-confidence about the reliability of our sense and intellectual faculties and the unity of truth as expressed in things and in the human intellect, and something that causes in us the awareness of real opposition, possession and privation (not simply difference).

Consequently, since, in its nature and origin philosophy, science, presupposes knowledge of the existence of several things and complicated psychological states, including something we fear can hurt us, and the hope of overcoming this fear, the mental attitude of complete skepticism is a contradictory opposite, and cannot simultaneously co-exist with the mental state of philosophy.

No matter what modern confidence men like René Descartes and his historical descendants, posing as philosophers and scientists, tell us, philosophy, science, cannot pre-exist knowledge. Philosophy, science, presupposes knowledge, including common sense knowledge of evident truths, and is born of sense wonder. People who cannot wonder cannot become philosophers, scientists. And people who think they have the one philosophical method finally to put all wonder to rest are delusional. Only God has the one method to put all wonder to rest.

Since only people who fear ignorance wonder about how to escape from it, strictly speaking, none of us is born a philosopher or scientist; seeking to become a philosopher, scientist, is not something that all human beings explicitly desire to do; and engaging in philosophical, scientific, reasoning is not something all human beings do, can do, or even want to do.

People who are content to be in a state of ignorance cannot become philosophers, scientists. As Plato and Socrates emphasized, people cannot pour philosophy, science, into us like inserting vision into blind eyes.[8] Only those who have some knowledge and experience of this initial sort of

[7] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. 1, lect. 3.

[8] Plato, *Republic*, Bk. 7, 518B–518D.

fear, accompanied by the appropriate desire to put it to rest, can become philosophers, scientists.

For this reason, absolute skeptics cannot become philosophers, cannot even start the journey to become philosophers. Hence, when Socrates confronted people who were content to be ignorant, he attempted to jolt them out of their blissful ignorance by publicly shaming them, by driving them through Socratic irony into an *aporia* (an intellectual dead end), into becoming aware of the dangers of their ignorance.

Aside from the first principle of sense wonder, then, philosophy's, science's, specific, or *proximate*, common sense first principles include: (1) habits of knowing faculties; (2) existing things, real natures; (3) prior knowledge of these existing things; (4) the existence and knowledge of fear, hope; (5) desire to escape from fear and possess hope; (6) convictions of certainty about the: (a) unity of truth; (b) reliability of human sense and intellectual faculties; (c) and the existence and knowledge of real opposites.

Since philosophy's, science's, first principles include human knowing faculties, since sense wonder must exist in sense wonderers, the existence of philosophy, science (at least a common sense philosophy and science), essentially depends upon an understanding of human nature that involves human beings possessed of a human soul (or some identical, if differently named, psychological principle) that can generate human knowing faculties that can possess human habits.

Since denial of the existence of a faculty psychology involves essential denial of one of philosophy's essential principles of wonder (the wonderer), no human being can rationally, or with common sense, affirm the existence of philosophy/science and simultaneously deny the existence of the only human knowing principle capable of essentially producing philosophical/scientific activity: human knowing faculties.

Leading ancient Greek philosophers considered (1) philosophy and science to be identical and (2) the generic subject that all philosophy, science (not just physics) studies to be the problem of the one and the many.[9] Aristotle, especially, considered the subject of a science to consist of two main parts: (1) one genus (many hierarchically-ordered species related to one nature: *an operational organization* [an organization equipped with all

[9] I have extensively and rigorously defended this claim in my book *Wisdom's Odyssey from Philosophy to Transcendental Sophistry* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi B.V.: 1997).

the parts needed to operate organizationally]); unequal possession of one nature by a multitude of species (parts) united to each other as parts by means of a common, and unequal, relationship of each to some whole nature (the organization) through the relationship of a topmost part to a chief aim, or universal act (similar to the way a commanding general unites all of the parts of one army together to each other and to the whole army through a chief aim of military victory); (2) an intellectual habit, or virtue, that consists of ordering many acts of imagining, conceiving, judging, and reasoning to arrive at some evident, concluding judgment: a scientific conclusion arrived at through deductive reasoning, or demonstration.[10]

For Aristotle science is not chiefly a system, and it does not solely consist in a scientific demonstration. Scientific demonstration culminates scientific understanding like a crescendo culminates a symphonic musical performance. Science is chiefly a generic habit of knowing (of right judging about definitions, concepts, images, and sensible and non-sensible natures [operational organizations]). Science chiefly exists in the scientist's distinctive and comprehensive (that is, *generic*) habit of sensing, abstracting, imagining, conceiving, and judging; but chiefly in judging: in relation to the way a scientist is inclined by habit to abstract and relate concepts and images in a unique act of judging, reasoning, and drawing conclusions (species of the scientist's generic habit).

This is a *comprehensive understanding* (a scientific explanation) *that*, as history of philosophical experience has taught us, to be completely sure of being scientific, *culminates in a demonstration and a process of verification that demonstrative knowledge is possessed through testing what a scientist considers to be demonstrative knowledge in the form of a confirmed hypothesis* (somewhat like editing the final draft of a book for typographical errors).

Strictly speaking, considered in and of itself, a demonstrative syllogism or system of demonstrative syllogisms is no philosophical, no scientific, explanation.

Precisely speaking, *a philosophical or scientific explanation is communication of a knowledge of necessary whole/part relations through single act of understanding* given by one person to himself or herself, or to another person, of how parts essentially unite to form a whole or how

[10] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. 1, nn. 18–35; Bk. 3, l. 1 through l. 12; *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics of Ariatotle*, Bk. 2, l. 1, n. 246; Bk. 6, l. 3; *Posterior Analytics*, Bk 1, l. 10 through 21.

a whole is divided into parts. I call this a "comprehensive understanding:" a single, or generic, act of understanding that ties together all the parts of an investigation into a whole in a Eureka moment that culminates in a demonstrative conclusion that is verified by final testing of the prior reasoning process!

Strictly speaking, *all explanations, including all scientific, philosophical, ones, are personally-caused acts of recollected knowing unified into a single, whole* (*one generic act of understanding*) *communicated to oneself or another*. Science is chiefly a psychological act, an act of the human soul, or, better, the human person: a personally-caused act of comprehensive understanding.

Like Aristotle says, art and science, philosophy, presuppose experience, or much memory *habitually related to judging* that some multitude is essentially related as 1: as parts to a whole (that is, as species [organizational parts] to a genus, or organizational whole).

The reason for this is that art and science (the latter being, strictly speaking, identical with philosophy for Aristotle and St. Thomas) are reflections upon experience, upon prior knowledge that produces a memory—indeed, much memory that helps, through practice, to produce experience and a universal judgment about cause/effect relations. For example, medical experience grows out of much memory (much knowledge) that when given a specific medicine in specific dosages at specific times a person recovers from an illness.

Because it studies much memory related as a one, or whole, to parts of a scientific subject, the philosophical, scientific, habit can *analogously* be called a "system," or "body of knowledge;" but such way of talking is imprecise, and if used as a starting point for developing philosophical, scientific, understanding of St. Thomas's teaching, can lead to major mistakes down the road. Better to say it is chiefly an intellectual habit that studies systems or a single genus divided by extremes, or contrary opposites.

Every science studies many things, but only a limited number of them. The unity of a science comes from the unity of the multitude a scientist studies (a genus or operational organization) as related to a chief (or one main, generic) habit possessed by the mind of the scientist related to a chief scientific interest or aim.

The limited multitude (genus: hierarchically-ordered species) that a science studies is established by extremes of privation and possession within the relationship of one whole (a nature) to many parts. For example,

the science of medicine studies extremes of one generic nature, health, as health is most—and least—fully possessed by a multitude of bodily organs, and anything essentially related to achieving or maintaining health (like exercise, diet, books, medical instruments, and so on).[11]

Hence, the one science (generic habit of mind) of medicine studies extremes of health, opposites: health and disease (extreme species). The science, in turn, consists in the single, comprehensive, relationship between the knower and the things known established through this single, comprehensive, or generic habit of mind, ordering essential relationships among a multitude of specific habits of the respective science one to another in relation to the chief aim of the science considered as a generic habit.

Within each science, in turn, a most difficult set of chief questions, or problems, exists that a few persons can, through the excellence of their mental habit, solve better than anyone else. We rightly call such people "wise" in that science.

Today, the unity of philosophy, science, and wisdom as St. Thomas understood it, can be re-established by recovering a proper understanding of science as chiefly an act of a scientific habit of a human soul. More than anything else, through distinctive habits of mind essentially related to known natures (organizational wholes made up of parts), human beings (not logical systems, premises, or ideas divorced from knowing habits) generate, cause, science. This is chiefly what makes the act of science praiseworthy; not the fact that a person has memorized a multitude of facts or can deduce factual conclusions from factual premises.

No human beings with comprehensive knowing habits, no science. No science, no happiness. The human soul is a chief, essential, and proximate cause of science. The soul produces the intellectual virtue of science. The intellectual virtue of science causes wisdom. And wisdom causes happiness.

Hence, being wrong about the nature of human science, condemns a person, culture, or civilization to human misery. This is precisely what is happening within Western civilization today.

Turning now to the issue of leadership, just as, according to St. Thomas, and Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle before him, the knower and the thing known constitute essential parts of the same genus, or organizational whole, so do leadership and the thing led. Because leadership is a kind of directing activity, and in human beings, in its highest form, is not a chance

[11] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Bk. 10.

event, because human reason is its chief directing faculty, human leadership is a kind of knowing. Moreover, in its highest form, human leadership consists in a kind of philosophical/scientific way of knowing.

As a kind of knowing, leadership is chiefly a specific organizational habit existing within the highest part of organizational knowers, through which a leader is able, better than any other organizational part, to communicate a chief organizational aim to the other parts of an organization. Leadership, in short, is chiefly communications activity: an ability to communicate (in a way that need not be verbal or totally rational) specific superiority, exceeding other organizational parts in organizational strength, through which a leader is able to convey to, and elicit from, those led (other parts of an organization) receptivity to taking directions essentially related to the chief aim of an organization as an organization.

Obviously, the leader and the beings led belong to the same organization, or genus. Leadership is not an abstraction. It is an essential part of a real relation. As a knowing activity, the leader belongs to the same organizational whole, or genus, that the leader leads. Fire chiefs belong to fire departments, police chiefs to police departments, and so on. Abstractly considered, leaders as leaders do not exist.

Nor does an art or science of anything as a generic whole exist apart from its species. Arts and sciences exist in and through their species. Hence, the art of medicine as a genus did not come into existence and then the art of curing this or that disease. The art of curing this or that disease first came into existence, imperfectly encompassing the entire genus of medicine.

Strictly considered, experience, art, philosophy, science are not bodies of generically new knowledge added to something a leader already knows. They are more or less perfect, or maturely developed, habits, ways of possessing knowledge a leader already has about some operational, organizational whole a leader leads.

Experienced leaders grow out of knowledgeable leaders familiar with the organizational composition of essentially different, necessary, part/whole relationships. The art of leadership essentially grows out of the experienced leadership of different organizational parts (leaders) knowing the essential and necessary operational relationships that, to operate harmoniously, these or those parts must have to each other and to a chief organizational aim. The philosophy or science of leadership essentially grows out of the art of leadership of different organizational parts knowing

the organizational principles that guide organizational operational principles in relation to a chief organizational aim.

Put more simply, in contemporary business and military terms, experienced leaders know that this or that needs to be done at this or that time, under this or that circumstance or condition, and can overcome resistance and induce receptivity when necessary to do what needs to be done when it needs to be done. Beyond experiential knowledge, someone who possesses knowledge through an artistic quality of soul resembles a person with the habit of mathematics who has memorized formulas and knows when they can reasonably be applied to solve this or that problem. Similarly, people with the art of leadership know the operational principles at work that cause doing this or that at this or that time, under this or that condition or circumstance, reasonable in relation to a tactical plan of operation. People possessed of the philosophy or science of leadership, however, more perfectly possess what they already know by apprehending it in relation to the strategic, or generic, plan and aim articulated in an organizational mission statement that generates the operational principles behind tactical operations in the here and now.

Such people know how to build and preserve organizations, have the qualities of great discoverers, pioneers, and great teachers. Because such people must constantly instill hope, drive out fear, build and restore confidence, energize and calm emotions, communicate a superior ability to know and unify potentially opposing convictions among free and intelligent agents about the right direction to take within an organizational operation to satisfy the chief organizational aim, such people must, best of all, know the first reason why this or that action needs to be done, how to do it, and, through emotional and volitional strength and resolve, be able to communicate this to themselves and others. As a result, such people can never be absolute skeptics, egalitarians, totalitarians, or anarchists.

In the process of gaining this philosophical, scientific, more perfect and complete, possession of their own leadership knowledge, along the way of being liberated from their prior intellectual weakness, knowingly or not, the best leaders have to become aided by the traditional seven liberal arts (the operational leadership qualities of human communication like grammar, rhetoric, logic; and arts that facilitate ways imagining the harmonic constitution of the physical universe, like arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music) as well as the moral virtue of prudence and its handmaiden “history,” which renaissance humanists added to a new Western educational canon we now call the “humanities.”

Despite claims to the contrary, none of these skills, any more than philosophy, consists in some esoteric teaching or body of knowledge that poets, rhetoricians, and, in modern times, mathematicians have claimed them to be. While, because it is no book, Galileo Galilei was wrong when he maintained that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics, the physical universe is no body of facts or philosophy;[12] nor is it written in the language of mathematics, music, grammar, rhetoric, logic, poetry, the liberal arts as a whole, the Hegelian Absolute Spirit, the Marxist dialectic, egalitarianism, or libertarianism. If it were a book, it would be written in the language of organizational wholes, which is the way the ancient Greeks philosophers understood it. Mathematics would be one of its chapters. And those capable of reading this book would be anyone with knowing habits capable of grasping the composite being of sensible things and wondering about it as an organizational whole.

If we wish to renew the West, it is precisely to this understanding of common sense philosophy and leadership excellence that we need to return. I hope I have made evident to why this is so and that you will join me in this long-overdue, but essential, project.

THE ESSENTIAL CONNECTION BETWEEN COMMON SENSE PHILOSOPHY AND LEADERSHIP EXCELLENCE

SUMMARY

This article argues that, *strictly speaking*, from its inception with the ancient Greeks and for all time, philosophy and science are identical and consist in an essential relationship between a specific type of understanding of the human person as possessed of an intellectual soul capable of being habituated and a psychologically-independent composite whole, or organization. It maintains, further, that absence of either one of the extremes of this essential relationship cannot be philosophy/science and, if mistaken for such and applied to the workings of cultural institutions, will generate anarchy within human culture and make leadership excellence impossible to achieve. Finally, it argues that only a return to this "common sense" understanding of philosophy can generate the leadership excellence that can save the West from its current state of cultural and civilizational anarchy.

KEYWORDS: aim, analogy, anarchy, art, body of knowledge, cause, common sense, communication, comprehensive understanding, concept, contrary, contrariety, culture, demon-

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[12] Galileo Galilei, "The Assayer," in *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo*, ed. and trans. Stillman Drake (New York, Doubleday and Company, 1957), 237–238.

stration, demonstrative, equality, emotion, end, excellence, existence, explanation, fear, genus, habit, happiness, harmony, hierarchically ordered, history, hope, human, humanist, inequality, judgment, knowledge, language, leadership, logic, mathematics, memory, metaphysics, multitude, nature, operational, opposite, order, part, person, philosophy, physical, poetry, principle, quality, reason, receptivity, relationship, renaissance, resistance, rhetoric, science, soul, species, strength, syllogism, system, truth, West, Western civilization, unity, universe, virtue, whole, wonder.

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THE COMMON SENSE PERSONALISM OF ST. JOHN PAUL II (KAROL WOJTYLA)

Demonstrating a linkage between Karol Wojtyla's philosophical personalism and common sense seems to necessitate showing Wojtyla's appreciation for classical metaphysics as being nothing other than a philosophical development of the common sense interpretation of reality.[1] In my article, then, I am going to support two claims. First, that the personalism of St. John Paul II is specified by the metaphysical philosophy of the Lublin Philosophical School (further mentioned as LPS), which in turn means that Wojtyla's philosophical legacy can not be properly understood unless examined against the background of the philosophical project of this School. Secondly, that Wojtyla's usage of phenomenological method fully complies with the metaphysical approach to reality.

A Framer of LPS

Although in the 1950s the Faculty of Philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin (further mentioned as KUL) formally consisted of many professors, there were merely a few who not only delivered lectures but also contributed in conceiving and running some common project of doing philosophy. In 1954, when he started to commute from Krakow to Lublin, Fr. Wojtyla joined a group of three other Lublin scholars (namely

[1] In accord with metaphysics, I assume that common sense is a cognitive habit to apprehend reality in its most fundamental aspects. It is elicited in spontaneous, pre-scientific cognition, which conditions a normal human development in the area of knowing, acting, and producing. For more on the metaphysical understanding of common sense, see Wojciech Daszkiewicz, "Zdrowy rozsądek" ("Common Sense"), in *Powszechna Encyklopedia Filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B., vol. 9 (Lublin: PTTA, 2008), 909–912.

S. Swiezawski, J. Kalinowski and Fr. M. A. Krapiec, O.P.) in their effort to establish a philosophical school. Their collective work gave birth to LPS. In time its name "began to function as a description of the program for teaching and the style for cultivating philosophy started in the latter half of the 1950s." Consequently, the actual affiliation of a philosopher to LPS began to be determined by the way he or she cultivates and understands philosophy, rather than by his or her formal membership in the Faculty of Philosophy at KUL.[2] George Weigel noted that:

> The KUL project was defined by a quartet of relatively young men who had become professors at KUL because Poland's Stalinist rulers had expelled the older teachers. The four included Jerzy Kalinowski (the dean of the Philosophy Faculty, a specialist in logic and the philosophy of law), Stefan Swieżawski (a historian of philosophy and an exponent of the existential Thomism of Jacques Maritain), Father Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (a Dominican specialist in metaphysics), and Father Karol Wojtyla (a specialist in ethics) . . . These were very different personalities, with divergent interests and academic specialties.[3] They nonetheless achieved what Professor Swieżawski later called a 'rare and exceptionally fruitful collaboration,' built around four agreements which were crucial to Karol Wojtyla's philosophical project.[4]

Wojtyla's philosophical project, in turn, was very much an integral part of the collective enterprise of the School. While each of its four framers developed his own personal philosophical interest in private, they discussed their achievements in public to make them more coherent with the overall philosophy of LPS.[5]

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[2] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P., Andrzej Maryniarczyk, S.D.B., *The Lublin Philosophical School*, trans. Hugh McDonald (Lublin: PTTA, 2010), 10–11. It means that LPS is not a synonym of the Faculty of Philosophy at KUL.

[3] George Weigel, *Witness to Hope. The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 133.

[4] George Weigel, "Wojtyla's Walk Among the Philosophers." Address at a conference on "The Phenomenology of John Paul II" at Duquesne University, 1 December 2006 [http://eppc.org/publications/wojtylas-walk-among-the-philosophers/, accessed on 15.06. 2014].

[5] Those public discussions took place on different occasions. For instance, one of them was held after Karol Wojtyla's presentation during "The Philosophy Week" (Feb 13–17, 1961) at KUL. For the transcript of the paper and discussion, see Karol Wojtyla, "Personalizm tomistyczny" ("Thomistic Personalism"), *Znak* 13:5 (1961), 664–675.

Wojtyla's contribution in establishing LPS may be shown by his involvement in constructing three pillars of the LPS philosophy.[6]

The main pillar of LPS is its endorsement of metaphysics. Both Wojtyla and his colleagues from the School openly admitted the inalienableness of metaphysics in understanding the reality of persons and things. Metaphysics entered Wojtyla's life when he was preparing himself for priesthood, and remained with him from then on. He used to recall a manual book in the philosophy of being by Fr. Wais which gave him a first and unforgettable flavor of metaphysics.

> It was Father Klosak who first gave me Wais and told me to study him for an exam.[7] My literary training, centered around the humanities, had not prepared me at all for the scholastic theses and formulas with which the manual was filled. I had to cut a path through a thick undergrowth of concepts, analyses, and axioms without even being able to identify the ground over which I was moving. After two months of hacking through this vegetation I came to a clearing, to the discovery of the deep reasons for what until then I had only lived and felt. When I passed the examination I told my examiner that . . . the new vision of the world which I had acquired in my struggle with that metaphysics manual was more valuable than the mark which I had obtained. I was not exaggerating. What intuition and sensibility had until then taught me about the world found solid confirmation.[8]

And after several decades of his priestly ministry in the Church, he stated officially in his famous Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* that what the contemporary world strongly needed was "a philosophy of genuinely metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical data in order

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[6] In his introductory essay to Karol Wojtyla's book, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, O.S.M. (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), ix–xvi, Stefan Swieżawski wrote that "[a]s a group, the Lublin philosophers shared a commitment to affirming the primacy of realistic metaphysics in philosophy, underlining the significance of philosophical anthropology, rediscovering the 'true' Aquinas, and applying his ideas to contemporary problems." (Samuel Gregg, *Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II and the Development* of Catholic Social Teaching (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 1999), 74–75.)

[7] Mieczysław Maliński, *Pope John Paul II. The Life of Karol Wojtyla* (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1982), 179.

[8] George Weigel, *The Final Revolution. The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (New York 1992), 82.

to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its search for truth."[9]

Here, one might ask a question: why was metaphysics so important for John Paul II at every stage of his life? Even if it was to be always present, still it was not the only philosophical tradition which exercised its impact on his thought. For assistance in answering this question, I follow Rocco Buttiglione, who once referred to one of G. K. Chesterton's apt remarks: "the error is a truth become insane, that opposes itself to other truths instead of looking patiently for its proper place in the organism of complete truth." In this sense metaphysics is not just a philosophical current among others but a common compass showing which way a philosopher can avoid the absolutization of his own partial perspective. Thus, for Pope John Paul II, metaphysics guaranteed his orthodoxy (i.e. the correctness of his teaching) and his catholicity (i.e. his openness to the totality of truth and to dialogue with other perspectives).[10]

The second pillar of LPS can be described as a creative association of coherentism, realism, pragmatism and historicism. It follows that, for the LPS philosophers, any philosophical proposition is to be subject to a fourfold inquiry: that of logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy and the history of philosophy. In other words, any proposition which is put forward is to be: (a) internally consistent, (b) in accordance with reality and experience, (c) making allowance for its practical consequences, and (d) aligned with tradition, because we can understand and avoid errors only by knowing cultural consequences and considering answers given by our forefathers to questions we ask today.[11] While logical, metaphysical and historical approaches to philosophy were developed respectively by Kalinowski, Krąpiec and Swieżawski, Karol Wojtyla occupied himself with moral philosophy. Moral questions loomed large in his mind for all his life. He was convinced that

[9] John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 83. Certainly, it was not that he meant "to speak of metaphysics in the sense of a specific school or a particular historical current of thought." What he wanted was "to state that reality and truth do transcend the factual and the empirical, and to vindicate the human being's capacity to know this transcendent and metaphysical dimension in a way that is true and certain, albeit imperfect and analogical" (id.).

[10] Cf. Rocco Buttiglione, "The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla and St. Thomas Aquinas." Paper delivered at a conference on Thomas Aquinas as Doctor of Humanity, October 2013, Crowne Plaza Hotel, Houston [http://www.jp2forum.org/mlib/document/030514buttiglione.%20p.a.s.t.a%20paper%202013.pdf, accessed on 15.06.2014].

[11] See Henryk Kiereś, "Kultura klasyczna wobec postmodernizmu" ("Classical Culture in the Face of Postmodernism"), *Człowiek w Kulturze* 11 (1998), 242.

> [n]o less important than research in the theoretical field is research in the practical field—by which I mean the search for truth which looks to the good which is to be performed. In acting ethically, according to a free and rightly tuned will, the human person sets foot upon the path to happiness and moves towards perfection. Here too it is a question of truth.[12]

The third pillar of LPS is its personalism, which finds its essential justification in the metaphysical account of the transcendence of the human being. Such an account emphasizes the two-fold transcendence of the person: (a) in relation to nature, through spiritual acts of intellectual cognition, love and freedom; and (b) in relation to community—through acts bound with the moments: subjectivity of rights, ontic completeness, religious dignity.[13] Thus, all the LPS framers have always been very sensitive about any reductionism of man. Karol Wojtyla repeatedly expressed his concern about the person; in 1968, for example, he wrote to his friend, Fr. Henri de Lubac:

> I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person. It seems to me that the debate today is being played out on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this disintegration planned at times by atheistic ideologies we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of 'recapitulation' of the inviolable mystery of the person.[14]

There is no doubt that Wojtyla was always aware of the danger of collectivism, which in all its forms does make a horrible mistake of depriving man of his substantial status and treating him as an accidental part of the social whole. His contribution in recapitulating the inviolable mystery of the person culminated in his personalism tightly integrated with realist

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[12] John Paul II, *Fides et Ratio*, 25.

[13] See Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P., *I-Man. An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology*, trans. M. Lescoe and others (New Britain, Conn.: Mariel Publications, 1983), 326.

[14] George Weigel, "John Paul II and the Crisis of Humanism," in *The Second One Thousand Years: Ten People who Defined a Millennium*, ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2001), 116.

metaphysics and ethics. With his focus on the fulfillment and irreducibility of the human person, he made his substantial contribution to the metaphysical account of man conceived as a potential and transcendent being.

Regarding the above mentioned matter, it seems difficult to consider the personalism of St. John Paul II in separation from the philosophical project of LPS. I fully agree with George Weigel, who in one of his conference addresses evaluated it as "unfinished."[15] Definitely, the philosophical legacy of Karol Wojtyla should be taken as incomplete unless conceived as an integral department of the LPS philosophy as a whole. Wojtyla's cooperative way of doing philosophy seems to be a provocative lesson for all those who believe in cultivating philosophy individually or providing complete answers by an individual philosopher.[16]

The Phenomenology of St. John Paul II

While he was introduced to metaphysics by the book of Fr. Wais, Karol Wojtyla was presented with phenomenology by the writings of Max Scheler. It happened, of course, before he became a leader of LPS.

Why was Wojtyla attracted to Scheler? Perhaps it was caused by the popularity of that German phenomenologist among Catholic thinkers. Michael Waldstein pointed out that, in the introduction to his book on Scheler, Wojtyla noticed that Scheler's ideas attracted the attention of Catholic thinkers for two main reasons. The first reason was of ethical nature. Catholic ethicists, who had always been focused on the real objects of human acts, that is, on the good or value, seemed to find an ally in Scheler against Kant. As they opposed Kant's 'formalism,' in which moral goodness was a matter of the universal form of the categorical imperative rather than the material content of the will, they were naturally interested in Scheler's criticism of Kant and his 'material ethics of values.' The second reason was of Biblical origin. Scheler's thesis, that love for the person and

[15] Weigel, "Wojtyla's Walk Among the Philosophers."

[16] On a *complaint* about the incompleteness of Wojtyla's philosophy, see Ronald Modras, "The Moral Philosophy of Pope John Paul II," *Theological Studies* 41 (December 1980), 696–697: "Perhaps the greatest single difficulty with Karol Wojtyla's moral philosophy is the fact that it is incomplete. These two articles give an indication of being the first two chapters of a book-length study similar to his anthropology in *The Acting Person*. Chapter 3 appears never to have been written, or at least has not been published. As it stands, the Cardinal's metaethics leaves many questions unanswered. The consequent ambiguity leaves his theory open to the possibility that concepts like intrinsically evil actions and negative moral absolutes fit in quite neatly."

following an exemplary person have great importance and play a central role in ethical life as a whole, seemed to be correlated with the Gospel's teaching on following and imitating Christ.[17]

In his biography of John Paul II, George Weigel wrote that Wojtyla had become convinced that the answers to the question, whether it was possible to create a solid philosophical foundation for the moral life on the basis of Scheler's phenomenology of ethics, were not to be found in the neo-scholasticism of Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.[18] Michael Waldstein, however, replied to Weigel that

> [i]f Wojtyla set out to study Scheler's *Formalism* in this hope, one must conclude that he was disappointed. A Christian ethics cannot be built on Scheler. The answers were not to be found in the Phenomenology of Scheler. The failure of Scheler's system is not due to particular problems here or there; the failure is systemic. 'The whole difficulty is the result of the Phenomenological premises of the system and we must assign the blame to these principles.' Whatever should be said in detail about Garrigou-Lagrange, it is clear that Wojtyla's habilitation thesis defends Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophical ethics as the foundation for moral theology against Scheler's attempt to de-Hellenize Christian thought.[19]

In 1957, already as a member of the LPS team, Wojtyla openly expressed his support of Aristotle's ethics and his account of happiness. He wrote that an attribute of human nature

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[17] Michael Waldstein, "Wojtyla's Book about Scheler," 376 [http://www.jp2forum.org/mlib/document/070511wojtyla_on_scheler.pdf, accessed on 20.02.2014].

[18] See Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 127–128.

[19] Waldstein, "Wojtyla's Book about Scheler," 403. See also id., 401–402: "Wojtyla concludes his book with two theses: Thesis 1: The ethical system developed by Max Scheler is in principle unsuited for the scientific formulation of Christian ethics. For, although it establishes a relationship with the ethical content of the sources of revelation by defining ethical values as personal values, its Phenomenological and emotivist premises do not allow it to grasp this content completely and to understand it scientifically. In particular, Scheler's system is unsuited for grasping these sources theologically, which is absolutely necessary, given that they are sources of revelation and constitute an object of supernatural faith. Thesis 2: Although the ethical system developed by Max Scheler is in principle unsuited for the scientific formulation of Christian ethics, it can help us indirectly in our scientific work on Christian ethics. It facilitates the analysis of ethical facts on the phenomenological and empirical plane."

> is above all the desire for happiness. It is something natural and necessary. Man is unable not to desire happiness. He wills it always and in everything although he does not always name the object of his desires. And precisely for this reason it can seem as if he did not desire happiness, but only strove for the various values with which he is concerned, because he desires happiness in all and through all.
>
> The desire for happiness does not lie on the uppermost surface of willing and even less so on the surface of human acts. It is not difficult, however, to discover it in them and grasp it objectively—nobody will deny that this desire is always alive in the depth of willing.
>
> Ethics can neither reject this fact, nor occupy itself with it to the exclusion of all else. According to its nature, Ethics is not the doctrine of happiness, because it is a normative science, while happiness stands outside and above every norm. Happiness is the goal of nature and cannot be an object of choice, while the norm concerns only that which is an object of choice. The object of choice is always a way on which a particular person must walk.
>
> Happiness, by contrast, is not a way, but the goal of all the ways of human beings. It is, therefore, not difficult to agree that in a mediate way Ethics shows human beings the way toward happiness. Aristotle understood the role of happiness in this way, and so does the Gospel.[20]

In 1959, in turn, Wojtyla summarized his study on the metaphysical and phenomenological basis of the moral norm in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler, saying that

> in the light of my analysis of the views of these two thinkers, St. Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler, I am led to conclude that the concept of a norm is justified in a system of moral philosophy that proceeds from an existential view of the good and is not really justified in a system of the philosophy of values.[21]

[20] Karol Wojtyla, "Die ethische Fibel" ("Primer of Ethics"), in *Erziehung zur Liebe: Mit einer ethischen Fibel* (Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald, 1957 [1980]), 110–111 (after: Waldstein, "Wojtyla's Book about Scheler," 403).

[21] Karol Wojtyla, "On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler," in *Person and Community*, 93.

Even in 1969, in his famous *Person and Act* (in 1979, translated into English as *The Acting Person*), Wojtyla invoked classical metaphysicians as an important point of reference for his phenomenological study on man. He clearly stated that

> [i]n this area of study what offers particularly convincing arguments is the philosophy of Aristotle, which was developed by St. Thomas Aquinas in the middle ages. We are not going to repeat here their arguments for the complexity of man and the essential irreducibility of spirit to matter. It is not excluded that analyses already attempted in this book, as well as those reserved for later chapters, in their own way consider the arguments of Aristotle and Thomas and in their own way shed on them some new light. More probably, however, they use the light shed by the philosophy of these two thinkers.[22]

Nevertheless, it is an undeniable fact that all over the world Karol Wojtyla passes for a phenomenologist rather than a Thomist. Very few scholars are willing to admit that phenomenology was not essential, but rather a supplemental means of doing philosophy for Wojtyla, that he was a metaphysician who reached for phenomenology to gain not a full, but merely fuller grasp of man and that of his reality.[23] If we browse the internet to check the popularity of the phrase 'phenomenology of Karol Wojtyla' in comparison to the phrase 'Thomism of Karol Wojtyla,' the phrase with 'phenomenology' wins 1,260 to 1.[24] But even if Wojtyla deserves the name of a phenomenologist, all the advocates of this opinion have to admit that he was not faithful to phenomenology. Not only did he use to *betray* phenomenology with Thomism as often as he dared to appreciate metaphysics, but also he was disposed to do the same with any other philosophical current which would be aligned with Thomism. In 1979 at the Angelicum in Rome, he said that

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[22] Karol Wojtyla, *Osoba i czyn oraz inne studia antropologiczne* (*Person and Act with Other Studies in Anthropology*) (Lublin: TN KUL, 1994), 228. The English translation of the book (*The Acting Person*) does not contain this quoted fragment.

[23] Cf. Eduardo J. Echeverria, *"In the Beginning…" A Theology of the Body* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2011), 167, n. 5: "For helping me to see clearly how 'besides being a phenomenologist [John Paul II] was also a metaphysician,' I am indebted to the late Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., 'Metaphysical Realism of Pope John Paul II.' Also helpful is Deborah Savage's unpublished paper, 'Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyla's Account of the Person.'" On the publication of Deborah Savage's paper see note 33.

[24] I cite the data from July 27, 2014.

> every understanding of reality—which does in fact correspond to reality—has every right to be accepted by the 'philosophy of being,' no matter who is to be credited with such progress in understanding or to what philosophical school that person belongs. Hence, the other trends in philosophy, if regarded from this point of view, can and indeed should be treated as natural allies of the philosophy of St. Thomas, and as partners worthy of attention and respect in the dialogue that is carried on in the presence of reality. This is needed if truth is to be more than partial or one-sided.[25]

What I claim here is that the metaphysical view of man was regarded by Wojtyla as necessary, but insufficient. His Aristotelian-Thomistic formation found its enrichment in phenomenological method,[26] which was employed "merely in order to explore human interiority, including consciousness and self-consciousness."[27]

He understood metaphysical anthropology as a cosmological approach to man which was objectively reasonable but omitting personal factors of a human life. In 1978, he wrote:

> Traditional Aristotelian anthropology was based, as we know, on the definition . . . *homo est animal rationale* . . . [T]he definition is constructed in such a way that it excludes—when taken simply and directly—the possibility of accentuating the irreducible in the human being. It implies—at least at first glance—a belief in the reducibility of the human being to the world. The reason for maintaining such

[25] John Paul II, "Address at the Angelicum," *L'Osservatore Romano. English Weekly Edition* (17 December 1979), 6–8; Karol Wojtyla, "Perennial Philosophy of St. Thomas for the Youth of Our Times," in *The Whole Truth About Man: John Paul II to University Faculties and Students*, ed. James V. Schall, S.J. (Boston, MA: St. Paul Editions, 1981), 221. Cf. Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, O.P., *I-Man*, 326: "Doubtless the seeds of the theory of personal being are perceived very accurately and it would be proper to develop an analysis and considerations of the meaning of this topic by also taking into account phenomenological expositions and reflections. And in great measure, such reflections exist in philosophical literature, although they are not linked with the conception of a personal being."

[26] John Paul II, *Gift and Mystery* (New York: Image Books, 1999), 93–94: "My previous Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the phenomenological method, and this made it possible for me to undertake a number of creative studies. I am thinking above all of my book *The Acting Person*."

[27] Cf. Edward Barrett, *Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II* (New York: Lexington Books, 2010), 29.

> reducibility has always been the need to understand the human being. This type of understanding could be defined as cosmological.[28]

According to Wojtyla, such a cosmological anthropology needed to be complemented by a personalistic understanding of man. In the same text he maintained that

> [w]e should pause in the process of reduction, which leads us in the direction of understanding the human being in the world (a cosmological type of understanding), in order to understand the human being inwardly. This latter type of understanding may be called personalistic. The personalistic type of understanding the human being is not the antinomy of the cosmological type but its complement. As I mentioned earlier, the definition of the person formulated by Boethius only marks out the 'metaphysical terrain' for interpreting the personal subjectivity of the human being.[29]

Thus, phenomenology became a means by which Wojtyla found his way to the irreducible in man, the irreducible which was also, as he claimed, something objective.[30] Applying the phenomenological method turned out to be very helpful in saving human consciousness from the power of subjectivism and making it an object of realist philosophy. Exploring the human consciousness, however, needs a close cooperation of phenomenology and metaphysics. According to Rocco Buttiglione,

> phenomenology helps to disentangle the intricacies of human experience and leads us up to the fundamental questions which properly belong to the realm of metaphysics. Metaphysics, for its part, helps phenomenology not to get lost in the mazes of its interpretations. Metaphysics allows us to see, in a certain sense, the fundamental frame and the skeleton of experience while phenomenology

[28] Karol Wojtyla, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," in *Person and Community*, 210–211. See also: Karol Wojtyla, "Thomistic Personalism," in *Person and Community*, 171: "We can see here how very objectivistic St. Thomas' view of the person is. It almost seems as though there is no place in it for an analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness as totally unique manifestations of the person as a subject . . . Thus St. Thomas gives us an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person."
[29] Wojtyla, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being," 213.
[30] Id., 211.

> shows us the tendons and muscles supported by this skeleton. Together they constitute the living body of philosophical experience.[31]

John Paul II was very clear in his understanding of phenomenology and its relationship to metaphysics. In his famous *Memory and Identity*, he strongly emphasized that

> [i]f we wish to speak rationally about good and evil, we have to return to Saint Thomas Aquinas, that is, to the philosophy of being. With the phenomenological method, for example, we can study experiences of morality, religion or simply what it is to be human, and draw from them a significant enrichment of our knowledge. Yet we must not forget that all these analyses implicitly presuppose the reality of the Absolute Being and also the reality of being human, that is, of being a creature. If we do not set out from such 'realist' presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.[32]

Moral Sense and Common Sense

Given a special interest of Karol Wojtyla in moral philosophy, let us ask him a question: is there any connection between moral sense and common sense in his philosophy? Answering this question is focused on Wojtyla's phenomenological account of moral experience, in order to show its realistic foundation and its end which tends to be reinforced by metaphysics.[33]

What is human experience? According to Wojtyla, human experience can be explained by its two constitutive elements: a sense of reality and a sense of knowing. The sense of reality is "a basic orientation that grasps the fact that something exists with an existence that is real and objectively independent of the cognizing subject and the subject's cognitive

[31] Rocco Buttiglione, "The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla and St. Thomas Aquinas."

[32] John Paul II, *Memory and Identity: Personal Reflections* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 13. See also Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 70: "At this point phenomenology seems to infringe boldly upon metaphysics, and it is here that its reliance upon metaphysics is most needed; for phenomena themselves can visualize a thing clearly enough, but they are incapable of a sufficient explanation of themselves."

[33] In my further analysis of Wojtyla's personalism, I am greatly indebted to the article by Deborah Savage: "The Centrality of Lived Experience in Wojtyla's Account of the Person," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* LXI:4 (2013), 19–51.

act, while at the same time existing as the object of that act."[34] The sense of knowing, in turn, is "a sense made possible by the first; it is because the subject experiences a 'sense of reality' that he also experiences a 'sense of knowing.' This second sense is the result of the subject coming into contact with what exists; it manifests itself as a tendency toward that which really and objectively exists . . . as true."[35]

Wojtyla claims that, while considering experience as consisted of these two senses, we can define the nature of cognition and provide a further explanation of the sense of reality, which must be seen as transcendent in relation to cognition. This must be so since, if reality and cognition were identical, the tendency of the intellect to seek the truth would be unintelligible. Cognition goes beyond itself because "it is realized not through the truth of its own act . . . but through the truth of a transcendent object—something that exists with a real and objective existence independently of the act of knowing."[36]

Is it this way that morality is cognized too? Yes, it is. For Wojtyla, morality is a part of reality which has its own intelligible content, because it is transcendent to the act of cognition and given in the experience of human decision-making. The experience of deciding exercises a formative influence on the potentiality of the human intellect. This influence is always accompanied by a certain primordial understanding that is broadened and deepened with consecutive experiences of the same moral acts (decisions). The disposition to truth that is essential for intellectual cognition is gradually transformed into a habit of understanding that is also grounded in experience. Wojtyla maintains that, unless this is allowed, there is no way to sustain the realism of ethics.[37]

Is the experience of morality accompanied only by understanding? No, it is not. It is natural that, when experienced, decision-making appeals not only to intellect, but also to emotions as much as it evokes them by virtue of the moral good or evil it contains. Thus, morality can be accompanied either by joy and spiritual contentment, when contains the moral good, or by despair and sorrow, when contains the moral evil. For Wojtyla, our feelings are or can be indicators of the moral content of our decisions; they bear witness to the maturity of our own personhood and humanity;

[34] Id., 38.
[35] Id.
[36] Id., 38–39.
[37] Id., 39.

they are the way through which the reality of morality manifests itself to us.[38] But, though the experience of morality is accompanied by emotions, Wojtyla claims that we apprehend the specific moral good or evil, contained in decisions, not through them, but through understanding. The specific moral aspect of experience cannot be felt unless at the same time being understood.[39]

Now then, is there any connection between moral sense and common sense? The answer cannot be other than positive. If reality includes external and internal objects of experience, common sense must be a cognitive habit which not only pursues the apprehension of the outer world, but also strives to apprehend the inner reality of man. For Wojtyla, then, moral sense is nothing less than the common sense of morality. Consequently, as a component of common sense, moral sense is an integral part of metaphysics and makes the latter an indispensable element of moral life which conditions the understanding of human being in general and the full understanding of a man in particular. For, by metaphysics, the man can be provided with the understanding of human nature which he or she does not choose, but which qualifies his or her personal development in the area of knowing, acting, and producing. Only when based on the metaphysical interpretation of man, the phenomenological insight into the moral experience of a human person can enjoy its special status in the personalism of St. John Paul II.[40]

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[38] Id.

[39] Id., 39–40.

[40] Cf. Douglas Flippen, "Was John Paul II a Thomist or a Phenomenologist?," *Faith & Reason* 31:1 (Spring 2006), 65–106. Flippen provides several particularly interesting quotations; for example: "Reflecting on Wojtyla's anthropology, we can describe it as an existential personalism, which is metaphysically explained and phenomenologically described. By consciously using these two philosophical disciplines, Wojtyla sheds a new light on man. He enriches St. Thomas Aquinas' classical philosophy of man by availing himself of the contemporary phenomenological method." (Andrew Woznicki, *A Christian Humanism: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism* (New Britain, Ct.: Mariel Publications, 1980), 59). "Personally, I believe Wojtyla was trying to disclose the basis in concrete lived experience for theoretical—and especially for metaphysical—ethical considerations, and he found the phenomenological method particularly suited to this end. His aim was not to replace metaphysics with phenomenology, but to supplement metaphysical refection with phenomenological description as a way of gaining access to the processes of knowing and acting. I do not believe Wojtyla ever rejected the primary and fundamental role of the realistic philosophy of being in anthropology and ethics, but he did see phenomenology as a useful tool for describing the experiential base, and he tended to view phenomenological language as more communicative than scholastic terminology." (Stefan Swieżawski, "Karol Wojtyla at the

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Already it is more than a dozen years that I teach metaphysics at a diocesan seminary. My teaching experience shows that today there are no such seminarians as Karol Wojtyla, who on their own are able to discover the importance of metaphysics. Today, the seminary professor has to persuade his students about the value of metaphysics, because these feel no interest in learning it. To be persuasive, the seminary professor must know how to answer questions like: What's a universal value of metaphysics?, or: Why is metaphysics needed for every man? In my opinion, effective answers to these questions are included in the common sense personalism of St. John Paul II. Following the Pope's philosophy, we arrive at understanding that, although not all can be professors of metaphysics, metaphysics is needed by all, because, as moral beings, we all need to make choices and decisions. And since decision-making involves the understanding of ourselves and our world, nothing is more essential for this understanding than metaphysics and its common sense approach to reality.

THE COMMON SENSE PERSONALISM OF ST. JOHN PAUL II (KAROL WOJTYLA)

SUMMARY

The article aims at showing that the philosophical personalism of Pope John Paul II (Karol Wojtyla) stems from the common sense approach to reality. First, it presents Karol Wojtyla as a framer of the Lublin Philosophical School, to which he was affiliated for 24 years before being elected Pope John Paul II; it shows Wojtyla's role in establishing this original philosophical School by his contribution to its endorsement of Thomism, its way of doing philosophy, and its classically understood personalism. Secondly, it identifies a purpose of Woj-

Catholic University of Lublin," in Karol Wojtyla, *Person and Community*, xiv.). "Wojtyla's method consists of two steps: phenomenological description and metaphysical synthesis. Phenomenology is useful as a starting point for anthropology and ethics, Wojtyla holds, because of its ability to discover and describe many aspects of the human phenomenon which otherwise would be unknown to a metaphysician. As we saw, however, in *The Acting Person's* analyses . . . any phenomenological description is in need of a synthesis, since it considers the human person under many aspects. Such a synthesis can be obtained only through a metaphysical analysis which is able to describe the ultimate roots of all the phenomenological aspects of the human phenomenon." (Jaroslaw Kupczak, O.P, *Destined For Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla / John Paul II* (Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 2000), 146–147).

tyla's use of the phenomenological method in his personalism and reconstructs Wojtyla's possible answer to the question whether there is a link between moral sense and common sense in human experience.

KEYWORDS: John Paul II, Karol Wojtyla, personalism, common sense, Lublin Philosophical School, Thomism, metaphysics, phenomenology.